Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
William of Auvergne became a master of theology in the University of Paris in 1223 and was appointed bishop of Paris by Gregory IX in 1228. William governed the church of Paris until his death in 1249, while continuing to write the works which constitute his immense Magisterium divinale et sapientiale. Despite the fact that he was the first of the thirteenth-century theologians to appreciate the value of the Aristotelian philosophy that poured into the Latin West during the last half of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century, his writings have not received the scholarly attention they deserve. Étienne Gilson has sketched well the impact of the influx of Greek and Arabian philosophical works into the Christian West:
Up to the last years of the twelfth century, when the Christian world unexpectedly discovered the existence of non-Christian interpretations of the universe, Christian theology never had to concern itself with the fact that a non-Christian interpretation of the world as a whole, including man and his destiny, was still an open possibility.
1 It was only through the studies of Josef Kramp early in this century that William's writings were recognized to be parts of the one Magisterium divinale et sapientiale; see Kramp, J., “Des Wilhelm von Auvergne ‘Magisterium Divinale’,” Gregorianum 1 (1920): 538–613; 2 (1921): 42–103 and 174–195, for this point and for the dating of the parts.Google Scholar
2 Amato Masnovo's three volumes, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tommaso d'Aquino, 2d ed. (Milan, 1946), represent the only attempt to study the whole of William's philosophy. Steven Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton, 1983) is a welcome indication of new interest in William's contribution to the beginnings of scholastic philosophy and theology. For a bibliography of studies on William, see William of Auvergne: The Immortality of the Soul, trans. with introduction and notes by Teske, R. J. (Milwaukee, 1991).Google Scholar
3 Étienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), 11.Google Scholar
4 For William's use of this phrase, see Roland de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des XIIe–XIIIe siècles (Paris, 1934), 30, where de Vaux argues that “la philosophie arabe se résumait pour notre auteur en Avicenne. C'est donc Avicenne encore que nous allons retrouver derrière les sequaces Aristotelis.” De Vaux lists eleven metaphysical and psychological errors that William found in Avicenna (ibid., 37).Google Scholar
5 Besides de Vaux, Notes et textes, see Kramp, “Magisterium divinale,” 578.Google Scholar
6 Masnovo does not discuss William's arguments against the Manichees. Some of the anti-Manichaean arguments are treated tangentially in Gilson's “La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 15 (1946): 55–91.Google Scholar
7 See Bruno Switalski, William of Auvergne. De Trinitate. An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction (Toronto, 1976), 7. References to the De trinitate are by chapter and page of this edition. For an English translation with the pagination of the Latin edition indicated, see William of Auvergne. The Trinity or First Principle, trans. Teske, R. and Wade, F. (Milwaukee, 1987).Google Scholar
8 Switalski indicates two allusions to the Cathars. The first reference, in De trinitate chap. 4 (p. 34), to “imperiti intellectu” seems too general. The second, in De trinitate chap. 44 (p. 230) is clear: “Qui autem duos Deos et duo principia posuerunt….”Google Scholar
9 See Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis Opera Omnia, ed. Hotot, F. 2 vols., with Supplementum, ed. Le Feron, B. (Orléans-Paris, 1674; rpt. Frankfurt am Main, 1963), for William's works other than the De trinitate. Full references to the De universo, the second part of the Magisterium divinale et sapientiale, are to the part, chapter, page, column, and section of the first volume of this edition. I have simplified the punctuation of this edition in citing the Latin text.Google Scholar
10 See De universo Ia Iae, chap. 2, 594aH-bE.Google Scholar
11 Ibid., 594bE.Google Scholar
12 Ibid. See De universo IIa Iae, chap. 2, 686aG-687aC, for William's distinction between eternity, perpetuity, and time.Google Scholar
13 In the second chapter he sets out to show that the universe is one and has a single author. He promises to show this, “per vias probationum, non quemadmodum in primae philosophiae prima parte declaratur, sed probationibus facilibus, et pene vulgaribus …” (De universo Ia Iae, chap. 2, 594aH). Later, at the beginning of chapter 6, he adds, referring to the arguments in chapters 3 through 5, “Quoniam autem rationes, quas usque huc tibi adduxi, metaphysicae sunt atque sapientiales: satisfaciam tibi consequenter de promisso, et adducam tibi rationes vulgares, et intellectu facillimas, per quas declarabitur tibi erroris istius non tam impossibilitas, quam etiam ridiculositas” (ibid., chap. 6, 597bB). The phrase “in primae philosophiae prima parte,” according to Gilson, refers to William's De trinitate. See Gilson, “La notion d'existence,” 81. It would seem strange, however, for William to refer to his De trinitate as “the first part of first philosophy,” since that would imply that the whole Magisterium divinale et sapientiale was “first philosophy,” which it clearly is not, though the beginning chapters of the De trinitate could aptly be so described. I have elsewhere argued that William is referring to the first book of Avicenna's De philosophia prima, which contains the discussion of necessary and possible being in chapters 6 and 7. See Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina I-IV, ed. Simone Van Reit (Louvain-Leiden, 1977), 43–55.Google Scholar
14 William's silence with regard to Augustine's anti-Manichaean arguments is all the more striking in view of his obvious familiarity with the works of the bishop of Hippo, as the De trinitate reveals. See the index of Switalski's edition of the De trinitate, as well as the index of the English translation. René Nelli's contention that the originality of the Cathars of Languedoc in the years 1220 to 1230 lay in their use of Augustine to defend their dualism may offer an explanation of William's almost total reliance upon Avicenna. See René Nelli, La philosophie du catharisme: Le dualisme radical au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1978), 66.Google Scholar
15 Mani was born in 216 and founded his own religion after receiving a revelation at the age of twenty-four. Within fifty years of his death (276 or 270), Manichaeism had spread widely in the Roman Empire. By 373 Augustine became a Hearer in the Manichaean sect.Google Scholar
16 This claim on William's part probably indicates that the Manichaeism that he is confronting is simply different on this point from the Manichaeism that Augustine knew. The question of the connection between the earlier forms of Manichaeism that Augustine confronted and the Manichaeism of the thirteenth century is not clear. See Hamilton, “The Albigensian Crusade,” in Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades (900–1300) (London, 1979), 4.Google Scholar
17 Ibid., 5. The Cathars, of course, rejected the Genesis account of creation, along with the rest of the Pentateuch. See ibid., 5–10, for a succinct account of Cathar beliefs and practices.Google Scholar
18 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 3, 594bG.Google Scholar
19 Ibid.Google Scholar
20 I have followed Gilson in reading illo instead of illa, though the latter is found in the 1674 edition. See Gilson, “La notion d'existence,” 81.Google Scholar
21 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 3, 594bGH.Google Scholar
22 See Gilson, “La notion d'existence,” 81–84. Gilson says, “À première vue, on pourrait difficilement souhaiter une déclaration plus explicite en faveur de la distinction réelle d'essence et d'existence …” (p. 81). Gilson concedes that William “ait enseigné une distinction réelle d'essence et d'existence” (p. 83), but does not find that “dans le possible réalisé par sa cause, l’esse et l’essentia restent distinct de manière à former un composé proprement dit …” (pp. 83–84). In fact, he adds, “il suggère plutôt le contraire” (p. 84). The question as to the sense in which William held a real distinction between being and essence in creatures deserves further study; it is hard to see why Gilson denies a composition of essence and existence in the possible whose being is caused. After all, William is here speaking about something which is caused by its components, one of which is being (esse).Google Scholar
23 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 3, 594bH-595aA.Google Scholar
24 See De trinitate chap. 4 (Switalski, 26–31).Google Scholar
25 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 3, 595aA.Google Scholar
26 Ibid.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., 595aB.Google Scholar
28 Ibid., chap. 4, 595bA.Google Scholar
29 Ibid., 595bA-596aE.Google Scholar
30 Ibid., 596aE.Google Scholar
31 Ibid., 596aF.Google Scholar
32 Ibid.Google Scholar
33 Ibid., 596aH.Google Scholar
34 Ibid., 596bE.Google Scholar
35 Ibid.Google Scholar
36 Ibid., 596bF.Google Scholar
37 Ibid., chap 5, 596bG.Google Scholar
38 Ibid.Google Scholar
39 See below, n. 45, for the distinction between per se and per accidens causality.Google Scholar
40 See De universo Ia Iae, chap. 8, 601bB: “Jam autem destructa est infinitas causarum, et declaratus est status earum tibi per me in tractatu de primo principio….” Here William clearly refers to his De trinitate, which has the subtitle De primo principio; see De trinitate chap. 2 (Switalski, 21–23).Google Scholar
41 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 8, 601bC.Google Scholar
42 See De trinitate chap. 2 (Switalski, 21–23).Google Scholar
43 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 8, 601bD.Google Scholar
44 Ibid., chap. 9, 602aG.Google Scholar
45 The distinction between per se and per accidens causality is found in Aristotle; see Physics 255b23–28. Avicenna employed the distinction in Metaphysics VI, 2 Avicenna latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V–X, ed. Simone Van Reit (Louvain-Leiden, 1980), 301–2). Aquinas puts the distinction as follows: “Per se quidem est causa alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit effectum; unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa…. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius, si sit causa removens prohibens …” (Summa Theologiae la IIae, q. 85, a. 5.).Google Scholar
46 For these and other of William's examples, see De universo Ia Iae, chap. 9, 602aG-603aB.Google Scholar
47 Ibid., 603aB.Google Scholar
48 Though the arguments differ considerably, William may have at this point had in mind the dilemma that Nebridius presented to Augustine in refutation of the Manichaean account of the battle between God and the nation of darkness; see Augustine, , Confessiones VII, ii, 3: CCL XXVII, 93–94.Google Scholar
49 De universo Ia Iae, chap. 10, 603aC.Google Scholar
50 Ibid.Google Scholar
51 Ibid., 603aD. Something evil in this sense would be a per se cause of evil.Google Scholar
52 Ibid.Google Scholar
53 Ibid., 603bA.Google Scholar
54 Ibid., 603bC.Google Scholar
55 Ibid., 603bD.Google Scholar
56 Ibid., 604aE.Google Scholar
57 Nelli, , La philosophie du catharisme (as in n. 14 above), 73–74.Google Scholar
58 See Antoine Dondaine, Le Liber de duobus principiis (Rome, 1939); 2d. ed. by Christine Thouzellier (Paris, 1973). In her introduction, Thouzellier says the work was compiled between 1250 and 1276 but is indebted to previous sources from the 1230s. Kramp has given dates for the composition of the De universo as 1231–36. Hence, one might take the Liber de duobus principiis as representative of the sort of Catharist thought that William was battling.Google Scholar
59 See, for example, Le Liber de duobus principiis, ed. Dondaine, 81. “Aut unum tantum est principium principale aut plura uno. Si autem unum fuerit et non plura, ut aiunt imperiti, tunc bonum erit necessario sive malum. Malum vero non, quia ab ipso iam procederent tantum mala et non bona….”Google Scholar
60 De trinitate chap. 44 (Switalski, 230).Google Scholar
61 There may be traces of Avicennian influence earlier than William, but there is nothing earlier on the scale we find in William. Though Avicenna's influence is clearly found in the De immortalitate animae once attributed to Gundissalinus and supposedly plagiarized by William, the weight of scholarly opinion now ascribes that work to William. See my introduction to William of Auvergne: The Immortality of the Soul (as in n. 2 above).Google Scholar