¹ An amplified treatment of this problem can be found in my “The Real Distinction in Creatures between Being and Essence According to William of Auvergne” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1995). The following abbreviations will be used throughout this essay: Switalski = Bruno Switalski, ed., William of Auvergne. De Trinitate. An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction (Toronto, 1976); Teske and Wade = Roland Teske, J. and Wade, Francis C., trans., William of Auvergne. The Trinity or The First Principle (Milwaukee, 1989).Google Scholar

² Leo Sweeney adds that a real distinction reflects the actual items in question and that a mental distinction, on the other hand, arises because of one's mental activity. In general, Sweeney says, a distinction “is some sort of otherness, some kind of absence of identity.” See Sweeney, with William Carroll, J. and Furlong, John J., Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality (New York, 1993), 82. See also Bernard Lonergan, Insight (London, 1957), 489–90.Google Scholar

³ See Roland-Gosselin, M.-D., Le “De ente et essentia” de s. Thomas d’Aquin (Le Saulchoir, 1926; reprint, Paris, 1948), 160–66.Google Scholar

⁴ Masnovo, Amato, Da Guglielmo d’Auvergne a san Tommaso d’Aquino, 3 vols. (Milan, 1945–46), 1:129: “Ora sappiamo che secondo Guglielmo d’Auvergne le cose create offrono senza dubbio la composizione tra essenza ed essere. Ma quest'essere, unico per tutte le cose create, è l'essere divino: il quale però non entra nell'essenza di veruna cosa, e disimpegna, per così dire, la propria parte nei confronti di chicchessia senza per questo esserne un costitutivo.” Although Masnovo refers to the relation between being and essence as a composition, it is hard to see how this position can be maintained given that being is not, as Masnovo sees it, a component. Masnovo is careful to point out that although William sees God as the being of all things and as that in which every creature participates, he nevertheless manages to avoid pantheism. For example, he says: “Vedremo che, se attribuire a Guglielmo d’Auvergne la distinzione reale fra essenza ed essere in creatis, quale di consueto l'intendono i moderni scolastici, è cosa troppo spiccia, non è cosa meno spiccia trovare in questa distinzione l'appiglio per dichiarare panteista Guglielmo d’Auvergne” (ibid., 128).Google Scholar

Masnovo also argues (130–31) that William uses the word “accident,” or quasi accidens, with respect to being (esse) in order to signify that it does not pertain to the created thing by necessity. Masnovo adds that the “old Aristotelian logicians” would say that being, as William discusses it, is the fifth predicable or category of Porphyry and that while William repudiates the physical accidentality of being, he sustains its logical accidentality.Google Scholar

⁵ See Étienne Gilson, “La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 21 (1946): 82. “Dans l’être causé, en effet, l'existence est reçue d'ailleurs, et c'est à ce titre qu'elle y est, non pas nécessaire, mais possible. C'est également à ce titre, et dans ces limites, qu'elle y est comme accident, c'est-à-dire, exactement, comme adventice (accidens, hoc est, adveniens ei) ou surajoutée à l'essence complète en elle-même. En d'autres termes, la distinction d'essence et d'existence dont il est ici question, exprime simplement le fait que, dans l’être créé, l'essence n'existe qu'en vertu de l'existence que son créateur lui confère. Nous sommes donc assurés dès à présent, que Guillaume a soutenu au moins cette première distinction d'essence et d'existence, qu’Albert le Grand et la plupart de ses successeurs ont pareillement soutenue après lui.”Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., 83–84: “Le possible comme tel se définit pour lui: ce qui ne contient rien qui rende son existence impossible. On n'y trouve donc pas l'existence, et par conséquent notre pensée l'en distingue. Voilà ce que dit Guillaume d’Auvergne. Mais que, dans le possible réalisé par sa cause, l’esse et l’essentia restent distincts de manière à former un composé proprement dit, ce texte ne le dit pas, et il suggère plutôt le contraire. On ne saurait donc se fonder sur lui pour attribuer à Guillaume la distinction d'essence et d'existence telle que l'entendra saint Thomas d’Aquin.”Google Scholar

⁷ In the first argument against a real distinction, Gilson argues that the separability of existence from essence is something very different from a distinction between them. One can, he says, maintain that essence and existence are separable but not distinct while they are united, or inversely, that they are really distinct in their union and nevertheless fully inseparable. Ultimately, Gilson will want to say that essence and existence are, for William, separable but not distinct while united. In the second argument against a real distinction in William, Gilson maintains that because the conjunction of a white thing and whiteness does not amount to a real composition or real distinction, neither does the conjunction of essence and existence so amount. In the third argument, which serves as a corollary to the second, Gilson uses William's own belief that a true composition entails the coming together of two elements in such a way that something new is produced to argue against the thesis that there is a real composition or a real distinction. That is, a true composition is one in which a new thing is brought about through the union of its components, but since the union of a substance and an accident does not produce a new thing, and existence is an accident, the addition of existence to the essence cannot bring about a new thing. Thus, according to Gilson, there cannot be a real composition or a real distinction between essence and existence in William.Google Scholar

The root of these three closely connected arguments and that which ties them together is the accidentality of existence. It is fundamental to the first argument since the accidentality of existence indicates for Gilson that existence is extrinsic to the created essence, which in turn allows for its separability. It is fundamental to the second argument since it is precisely the accidentality of whiteness that suggests to Gilson that as there is not a true composition between a white thing and whiteness, so there is not a true composition between essence and existence. To the third argument it is also fundamental, since Gilson's point is that an accident cannot unite with the substance to form what William himself considers a real composition. As Gilson sees it, existence for William is something extrinsic to a thing and can only be considered distinct from the essence since it comes to it from an external source. But again, he does not think it comes together with the essence in such a way that there is a real composition or, consequently, a real distinction.Google Scholar

⁸ De trinitate, chap. 1: “Sic et bonum essentialiter dicitur eo, quod eius essentia ipsa bonitas est, qua dicitur bonum, aliud vero participatione, in habendo scilicet vel participando bonitatem, quae ipsa essentia participantis non est” (Switalski, 17; translation from Teske and Wade, 65).Google Scholar

⁹ De trinitate, 1: “Ad hunc modum et ens, cuius essentia est ei esse et cuius essentiam praedicamus, cum dicimus ‘est’, ita ut ipsum et eius esse, quod assignamus, cum dicimus ‘est’, sint res una per omnem modum. Aliud vero dicitur participatione, in habendo scilicet quoddam, quod nullo modo cum essentia ipsius entis est res una, sed neque de essentia ipsius est, immo, omnino praeter rationem substantiae ipsius entis” (Switalski, 17; Teske and Wade, 65–66).Google Scholar

¹⁰ De trinitate, 2: “Oportet autem te scire, quia esse duas habet intentiones. Et una earum est residuum a circumvestitione et varietate accidentium. Et hoc est proprie, quod nominatur essentia sive substantia, et accipitur in intentione hac cum huiusmodi determinatione intentio, quae est esse omne, vel alia, et significat illud solum, quod definitiva oratione significatur, sive nomine speciei. Hoc igitur est, quod dicitur substantia rei et eius esse et eius quidditas, et hoc est esse, quod definitio significat et explicat, et hoc ipsum dicitur rei essentia” (Switalski, 20–21; Teske and Wade, 68–69).Google Scholar

¹¹ De universo Ia Iae, 30, 625bC, in Guilielmi Alverni Episcopo Parisiensis Opera Omnia, ed. Hotot, F., 2 vols., with Supplementum, ed. Le Feron, B. (Orléans/Paris, 1674; reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1963). References to the De universo are to the part, chapter, page, column, and section of the first volume of this edition. “Creator vero unicuique creatorum proximus est ac praesentissimus, immo etiam intimus, et hoc apparere tibi potest per abstractionem sive spoliationem conditionum omnium atque formarum accidentalium et substantialium. Cum enim ab unoquoque creatorum omnia haec abstraxeris, ultimum omnium invenietur esse, vel entitas, et propter hoc dator ipsius: verbi gratia, cum Socratem spoliaveris forma sua singulari, qua est Socrates, et a specifica, qua est homo, et a generalibus quibus est animal, corpus substantia, adhuc remanebit ens, quapropter remanebit ei esse suum, et entitas, quasi intimum indumentum ipsius, et velut interula, qua primo induit ipsum creator, et cum ipsum esse, et entitatem ei detraxeris, erunt ei detractae omnes causae essendi et adminicula excepto solo creatore. Quare manifestum est quod omnium adminiculorum et adjumentorum essendi, primum est creator et intimum.” (Translation largely borrowed from Teske and Wade, trans., De trinitate, chap. 2 [68 n.1]). As Teske observes, the imagery of forms as clothing is also found in both Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae and Avicenna's Metaphysics. See Avencebrolis Fons Vitae, ex arabico in latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino (= Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 1 [Münster 1892–95]), 3.10 (101, lines 9–10), 5.8 (271, line 7), 5.26 (305, line 15), 5.42 (334, line 21); see Avicenna Latinus Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, ed. Simone van Riet, intro. Gerard Verbeke, 3 vols. (Louvain/Leiden, 1977–83), 1:4.2 at 210, line 98; hereafter this work will be referred to as Metaphysics, ed. van Riet.Google Scholar

¹² Cf. Liber de causis 1.11: “Et illius quidem signum est quod quando tu removes virtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo et remanet vivum spirans sensibile. Et quando removes ab eo vivum, non remanet vivum sed remanet esse, quoniam esse non removetur ab eo, sed removetur vivum, quoniam causa non removetur per remotionem causati sui, remanet ergo homo esse. Cum ergo Individuum non est homo, est animal et, si non est animal, est esse tantum.” See La demeure de l’être, ed. and trans. Magnard, P., Boulnois, O., Pinchard, B., and J.-L. Solère (Paris, 1990), 40. For the author of the Liber de causis, living is what remains after rationality is stripped away from a man, and being is what remains after living is stripped away. Moreover, when man is subtracted from an individual, there is still an animal, and when animal is subtracted, being is found remaining. Being is thus the foundation of a thing since only it remains after all other formalities and conditions have been stripped away. It is, however, important to recognize that being is not synonymous with actus essendi. As Richard Taylor, C. observes, the word “anniyah, translated into Latin from the Arabic as esse, is the formal substrate on the basis of which further perfections such as life and intelligence are received. In the De causis there is no notion of being as the act of existence such as we find in the thought of St. Thomas.” Of course, the Latin version of the Liber de causis was a translation from an Arabic text. See Richard Taylor, C., “St. Thomas and the Liber de causis on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances,” Mediaeval Studies 41 (1979): 506–507. Also see Leo Sweeney, “Doctrine of Creation in Liber de causis,” in An Etienne Gilson Tribute, ed. Charles J. O’Neil (Milwaukee, 1959), 274–89, esp. 285–87. Sweeney also notes that the terms esse, ens, and essentia seem to be synonyms throughout the treatise (280 n. 30).Google Scholar

¹³ The interpretation of being in this passage as that of the second intention seems reasonable in light of the fact that William insists that being (esse) comes to a thing and is thus in a sense accidental. The being (esse) William describes in this passage can also be said to come to a thing, at least inasmuch as it is like an “undergarment with which the creator first clothed” it. William also uses being (esse) in conjunction with entity (entitas) three times, which suggests that the being that is referred to here is that of the second intention since it is this sense of being with which William usually associates entitas. For an example of William's synonymous use of esse and entitas, see De universo IIa IIae.8.852aG: “Et omne aliud ens est quodammodo compositum ex eo, quod est, et ex eo, quo est, sive esse suo, sive entitate sua, quemadmodum album est album ex subjecto et albedine….” Gilson also notes that, for William, the terms esse and entitas, as well as quo est, are synonyms and that they can all be understood in the sense of “to exist.” He writes, “Il est intéressant de noter ici, au point de vue du lexique personnel de Guillaume, que les termes de quo est, esse, et entitas sont pour lui synonymes et peuvent être pris trois au sens d'exister” (“La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne,” 86 n. 6).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Leo Donald Davis, “Creation according to William of Auvergne,” in Studies in Mediaevalia and Americana (Spokane, 1973), 55. Also see Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (Toronto, 1962), 114.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Joseph Owens describes this sense of essence in “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 26.Google Scholar

¹⁶ De trinitate, chap. 2: “Secunda autem intentio huius, quod est esse, est illud, quod dicitur per hoc verbum ‘est’ de unoquoque, et est praeter uniuscuiusque rationem. In nullius namque ratione accipitur esse; quidquid enim imaginati fuerimus, sive hominem, sive asinum, sive aliud, in ratione eius esse non intelligimus, eo solo excepto, de quo esse essentialiter dicitur; eius namque essentia nisi per ipsum esse intelligi non potest, cum ipsa et eius esse omnimodo sint una res” (Switalski, 21; Teske and Wade, 69).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Maurer says quite simply that being in the second intention “means a thing's existence, which is designated by the verb ‘is’ in a proposition” (Medieval Philosophy, 113–14).Google Scholar

¹⁸ A brief look at what William means by “intention” may help to clarify the status of the distinction between the essence of a thing and its being as it is found in William's discussion here. Because William follows Avicenna in his use of the term “intention,” the best way to understand William's use of the term will be to examine Avicenna's usage. For Avicenna, an intention is what the internal sense discovers in things, and is prior to the phantasms discovered by the exterior senses. While an intention signifies, in general, what is immediately before the mind, its object may or may not be outside the mind. If the object of the intention is outside the mind, the intention is called a “first” intention. If the object is itself an intention, i.e, if the object is itself some concept or abstraction of an actual existent, then the intention is a “second” intention. Accordingly, Christian Knudsen says that an intention is, for Avicenna, “nearly the same as a concept as well as the foundation of the concept's content — one reason why the ontological status of intentions was ambivalent from the beginning” (“Intentions and Impositions,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and Pinborg, J. [Cambridge, 1982], 479–80). Still, it is clear that, for William, an intention is basically the same as a concept. See also Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee, 1963), 237–40.Google Scholar

Although William understands “intention” in the general sense described above, he does not speak specifically in terms of “first” and “second” intentions. There is, however, no reason to suppose that William would object to the distinction between first and second intentions. Such a distinction should not, of course, be confused with the first and second intentions of being. However, with respect to the relation between first and second intentions and the two intentions of being, it seems true that while William's first intention of being corresponds to the notion of a first intention, the second intention of being may in fact be a second intention. To the extent that the being signified by est can be considered apart from the subject itself, and it is of course outside the essence, it is understood in an abstract manner. (On this point, see Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 61–62. Owens discusses the way in which being can be understood in either the abstract or the concrete. Understood in the concrete, being denotes a subject that exists, while in the abstract, it denotes what is understood apart from the subject.) Simply stated, if what is predicated of a thing by the verb “is” is taken in an abstract manner, then it corresponds to the notion of a second intention. But, again, William does not speak in these terms.Google Scholar

¹⁹ De trinitate 7: “Quoniam autem ens possibile non est ens per essentiam, tunc ipsum et eius esse, quod non est ei per essentiam, duo sunt revera, et alterum accidit alteri, nec cadit in rationem vel quidditatem ipsius. Ens igitur, secundum hunc modum, compositum est et resolubile in suam possibilitatem sive quidditatem et suum esse. Ex quo manifestum est ipsum esse causatum ab educente possibilitatem eius in effectum essendi, et a coniungente ipsum esse cum possibilitate ipsius. Non enim possibile venit ad effectum per solam potestatem, ut supra ostendimus, sed per participationem; …” (Switalski, 43–44; Teske and Wade, 87).Google Scholar

²⁰ See Herbert Davidson, A., Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (New York, 1987), 289–93, for a discussion of Avicenna's understanding of the concepts “necessary,” and “possible,” and, more specifically, of necessarily existent being and possibly existent being. Davidson says that, for Avicenna, actual existence is either: “(a) Necessarily existent by virtue of itself; this is something ‘such that if assumed not to exist an impossibility results,’ with the proviso that it has its character by reason of itself. Or (b) necessarily existent by virtue of another, but possibly existent by virtue of itself; this is something, again, such that if assumed not to exist, an impossibility results, with the proviso that it has its character by reason of another, only inasmuch as ‘something other than itself is assumed [to exist].’ The necessity characterizing the two categories of necessarily existent being, is, as already seen, construed by Avicenna as an indefinable primary concept to be grasped by the human mind immediately” (292–93). For Avicenna's discussion of necessary and possible being, see Metaphysics 1.6–7 (van Reit, 43–55).Google Scholar

²¹ De trinitate 6: “… quoniam si consideramus universum in se ipso, non inveniemus in ipso nisi possibilitatem. Postquam in universo secundum se ipsum non ponitur nisi possibilitas, quare universum in se ipso est tantum possibile” (Switalski, 39; Teske and Wade, 83).Google Scholar

²² De trinitate 6: “Esse vero possibile, quod quidem in se et per se ipsum consideratum, invenitur non prohibens suum esse; verumtamen in hac consideratione nondum invenitur habere esse, sed tamen invenitur prope, ut habeat esse; et haec appropinquatio nominatur in eo possibilitas” (Switalski, 36; Teske and Wade, 81).Google Scholar

²³ William's statement that the being (esse) of a possible being comes (accidit) to it evinces the influence of Avicenna. See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.4 (van Riet, 402, lines 44–47): “Igitur omne habens quidditatem causatum est; et cetera alia, excepto necesse esse, habent quidditates quae sunt per se possibiles esse, quibus non accidit esse nisi extrinsecus.”Google Scholar

²⁴ De universo IIa IIae.8.852aG: “Ab omni vero possibili, et ab omni eo, quod est necesse esse per aliud, est separabile suum esse, aut actu, aut intellectu, sive ratione. In omni igitur alio est aliud ipsum ens aliud ejus esse, seu entitas. Et iste est intellectus sapientis illius de hoc et hoc. Et omne aliud ens est quodammodo compositum ex eo, quod est, et ex eo, quo est, sive esse suo, sive entitate sua, quemadmodum album est album ex subjecto, et albedine….”Google Scholar

²⁵ Avicenna says that while being necessary through itself does not have a cause, that whose being is possible, on the other hand, does have a cause. Avicenna discusses this in Metaphysics 1.6 (van Riet, 43): “Dicemus igitur quod necesse esse per se non habet causam et quod possibile esse per se habet causam….”Google Scholar

²⁶ See De universo Ia Iae.3.594bH: “Esse enim omne, quod datur a causa hujusmodi suo causato, separabile est ab illa saltem intellectu, et omne receptum a suo recipiente, et generaliter omne esse, cum fuerit aliud a suo ente, separabile est ab ipso modo, quo diximus.”Google Scholar

²⁷ Scholars now recognize that William is the author of The Immortality of the Soul. For many years, however, Dominicus Gundissalinus was thought to have been the author. Gilson, for example, believed that William's work was a plagiarism of that of Gundissalinus. For a history of the question of the authorship of this work, see Roland Teske, J., ed. and trans., William of Auvergne. The Immortality of the Soul (Milwaukee, 1991), 1–4.Google Scholar

²⁸ See De immortalitate animae, ed. Georg Bülow, in Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Nebst einem Anhange, enthaltend die Abhandlung des Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) “De immortalitate animae” (= Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 2.3 [Münster, 1897]), 26–27: “Amplius. Omne destructibile non est destructibile nisi uno modorum istorum: videlicet aut divisione formae suae a materia sua—quod non potest esse nisi aut forma manente, sicut ponimus in homine, qui morte, quae est divisio formae suae a materia, id est animae a corpore, ita destruitur, quod manet eius forma, hoc est anima ipsa secundum quod nos ponimus; aut destruitur id quod destruitur divisione formae a materia forma ipsa destructa, quae destructio proprie vocatur corruptio—; aut destruitur divisione partium suarum integralium, quemadmodum domus, cum partes eius ab invicem separantur, id est ligna et lapides.”Google Scholar

²⁹ See De immortalitate animae 7–8: “Amplius. In omnimoda sui coniunctione ad corpus, quae est omnimoda sollicitudo eius ad ipsum et omnimodus amor, omnimodo absorbetur intellectivae virtutis propria operatio. A contrariis igitur in omnimoda separatione sui a corpore omnimodo confortabitur et revigorabitur eius operatio. Et haec separatio in morte est, vel potius mors ipsa.”Google Scholar

³⁰ William also says in this passage that “this is the understanding of the wise man [Boethius] about this and that (hoc et hoc).” With regard to the meaning of hoc et hoc, Switalski suggests that “hoc in Boethius stands for the absolute simplicity of God; hoc et hoc for the composition of creatures” (27 n. 35). Specifically, for Boethius, every being other than the First is composed of matter and form. William discusses this usage in De universo IIa IIae.8.852aE: “Debes autem scire cum his, quae dixi tibi in hoc capitulo, quod praedictus latinorum philosophus disputans de simplicitate, et unitate creatoris, in quodam ex libris suis, dixit, quia primum principium est hoc tantum, omne autem aliud est hoc, et hoc per quem sermonem visum est nonnullis omne aliud a principio primo esse compositum, et esse duo, et propter hoc nihil esse hoc praeter ipsum. Et ex hoc visum est eis, quod omne aliud compositum sit ex materia, et forma.” Also see Boethius De trinitate II, in The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Stewart, H. F. and Rand, E. K. (London/New York, 1918), 10, lines 29–39: “Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus vel anima in partem; igitur non est id quod est. Quod vero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est hoc, illud vere est id quod est….”Google Scholar

³¹ De universo IIa IIae.8.852aG–H: “… haec autem conjunctio albi, et albedinis, non est veri nominis, et propria compositio, videlicet per quam aliud novum constituatur, cum manifestum tibi sit ex aliis, quae alibi didicisti, impossibile esse ex substantia, et accidente aliquid esse, vel fieri. Accidens enim non advenit substantiae ad constituendum novem aliquid, sed magis ad ordinandam, decorandam et perficiendam perfectionibus forinsecis ipsam, cui advenit, substantiam. Non debet igitur conturbare te sermo iste sapientis illius de hoc, et de hoc, tamquam per ipsum cogaris confiteri omnem substantiam compositam esse ex materia, et forma, sive spiritualis sit illa, sive corporalis. Sollicite autem attendere debes exemplum, quod posui tibi de albo, et albedine. Convenientissimum enim est ad id, de quo agebatur videlicet de ente creato, et entitate, et hoc, quoniam esse, sive entitas unicuique accidit, et advenit praeter completam ejus substantiam, et rationem, praeterquam primo principio, cui soli essentiale est, et unum cum eo in ultimitate unitatis.”Google Scholar

³² One reason why William stressed that an accident cannot bring about a numerically distinct being, i.e., a quantitatively new individual, stemmed from what he considered Avicenna's view of the individuation of the human soul and the ramifications of this view. As William understood Avicenna, the soul is individuated by the body, which is something accidental to the soul. The price of such a view, as William considered it, is that human souls would lose their individuality and become one soul upon separation from their bodies. Thus, by showing that accidents cannot individuate, William could show that the body, as accidental to the soul, cannot individuate the soul. On this point, see Roland Teske, J., “William of Auvergne on the Individuation of Human Souls,” Traditio 49 (1994): 77–93, esp. 89–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ Interestingly, a real distinction may be said to exist between the thing and whiteness. That is, if Owens is correct in holding that there is a real distinction between an apple and its red color, there would also have to be a real distinction between the thing and its white color. In short, Owens argues that because the apple was an apple before receiving its ripe color, it is different from its color prior to any consideration by the intellect. Similarly, since the thing was in fact a thing before receiving its white color, there was a distinction between the thing and its color prior to the consideration of the intellect. Owens points out that in contrast to this sort of distinction, the distinction between iron and metal in iron ore is only a conceptual distinction since iron and metal are different concepts of the same thing. See Owens, , Elementary Christian Metaphysics (n. 18 above), 37–38.Google Scholar

³⁴ William seems to have been the first philosopher in the Latin West to maintain that there are immaterial substances. For Augustine and his followers, on the other hand, everything other than God is material, although not necessarily corporeal. Ibn Gabirol also held that everything except God is composed of matter and form. Regarding the prevailing opinion with respect to the composition of angels and of the soul in the first half of the thirteenth century Latin West, Roland-Gosselin writes: “L'opinion prépondérante, et considérée comme traditionnelle dans la théologie latine au moment où écrivait saint Thomas, admettait que l'ange aussi bien que l’âme, et celle-ci en dehors de son union au corps, étaient composés de forme et de matière, d'une matière tout au moins spirituelle, exempte de quantité. Et l'on s'appuyait généralement sur l'autorité de Boèce pour soutenir que cette composition de l'ange et de l’âme était requise par leur qualité de créature, et nécessaire pour les distinguer de la simplicité absolue de Dieu. A l'exception de l’évêque de Paris, Guillaume d’Auvergne, et d’Albert le Grand, la grande majorité des théologiens de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle se ralliait à cette manière de voir.” See Roland-Gosselin, , Le “De ente et essentia” de s. Thomas d’Aquin (n. 3 above), xvii–xviii.Google Scholar

³⁵ William refers to being as “the first and greatest, that is, the most excellent of all things which proceed from the creator.” He says in De universo Ia Iae.30.625bA–B: “… quoniam esse est primum, et maximum idest amplissimum omnium eorum, quae procedunt a creatore, et quod recipit unumquodque ab ipso. Impossibile enim est manifestum, aliquid recipit, vel fluere, super rem quamque, ante esse.”Google Scholar

³⁶ De universo Ia Iae.3.594bG–H: “Jam ante declaratum est in prima parte primae philosophiae, quia omne hujusmodi causatum est possibile esse per se, et est recipiens esse supra se, quod est aliud ab ipso, et propter hoc est in eo potentialiter sive possibiliter, quoniam est ei accidens, hoc est, adveniens ei, et receptum ab ipso supra totam completam essentiam suam.”Google Scholar

³⁷ See Teske, “William of Auvergne and the Manichees,” Traditio 48 (1993): 63–75, at 65 n. 13. Also see Roland-Gosselin, Le “De ente et essentia,” 163, and Gilson, “La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne” (n. 5 above), 81.Google Scholar

³⁸ See De trinitate chap. 7, and De universo IIa IIae.8.852aG.Google Scholar

³⁹ Whereas one finds in St. Thomas the distinction between the essence abstracted with precision, which is represented as a part of the thing, and the essence abstracted without precision, which is represented as the thing itself, one does not find in William an explicit formulation of such a distinction. See St. Thomas De Ente et Essentia chap. 2 (ed. Roland-Gosselin, 22, lines 12–18, and 23, lines 4–7). Also see Owens's discussion of this distinction in St. Thomas, in Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 132–33, and “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being” (n. 15 above), 31–33.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ One text in which William makes this assertion is De universo Ia Iae.3.594bG–H.Google Scholar

⁴¹ William's description in De trinitate of being (esse) as that which each thing values most and that for which each thing seems to neglect and risk itself may, given the context, be interpreted as referring to God. The point William wishes to make in the context is that God is ultimately the being (esse) of all things. All things depend upon and participate in the creator. But the text is ambiguous and can also be interpreted as referring to the being that is proper to each individual thing. And even if being (esse) is interpreted as the creator here, such is certainly not the usual sense of being (esse) for William. Moreover, because William does consider God to be the First Being (esse) in whom all other beings participate and in whom being and essence are one, it would seem perfectly consistent for him to refer to God on occasion simply as being (esse). But doing so would not imply that being (esse) cannot also signify the participated act of being that is other than the essence and proper to creatures. See De trinitate chap. 7: “Sive autem ita sit sive aliter, dubitari tamen non potest omnia esse vel participatione primi esse, qualem diximus, vel participatione alicuius, quod ex illo fluit, sicut lumen sparsum super omne. Indicium autem huius est, quoniam omnia adeo amant et appetunt esse, quod unaquaeque res se ipsam negligere videtur et exponere propter ipsum esse, quemadmodum omne totum partes suas …” (Switalski, 47; Teske and Wade, 90).Google Scholar