^{page 105 note 1} A brief statement of the main theme of this study has appeared in The Modern Schoolman 25 (1948) 91–106, under the title, ‘The Inner Unity of the De Potentia.’ The original study on which the published versions are based, was accepted by the philosophy department of the Fordham University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 2} Coconnier, R. P., ‘Le vrai thomiste,’ Revue thomiste 1 (1893) 11.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 3} Santés Marialès, a 17th-century Venetian friar preacher who wrote Amplissimum artium scientiarumque omnium amphitheatrum: hoc est, de rebus universis celeberrimae Quaestiones disputatae (Bononiae 1658) cited by Mandonnet, P., ‘Chronologie des questions disputées de saint Thomas d’Aquin,’ Revue thomiste 23 (1918) 266.Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 4} Cf. Mandonnet, , Introduction to Quaestiones disputatae 1 (Paris 1925) 12; Gilbey, T., Introduction to L. Shapcote’s tr. of the De potentia Dei, On the Power of God 1 (London 1932) ix.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 5} Scheeben, M.-J., La dogmatique (tr. by Bélet, P., Paris 1877) 672, no. 1056, cited by Bouyges, M., ‘L’idée génératrice du De potentia de saint Thomas,’ Revue de philosophie 2 (1931) 120–121.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 6} Synave, P., ‘Le problème chronologique des questions disputées de saint Thomas,’ Revue thomiste 31 (1926) 155–156.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 7} Mandonnet, P., op. cit. (n. 3) 281–282.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 8} Glorieux, P., ‘Les questions disputées de S. Thomas et leur suite chronologique,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 4 (1932) 10–11, 14.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 9} Bouyges, , op. cit. 124.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 10} On the nature and historical background of the disputed question cf. Mandonnet, Introduction to Quaestiones disputatae 1, 1–9. Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei’ Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 11} Bouyges, , op. cit. 126–127, quotes Chossat, Marcel, ‘Dieu, sa nature selon les scolastiques,’ DThC 4, 1241–1242.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 12} Bouyges, , op. cit. 128–131, 247–256.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 13} Ibid. 250–251, 256–267. Father Bouyges thus analyzes the general plan that governs the choice and arrangement of the subject matter of the De potentia: To describe the origin of beings ab alio, he says, a Christian metaphysician cannot do better than to show first how God can be the principle of creation, that is, to show what power one can and must attribute to Him (q. 1). But in considering the divine power and the way in which God can be a principle, St. Thomas discovers in the light of Revelation a more ineffable divine manner of being a principle: namely, that by which the Father generates the consubstantial Son and thus appears, to a limited intelligence, to be endowed with a mysterious potentia generativa (q. 2). Up to this point the adversary cannot object: ab uno unum.—But other realities exist; their origin, too, must be explained: the Holy Spirit and, on a lower level, the world with its spiritual and corporeal beings. To understand these latter we must consider again the nature of that divine power which we studied at the beginning. The first effect of the divine power is creation (q. 3); and we may note in passing certain problems of biblical exegesis which arise in reference to the creation of matter (q. 4). The continued creative action is known as conservation (q. 5). And lastly, we must observe that the divine activity is not bound by the laws of created nature, but can act contrary to those laws and produce miracles (q. 6).—By way of transition from the study of the origin of the creature to a study of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity, we must establish the simplicity of the divine essence (q. 7). This is necessary in order to indicate the nature of the relations which unite the creature to God; to speak of the Holy Spirit correctly; and to show that the divine processions can differ from the emanation of creatures with no detriment to the divine simplicity. Then, finally, we may consider the dogma of the Trinity: the divine relations (q. 8); the Divine Persons (q. 9); and the procession of the Divine Persons (q. 10). ‘This general view is sufficient to show the procedure of the De potentia,’ Bouyges comments (259–260). ‘St. Thomas has succeeded with the maximum of coherence, but not without the hiatus that the reality imposed, in synthesizing the solutions of Christian metaphysics to this problem of the ens ab alio that emanationism believed it could solve by the thesis of a single emanation.’ Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 14} On the transition from the 12th to the 13th centuries and the problems which the influx of Latin translations of Arabian commentaries on Aristotle raised for Christian thinkers, cf. Pegis, A. C., Introduction to Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York 1945) 1, xxviii, xxxv-xxxix; Van Steenberghen, F., Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme (Louvain 1942) 388–389, 394–401; de Wulf, M., Histoire de la philosophie médiévale 1 (6th ed. Paris 1934) 185–192.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 15} See Gilson, E., ‘Pouquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 1 (1926) 5–127.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 16} See e.g. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei 1, 3, resp.; 3, 14, resp.; 9, 6, Sed contra; 9, 9, Sed contra (Marietti, ed. 1, Taurini-Romae 1931).Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 17} De pot. 3, 4, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 18} Ibid. 1, 1, 6; 3, 14, Sed contra 5; 3, 17, 2; 5, 5, 3; 9, 9, 1.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 19} Ibid. 3, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 20} Ibid. 2, 3, 10; 3, 15, 1; 3, 17, 1; 9, 9, 14; 10, 2, Sed contra 3.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 21} Ibid. 3, 4, resp. & 10; 7, 5, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 22} Ibid. 1, 5, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 23} Ibid. 3, 4, resp.; 5, 2, 1.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 24} Ibid. 1, 5, 15; 3, 8, resp.; 3, 10, resp.; 3, 16, 17; 5, 1, 5 & 14; 9, 1, ad 5; 9, 2, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 25} Ibid. 3, 10, ad 5; 5, 1, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 26} Ibid. 1, 5, resp. & 3; 3, 4, resp.; 3, 8, resp.; 3, 11, resp.; 5, 1, resp.; 6, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 27} (1) 2, 1, 11 (2) 2, 3, resp. (3) 3, 1, 5 (4) 3, 1, Sed contra (5) 3, 1, ad 7 (6) 3, 3, ad 2 (7) 3, 3, ad 5 (8) 3, 4, resp. (9) 3, 5, resp. (10) 3, 8, resp. (11) 3, 10, resp. (12) 3, 11, 8 (13) 3, 14, ad 7 (14) 3, 16, resp. (15) 3, 17, 4 (16) 5, 1, 5 (17) 5, 1, 9 (18) 5, 3, resp. (19) 5, 4, 3 (20) 5, 5, resp. (21) 5, 7, resp. (22) 6, 3, resp. (23) 7, 3, ad 4 (24) 7, 4, resp. (25) 7, 9, 1 (26) 7, 9, 8 (27) 7, 10, resp. (28) 9, 1, resp. (29) 9, 7, resp (1) 2, 1, 11 (2) 2, 3, resp. (3) 3, 1, 5 (4) 3, 1, Sed contra (5) 3, 1, ad 7 (6) 3, 3, ad 2 (7) 3, 3, ad 5 (8) 3, 4, resp. (9) 3, 5, resp. (10) 3, 8, resp. (11) 3, 10, resp. (12) 3, 11, 8 (13) 3, 14, ad 7 (14) 3, 16, resp. (15) 3, 17, 4 (16) 5, 1, 5 (17) 5, 1, 9 (18) 5, 3, resp. (19) 5, 4, 3 (20) 5, 5, resp. (21) 5, 7, resp. (22) 6, 3, resp. (23) 7, 3, ad 4 (24) 7, 4, resp. (25) 7, 9, 1 (26) 7, 9, 8 (27) 7, 10, resp. (28) 9, 1, resp. (29) 9, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 28} The classic text for this topic is De pot. 3, 16; cf. also 1, 5; 3, 4; 3, 15; 3, 17.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 29} The following De potentia texts present either explicit or implicit contrasts between the Avicennian view that God acts by natural necessity and the Christian view that God acts by His wisdom and will: 1, 1, ad 8; 1, 2, 2 & 13. 1, 5, 3 & 9 & 13 & 14 & 15 & resp. 1, 6, ad 7 & 9. 3, 1, 9; 3, 4, resp.; 3, 3, 4 & 5. 3, 6, ad 16, ad 22, ad 4. 3, 7, 8 & 9, ad 12, ad 13. 3, 13, resp. 3, 14, 4 & 5, ad Sed contra 5. 3, 15 (whole art.). 3, 16, passim (esp. ad 5, ad 9, ad 11, ad 19, resp.). 3, 17 (esp. 4 & 6). 4, 1, 8. 5, 3, ad 4, ad 5, 12, Sed contra, resp. 5, 4, resp. 5, 5, ad 3, 5, ad 7, 8 & 9 & 16, ad 21, resp. 5, 6, ad 10 & resp. 5, 8, 1. 6, 1, 6, ad 12, ad 14, resp. 7, 1, ad 1, ad 7, ad 8. 7, 9, ad 6. 9, 9, ad 1, Sed contra 1 & 2. 10, 2, ad 4, ad 6, 17. 10, 5, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 1} De pot. 3, 1, ad 7; 3, 3, ad 2, ad 5; 3, 11, 8; 7, 3, ad 4; 7, 4, resp.; 7, 9, 1 & 8; 9, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 2} Ibid. 2, 1, 11 & ad 11; 3, 1, 4 & 5 & Sed contra; 3, 14, ad Sed contra 7.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 3} Ibid. 7, 10, resp. Cf. Avicenna, , Metaphysica 8, 6, fol.99v-100r; 8, 7, fol.100v (Opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendata, Venetiis 1508); Avicenna, , Metaphysices compendium (Nadjât) 1, 2, tr. 1 & tr. 5 (ed. Carame, N., Rome 1926) 75–76, 127, 131.—For other texts quoted with an un-Avicennian meaning, cf. De pot. 2, 3, resp.; 3, 5, resp.; 3, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 4} De pot. 3, 16, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 5} Avicenna, , Met. 9, 4, fol.104v–105r: ‘De ordinatione esse intelligentiae et animarum celestium et corporum superiorum a Primo. Iam certum est nobis ex supradictis quod necesse esse per se unum est et quod non est corpus nec in corpore nec dividitur aliquo modo et quod esse omnium quae sunt est ab eo … non potest esse ut esse omnium ab illo sit secundum viam intentionis ab illo quemadmodum est nobis intentio in his omnibus quae fiunt a nobis. Tunc enim ipse esset intendens propter aliquid aliud praeter se … nulla res intendit aliquid quod sit inferius se. In eo autem hoc evidentius est secundum quod proprium sit ei non habere intentionem ut esse omnium sit ab eo. Ratio haec est scilicet quia induceret multitudinem in sua essentia…. Igitur ea quae primo sunt ab eo, et haec sunt creata non possunt esse multa nec numero nec divisione in materiam et formam, quoniam id quod sequitur ex eo est ab eius essentia non ab aliquo alio…. Manifestum est igitur quod primum eorum quae sunt a causa prima unum numero es0 … primum causatum est intelligentia pura quia est forma non in materia et ipsa est prima intelligentiarum separatarum quas numeravimus…. Item nos ti quod in universitate eorum quae sunt a primo sunt corpora et nosti quod omne corpus est possibile esse quantum est in se et quod necessarium est per aliud esse et nosti non esse illis viam essendi a primo absque mediante aliquo. Sunt igitur ex ipso sed mediante aliquo. Et nosti quod medium non est unitas pura. Nosti etiam quod ex uno secundum quod est unum non est nisi unum…. Propter primum autem est necessarium esse, sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia et intelligit seipsum et intelligit primum necessario, unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo ex hoc quod intelligit se, quod est possibile esse quantum in se et ex hoc quod intelligit necessitatem sui esse a primo quod est intellectum per se. Non est autem ei multitudo ex primo. Nam possibilitas sui esse est ei quiddam propter se non propter primum sed est ei a primo necessitas sui esse et deinde multiplicatur per hoc quod intelligit primum et propter hoc quod intelligit seipsum tali multiplicatione quae est comitans esse suae unitatis ex primo … manifestum est nobis ex praedictis quod intelligentiae separatae sunt plures numero: igitur non habent esse simul ex primo sed necesse est ut excellentior omnibus illis sit esse quod primum est ex eo post quod sequitur intelligentia…. I am igitur manifestum est quod ex omni intelligentia superiore in ordine secundum hoc quod intelligit primum provenit esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea. Sed secundum hoc quod intelligit seipsam provenient circuli per se tantum, corpus vero celi fit ab ea et permanet mediante anima celesti. Omnis enim forma causa est …’ Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 6} Ibid. ‘Sub unaquaque autem intelligentia est coelum, cum sua materia et sua forma, quae est anima et intelligentia inferius ea. Igitur sub omni intelligentia sunt tria in esse. Unde oportet ut possibilitas essendi haec tria sit ab illa intelligentia prima, in creatione, propter ternitatem quae est nominata in eam; et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis. Igitur ex prima intelligentia, inquantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea; et inquantum intelligit seipsam, sequitur ex ea forma coeli ultimi, et ejus perfectio, et haec est anima; et propter naturam essendi possibilem quae est ejus, quae est retenta inquantum intelligit seipsam, est etiam corporeitas coeli ultimi, quae est contenta in totalitate coeli ultimi…. Similiter est dispositio in intelligentia et intelligentia, et in coelo et coelo, quousque pervenitur ad intelligentiam agentem quae gubernat nostras animas. Non oportet autem ut hoc procedat in infinitum, ita ut sub unoquoque separato sit separatum…. Et sequitur semper intelligentia post intelligentiam, quousque fiat sphaera lunae, et deinde fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in specie, multam numero, ab intelligentia ultima.’—Cf. also Avicenna, , Met. comp. 1, 4, 1, 185; 1, 4, 2, 186–196 & 201.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 7} De pot. 3, 16, resp. In 3, 4, resp. the author of the Liber de causis and Algazel, Avicenna’s successor, are reported as holding this theory of emanation together with Avicenna. Cf. Liber de causis, prop. 6, 7, 8, 20, 23 (ed. Steele, R., Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi Fasc. XII,. Oxford 1935, pp. 159–187), and Algazel, , Metaphysica 1, 2 & 5 (ed. Muckle, J. T., Toronto 1933,. pp. 56, 119–121).Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 8} De pot. 3, 14, ad 8: ‘… quod esse factum et esse semper non habeant ad invicem repugnantiam secundum se considerata …’ Cf. also 3, 14, ad Sed contra 7 & resp.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 9} Avicenna, , Met. comp. 1, 1, 7, 63–64.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 10} De pot. 3, 17, 4; 5, 3, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 11} Met. comp. 1, 2, 1, 69–70. Cf. translation and analysis of this text by Smith, G., ‘Avicenna and the Possibles,’ New Scholasticism 17 (1943) 342–343.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 12} De pot. 3, 17, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 13} Ibid. 3, 14, 5; 3, 17, 1 & 3 & 6 & resp.; 5, 3, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 14} Ibid. 3, 4, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 15} Ibid. 3, 6, 22.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 16} Ibid. 3, 16, 11.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 17} Ibid. 7, 6, 6. Cf. also 7, 1, 1; 9, 9, Sed contra 1; 10, 2, 15 & 21; 10, 5, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 18} Ibid. 1, 1, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 19} Ibid. 3, 1, 9.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 20} Avicenna, , Met. 9, 4, fol.104v–105r.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 21} De pot. 3, 4, resp.; 3, 5, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 22} Ibid. 2, 3, resp. Cf. also 2, 4, resp.; 3, 7, 8; 3, 15, ad 6, ad 7 & 16; 5, 5, resp.; 5, 8, 1; 9, 9, ad 1; 10, 2, ad 17.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 23} Ibid. 3, 13, resp.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 115 note 24} Ibid. 1, 5, resp.; 2, 3, 5; 3, 1, resp.; 3, 15, resp.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 115 note 25} Met. 9, 4, fol.104v-105r.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 26} De pot. 3, 4, 1.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 27} Ibid. 3, 4, 10 & 11.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 28} Ibid. 3, 4, 4 & 6 & 13 & 14; 3, 16, 20 & 21; 3, 18, 13; 6, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 29} Ibid. 5, 2, 1; 3, 4, resp. Cf. Lombard, Peter, Sent. 4, 5, 3 (Quaracchi ed. 1916, 2, p. 776).Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 30} De pot. 3, 15, 15.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 31} Ibid. 3, 14, ad Sed contra 5.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 32} Ibid. 3, 17, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 33} Ibid. 5, 3, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 34} Ibid. 5, 3, Sed contra.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 116 note 35} Ibid. 5, 3, resp.; 10, 2, ad 6. For a full list of De pot. texts which give explicit and implicit contrasts between the views that God acts by natural necessity and the view that He acts by His wisdom and will, cf. note 29 to Chapter I.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 116 note 36} De pot. 3, 15, resp. arg. #1. Cf. also 1, 5, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 37} Ibid. 3, 15, resp. arg. #3.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 38} Ibid. 3, 16, resp.; 3, 1, 9; 5, 3, resp.; 5, 4, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 39} Ibid. 3, 16, resp. The following texts also show that creatures have no necessary connection with the divine goodness: 1, 5, 15; 3, 17, ad 7, ad 14; 3, 15, ad 1, ad 5, ad 10, ad 12, ad 16, ad 18.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 40} Pegis, A. C., St. Thomas and the Greeks (Milwaukee 1943) 58.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 41} De pot. 3, 16, resp. at end.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 42} Ibid. 3, 16, ad 11.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 43} Ibid. 3, 6, ad 22.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 44} Ibid. 10, 5, resp.; Cf. also 1, 5, ad 3, ad 13; 7, 1, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 45} Ibid. 3, 4, resp. Note that in St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences there was not, on purely philosophical grounds, the decisive rejection of mediate creation that we see in the De potentia. Cf. St. Thomas, , In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 3. For an interesting comparison of St. Thomas’ views on Peter Lombard’s opinion in these two works, see Forest, A., La structure métaphysique du concret (Paris 1931) 66 and note 1 on that page.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 46} De pot. 3, 4, resp. Cf. Summa contra Gentiles 3, 120 (Taurini 1905).Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 47} De pot. 3, 4, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 48} Ibid. Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 49} Ibid. 3, 4, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 50} Ibid. 3, 4, ad 10, ad 11.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 51} Ibid. 3, 4, ad 13, ad 14, ad 4, ad 6; 3, 16, ad 20, ad 21; 3, 18, ad 13.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 52} Ibid. 3, 4, resp.; 5, 1, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 53} Ibid. 6, 2, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 54} Ibid. 3, 4, ad 15.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 55} Among the Avicennian texts which seem to deny that things proceed from God by natural necessity is Met. 8, 7, fol.100v; here Avicenna says that the form of concrete beings does not follow as light follows that which illumines, nor as heat follows that which is burning; but on the contrary it knows the modality of the order of the good in being and knows that it comes from it. Avicenna here denies an analogy between ‘creatures’ and purely natural, physical effects, but it is important to note the extent of his denial. He does not deny that either ‘creatures’ or natural physical effects proceed necessarily from their respective causes. He denies only that ‘creatures’ like natural physical effects are unconscious of their origin. ‘Creatures’ proceed necessarily but they know whence they proceed; e.g. Avicennian Intelligences which move the spheres: each must be produced from the preceding Intelligence, but it knows by an act of reflection the Intelligence from which it proceeds. But since a thing’s knowledge of its origin does not alter the manner of its origin, this Avicennian text does not deny that things necessarily proceed from God.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 56} Met. 9, 4, fol.104v.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 57} Met. comp. 1, 4, 2, 187.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 58} Ibid. 187–188. Cf. also Met. 9, 4, fol.104v.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 59} Cf. Met. 9, 4, 104v.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 60} Ibid. Google Scholar

^{page 122 note 61} Goichon, A.-M., La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Paris 1937) 207. Cf. also Goichon, , Introduction à Avicenne: son épître des définitions (Paris 1933): on p. 5, Goichon, , in interpreting Avicenna, explains lūzim as being a proper accident which is not separable and which one cannot supress; on p. 14 he adds that it has the meaning of some characteristic indissolubly and necessarily attached, of something inherent, or concomitant.Google Scholar

^{page 122 note 62} Cf. references cited in note 3 supra .Google Scholar

^{page 123 note 1} This term, dator formarum, Professor Gilson points out, was used by Algazel, whose summary of Avicenna’s philosophy acquainted many medieval thinkers with Avicennianism: Gilson, E., ‘Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 4 (1929) 78. The term is used at least once, though in the plural, by Avicenna himself in Met. 9, 5, fol.105r-v.Google Scholar

^{page 123 note 2} Avicenna, , Met. 3, 4, fol.77r: ‘De prioritate formae super materiam in ordine essendi … Speculemur igitur quod eorum oportet esse causam; materia autem non potest esse causa essendi formae, primo quia non est materia, nisi quia est ei virtus receptionis et adaptationis, adaptatum autem inquantum est adaptatum non est causa essendi id ad quod est adaptatum.’—C. Met. comp. 1, 1, 2, 23; Forest, , La structure métaphysique (Ch. II n. 45 supra) 207, 227.Google Scholar

^{page 123 note 3} Avicenna, , Met. comp. 1, 4, 2, 190: ‘… esse materiae est esse receptivum tantum, nec potest esse causa essendi alterius rei nisi per modum receptivi.’—Cf. also ibid. 1, 1, 2, 16–17; Sufficientia (Opera… per canonicos emendata, Venetiis 1508) 1, 2, fol.15r; Goichon, , Introduction à Avicenne 74, note b; Forest, , op. cit. 220, 223; Plato, , Timaeus 50–51 (ed. Demos, R., New York 1937).Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 4} Met. 9, 5, fol.105r-v: ‘Appropriatores vero materiae sunt ejus praeparatores. Praeparator vero est ille a quo fit praeparatio quaedam, cujus comparatio convenientior est ad illud quam ad aliquid aliud. Erit autem hie praeparator eligens esse id quod est sibi dignius a primis datoribus formarum. Si autem materia esset secundum aptitudinem primam, posset utique aptari duobus contrariis. Quare enim magis eligeret unum quam aliud, nisi propter dispositionem quam dederunt imprimentes in ea? Et hujus etiam diversitatis comparatio ad omnes materias una est. Unde non oportet ut quantum ad illud approprietur una materia potius quam alia, nisi propter aliquid etiam, quod est in illa materia; quod non est nisi aptitudo perfecta; nec est praeparatio, nisi comparatio perfecta ad ipsum, ad quod est praeparata.’ Cf. Gilson, , ‘Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,’ Archives 1, 39–40.Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 5} De pot. 5, 1, ad 9.Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 6} Ibid. 3, 8, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 7} Ibid. 5, 1, 9.Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 8} Ibid. 6, 3, resp.; 5, 1, ad 5; 3, 8, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 124 note 9} Ibid. 3, 7, resp. Cf. Avicebron, , Fons vitae 2, 9 & 10 (ed. Baeumker, C., Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 1, 2–4; Münster 1892–1895, pp. 41–42).Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 10} De pot. 3, 7, resp. Cf. Maimonides, Moses, Guide for the Perplexed 1, 73 (tr. Friedländer, M., 2nd ed. London 1936, pp. 124–125).Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 11} De pot. 3, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 12} Ibid. 3, 8, Sed contra 2.Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 13} Ibid. 3, 11, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 14} Ibid. 6, 3, resp.; 3, 8, resp.; 5, 1, 5.—Cf. Aristotle, , Metaphysics 2, 4, 999b 18; 6, 8, 1033b 16, 17, 23; 6, 14, 1039a 24; 7, 3, 1043b 19 (ed. McKeon, R., New York 1941).Google Scholar

^{page 125 note 15} De pot. 3, 11, resp.; 5, 1, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 16} Ibid. 5, 4, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 17} Ibid. 3, 7, resp. ad 3, 4, 5, 7.Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 18} Ibid. 3, 8, resp.; 5, 1, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 19} Ibid. 5, 1, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 20} Ibid. ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 126 note 21} Ibid. 3, 8, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 22} Plato, , Timaeus 28–30; Republic 7 (ed. Demos, R., New York 1937). On Plato’s Demiurge, cf. also Taylor, A. E., A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Oxford 1928) 79 & 493.Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 23} Plato, , The Sophist 250c–260c (ed. Demos, R., New York 1937). It is possible, too, that St. Thomas associated the dator formarum theory with Plato and the ‘Platonists’ as a result of his reading in Macrobius. De pot. 6, 6, attributes to Plato, as cited by Macrobius, the opinion that there are two separate substances, God, the Father of the whole universe, and His mind or the paternal intellect containing the models or ideas of all things. In Summa theologiae 1, 32, 1 (Ottawa 1941–1946) this same opinion is again cited from Macrobius, , Super somnium Scipionis 1, 2 (ed. Eyssenhardt, F., Leipzig 1893, p. 482), but in the Summa it is attributed to the ‘Platonists.’ Certainly it is not improbable that St. Thomas might have seen an analogy between this separated divine mind and the Avicennian dator formarum. Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 24} Liber de causis prop. 10 & 4; cf. also St. Thomas, , In Lib. de causis 4.Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 25} De pot. 3, 8, Sed contra.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 26} St. Thomas, , In II Sentent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 4; d. 18, q. 1, a. 1; Avicenna, , Met. 2, 1, fol.74v–75r.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 27} Averroes, , De substantia orbis fol.3v (Tomus quintus operum Aristotelis Stagiritae peripateticorum principis, Venetiis 1560).Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 28} Avicebron, , Fons vitae tr. 2; Avicenna, , Sufficientia fol.14r. Cf. Forest, , op. cit. 193–195, 240–242.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 29} De pot. 5, 7, resp.; Avicenna, , Met. 8, 2, fol.97v. Cf. also Forest, , op. cit. 197–198.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 30} De pot. 3, 9, ad 9.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 31} Forest, , op. cit. 198.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 32} De pot. 3, 16, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 33} Cont. Gent. 1, 63.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 34} In I Sent. d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; Sum. theol. 1, 15, 2, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 35} In I Sent. d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 36} Ibid. d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 37} Sum. theol. 1, 15, a. 2, resp.; In I Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 38} In I Sent. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, sol.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 39} Sum. theol. 1, 13, 4, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 131 note 40} Avicenna, , Lib. VI naturalium (De anima) 5, 7, fol.27r-v (Opera …, Venetiis 1508): ‘Repetamus autem id quod praediximus, scilicet quod si subito crearetur homo, expansis ejus manibus et pedibus, quae ipse non videret neque contingeret, neque ipsa se contingerent; neque audiret sonum; nesciret quidem esse aliquod suorum membrorum, et tamen sciret se esse, et quia unum aliquid est, quamvis non sciret illa omnia. Quod autem non scitur non est id quod scitur. Haec autem membra non sunt vere nisi sicut vestes, quae quia diu est quod adhaerent nobis, putavimus nos esse illa, aut quod sunt sicut partes nostri. Cum enim imaginamur nostras animas non imaginamur eas nudas, sed imaginamur eas nudas corporibus. Cujus rei causa est diuturnitas adhaerentiae. Consuevimus autem exuere vestes et projicere, quod omnino non consuevimus in membris. Unde opinio quod membra sunt partes nostri firmior est nobis quam opinio quod vestes sunt partes nostri … ’; ibid. 1, 1, fol.1r-v: ‘Hoc enim nomen anima non est indictum ei ex substantia sua, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa.’ Cf. Pegis, A. C., St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto 1934) 119, 90, 128; Roland-Gosselin, M.-D., ‘Sur les relations de l’âme et du corps d’après Avicenne,’ Mélanges Mandonnet 2 (Paris 1930) 47–54.Google Scholar

^{page 131 note 41} Avicenna, , Lib. VI naturalium (De anima) 5, 5, fol.25r: ‘Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intelligens in potentia, deinde fit intelligens in effectu…. Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum. Cujus comparatio ad animas nostras est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros; quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu, quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio hujus intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas. Virtus enim rationalis, cum considerat singula quae sunt in imaginatione, et illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos, quam praediximus, fiunt nuda a materia et ab ejus penditiis et imprimuntur in anima rationali … ex consideratione eorum aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio. Cogitationes enim et considerationes motus sunt aptantes animam ad recipiendum emanationem, sicut termini medii praeparant ad recipiendum conclusionem necessario, quamvis illud fiat uno modo, et hoc alio, sicut postea scies.’—ibid. 5, 6, 26r-v: ‘… ex principio agente emanet in anima forma post formam secundum petitionem animae, a quo principio postea cum avertitur cessat emanatio … ut discere non sit nisi acquirere perfectam aptitudinem conjungendi se intelligentiae agenti, quousque fiat ex ea intellectus, qui est simplex, a quo emanent formae ordinatae mediante anima in cogitatione…. Cum enim anima conjungitur intelligentiae, emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis, quam sequitur emanatio ordinandi; si vero avertitur a principio, fiunt ipsae formae in potentia….’ Google Scholar

^{page 131 note 42} De pot. 3, 10, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 43} Ibid. 3, 9, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 44} Ibid. 9, 2, ad 14.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 45} Ibid. 5, 10, ad 9, ad 10, ad 11, ad 16.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 46} Ibid. 3, 9, ad 22.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 47} Ibid. 6, 7, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 48} Ibid. 4, 2, ad 22.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 49} Ibid. 5, 5, resp. & ad 4. Cf. Avicenna, , Met. comp. 1, 3, 3, 164–165, and Carame’s, note 2, p. 165.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 50} De pot. 5, 5, resp. & ad 6.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 51} Ibid. 5, 10, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 52} Gilson, E., Le thomisme (Paris 1944) 261; The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York 1936) 456.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 1} Avicenna, , Met. comp. 2, 2, 1, 81–91; 2, 2, 2, 93: ‘Igitur causa dans esse est extrinseca totalitate et est necesse-esse per se.’ Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 2} Ibid. 1, 2, 1, 72.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 3} Ibid. 1, 2, 3, 114.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 4} Ibid. 1, 2, 5, 130.Google Scholar

^{page 134 note 5} Ibid. 130–131, 129.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 6} De pot. 3, 13, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 7} Ibid. 1, 5, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 8} Ibid. 1, 5, 3.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 9} Ibid. 1, 5, 9.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 10} Ibid. 1, 5, 7.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 11} Ibid. 1, 5, 6.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 12} Ibid. 3, 17, 2 Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 13} Ibid. 3, 17, 9; 3, 14, Sed contra 5 & 6; 4, 1, 8.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 14} Ibid. 1, 2, 13.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 15} Ibid. 1, 5, 8.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 16} Ibid. 3, 6, 26.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 17} Ibid. 5, 1, 14; 1, 5, 15; 3, 16, 17. Cf. Plato, , Timaeus 29 & 92.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 18} Avicenna, , Met. 9, 6, fol.105v: ‘… oportet enim ut scias quod cura horum est ex hoc quod primus scit seipsum: et quod ab ipso est necessitas ordinationis bonitatis: et quod sua essentia est causa bonitatis et perfectionis secundum quod possibile est rebus…. Intelligit igitur ordinationem bonitatis secundum quod possibile est esse melius, unde ex hoc quod intelligit ordinationem et bonitatem quae melior esse potest, secundum quod ipse intelligit eam fluit ipsa tali fluxu quod perfectius pervenitur ad ordinem secundum possibilitatem…. ’ Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 19} De pot. 1, 5, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 20} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 21} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 9.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 22} Ibid. 5, 5, ad 7.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 23} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 6.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 24} Ibid. 3, 14, ad Sed contra 5.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 25} Ibid. 1, 2, ad 13.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 26} Ibid. 1, 2, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 27} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 8.Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 28} Ibid. 3, 16, ad 17.Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 29} Ibid. 5, 1, ad 14.Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 30} Ibid. 1, 2, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 31} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 15.Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 32} Ibid. 1, 5, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 138 note 33} Ibid. Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 34} Ibid. 5, 3, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 35} Ibid. 6, 1, 14.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 36} Ibid. 6, 1, 4.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 37} Ibid. 5, 1, 7.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 38} Ibid. 5, 3, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 39} Ibid. 3, 1, 2.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 40} Ibid. 3, 5, 1.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 41} Ibid. 3, 5, 2.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 42} Ibid. 1, 5, 14.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 43} Ibid. 1, 3, Sed contra 5.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 44} Ibid. 5, 3, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 45} Avicenna, , Met. 1, 7, fol. 73r: ‘Dicemus igitur quod ea quae cadunt sub esse possunt in intellectu dividi in duo. Quorum unum est quod cum consideratum fuerit per se, eius esse non est necessarium: et palam est etiam quod eius esse non est impossibile, alioquin non cadit sub esse; et hoc est in termino possibilitatis. Alterum est quod cum consideratum fuerit per se, eius esse erit necesse. Dicemus igitur quod necesse esse per se non habet causam; et quod possibile esse per se habet causam; et quod necesse esse per se est necesse omnibus suis modis….’ —ibid. 8, 4, fol.98v: ‘… manifestum est quod necesse esse unum numero est; et patuit quod quidquid aliud est ab illo cum consideratur per se est possibile in suo esse.'—Met. comp. 1, 4, 2, 192: ‘… scivisti enim omne corpus possibile in se et necessarium esse per aliud….’ Cf. also Met. comp. 1, 2, 1, 66–67, 70.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 46} Avicenna, , Met. 4, 2, fol.85v: ‘Omne enim quod incipit esse antequam sit, necesse est ut sit possibile in se. Si enim fuerit non possibile in se, illud non erit ullo modo. Non est autem possibilitas sui esse eo quod agens sit potens supra illud cum ipsum non fuerit possibile.'—ibid. 9, 4, fol.104v: ‘Nam possibilitas sui esse est ei propter se, non propter principium sed est ei a principio necessitas sui esse.’ Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 47} Met. comp. 1, 1, 6, 54–55. Cf. also Smith, G., ‘Avicenna and the Possibles,’ New Scholasticism 17 (1943) 344–346, 351.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 48} Smith, , op. cit. 345–346. Avicenna, , Met. comp. 1, 1, 6, 55–56; Met. 4, 2, fol.85r-v.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 49} De pot. 3, 1, 2; 3, 17, 10 & 11.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 50} Avicenna, , Met. 6, 2, fol.92r: ‘… igitur omne creatum est ens post non ens posteritate essentiae. Si autem laxaverint nomen inceptionis circa omne quod habet esse post non esse, quamvis non sit haec posteritas tempore, tunc omne creatum erit incipiens.’—Cf. also Smith, , op. cit. 346.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 51} Avicenna, , Risūlū … fī taf sīr al-mu ’awwadat al-’ūlä, pp. 24–29 of Jūmi’ al-badū’ i’ (Cairo 1917), as tr. from Arabic by Goichon, , La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Paris 1937) 203.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 52} Forest, however, (La structure métaphysique 140–141, 160–161) would not admit that Avicenna’s possibles have a reality which is independent of God since, he says, Avicenna situates those possibles within God’s intellect. He recalls Avicenna’s statement: ‘Hoc igitur quod intelligit essentiam suam causa est intelligendi id quod est post suam essentiam’ (Met. 8, 6, fol.100v). It is only because God thinks necessarily all that is in His essence that in a certain manner one can say that essences are possible before being. Because God acts necessarily they are constituted as actual beings independently of the divine will and wisdom. So Forest explains Avicenna on this point. And certainly it is clear in Avicenna that the actual being of the possibles flows, mediately, from God’s act of knowing His essence. The possibles, once they are constituted in existence, certainly have their source in God. But an exploration of Avicenna’s texts not only on the existence of the possible (it exists per aliud) but on the possibile per se would seem to suggest that there is a sense in which it is entirely valid to speak of an independent order of possibles in Avicenna.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 53} Smith, , op. cit. 346–347.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 54} De pot. 3, 7, ad 16.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 55} Ibid. 6, 1, Sed contra & resp.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 56} Ibid. 6, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 57} Ibid. 6, 1, ad 7.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 58} Ibid. 6, 1, ad 14.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 59} Ibid. 6, 3, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 60} Ibid. 6, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 61} Ibid. 3, 1, ad 2.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 62} Ibid. 3, 5, ad 2.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 63} Ibid. 3, 1, ad 17.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 64} Ibid. 1, 5, ad 14.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 65} Ibid. 1, 3, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 66} Ibid. 1, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 67} Ibid. 7, 6, ad 6.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 68} Ibid. 6, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 69} Ibid. 3, 16, ad 14, ad 15; Sum. theol. 1, 14, ad 14.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 70} Smith, , op. cit. 352.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 71} Ibid.; De pot. 1, 3, resp. Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 72} De pot. 1, 2, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 73} Smith, , op. cit. 350.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 74} De pot. 3, 3, resp. & ad 2.Google Scholar

^{page 144 note 75} Ibid. 3, 1, ad 7, ad 16.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 76} Ibid. 3, 3, resp., ad 6; 3, 1, 1.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 77} Ibid. 3, 17, resp.; 3, 5, resp.; 3, 8, resp.; Gilson, , Thomisme 174–176.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 78} De pot. 3, 2, resp.; 3, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 79} Ibid. 3, 2, resp.; 3, 2, ad 1, ad 2; 1, 1, ad 15.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 80} Ibid. 3, 3, ad 8, ad 5.Google Scholar

^{page 145 note 81} Ibid. 3, 1, resp., ad 12; 3, 16, ad 21; 3. 8, ad 19 Google Scholar

^{page 146 note 82} Note, however, that in Met. comp. 1, 2, 4, 121, Avicenna tries to say both that the Necessary Being knows things only in a universal way and that not even the least atom on heaven or earth is hidden from God's knowledge. He tries to solve this contradiction through an analogy (ibid. 122–124), but at best all he proves is that God can know particular things as present—not as singular.Google Scholar

^{page 146 note 83} Met comp. 1, 2, 1, 118–121. On God's knowledge according to Avicenna, cf. de Vaux, C., Avicenne (Paris 1900) 261–262; Saliba, D., Étude sur la métaphysique d’Avicenne (Paris 1926) 155–156. The position of St. Thomas has been given in Chapter III.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 1} De pot. 1, 2, 6, resp.; 3, 15, ad 9.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 2} Ibid. 7, 7, 3 & 5 & 6; 7, 4, 4 & 5.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 3} Ibid. 7, 7, ad 3; 7, 4, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 147 note 4} Ibid. 7, 7, resp.; 7, 4, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 5} Ibid. 8, 2, 11.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 6} Ibid. 9, 1, 5.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 7} Ibid. 7, 6, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 8} Ibid. 9, 1, ad 5. Cf. also 9, 5, resp.; 7, 7, ad 6; 7, 10, ad 10.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 9} Ibid. 7, 2, ad 7.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 10} Ibid. 7, 5, ad 2; 7, 6, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 11} Ibid. 1, 5, 10.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 12} Ibid. 3, 4, 13; 3, 16, 21; 3, 18, 13 & 14.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 13} Ibid. 3, 4, 10 & 11.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 14} Ibid. 4, 1, Sed contra 3; 3, 8, 6; 3, 11, 11.Google Scholar

^{page 148 note 15} Ibid. 3, 1, ad 12; 3, 1, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 16} Ibid. 8, 1, ad 11.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 17} Ibid. 3, 8, resp. Cf. Chapter III.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 18} Ibid. 5, 4, 3; 5, 3, resp.; 2, 11, 11.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 19} Ibid. 9, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 149 note 20} Ibid. 3, 8, resp.; 5, 1, ad 5; 6, 6, ad 4.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 21} Ibid. 2, 1, resp.; 2, 9, ad 1.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 22} Ibid. 2, 4, resp.; 2, 1, ad 10; 7, 7, resp.; 9, 1, resp.; 9, 2, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 23} Ibid. 5, 4, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 24} Maritain, J., A Preface to Metaphysics (New York 1939) 55, 63, 66–67, 92–93.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 25} De pot. 9, 7, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 26} Ibid.; cf. also 3, 16, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 27} Gilson, , Thomisme 56; Forest, , La structure métaphysique 41.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 28} Averroes, , In IV Met. 2, 3, fol.67r (Venetiis 1574).Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 29} Ibid. fol.67r-v.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 30} Averroes, , In X Met. 4, 8, fol.286r.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 31} Averroes, , Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis fol.34v (Venetiis 1550). Cf. Algazel, , Met. 1, 1, 4, 26.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 32} In IV Met. 2, 3, fol.32r.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 33} Destr. destr. fol.19r–25v.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 34} Averroes, , Epitome in librum metaphysicae Aristotelis 1, fol.360v (Venetiis 1574).Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 35} Destr. destr. fol.34v.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 36} In IV Met. 2, 3, fol.67r.Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 37} Met. 8, 4, fol.99r: ‘… cetera alia excepto necesse esse habent quidditates quae sunt per se possibiles esse: quibus non accidit ei esse nisi extrinsecus; primus igitur non habet quidditatem.’ Google Scholar

^{page 152 note 38} Met. comp. 1, 1, 3, 29.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 39} Ibid. 1, 1, 1, 2.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 40} Ibid. 1, 1, 3, 28.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 41} Met. 3, 3, fol.79r: ‘Manifestum est igitur quod unitas non est illius naturae ut separatur a substantia in qua est.’ Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 42} Met. comp. 1, 1, 3, 28–29.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 43} Met. 3, 3, fol.79r: ‘Cum vero [unitas] dicitur de substantiis non dicitur de eis sicut genus nec sicut differentia ullo modo; non enim recipitur in certificatione quidditatis alicuius substantiarum; sed est quiddam comitans substantiam sicut iam nosti. Non ergo dicitur de eis sicut genus vel sicut differentia sed sicut accidens: unde unum est substantia; unitas vero est íntentio quae est accidens…. Natura enim intentionis simplicis de eo sine dubio est accidens secundum aliam intentionem; eo quod est in substantia: non sicut pars eius. Et impossibile est esse sine eo.’ Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 44} Met. comp. 1, 1, 3, 28.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 45} Ibid, 1, 1, 7, 63.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 46} Met. 1, 6, fol. 72v: ‘Dicemus igitur nunc quod quamvis ens, sicut scisti, non sit genus, nec praedicatum aequaliter de his quae sub eo sunt. …’ Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 47} Averroes, , In IV Met. 2, 3, fol.67r. But see Avicenna, , Met. 1, 6, fol.72v: ‘Dico igitur quod intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur in animabus duae intentiones; ens vero et aliquid sunt nomina multivoca unius intentionis.’ Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 48} Paulus, J., Henri de Gand (Paris 1938) 274–275.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 49} Gilson, , Thomisme 57, note 2, reminds us that St. Thomas himself follows the Avicennian method of the analysis of essences in the De ente et essentia c. 4. Noting that the concept of a finite thing does not include to-be as one of its constituent notes, St. Thomas argues that if a thing has existence, its to-be is something added to it from outside the concept. But Gilson explains that when St. Thomas says hoc est adveniens extra, he does not mean existence is added from outside essence as an accident but that it comes to it from an efficient cause transcending essence and therefore exterior to it, that is, God. The esse caused by God in the essence is what is most intimate within it, for although it has come from without, it nevertheless constitutes it from within.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 50} Gilson, , Thomisme 55; and Avicenna, , Logica 1, fol.2r (Venetiis 1508): ‘Essentiae vero rerum aut sunt in ipsis rebus aut sunt in intellectu; unde habent tres respectus. Unus respectus essentiae est secundum quod ipsa est non relata ad aliquod tertium esse, nec ad id quod sequitur eam secundum quod ipsa est sic. Alius respectus est secundum quod est in his singularibus. Et alius secundum quod est in intellectu. Et tunc sequuntur eam accidentia quae sunt propria istius sui esse, sicut est suppositio et praedicatio et universalitas et particularitas in praedicando et essentialitas et accidentalitas in praedicando…. In eis autem quae sunt extra, non est essentialitas nec accidentalitas omnino…. Cum autem volumus considerare ad hoc ut sciamus eas necesse est eas colligere in intellectu; et tunc necessario accident illis dispositiones quae sunt proprie tantum intellectui.’ Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 51} Gilson, , Thomisme 55–56, 56; De pot. 5, 4, ad 3.Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 52} Met. 1, 6, fol.72r: ‘Dicemus igitur quod ens et res et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima, prima impressione quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se.’ Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 53} Paulus, , op. cit. 74, 12.Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 54} Met. 1, 6, fol.72v: ‘Dicemus igitur nunc quod quamvis ens, sicut scisti, non sit genus, nec praedicatum aequaliter de his quae sub eo sunt, tamen est intentio in qua conveniunt secundum prius et posterius. Primum autem est quidditati, quae est in substantia; deinde ei quae est post ipsum. Postquam autem una intentio est ens secundum hoc quod assignavimus, sequuntur illud accidentalia quae ei sunt propria, sicut supra docuimus, et ideo eget aliqua scientia in qua tractetur de eo sicut omni sanativo necessaria est aliqua scientia,’ Cf. Gilson, , ‘Avicenne et le point du départ de Duns Scot,’ Archives 2 (1927) 96.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 55} The terms, ‘existentialist ontology’ and ‘existentialism,’ are here used to refer to such a metaphysics of existing beings as one finds in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas; they are not used to refer to any of the views of the modern French schools described, e.g. in Arnou, R., ‘Existentialism in France Today,’ Modern Schoolman 24 (1947) 193–207. Cf. also Phelan, G. B., ‘The Existentialism of St. Thomas,’ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 21 (1946) 25–40.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 56} Plato, , Sophist 250–260c; Parmenides 128–166. Cf. A. C. Pegis, Introduction to Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas 1, xlii, xlvii–xlviii.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 57} St. Thomas’ agreement with Averroes’ interpretation of Avicenna must not be thought, however, to signify any identity between the metaphysical views of St. Thomas and Averroes. Averroes believes that the only way to avoid the absurdity of regarding existence as an accident of essence is to assert that there is no distinction between essence and existence. Cf. Averroes, , Destr. destr. fol.34v. Averroes’ view, which appears in his criticism of Avicenna, proceeds from the very assumption which he objects to in Avicenna: namely that a real distinction of essence and existence means a physical distinction. Only, instead of accepting a real-physical distinction, he denies a real distinction because he thinks that is the way to deny a physical distinction. Averroes and Avicenna contradict each other, Gilson points out in Thomisme, p. 60, because they stand upon the same plane. But St. Thomas, by transcending the plane of essentialist ontology which is common to them both, annuls their conflict. He goes beyond both Averroes and Avicenna to the very root of being, the actus essendi, the ipsum esse. Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 58} De pot. 3, 8, resp.Google Scholar

^{page 158 note 59} Smith, G., ‘A Date in the History of Epistemology,’ The Maritain Volume of the Thomist (New York 1943) 250.Google Scholar

^{page 158 note 60} De pot. 7, 2, ad 9.Google Scholar

^{page 159 note 61} Gilson, E., God and Philosophy (New Haven 1941) 40–41, 63–73. Cf. also Phelan, G. B., ‘A Note on the Formal Object of Metaphysics,’ New Scholasticism 18 (1944) 197–201.Google Scholar

^{page 159 note 62} Bouyges, , ‘L’idée génératrice du De potentia de saint Thomas,’ Revue de philosophie 2 (1931) 124.Google Scholar

^{page 159 note 63} Ibid. 127, 257, 261–262.Google Scholar