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‘Swimming Upside Down in the Wrong Direction’ Plato's Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic Grounds
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 July 2017
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The reform of rhetoric is an integral part of the great program of moral reform undertaken by Plato, and the intensity with which he pursues the subject is a measure of the importance it assumed in his thought. This importance is only partly a result of the enormous and perverse influence wielded by rhetoric on politics and the ethics of the individual. The basic reason for Plato's hostility to sophistic rhetoric was that it took the side of appearance in the conflict between appearance and reality which lay behind much of the Socratic–Platonic philosophy. Rhetoric as it was developed by the great teachers of the late fifth century and exercised in the early fourth was concerned, not with knowledge, but with the appearance of knowledge. It did not care for truth, only for what was probable (εἰϰός) or persuasive (πιθανόν). ‘To seem’ (δοϰεĩν, ϕαíνεσθαı) rather than ‘to be’ (εἷναı) was its goal.
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- Research Article
- Information
- Traditio , Volume 32 , Issue S1: ΠAPAΔOΣIΣ: Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain , 1976 , pp. 11 - 29
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- Copyright © Fordham University Press
References
2 Not all βϱαχυλογία, however, is Socratic and capable of accomplishing the work of the έλεγχος. Both Protagoras and Gorgias are represented as boasting of their ability to speak at length or briefly, yet both are shown to be incompetent at managing the technique of question and answer. See Prot. 334E, 335B, and Gorg. 449C. Cf. Phaedr. 267A on the claims of both Tisias and Gorgias.Google Scholar
3 Plato's use of the words ϱήτωϱ, πολιτικὸς, and σοφιστής is not entirely consistent, but in general ϱήτωϱ refers to one who practices public speaking, especially in the Assembly, πολιτικὸς is often a synonym for ϱ'ήτωϱ and always indicates a man in public life, a statesman, while σοφιστής means one who teaches (for pay) and claims to impart the ability to speak, or what is often called άϱετή πολιτική, political excellence. Gorgias is called a ϱήτωϱ (Gorg. 449A6) which in his case merely implies that he teaches rhetoric, a meaning not generally attached to the word in Plato's time. In the present paper ϱήτωϱ refers to one who practices oratory, not one who teaches it. Plato's use of these and related terms is discussed by Wilcox, Stanley, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 53 (1942) 134 and Coulter, James and Brown, Malcolm, Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971) 414–15, note 16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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