Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
Codex 485 (213) of the University Library of Erlangen contains an anonymous commentary, by questions, on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle commencing on fol. 47r and ending on fol. 80v. In 1930, M. Grabmann called attention to this commentary as one of the sources of the thesis that God cannot be the immediate source of human happiness — a thesis condemned in 1277 by Stephen Tempier along with 218 other ‘heretical’ doctrines. Professor Gaines Post of the University of Wisconsin had a photostatic copy made of the manuscript in question and Miss N. Koskenlinna, a former student of his, performed the painful task of its transliteration. The object of this article is the description and analysis of this unpublished, late thirteenthcentury exposition of the moral philosophy of Aristotle.
1 Incipit : ‘Sicut dicit Philosophus primo Politicorum, in animali est reperire duplicem principatum …’ Explicit: ‘… et appetitus vel etiam intellectus ut dictum est.’ See Fischer, H., Die lateinischen Pergamenthandschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Erlangen (Erlangen 1928) 252–54. Codex 485(213) of the University Library of Erlangen also contains both of the two known works of Boethius of Dacia, the De summo bono and the De sompniis, several of the commentaries of Martinus of Dacia, two anonymous commentaries on the De caelo and the De generacione, and two minor works of Thomas Aquinas and of Giles of Rome.Google Scholar
2 Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung (Sb. Akad. Munich 1931, Heft 2) 30–37, 51–55.Google Scholar
3 Fol. 52ra. Google Scholar
4 Fischer, , Die lateinischen Pergamenthandschriften 252 254. Cf. Grabmann, Der lateinische Averroismus 51–52.Google Scholar
5 Denifle, H. and Chatelain, E., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis 1 (Paris 1889) 543ff. proposition No. 22; Mandonnet, P., Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII a siècle, 2nd ed. (Louvain 1911) 2.188, proposition No. 173.Google Scholar
6 Gauthier, R. A., ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque,’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 22–23(1947–1948)187–336. The Commentary of Giles of Orleans (MS Paris Bibl. Nat, lat. 16089), he dates from the last years of the thirteenth, or the early years of the fourteenth century, because he thinks there is in it an ‘allusion’ to a doctrine of Godfrey of Fontaines on the problem of the classification of the virtue of justice, defended by Godfrey in his Questiones quodlibetales III and XIV, dating from 1286 and 1297 respectively. The commentary contained in MS Vat. Lat. 832 and 2172, he dates from around 1290 because he finds its author posing a problem in the manner of Henry of Ghent, making an allusion to a notion of the same doctor, and this time also because there is in the commentary an express reference to the De regimine principum of Giles of Rome. The commentary contained in MS Vat. lat. 2173 (in which there is a reference to the condemnation of 1277), Gauthier places after 1304, because he is persuaded that its compiler made use of Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet XV, which dates from 1303–1304. Finally, the commentary in MS Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14698, Gauthier dates from only a few years after 1277, this time largely because he finds its author moderate in tone, and anxious to avoid burning issues. Needless to say, the argument from allusion does not constitute a sufficiently adequate basis for the dating of the commentaries in question. The direct reference to the De regimine would undoubtedly have been conclusive, had the dating of this work itself been beyond doubt. But this is not the case, as Gauthier himself admits. The dating of the De regimine from 1277–1279 is clearly conjectural and can offer, therefore, no firm basis for the dating of the commentary in question.Google Scholar
7 See Chartularium Univ. Paris. 1 (Paris 1889) 609; ibid. 553. proposition No. 170. From here on, the Articles of 1277 will be referred to simply by their numbers in the editions of Denifle and Mandonnet; the first number will refer to the edition of Mandonnet in the second volume of his Siger de Brabant, the second number in parenthesis to that of Denifle and Chatelain in the Chartularium. Google Scholar
8 Gauthier, , op. cit . 334ff.Google Scholar
9 ‘ A propos de la date de certains commentaires sur l’Éthique,’ RTAM 17 (1950) 127–133; cf. Lottin, O. ‘St. Thomas d'Aquin à la faculté des arts de Paris aux approches de 1277,’ RTAM 16 (1949) 292–313. See also the valuable chronological table of materials in Lottin's Psychologie et morale aux xii e et xiiie siècles (Louvain 1942–1949) III-II 722–735. Google Scholar
10 RTAM 16 (1949) 292–313.Google Scholar
11 Ibid. 307ff. For the dating of St. Thomas’ commentary see Verbeke, A., ‘La date du commentaire de saint Thomas sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque,’ RTAM 18 (1951) 66–105. Gauthier convincingly argues that Thomas’ Ethics commentary must be dated from 1270–1271.Google Scholar
12 Lottin, RTAM 17 (1950) 129. Google Scholar
13 RTAM 16.297. Google Scholar
14 Compare for example St. Thomas in Sum. Theol. la. qu. 81. art. 3, ad 2. with my commentator on fol. 47r, col. 1 : ‘Sicut dicit Philosophus primo Politicorum; in animali est reperire duplicem principatum, scilicet despoticum et civilem sive regalem. Anima autem principatur corpori principatu despotico. Intellectus autem appetitui principatur principatu regali et civili.’ My commentator then proceeds to define ‘principatus despoticus’ and ‘principatus regalis vel civilis,’ and continuing, he asserts that, whereas every member of the body which is moved by voluntary movement (‘ut pes et manus’) is under the absolute control of the soul, and cannot resist its sway (‘moventur ad imperium anime et non resistunt eius imperio’), the sensitive appetite is ruled by reason with a power that is non-despotic in nature. For, seeing that the sensitive appetite is moved not only by the cogitative power, but also by the senses, sensitive appetite has something of its own by which it can resist reason. All this is so similar to St. Thomas’ elaboration on the subject that it makes it extremely difficult to assert that my commentator was writing independently. One might further compare St. Thomas in Sum. Theol. la. 2ae. qu. 3. art. 4 with the passage on fol. 52ra; ‘Minor patet quia voluntas duplica fertur in finem, vel absentem desiderando vel presentem delectando in ipso. Modo desiderium voluntatis non est adeptio finis, sed est motus et inclinacio in eum. Iterum delectatio in fine … non est adeptio eius; immo adeptio fit per aliquid aliud.’ Following this, my commentator illustrates his point, as does St. Thomas, by citing the instance of the covetous man; if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the man desirous of wealth would have it from the very moment he wished for it. In the same place my commentator elaborates precisely as does St. Thomas (ibid. ad 2) that from the very fact that if happiness were an act of the will, it would have to have been its first object, we must conclude that happiness does not pertain to the operation of the will as to its act; ‘quia actus non est obiectum potentie, sicut visio non est obiectum visus.’ Finally, one might compare St. Thomas in Sum. Theol. la. 2ae. qu. 3, art 2, with my commentator on fol. 51rb: ‘Dicendum quod felicitas hominis est eius operacio. Cuius racio est quia felicitas hominis est ultima eius perfectio. Unumquodque autem tantum perfectum est quantum est in actu.’ Google Scholar
15 Leonine ed. (Rome 1884) 2.96. For the dating of Thomas’ commentary on the Physics see Grabmann, M., ‘Die Aristoteleskommentare des hl. Thomos von Aquin’ in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (Munich 1926) I 274; cf. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas υ. Aquin, 2nd ed. (1931)262; 3rd ed. (1949)275.Google Scholar
16 Lottili, RTAM 16.312–313. Google Scholar
17 Fernand van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabanl d'après ses oeuvres inédites (Louvain 1942) II 697. Google Scholar
18 Politics 1.5.1254b2.Google Scholar
19 Fol. 47ra. Google Scholar
20 Fol. 48va. Google Scholar
21 Fol. 48vab. Google Scholar
22 Fol. 48vb - fol. 49ra. Google Scholar
23 Nic. Eth. 1014 and 1ff.Google Scholar
24 Fol. 47vb; fol. 49ra. Google Scholar
25 Fol. 49ra. ‘Omnis peccans est ignorane.’ Ignorance, however, does not excuse wrong-doing, seeing that often man is the cause of that ignorance. Google Scholar
26 Fol. 49rb Google Scholar
27 Fol. 50vb - fol. 51rb. Google Scholar
28 Fol. 49rb - fol. 49vb; fol. 50vb. Google Scholar
29 Fol. 50vab. Google Scholar
30 In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio , ed. Pirotta, I.10.129, I.16.202, 10.13.2136; Sum. Theol. la. 2ae. qu. 3, art. 2 ad 4; cf. Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” ‘ 250–253, 253–258.Google Scholar
31 Gauthier, , op. cit . 279 note 1.Google Scholar
32 Fol. 51.va Google Scholar
33 Fol. 50vb. Google Scholar
34 Fol. 51va. Google Scholar
35 Proposition 172(176). Google Scholar
36 Nicomachean Ethics 1100 and 10ff.; 1115a 26–7; Joachim, H. H. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Rees, D. A. (Oxford 1951) 60; cf. Steward, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford 1892) I 138–151.Google Scholar
37 Fol. 49vb - fol. 50ra; cf. fol. 50rab - fol. 50va. Google Scholar
38 Fol. 50vb. Google Scholar
32 Nic. Eth. 1122b 26ff. 1178a 28ff; 1099a 31–1099b 9; cf. Politics, 3.3. 1278a 20; οὐ γὰϱ oἷóv τ’ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῇς ἀϱετῇς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἤ θητιϰόν. Google Scholar
40 Fol. 61ν, vol. 1. This solution coincides with that offered by St. Thomas; In Eth. ed. Pirotta, 1.5.67; 6.11.1288. The commentators whose work is discussed by Gauthier offer the same answer; Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes”’ 299. Google Scholar
41 Fol. 50vb. Google Scholar
42 Fol. 51rb - fol. 51va. Google Scholar
48 Fol. 49vb; fol. 47va; fol. 50va; fol. 51rb; fol. 51va; fol. 52ra; fol. 62vb; fol. 72rb. For the vision of truth as the ultimate end of human life in Aristotle see Joachim, , Aristotle 290ff. For the same ideal in the Neoplatonists, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas see Wittmann, , Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin, 40ff. 64f. 304ff.Google Scholar
44 Fol. 76va. Google Scholar
46 Steenberghen, Van, Siger de Brabant II 605.Google Scholar
46 Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” ‘ 289 note 4. Google Scholar
47 Ibid. 289–290.Google Scholar
48 Propositions 8 (211) and 9 (36). Google Scholar
49 St. Thomas, on the other hand, while granting that perfect happiness can only be experienced in the intellectual vision in which God is manifest, also claims that man cannot in this life come to know God secundum se ipsum. But the apprehension of God in his essence is not the only avenue to Him. There is for man while he is still in the state of a wayfarer, a surer way, the way of charity. Without surrendering the Aristotelian notion of the priority of the intellect over the will, St. Thomas concurs with the theologians in making the attainment of God, in this life at least, an act of the will, rather than an act of the intellect. The beatific vision of God is reserved for man in the life to come. There is more than a discrepancy of words in these two views. In both, of course, happiness is conceived as a union of the creature with his Creator. But the one reserves this experience to an elite which, in accordance with the Greek emphasis, is an elite of mind. It is only the philosopher who is capable of attaining perfect happiness. The rest of mankind must remain content with a life on a lower level and with the happiness to be found in the life of good action. The other makes no such reservations. If the union of man with God is effected in this life by an act of the will, i.e. by love, then God, and consequently supreme happiness, is attainable by all the faithful. (See Sum. Theol. la. 2ae. qu. 8; la. qu. 12, art. 12; la. 2ae. qu. 5, art. 3; la. qu. 82, art. 3; la. 2ae. qu. 3, art. 4; Contra Gentiles 1.4.)Google Scholar
50 Fol. 52rb; fol. 52va. Google Scholar
51 Fol. 52rb. Google Scholar
52 Loc. cit. Google Scholar
53 Nic. Eth. 1099b8–14.Google Scholar
54 In Eth. , ed. Pirotta, 1.14.168. cf. St. Thomas, ibid. 1.14.167. St. Thomas (like Eustratius) interprets Aristotle to mean that while happiness is a gift of God (‘sit a Deo principaliter’), in its reception man has a role to play (‘tamen ad hoc homo aliquid cooperatur’). Ibid. 169. For Gauthier's interpretation of St. Thomas in this connection, see ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” ‘ 248–249. Cf. Grabmann, Der lateinische Averroismas 63–64; see also Grabmann, op. cit. 64–71 for the position of other theologians as regards the matter of the source of human happiness.Google Scholar
55 Fol. 52rb. Google Scholar
56 Loc. cit. The position of the anonymous commentator in the Erfurt MS Amplon. F. 13 is the same. It is impossible to conceive of God as the immediate cause of happiness because happiness is something new, and nothing that is new can proceed directly from God; fol. 89rb. Giles of Orleans and the commentator in MS Vat. lat. 832 and 2172 argue in a similar fashion. See Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” ‘ 273, note 2.Google Scholar
57 Cf. Mandonnet, , Siger de Brabant 1.160-168; Van, F. Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant 2.608–615.Google Scholar
58 Gauthier, , op. cit. 273 note 2.Google Scholar
59 Giles of Rome, De erroribus philosophorum, ed. Mandonnet (Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant II) 5, No. 8; 9, No. 10; 12, Nos. 6, 7, 8; 14, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7. Google Scholar
60 De potentia 3.4 (Opera 13.46).Google Scholar
61 Propositions 173 (22) and 36 (67). Google Scholar
62 Proposition 22 (48); cf. propositions 16 (190), 18 (52), 20 (53), 21 (39), 23 (50), 24 (51), 28 (44), 33 (64), 34 (58), 39 (5), 67 (54), 68 (43). Google Scholar
63 Proposition 202 (180). Google Scholar
64 Fol. 5rb. Google Scholar
65 Fol. 68rab. Google Scholar
66 Cf. Gauthier,’ Trois commentaires “averroïstes”,’ 275–278. Google Scholar
67 Lottin, O., ‘Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des Arts de Paris, aux approches de 1250,’ Revue néo-scol. de philos. 42 (1939)182–212.Google Scholar
68 Fol. 52rb. Google Scholar
69 Fol. 52vb. Google Scholar
70 Fol. 53vb; cf. fol. 53rab. Google Scholar
71 Fol. 54rb. Google Scholar
72 Fol. 63vb; cf. fol. 63rb. Google Scholar
73 The text is taken from Gauthier,’ Trois commentaires “averroïstes”,’ 298 note 2.Google Scholar
74 Fol. 59ra.Google Scholar
75 Nic. Eth. 1104a25f.; 1119a5ff.Google Scholar
76 Ibid. 2.6; 6.8. Cf. my commentator fol. 53va; fol. 54rb; fol. 69rab; fol. 69vb; fol. 70ra.Google Scholar
77 St. Thomas, in Eth., ed. Pirotta, 2.2.263; for Siger of Brabant see Stegmüller, F., ‘Neugefundene Questionen des Siger von Brabant,’ RTAM 3 (1931) 175.Google Scholar
78 Fol. 59vb. Google Scholar
79 Fol. 59rb - fol. 59va. Google Scholar
80 Fol. 59vb. On fol. 73va my commentator makes the statement that if continence is taken to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure, then continence is a virtue superior to temperance just as virginity is superior to chastity. This is an important admission not readily reconcilable with what he says when he discusses temperance and its opposites. One wonders if this admission is not a mechanical reproduction of St. Thomas’ distinction; Sum. Theol. 2a. 2ae. qu. 155 art. 1. Google Scholar
81 Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes ‘ 298 note 1. Google Scholar
82 Fol. 59vb. Google Scholar
83 Proposition 210 (169). Google Scholar
84 Proposition 208 (168). Google Scholar
85 Nic. Eth. 1119b5ff.; cf. fol. 72ra, fol. 47vr, fol. 73vab, fol. 77vb, fol. 78ra.Google Scholar
86 Fol. 73rab, fol. 73vab, fol. 72ra, fol. 72vb; cf. Nic. Eth. 1128b34ff; 1151b33–1152a18. Google Scholar
87 Propositions 213 (178) and 174 (15). Google Scholar
88 Nic. Eth. 1115a26–27.Google Scholar
89 Fol. 55rab. Google Scholar
90 Nic. Eth. 1117b5ff.Google Scholar
91 Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” ‘ 287, note 2. Google Scholar
92 Nic. Eth. 1123a33–1125a35; cf. Joachim, op. cit. 124ff.Google Scholar
93 Nic. Eth. 1123b5ff.Google Scholar
94 St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant. 16.10 (PL 183.853). This reference to St. Bernard is made by Albert in his unpublished commentary on the Ethics. The text is given by Gauthier, op. cit. 304 note 2. cf. also Albert in his published commentary In Eth. 4.2.2 (ed. Borgnet 7.297). Here Albert attributes the Augustinian conception of humility as the sense of one's emptiness to the ‘Stoics,’ i.e., to Socrates and Plato. Google Scholar
95 Albert, , In Eth . 4.2.2. (ed. Borgnet 7.297); cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 2a. 2ae. qu. 161, art. 2; art. 1 and art. 6.Google Scholar
96 Stegmüller, , op. cit. 172. Giles of Orleans and the anonymous in MS. Vat. lat. 2172 concur with my commentator; see Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes”,’ 321–328.Google Scholar
97 Fol. 62ra - fol. 62rb; cf. fol. 63ra. Google Scholar
98 Fol. 62ra; cf. fol. 62va. Google Scholar
99 For a correct use of the term philotimia, see St. Thomas, in Eth. ed. Pirotta 2.9.346, 4.12.794. Google Scholar
100 Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, (Rome 1607) 122. Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires ‘averroistes ‘,’ 324 note 1. Google Scholar
101 Gauthier, , op. cit . 333 note 4.Google Scholar
102 Politics 3.15 -16, 1286a7ff.; cf. Nic. Eth. 5.6, 1134a35; « διò οὐϰ ἐῶμεν ἄϱχειν ἄνθϱωπον, άλλὰ τòν νόμον, ὄτι ἑαυτῶ τοῦτο ποιεΙ ϰαΙ γίνεται τύϱαννος. » St. Thomas in his commentary on the Politics (ed. Spiazzi, R. M. [Turin-Rome 1951] 3.1.14, pp. 174–175) interprets Aristotle as saying that the state ought to be ruled by man through laws and that man should supersede the law only in ‘illis que non possunt per legem terminari vel simpliciter, vel non bene.’ The commentator in MS Vat. lat. 832 decides that it is better for a civitas to be ruled by good laws than by a good man (fol. 31vb). Giles of Rome in his De regimine principum, takes Aristotle's statement (Politics 3.16.9, 1287b5): ‘Even granting that a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law (τῶν ϰατὰ γράμματα νόμων), still he is not so safe as the law of social custom (ἒθη),’ to mean that if one considers natural law, it is better for such law to be supreme, but if one considers written law, then it is better for the state to be ruled by a good prince. See Molenaer, S. P. Li livres du gouvernement des Rois: A xiiith century French Version of Egidio Colonna's Treatise, De regimine principum (New York 1899) 352ff. From Pierre Dubois we gather that Siger of Brabant discussed the same question, concluding, it would seem, that it is better for a people to have good laws than good leaders: ‘Ad hec facit id quod super Polytica Aristotelis determinavit precellentissimus doctor philosophiae, cujus eram tunc discipulus, magister Segerus de Brabantia, videlicet quod: Longe melius est civitatem regi legibus rectis quam probis viris, quoniam non sunt nec esse possunt aliqui viri tam probi quin possibile sit eos corrumpi passionibus ire, odii, amoris, timoris, concupiscencie.’ De recuperatione Terre Sancte, ed. Langlois, 121–122. The text is taken from Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant I 141.Google Scholar
103 Fol. 67rb - fol. 67va. Google Scholar
104 Der lateinische Averroismus 35ff.Google Scholar
105 De unitate intellectus . ed. Keeler, 122 and 123, 78–80. See also one of St. Thomas’ sermons, the text of which is cited by Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant I 109 note 1. For the prologue to the act of 1277, see Mandonnet, . op. cit. II 175–176. For a discussion of the matter of double truth in Siger, see Van, F. Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant II 677ff.; cf. J. P. Müller, ‘Philosophie et foi chez Siger de Brabant, la theorie de la double vérité,’ Studia Anselmiana 7–8 (1938) 35–50.Google Scholar
106 For such assertions in the Ethics commentaries in question see Grabmann, , op. cit . 50, 54f., 60. See also Gauthier, op. cit. 273 note 2; 276 note 1; 279 note 1; 291 note 1; 298, notes 1 and 2. The Erlangen commentator uses the formula only once (fol. 52rb); ‘Unde immediate a deo non est, quia felicitas est aliquid novum secundum viam Philosophi, non tamen secundum veritatem.’Google Scholar
107 Cf. Gauthier, , op. cit. 275ff.Google Scholar
108 Cf. ibid. 283ff. Google Scholar
109 Cf. ibid. 288ff. Google Scholar
110 Ibid. 334ff.Google Scholar
111 Mandonnet, , Siger de Brabant I 220.Google Scholar
112 Proposition 181 (174). Google Scholar
113 Van, F. Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant II 680.Google Scholar
114 Op. cit . 495 note 1.Google Scholar
115 Op. cit. 490-497. Mandonnet is more liberal in his interpretation of the intentions of Thomas: ‘Pour Thomas d'Aquin,’ he writes, ‘l'averroïsme est … constitué par certaines erreurs d'Aristote maintenues par Averroès, mais surtout par celles qui sont propres à ce dernier, et, avant tout, par la théorie de l'unité de l'intelligence humaine.’ Siger de Brabant I 158.Google Scholar
116 Mandonnet, , Siger de Brabant I 219. cf. 152, 144–145, 153–156, 219–220.Google Scholar
117 Der lateinische Averroismus 4.Google Scholar
118 Gorce, M. M. in DHGE (Paris 1931) 5.1032, 1056–57, 1058.Google Scholar
119 Dante et la philosophie (Paris 1939) 213–214.Google Scholar
120 De unitate intellectus , ed. Keeler, 117.75.Google Scholar
121 St. Bonaventura, In Hexaemeron, Collatio VI, ed. Quaracchi, 5.360–361. Nardi, B. quotes an author who claims that if one teaches the doctrine of creation ab aeterno, one should also teach the doctrine of the unicity of the human intellect; otherwise, ‘infiniti homines processissent et infiniti anime rationales iam essent actu.’ Nardi, B., Opuscoli e testi filosofici II A. 68, note 2.Google Scholar
122 Gauthier, , op. cit. 245.Google Scholar