¹ I am very grateful for the valuable help given to me in preparing this article by Fr. Sebastian Day, O.F.M., who is working on a comprehensive study on the notitia intuitiva under my direction. Google Scholar

The following works will be simply quoted by name and pages: Hochstetter, E., Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham, Berlin 1927, Walter de Gruyter Co.— Gilson, E., The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York 1937, Charles Scribner's Sons. Google Scholar

² For further details we refer to Hochstetter, p. 27 ss. and to Vignaux, P, “Nominalisme”, in: Vacant, , Diction. de Théol. cath., t. 11, pt. 1 (1931), col. 752 s. and 767 ss.Google Scholar

³ Ordinatio, prol. q. 1 X (our edition, Paderborn 1939, Schöningh, p. 19); cfr. below, Rep. II, q. 15 E. Note that Ockham proves (in X-Y) also that sensitive intuitive knowledge does not suffice for knowing a contingent truth, which, of course, is a proposition, but only intellective intuitive knowledge of material or immaterial things: “ ad notitiam alicuius veritatis contingentis non sufficit notitia intuitiva sensitiva, sed oportet ponere praeter illam etiam notitiam intuitivam intellectivam.” Y (p. 21).Google Scholar

⁴ “Patet etiam, quod intellectus noster pro statu isto non tantum cognoscit ista sensibilia, sed in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua intelligibilia, quae nullo modo cadunt sub sensu, cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio consequens et tristitia et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi ” l.c. HH (p. 29); cfr. Y (p. 22).Google Scholar

⁵ “Et ista erit intuitiva. Et illa est notitia, a qua incipit notitia experimentalis, quia universaliter ille, qui potest accipere experimentum de aliqua veritate contingente, et mediante illa de veritate necessaria, habet aliquam notitiam incomplexam de aliquo termino vel re, quam non habet ille, qui non potest sic experiri. Et ideo sicut secundum Philosophum 1° Metaphysicae et 2° Posteriorum scientia istorum sensibilium, quae accipiuntur per experientiam, de qua ipse loquitur, incipit a sensu, id est, a notitia intuitiva istorum sensibilium, ita universaliter notitia scientifica istorum pure intelligibilium accepta per experientiam incipit a notitia intuitiva intellectiva istorum intelligibilium.” l.c. Z (p. 25); cfr. below Rep. II, q. 15 G. Google Scholar

⁶ “Notitia abstractiva potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, quia est respectu alicuius abstracti a multis singularibus, et sic cognitio abstractiva non est aliud quam cognitio alicuius universalis, abstrahibilis a multis. Aliter accipitur cognitio abstractiva, secundum quod abstrahit ab existentia et non-existentia et ab aliis conditionibus, quae contingenter accidunt rei vel praedicantur de re ” l.c. Z (p. 24). Google Scholar

⁷ Ockham sometimes includes in this imperfect intuitive knowledge the knowledge of future contingent facts also; for instance Rep. II, q. 16JJ; q. 20 E, but he does not give further details. Google Scholar

⁸ Cfr. our edition in The New Scholasticism, 16 (1942), 239 ss. Google Scholar

⁹ “Per notitiam abstractivam immediate sequentem notitiam intuitivam nihil fit nec aliquod capit esse praeter ipsam notitiam abstractivam, quia idem totaliter et sub eadem ratione est obiectum notitiae intuitivae et abstractivae immediate sequentis; ergo sicut nihil est medium inter obiectum intuitive cognitum et ipsam notitiam intuitivam, ita nihil est medium inter obiectum et notitiam abstractivam.” Ord. I, d. 27, q. 3 J; cfr. prol. q. 1 TT (p. 43 ss).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Another point in Hochstetter's interpretation seems to be confused. The excellent interpreter of Ockham finds (p. 75) a difference, if not an opposition, to Ockham's former ideas about the teachings of recordative knowledge (Quodl. I, q. 13 and Rep. II, q. 15; IV, q. 12). But it is important to note that Ockham deals with different problems. Abstractive and conceptual or universal knowledge are not always the same. In addition, the fact of remembrance is a judgement, and by this surpasses the incomplex or abstractive knowledge or imperfect intuitive knowledge which by definition is no judgement. Of this judgement, Rep. IV, q. 12 affords an excellent analysis. Google Scholar

¹¹ See quotations below in Rep. II, q. 15 E, note 14. Cfr. Ord., prol. q. 1AA (p. 26); the references in the text refer to this question. Google Scholar

¹² Though it is very likely that the Ordinatio contains in a revised form the Reportatio on the first book, to which II, q. 15 several times refers, nevertheless, we do not know to what extent Ockham revised his original reportation. Google Scholar

¹³ That this was imputed to St. Bonaventure's theory of illumination, proves once more that very clear theological notions are imperatively needed. Gilson (p. 55 s). finds himself unable to distinguish a more special (but non-supernatural) divine influence on our knowledge from a supernatural influence, if the more special influence is distinct from the general influence of God. And since he would be glad to know what the difference between a more special and natural and a special and supernatural influence could be, I can answer that the one belongs to the natural equipment of human nature (like the general influence which is naturally added), while the other does not. To the first, nature has a natural right, because it is willed by God in this natural insufficiency; to the other, nature has not a natural right. The first is more special, because it does not concern all creatures, but only intellectual creatures, and nevertheless general, because it concerns all intellectual creatures. Is not some generality even contained in the special supernatural influence? There is a dogma of the generality of redemption.Google Scholar

¹⁴ “Praeterea: In illo articulo fundatur illa propositio famosa theologorum: quidquid Deus producit mediantibus causis secundis, potest immediate sine illis producere et conservare. Ex ista propositione arguo sic: Omnem effectum, quem potest Deus mediante causa secunda, potest immediate per se; sed in notitiam intuitivam corporalem (om. P) potest mediante obiecto; ergo potest in eam immediate per se. Praeterea: Omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta potest per divinam potentiam existere alia re absoluta destructa; sed visio stellae in caelo tam sensitiva quam intellectiva est huiusmodi: ergo etc.” Quodl. VI, q. 6. The quotations will be according to the more common Strassburg-edition 1491 (quoted as S), the text is revised according to the Paris-edition 1487 (quoted as P) and the oldest known manuscript Vatic. lat. 3075, written in 1333 (quoted as V). Because of this revision we will bring almost the entire questions V, 5 and VI, 6 of the Quodlibeta into the footnotes, and add variants mostly of V and P Google Scholar

¹⁵ “Praeterea: Deus per eandem notitiam videt rem esse, quando est, et non esse, quando non est; ergo ita potest esse in proposito sine repugnantia.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Cfr. Ord., prol. q. 1 HH (p. 29): “Patet etiam ex praedictis, quomodo Deus habet notitiam intuitivam omnium, sive sint, sive non sint, quia ita evidenter cognoscit creaturas non esse, quando non sunt, sicut cognoscit eas esse, quando sunt.”—About this knowledge of God see Ordin. I, d. 38, q. un. M, and our edition of the Tractatus de praedestinatione etc., which will be published soon. Google Scholar

¹⁶ “Secunda conclusio est, quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potest causari nec conservari obiecto non existente (praesente V). Cuius ratio est: quia effectus realis non potest conservari nec produci de non-esse ad esse ab illo, quod nihil (non V) est; et per consequens naturaliter loquendo requirit tam causam producentem quam conservantem.” Quodl. VI, q. 6. Google Scholar

¹⁷ “Probo primum: Quia licet sit inconveniens, quod eadem notitia sit causa totalis unius (om. V) iudicii et iudicii contrarii respectu eiusdem passi, tamen non est inconveniens, quod sit causa partialis unius iudicii, quando res existit, et similiter causa partialis iudicii contrarii, quando res non existit. Et sic est in proposito.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

¹⁸ “Sed contra: Hoc dato sequitur, quod Deus non posset causare in nobis unum actum cognoscendi, per quem apparet nobis res esse praesens, quae est absens, quod falsum est, cum hoc non includat contradictionem. Assumptum probatur: quia ista cognitio non est intuitiva per te, quia (et V) per illam apparet res esse, quando est, et non esse, quando non est; nec abstractiva: quia per illam non apparet res esse praesens.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

¹⁹ “Ad primum istorum dico, quod Deus non potest causare in nobis cognitionem talem, per quam evidenter appareat nobis rem esse praesentem, quando est absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem: nam cognitio evidens importat, quod ita sit in re, sicut denotatur per propositionem, cui fit assensus per cognitionem, et per consequens (per cognitionem VP, seq. om. V; ut P) cum cognitio evidens huius propositionis: res est praesens, importat rem esse praesentem (et add. VP), oportet quod res sit praesens. Aliter non erit cognitio evidens. Et tu ponis, quod sit absens. Et ita ex illa positione cum cognitione evidente sequitur manifesta contradictio, scilicet quod res sit praesens et non praesens. Et ideo Deus non potest causare talem cognitionem evidentem. Tamen Deus potest causare actum creditivum, per quem credo rem esse praesentem, quae est absens. Et dico, quod ista cognitio creditiva (credita V) erit abstractiva, non intuitiva. Et per talem actum fidei potest apparere res esse praesens, quando est absens, non tamen per actum evidentem.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²⁰ “Praeterea: Quod convenit actui secundum substantiam actus, si substantia eius maneat eadem quocumque alio posito, adhuc tale (om. V) potest sibi convenire; sed substantia visionis manet eadem, re non existente, per potentiam divinam; ergo non repugnat sibi saltem partialiter causare talem assensum, qualem prius causavit, re existente, et per consequens hoc potest sibi competere.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²¹ “Ad aliud concedo, quod si per potentiam divinam visio remaneat, re non existente, non repugnat sibi causare partialiter talem assensum, si omnes aliae causae requisitae con-currant; tamen repugnat sibi causare talem assensum totaliter et partialiter (et p./om.P) sine aliis causis. Et ita cum existentia rei sit causa partialis illius assensus evidentis, impossibile est, quod causetur naturaliter sine existentia rei.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²² “Praeterea: Hoc dato, sequitur, quod visio posset esse, et tamen quod per illam nec apparet res esse nec non esse. Consequens est contra te. Assumptum probatur per illud principium commune: Ubi (om. V) quodlibet aliquorum convenit alicui contingenter, si non sit contradictio, Deus potest facere ipsum sine omnibus simul. Sic enim probatur potissime materiam posse esse sine omni forma. Sed virtute visionis aliquis potest aliquando scire rem esse et aliquando scire rem non esse. Ergo non est contradictio, quod neutrum sibi conveniat. Ad aliud concedo illud principium et conclusionem et totam deductionem: quia non est contradictio, quod visio rei sit, et tamen quod per illam visionem nec iudicem rem esse nec non esse, quia Deus potest facere visionem sine omni assensu tali; sed per naturam non (om. V) potest hoc fieri.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²³ On this question, in connection with the problem of a three-valued Logic in Ockham and others, I am preparing a study. The treatment of Michalski on this subject needs revision: Cfr. “Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIV^e siècle,” Studia philosophica, 2 (Lemberg 1937), 296 ss.Google Scholar

²⁴ “Praeterea: Hoc dato non posset Deus causare assensum evidentem respectu huius contingentis: haec albedo est, albedine non existente: quia visio albedinis causat assensum evidentem respectu huius: haec albedo non est, et intellectus non videtur (potest P) assentire oppositis simul; ergo etc.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²⁵ “Ad ultimum dico, quod Deus non potest facere assensum evidentem huius contingentis: haec albedo est, quando albedo non est, propter contradictionem, quae sequitur: quia assensus evidens denotat sic esse in re, sicut importatur per propositionem, cui fit assensus; sed per istam propositionem: haec albedo est, importatur, quod albedo sit; et per consequens, si sit assensus evidens huius (om. S): haec albedo est, et positum est, quod haec albedo non sit, et ita hypothesis cum notitia evidente includit manifeste contradictionem, scilicet quod albedo sit et albedo non sit (et ita /om. V).” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²⁶ “Concedo tamen, quod Deus potest facere assensum eiusdem (illius V) speciei cum illo assensu evidente respectu illius contingentis (conclusionis P; seq. importatur/om. V): haec albedo est, quando illa albedo non existit; sed ille assensus non est evidens, quia non est ita sicut in re, sicut importatur per propositionem, cui fit assensus.” Quodl. V, q. 5. Google Scholar

²⁷ “Et si dicis: Deus potest facere assensum evidentem huius contingentis mediante existentia rei sicut mediante causa secunda; ergo potest hoc facere se solo.—Respondeo, quod haec est fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut hic (s.h./om. V): Deus potest facere actum meritorium mediante voluntate creata, ergo potest facere se solo; et hoc est propter diversam connotationem hinc inde.” Quodl. V, q. 5. As to this favored example see Summa Log. III (4) c. 10; ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 102 ra.Google Scholar

²⁸ This would be the answer to Gilson's criticism (p. 81–82).—There are no two answers in Ockham to the same problem, and there is no evidence in Ockham that “the fact remains that human knowledge would be practically indistinguishable from what it is, even though all its objects were destroyed ” (p. 82). Consequently it is not correct to say: “In other words, if it is possible for God to make us perceive as real an object that does not really exist, have we any proof that this world of ours is not a vast phantasmagoria behind which there is no reality to be found?” (p. 81). In fact, the expression in italics (mine) belongs to an imaginary world, for Ockham had called it a contradiction to perceive as real an object that does not exist; not, however, to perceive intuitively an object as not real .Google Scholar

²⁹ Michalski, K., “Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XIV^e siècle”, Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, Cracovie 1922, p. 65.Google Scholar

³⁰ Quoted by Michalski, in: “Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIV^e siècle”, Bulletin 1926, p. 91.Google Scholar

³¹ Let us add that intuitive knowledge can only concern possibilia: “Dico, quod contradictio est, quod visio sit et quod (tamen P) illud, quod videtur, non sit in effectu nec esse possit. Ideo contradictio est, quod chimaera videatur intuitive. Sed non est contradictio, quod illud, quod videtur, nihil sit in actu extra causam (animam S; seq. om. SP) suam, dummodo possit esse in effectu vel aliquando fuit in rerum natura. Et sic est in proposito. Unde Deus ab aeterno vidit omnes res factibiles, et tamen tunc nihil fuerunt.” Quodl. VI, q. 6. Google Scholar

³² Koch, J., “Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 7 (1935), 375.Google Scholar

³³ “Respondeo: Hic non est aliqua habitudo (bona similitudo P) arguendo, quod quia Deus potest facere talem visionem sine obiecto creato, a quo non dependet (illa visio add. P) nisi tamquam a causa secunda, ergo Deus potest videri intuitive et beatifice non exhibita sua praesentia actuali in ratione actualiter praesentis ipsi intellectui, a quo obiecto dependet illa visio sicut a causa prima. Quia quamvis secundum doctores Deus potest facere effectus proprios causarum secundarum sine illis causis secundis, non tamen potest aliquem effectum facere sine causa prima. Unde sicut non est possibile, quod color causet effective visionem suam in oculo, nisi sit actualiter praesens, ita non est possibile, quod Deus causet visionem in intellectu nisi exhibita sua actuali praesentia.” Quodl. VI, q. 6. Google Scholar

³⁴ Guglielmo di Ockham, Lanciano 1931, p. 68. Abbagnano at least does not see the two different problems, when he writes: “Ritornando sull' argomento, egli finisce per concludere che la conoscenza intuitiva mediante la quale giudico dell' inesistenza di un oggetto è di ordine sopranaturale: è Dio che interviene a conservarla, quando si tratta di un oggetto reale che ha cessato di esistere, o che interveniene a produrla e a conservarla quando si tratta di un oggetto che non è mai esistito. Ma è chiaro che questa conclusione di Ockham non è una soluzione, bensì il riconoscimento esplicito che ogni soluzione logica della difficoltà è da ritenersi impossibile.” Google Scholar

³⁵ De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententien, Hilversum, Schipper (s. anno). Zuidema, who knows Hochstetter's study, speaks of a “regelmatige”, that is of a regular intervention of God as concerns human cognition.Google Scholar

³⁶ p. 79s.—G. does not distinguish the two problems either, but proves by his reference to Hochstetter and Abbagnano that he does not think differently, when he writes: “Ockham has several times dealt with the difficulty but his successive answers have merely driven to despair his most conscientious historians” (p. 80). Google Scholar

³⁷ The most conscientious historian, P Vignaux, was, as it seems, not driven to despair. He objects against Hochstetter: “Mais il ne faut pas oublier que l'affirmation et la négation d'existence n'ont pas, dans la doctrine, la même place: l'affirmation d'existence, l'évidence du fait sont la donnée première; la négation évidente d'une réalité n'est q'une possibilité ouverte devant l'esprit.” (l.c. [cfr. note 2] col. 768). And as to the deceiving God he remarks (against Hochstetter p. 19 and 57): “Mais Occam ne semble pas s'être posé le problème de discerner l'évidence des déceptions possibles: il ne se demand pas comment aller des idées aux choses, mais tient que selon l'ordre naturel, la connaissance a sa cause dans l'objet; il s'agit seulement de concevoir exactement cet ordre naturel, qui est contingent” (col. 769). Google Scholar

³⁸ “Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweis bei Wilhelm von Ockham,” Scholastik, 3 (1928), p. 370, note 6. This study is inexact in many respects. Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 1} om. FM; quaestio 10 ^a mg.Ob; quaestio 12 ^a O; M habet in margine: Istud non fuit po(situm?). Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 2} om. ObOME Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 3} per se add. E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 4} operationes E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 5} cognitio E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 6} absentem Ob; absolute M Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 7} perfectorum E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 8} quod est E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 9} concedi ObO Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 10} ex F Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 11} vel magis perfecta add. E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 12} om. FM Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 13} arguitur E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 14} intentiones FObO Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 15} sic F. Cfr. l.c. (21); PL t.42, col.1074. Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 16} om. F; pro seq. Conformiter E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 17} particulariter F Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 18} om.Ob Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 19} absoluta(?) add. Ob; causa add. M; pro seq. sufficienter FO(disposita add. O) Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 20} om. FObOM Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 21} om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 1a} Item quaeritur E; quaestio 11 ^a marg. Ob; quaestio 16 ^a (3ⁱⁱ libri) marg. Ob'; quaestio 13 ^a marg. O Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 2a} op.cit. l.II, c.12(3); t.2, p. 401. Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 3a} cognoscendi add. E Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 4a} et F; sicut Ob'OM Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 5a} principium (actus) F; primum EM Google Scholar

^{page 246 note 6a} intellectiones Ob Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 1} Sic vocatur a Gabr. Biehl in Collectorio Ockham hic. Cfr. S. Thomam Contra Gent II, c.98, et Sum. Theol. I, q.55 a. 1ss. Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 2} modo Ob; seq. om. F Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 3} posse ^t Ob'O Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 4} fit E Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 5} om. FObOb'OM, sed Ockham respondet ad istam rationem. Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 6} perfectior ObOb'M; intelligere add. F Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 7} quod E; est add. Ob'OME Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 8} om. Ob; in seq. intelligens E Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 9} l.c.; t. VIII, f. 54ra. pro “12°” 11° FO (5° ! Ob) Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 10} op. cit. Sect. 7; ed. Bardenhewer (Freiburg 1882) Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 1} Cfr. S. Thomam, Sum. Theol. I, q.55, a.3, et Qu. disp. de Verit. 8, a.10. Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 2} om. Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 3} infinitae Ob'OE; pro seq. intelligentiae E Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 4} vel E Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 5} quaestionem ObME Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 6} aliquas E; multas Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 7} Vide infra MM Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 8} quod species non est ponenda add. O Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 9} probari E Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 1} istas quaestiones Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 2} quia ObOE Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 3} albedinem habens vel corpus est add. Ob(et om. in seq. “vel album”); corpus est album. corpus album est M; corpus est. album est. vel corpus est album E Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 4} om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 5} diceretur abstractiva add. E Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 6} om. FOb Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 7} et hoc/om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 8} intellectiva/om. F Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 9} non add. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 10} debita OE Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 11} naturalituer add. Ob'M Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 12} alia Ob'; ipsa O Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 13} om. F; ratio (differentiarum) E Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 14} Cfr. Ockham Prol. q.1 AA (p.26), et Scotum Oxon. 2, d.3, q.9, n.6; t.12, p.212; Quodl. q.6, n.7–8; t.25, p.243s; Quodl. q.13, n.10–13; t.25, p.522–540; Quodl. q.14, n.10; t.26, p. 39; Oxon. 4, d.10, q.8, n.5; t.17, p.285. Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 15} causatur add. Ob'; supra: quae causatur ME Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 16} om. ME; seq. “etiam”/om. Ob'ME (et O) Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 17} etc./om. Ob'M Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 18} obiectum F; pro seq. “quia” et E, et pro seq. videndo ME Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 19} supernaturalis FOM Google Scholar

^{page 250a note 1a} om. FObO; pro seq. iudico F Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 2a} intuitiva add. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 1} 1°Metaph. c.1 (1ss.); t.2, p.468; 2°Poster. c.15(5); t.1, p. 170. Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 2} aliquando add. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 3} aliquando fuisse/om. Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 4} videbam ObO Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 5} imperfecta add. E Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 6} non add. E Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 7} om. FM Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 8} perfecta add. E Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 9} intuitiva/cognitio vero perfecta intuitiva non. ergo E Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 10} fiat FOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 11} aliam FM Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 12} om. F; similis M; inclinantem/M transp. post: “aliam cognitionem abstractivam”, et rep. “Ponendo. ” Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 13} Tenendo E; post habitum quam ante etc./om. F; E transp. totum post J: “cognitionem abstractivam” Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 14} om. ObO Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 15} om. OE Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 16} intuitivae add. E Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 17} intelligi/om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 18} post habitum quam ante etc./transp. post M (in fine): “imperfecta tamen” Ob'M Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 19} … intuitiva/om. Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 1} om. F; imperfecta O Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 2} elicita/intuitiva cum abstractiva M Google Scholar

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^{page 252 note 4} om. ObO Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 1a} et etiam add. F Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 1b} cognitione/ex illa cognitione E Google Scholar

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^{page 252 note 6b} et F; sicut ad M; post seq. perfectam ObO Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 1} l.c. c.2(8); t.2, p.16.Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 2} partialis/om. E(et om. seq. “non”) Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 3} om. F M (rasura); O interl. Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 1a} perfecta OM Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 2a} videre Ob Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 3a} aliam FOM Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 4a} om. FObM; seq. om. ObM Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 5a} viderem Ob; videm(!)corr. marg. M Google Scholar

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^{page 253 note 7a} supposita FOb; seq. opposita/om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 8a} fuisse/om. M; nec opposita/om. O Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 1b} causa OE Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 2b} om. FObO; qui tamen est intra agentem Ob'et om. seq. Google Scholar

^{page 253 note 3b} non add. E, quod Ob' transp. post “requisitum” Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 1} Hoc prob./om. Ob; haec F Google Scholar

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^{page 254 note 7} vel E; oportet M Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 1a} sed FOb Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 2a} oculorum Ob'E; quod falsum est add. O Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 3a} species add. F; aliud add. O; aliquid add. E Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 4a} rationem effectivam O (marg. M?) Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 5a} efficientibus E; Cfr. Scotum Oxon. 1, d.3, q.7, n.3; t.9, p.339; Quodl. q.7, n.19; t.25, p.299s.Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 6a} determinate add. E Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 7a} possit Ob'E; posset O Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 8a} posset Ob'ME; poterit O Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 1} om. OM; non FOb Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 2} Cfr. ad sensum l.c.c.5(4ss); t.3, p.45. Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 3} quae OE Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 4} aliam FOM Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 5} ergo etc. add. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 1} cognitione Ob Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 2} om. OM Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 3} post FOb Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 4} per OE; pro seq. l.c.4(6); t.3, p.467 Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 5} ante/om. F Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 6} accidentali(2)/om. Ob'; pro seq. alium FOE Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 7} prius habuit F; pro seq. intentionem FM Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 8} multae ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 1a} om. F; seq. om. FObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 2a} est add. M; requiratur add. E Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 3a} sufficit F; sufficeret ObO; seq. om. ObO Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 4a} corrumpitur ObOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 5a} centum mille E; mille? F; actum (intelligendi)M Google Scholar

^{page 256 note 6a} posset FE; possim O Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 1} unitatem FObOM Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 2} maxime O; sic correxit marg. M Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 3} receptivam F; recepto M; pro seq. ab M Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 4} om. FObOb'O(M?) Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 5} om. F; cognitionem Ob Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 6} intellectus FM Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 7} l.c. c.8(1–2); t.3, p.470. Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 8} om. FObO (in seq. requirit FOb) Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 9} ergo add. Ob; semper add. E Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 10} ducet Ob'O; duceret M Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 11} potest Ob'(M?); possit E Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 12} omne agens add. M; obiectum add. E Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 13} om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 14} om. FOb Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 15} etiam O; qui E Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 16} in (F?)E Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 17} quae (. in spirituali) Ob Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 18} et Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 19} materiale F (sic corr. M pro: spirituale) Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 1a} essentias ObO Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 2a} vere add. Ob'; illud add. M Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 3a} om. Ob; supra: annihilatur ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 4a} acquisitus/om. ObE Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 1} intelligatur M Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 2} ratione(?)ObOb'O Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 3} aliquis Ob Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 1a} om. FObOb'; magis M; pro seq. intelligatur OM Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 2a} unus add. Ob'; unum add. MO Responsio inceptoris marg. Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 1} possunt F; posset E Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 2} isti tres (et in seq.: terminarentur) OME Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 3} si ME (O long. omissio) Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 4} distinguuntur ObOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 5} actus add. OME (supra nam pro “non nisi” E) Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 6} album FOb; aliud Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 7} quae FObO Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 8} accipiuntur ObOb'; pro seq. mille F; multae OE Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 9} quia Ob'ME; pro seq. “hoc” quod et pro “quod” illud E Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 10} huius (modi) O(Ob?) Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 11} autem FM; pro seq. accipiuntur ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 12} possum ObM; possem (F?) Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 13} l.c. c.8(2); t.3, p.470 Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 14} habitus/Tum quia praesupponit actum et per consequens praesupponit intellectum reductum de potentia essentiali E Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 15} nos M; seq. om. Ob; post seq. simus FO Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 16} De Insomniis c.3; t.3, p.511 Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 17} aliquid Ob'OE Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 18} om. E; seq. om. FOM(Ob'?) Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 1} om. Ob; non F Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 2} imperfectae Ob'; imperfectiori E Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 1a} non add. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 2a} om. ObO Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 3a} apprehensionem Ob Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 4a} approximatum FObOb'M; pro seq. secundum sensum F; seq.: sensus/om. Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 1} aliquis Ob Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 2} aliquis OE; om. M Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 3} om. ObOb'OM; supra immaterialem et infra materialem sed E Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 4} l.c. text 69; t. V, p.19vb. Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 1a} om. FOb'M; seq. om. ObO Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 1} intellectio FM Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 2} similitudinem F; pro seq. quod Ob Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 3} omnis add. Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 4} sequitur Ob'OME Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 5} producetur E; producatur ObM Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 6} producitur FOb'; pro seq. om. O; et M Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 7} produceretur FOM Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 8} produceret O Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 9} in nullo F Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 10} produceretur FOb'O Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 11} determinat ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 12} intentio FObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 13} assimiletur ObM; assimilatur Ob' Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 14} unius Ob Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 15} uno Ob'; om. F Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 16} om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 17} totaliter O. Cfr. II, q.5L; I d.2, q.10N.Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 18} in 4° dist. 43^a in responsione add. O (M marg. illeg). Vide IV, q.10 J Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 19} om. Ob; illis M Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 20} sicut FO; seq. om. ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 21} concludat E; concludit O; concluditur Ob'; pro praeced. quandocumque F Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 1} dictum ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 2} intentione FOb Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 3} om. Ob'OME Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 4} om. Ob'M; sentiuntur/om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 5} om. Ob'OME Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 6} Vide II, q. 9M Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 1} iudicare Ob'(OB?); praec. om. ObM Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 2} debent ObOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 1} om. ObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 2} partialem/causa partialis OE Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 3} ille F; Philosophus Ob Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 4} om. Ob; aliqua? O; seq. “inhaer.” om. F Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 5} om. FOb'O Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 6} om. F; seq. om. F; intuitive(ae?) ObOb'OM (intellectivae?) Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 7} intellectio OM; intellectui E Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 8} quae FObME(Ob'?) Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 9} 5 FOME; 9 Ob'; libro Ob. Cfr. l.c.11(20); 12(22); 15(25); t.42, c.1071ss Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 10} est Ob'OME; pro seq. similis ME Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 11} hic et in seq. dub. assimilatur? FObOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 1a} intelligatur/om. Ob; post seq. intellectus intelligit add. E Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 2a} intelligente FOb' Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 3a} om. Ob'OE; seq. om. Ob'OME; album add. Ob; Ø add. M, id est nihil vel spatium album in originali Ockham. Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 1b} dico E (quod videtur esse melius) Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 2b} om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 3b} om. Ob'E (M interl.) Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 4b} om. FObOb'OM Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 1} quae ObOb'E; quia O; pro seq. non E Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 2} sed Ob'E Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 3} senex M; angelus hic et in seq. Ob'O Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 4} isto E; et praec. om. FOb'OM Nota margin. haud legibilis refert probabiliter ad locum citatum in M.Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 1a} Cfr. Scotum l.c. n.5, t.9, p.236: “Certum est enim, quod universale potest ab intellectu intelligi. Ex hoc igitur manifesto accipio hanc propositionem: Intellectus potest habere obiectum actu universale perfecte sibi praesens in ratione obiecti prius naturaliter quam actu intelligat; ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod in illo priori habet obiectum sibi praesens in specie intelligibili, et ita habet speciem intelligibilem priorem actu. Antecedens assumptum videtur satis manifestum, quia obiectum in ratione obiecti est prius naturaliter actu; igitur universalitas, quae est propria conditio obiecti inquantum obiectum, praecedit actum intelligendi, et sub illa ratione oportet obiectum esse praesens, quia praesentia obiecti praecedit naturaliter actum intelligendi.” Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 2a} quod Ob'OME Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 3a} om. FOE Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 4a} autem add. Ob; post seq. est. unum/om. ObOM Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 5a} om. ObOb'; seq. “obi. pr.” om. Ob' (marg. M) Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 6a} quod ObOb'M Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 7a} realiter Ob; reale E; rationale Ob'; om. O Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 8a} intelligendi M Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 9a} motum FOb'E Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 10a} motus FOb'; et add. Ob; vero est add. E; est add. Ob'M Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 1} om. ObOb'; dico et M Cfr. Scotum l.c.: “Consequentiam probo. Primo arguo sic: Species ex hoc quod talis species habet talem rationem repraesentandi, et hoc respectu obiecti sub tali ratione repraesentabilis; ergo eadem species manens, non habet duas rationes repraesentativas, nec est respectu duarum rationum repraesentabilium. Sed repraesentare obiectum sub ratione universalis et singularis, requirit duplicem rationem repraesentativam, et est respectu duplicis rationis repraesentabilis formaliter; igitur idem manens idem non repraesentat sic et sic; ergo phantasma quod de se repraesentat obiectum sub ratione singularis, non potest ipsum repraesentare sub ratione universalis.” Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 2} phantasma F Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 3} prima F; agendi/om. E (long. om. M) Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 4} nec FOb Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 1} om. FObOb'OM Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 2} et/om. OE Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 3} qui Ob Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 4} repraesentare sive add. Ob pro seq. repraesentare Ob'O Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 1a} Ad r./om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 2a} intelligibilem FE; pro praec. speciem E Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 3a} phantasma Ob Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 4a} causarum E(F?) Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum, l.c.n.7, p.238: “Secundo ad istud primum membrum arguo sic: Quia repraesentativum secundum totam virtutem suam repraesentans obiectum aliquod sub una ratione, non potest simul repraesentare idem, vel aliud sub alia ratione obiecti; sed phantasma in eodem instanti in quo intelligitur universale, secundum totam virtutem suam repraesentat obiectum ut singulare virtuti phantasticae, quia tunc est actualis imaginatio illius obiecti in singulari; et patet, quod secundum totam virtutem phantasmatis, quia alias virtus phantastica non posset habere per phantasma ita perfectum actum circa obiectum, sicut obiectum natum est repraesentari per illud phantasma, igitur tunc non potest repraesentare obiectum sub alia ratione repraesentabilis.” Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 1b} ratione Ob (in aliis dubium) Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 2b} rerum FME (M add. post seq. natura) Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 3b} dicta FOb' Vide I, d.2, q.6, et alias.Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum, l.c.n.8, p.243: “Ex alio membro arguitur sic: Intellectus agens est potentia mere activa secundum Philosophos, quia est illud quo est omnia facere, sicut possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, et secundum Philosophum est sicut ars ad materiam, id est, ita comparatur ad intellectum possibilem sicut ars ad materiam; omnis autem actio realis habet aliquem terminum realem et unum; ille autem terminus realis non est in phantasmate, quia intellectus agens nihil causat in phantasmatibus, quia illud receptum esset extensum, et ita intellectus agens non transferret obiectum ab ordine in ordinem, nec illud esset magis proportionatum intellectui possibili quam phantasma; ergo est in intellectu possibili, quia nihil recipitur in intellectu agente. Illud autem primum causatum non potest poni actus intelligendi, quia primus terminus actionis intellectus agentis est universale in actu; universale autem in actu praecedit actum intelligendi, sicut praedictum est in antecedente, quia obiectum sub ratione obiecti praecedit actum.” Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 1} intellectionem Ob'OE Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 2} habet FObOM Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 3} repraes./om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 4} repraesent./om. Ob(Ob') Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 1} est Ob. Cfr. I, d.2, q.8 E ss; ed. nostra in The New Scholasticism 16 (1942) p. 266ss. Istam opinionen Ockham postea dimisit.Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum l.c.: “Et confirmatur ratio, quia intellectus agentis est facere de non universali universale, vel de intellecto(!) in potentia intellectum(!) in actu (secundum Ockham textus habuit: “de intelligibili intelligibile”) sicut dicunt auctoritates Philosophi.” Google Scholar

Cfr. Arist. III De Anima, c.3; t.3, p.464s, et specialiter Commentatorem text. 18 et 19; t.V f.169vs.Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 1a} intellectu Ob'ME. Ockham rursus vituperat istam negligentiam in Expositione (inedita) sup.1. Physic. I, ad text.11.Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 2a} intentionem F; ed. Juntas semper habet “intentio” etc., ubi hic invenitur “intellectio,” sed testimonium F nihil valet in hac parte, quia semper confundit istas lectiones.Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 3a} ad intellectionem E (intentionis F) Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 4a} vel intell./om. Ob (et ed. Juntas, quae habet in seq. “intellectum”, sed Ob corr. consequenter in intellecta) Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 5a} possibilis E i post seq. est add. FOM Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 6a} intentiones FO (et Juntas).Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 7a} ibi E; om. Ob Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 1b} recipitur ObOb'M Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum l.c.: “Et Commentator 3. de anima, dicit quod si essentiae rerum essent universales, sicut posuit Plato, non indigeremus, secundum ipsum, intellectu agente. Cum autem universale inquantum universale nihil sit in existentia, sed tantum sit in aliquo, ut repraesentante ipsum obiectum sub tali ratione, ista verba nullum intellectum habent, nisi quia intellectus agens facit aliquid repraesentativum universalis de eo quod fuit repraesentativum singularis, quomodocumque illud ‘de’ intelligatur, materialiter vel virtualiter, hoc realiter est facere repraesentativum sub ratione universalis, quia actio talis non terminatur nisi ad repraesentativum obiecti sub ratione universalis; ergo talis actio intellectus agentis terminatur ad formam aliquam realem in existentia, quae formaliter repraesentat universale inquantum universale, quia aliter non posset terminari actio eius ad universale sub ratione universalis.” Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 1} intentionem O (et in seq.); intentiones F Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 2} subiective add. Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 3} possunt ObOb'O Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 4} unde O; non add. M (transponendo); in seq. eam FO Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 5} istam additionem om. FObOb'OM Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 6} qui FOE Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 7} possibilem FObOb' Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 8} omne Ob'O Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum l.c.n.10, p. 250: “De secundo membro, scilicet praesentia obiecti, probatur illa consequentia prima, primo sic: Aut intellectus potest habere obiectum sibi praesens in ratione obiecti intelligibilis absque hoc, quod sit praesens alicui potentiae inferiori, aut non. Si non, igitur non potest habere aliquam operationem sibi propriam sine potentiis inferioribus, quia si non potest habere obiectum suum sibi praesens sine eis, non potest habere operationem sine eis. Si autem potest habere obiectum praesens absque eius praesentia potentiae inferiori, ergo habet. Haec consequentia probatur, quia agentia talis praesentiae obiecti, scilicet phantasma et intellectus agens sunt sufficienter appropinquata intellectui possibili, et agunt per modum naturae, et ita causant necessario in illo praesentiam cuius est receptivus; modo obiectum non est praesens intellectui possibili in cognitione abstractiva ante actum elicitum, nisi per aliquod repraesentativum, quod voco speciem, et sic habeo propositum.” Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 1a} om. FO Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 2a} om. Ob; vel Ob'E. Pro seq. cfr. Scotum l.c.n.11: “Secundo sic: Aliae potentiae cognitivae habent obiectum praesens eis, non solum praesentialitate secundaria, scilicet quia illa sunt praesentia aliis potentiis inferioribus, sed propria praesentialitate, sicut sensus communis habet colorem sibi praesentem, non tantum inquantum est praesens visui, sed quia habet speciem eius praesentem in organo sensus communis; ergo cum hoc sit perfectionis in potentia cognitiva, scilicet posse habere obiectum sibi praesens sub ratione, qua est obiectum talis potentiae, sequitur quod intellectus non tantum potest habere obiectum sibi praesens, quia praesens est virtuti phantasticae, sed propria praesentialitate, inquantum scilicet relucet intellectui per aliquod, quod est in intellectu.” Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 3a} debito Ob'OE Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 4a} Cfr. Scotum l.c.n.13, p.253: “Haec etiam videtur intentio Aristotelis, qui 3°De Anima (Text.37), volens quod anima sit quodammodo omnia, quasi probando, exponit se, quod est per sensus sensibilia, et per intellectum vel scientiam scibilia, quod aliqui exponunt quod non loquitur uniformiter hic et ibi, quia de sensu loquitur quantum ad speciem impressam, de intellectu autem quantum ad habitum scientiae. Sed haec expositio non videtur esse ad intentionem Philosophi, quia sicut antiqui posuerunt animam esse omnia realiter, ut omnia cognosceret, sic Philosophus ponit eam esse omnia non realiter, sed per quamdam similitudinem.” Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 5a} omnia add. Ob'ME Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 6a} Textus corruptus: August.de/om. FE; Augus. Ob'; de dicto Aug. O; quod de (dictum interl.) Augustini de M; pro praec. dico Ob'M Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 7a} etc. add. FOb'OE Google Scholar

Cfr. Scotum, l.c.n.14: “Expressius tamen est ad istud intentio Augustini. Quod deduco sic: nihil enim sufficienter natum est gignere notitiam actualem, nisi ipsum habeat obiectum prius naturaliter quam actum praesens sibi in se vel in aliquo repraesentante ipsum; sed negando speciem intelligibilem, tota pars intellectiva non habet ante actum intelligendi, obiectum sibi praesens in se, nec in aliquo repraesentante; ergo negando speciem intelligibilem, nihil in intellectiva parte erit sufficienter natum gignere actum intelligendi, et ita nihil in parte intellectiva erit sufficienter memoria respectu talium intellectionum vel gignitionem, quod negat Augustinus 12° De Trinitate c.14 [(23); PL t.42, col.1010]” Google Scholar

^{page 275 note 1} re E (in ObOM dubium) Google Scholar

^{page 275 note 2} Cfr. prol. q.4 in ordine (secunda incid.) Google Scholar