¹ This article is concerned exclusively with the philosophy of the Western world. There are parallels to microcosmistic speculations in the philosophy of India and the Far East. This is an interesting fact, which apparently indicates a deep rooted tendency in the human mind for such like ideas. The information on these Eastern philosophies I could find is, however, not sufficient for any systematic treatment. Also, to include these things here would lead too far afield.Google Scholar

² Conforming itself to the general program of Traditio, this study does not deal with any of the more recent developments. To realize the persistent influence of what may be called, for brevity's sake, “microcosmism”, it suffices to recall Lotze's, H. Mikrokosmus, or certain ideas in the philosophy of G. Th. Fechner. Lotze's work has been translated by E. Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones (Edinburgh, 1894).Google Scholar

³ There is, in fact, one doctoral dissertation, Meyer, A., Wesen und Geschichte der Theorie vom Mikro- und Makrokosmus (Bern, 1901, also: Berner Stud. z. Phil. XXV). This study is not very satisfactory, and not only because since its publication a great amount of new material has become known. Meyer's study does not even take account of the material which indubitably was available fifty years ago. The author is so little acquainted with his problem that he claims (p. 98) that the term microcosmus was coined by Nicolaus Cusanus and Paracelsus. The lack of interest for this problem is evidenced also by the fact that the treatise Microcosmus by Godefroy of St. Victor is still unedited. B. Hauréau characterizes this work as a “receuil très considérable d' allégories simplifiées.” The only passage he quotes is, however, insufficient to give an idea of this work. Cf. Histoire de la philosophie scholastique, I (Paris, 1872), 515. There is, however, another and much more detailed study with which I unfortunately became acquainted only after this article was already in print. G. P. Conger published a monographic analysis of Theories of Macrocosms and Microcosms in the History of Philosophy (New York 1922). As the title indicates, the intention is not a systematic but a historical survey which, moreover, is extended into quite recent times. The book contains also particularly valuable informations on early and medieval Jewish and Mohammedan ideas. The author has also made a special study of Eastern philosophies; see his “Cosmic Persons and Human Universes in Indian Philosophy”, Journ. and Proceed. Asiatic Soc. of Bengal, 29 (1933), 255. Dr. Conger is rather sceptical concerning the value of microcosmistic conceptions which, he thinks, are best left to “lie like fossils scattered throughout the upheaved and faulting strata of the history of philosophy.” Google Scholar

⁴ On the notion of the hermeneutic circle, see Wach, J., Das Verstehen; Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Idee , Vol. I (Tübingen, 1926).Google Scholar

⁵ Mauthner, Fr., Wörterbuch der Philosophie , 2d ed., II, 324 ff., curiously enough, seems not to have grasped the signification of the Stoic term. It is, however, easy to discover. βραχύς conveys, in this context, exactly the signification of “abbreviation” or “on a small scale”. E.g.: Basilius, Adv. Eunom. III, 6 (P.G. 29,669). Leibniz has apparently this idea in mind when he says that the monads represent the great world en racourci. Mauthner also objects against the name of macrocosmus. One may, so he says, consider man as a small world, but to call the universe which contains everything a macrocosmus does not make sense. He overlooks that κóσμoς does not signify primarily the universe. Calling the universe by this name denotes already a particular kind of cosmological interpretation. The original meaning of κóσμoς is all kind of order whatsoever. The mere fact that Neo-Platonism speaks of the κóσμoς νoητóς, or that eventually the state in which reign justice and order—εὐνoμία καὶ δίκη—is said to be a κóσμoς, should prevent from interpreting the name, in its ancient and medieval use, according to the limited signification it has been given in modern times, especially under the influence of science. The expression occurs often in Philo, e.g., De plant, 28; De vita Mosis, II, 135; De provid. I, 40; Quis rer, div. heres, 155.Google Scholar

⁶ Phys. VIII, 2 (252 b 26).Google Scholar

⁷ Stein, L., Die Psychologie der Stoa , I (Berlin, 1886), 205.Google Scholar

⁸ E.g. Gregor. Naz. Orat. XXVII (P.G. 36, 57 A): ὁ μικρòς oτoς κóσμoς … ὁ ἄνϑρωΠoς. Google Scholar

⁹ Proclus, , In Tim. 348 A, quoted by Schedler, M., Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalters (Münster, 1916, Beitr. z. Phil. d. MA. 13, 1), p. 44, note: μικρóς ἐστι καὶ oτoς (sc. ἄνϑρωΠoς) κóσμoς. Plotinus calls man a κóσμoς νoητóς, Enn. III, 4, 3: ἐσμὲν ἕκαστoς κóσμoς νoητóς, and his works were widely read. Cf. Henry, P., Les états du texte de Plotin (Paris, 1938).Google Scholar

¹⁰ The somewhat dubious praise of Macrobius: Abaelard, , Theol. Christ. I, 19 (P.L. 178, 1153). On Macrobius, see below. Among the Greek sources which became directly or indirectly influential one may mention also Galenus, , De usu part. III, 10: τò ζoν ooν μικρòν τίνα κóσμoν εναι φάσιν ἄνδρες Παλαιoὶ Περὶ φύσεως ἱκανoὶ. Besides excerpts of Macrobius, medieval Florilegia contained passages from Martianus Capella and Seneca, enough to transmit the Neo-Platonic and Stoic spirit. Ullman, B. L., “Classical Authors in Medieval Florilegia”, Class. Phil. 27 (1932), 1.Google Scholar

¹¹ One is reminded of Goethe's word: “Ist nicht der Kern der Natur, Menschen im Herzen?” Google Scholar

¹² V. infr. p. 395 ff.Google Scholar

¹³ I have, in my classes, often referred to the similarities obtaining, e.g. between Averroism and the idea of C. G. Jung of a “collective unconscious”. See also Hayes, M. D. Sr., Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles (Washington, D. C., 1942). The ideas of L. Klages on “spirit” (Geist) deserve mention since they seem to point into the same direction.Google Scholar

¹⁴ It may be permitted to comment briefly on the importance of the microcosmistic conceptions discussed above for certain types of metaphysical speculation. I refer particularly to the well known argument St. Anselm of Canterbury proposed as a proof for the existence of God. This so-called ontological argument—the name was, it seems, given to it by Kant—is criticized for “jumping” in a wholly unwarranted manner from the logical into the real or ontological sphere. This was the gist already of Gaunilo's objections. In reading St. Anselm, especially his answer to Gaunilo (Liber contra insipientem) one is amazed by the trust he put into his reasonings. Anselm was a powerful thinker and hardly so easily deceived by a specious argument. His proof also appealed to several of his successors, to Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel. It seems probably that Anselm himself and the other philosophers who approved of his argument (even though they might have to “color” it, as Duns Scotus says) envisioned it on a background which allowed to “shift” from the logical into the ontological field, in fact made such a shifting not only permissible but let it appear as no “shift” at all. If it is assumed that the mundus intelligibilis—whatever its ontological standard—is built according to the same fundamental principle as the mundus sensibilis v. realis, then the Anselmian argument may well be considered as conclusive. It then becomes possible to argue from the rationes necessariae here to real facts there. A similar spirit seems to prevail as well in Leibniz' monadology as in Hegel's so-called pan-logism.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Irenaeus, , Adv. Haer. IV, 21 (P.G. 7, 1046).Google Scholar

¹⁶ However, one should not forget, that “it is not always science which speaks, when the scientist talks”, as E. Husserl remarked. The relation between medieval symbolism and modern science can be illustrated by the use of the metaphorical expression “book of nature”, which is common to both. “The true book of philosophy is the book of nature … written in letters others than those of our alphabet; the letters are triangles, squares, circles, cones, pyramids, and other mathematical figures”, Galileo, , opp. ed. Alberti, , VII, 354. The “code” was another one with Galileo and the medieval symbolists; but to both it was a code to be decoded. K. Jaspers uses the term “decipher” to indicate the philosopher's activity in interpreting the given.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Cf. P. A. Sorokin's notion of “sensate culture”.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Dunbar, H. F., Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy (New Haven, 1929), p. 5 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁹ V. infr. p. 348 f.Google Scholar

²⁰ See, for instance, De migr. Abr. 16, 92 (Opera, edd. Cohn, L. and Wendland, P., II, Berlin, 1895, p. 285).Google Scholar

²¹ Cassianus, Joh., Collat. XIV (ed. Petschenig, M., Corp. SS. Eccl. Lat. vol. 13).Google Scholar

²² The passage proceeds: “Interpositis quippe aenigmatibus dum quoddam in verbis cognoscit (sc. anima) quod suum est, in sensu verborum intelligit quod non suum est; et per terrena verba separatur a terra. Per hoc enim quod non abhorret cognitum, intelligit quoddam incognitum.” The last sentence has been misunderstood by Dunbar, , op. cit. p. 270, who thinks that the quod non abhorret cognitum refers to the second Person of the Trinity; obviously the reference is to what can be immediately known. “Rebus enim notis per quas allegoriae conficiuntur sententiae divinae vestiuntur, et dum re cogniscimus exteriora verba, pervenimus ad interiorem intelligentiam.” (Magnus, Gregorius, Super Canticum Canticorum expositio, Prooemium, P.L. 79, 467).Google Scholar

^22a De partibus legis , P. L. 68.Google Scholar

²³ Maurus, Rabanus, Allegoriae in Scripturam Sanctam (P.L. 112, 850).Google Scholar

²⁴ Magnus, Gregorius, Moralia , XX (P.L. 76, 135). Cf. Saresberiensis, Joannes, D septem septenis, VI (P.L. 199, 956 B).Google Scholar

²⁵ Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1m.Google Scholar

²⁶ De an. III, 8 (431 b 21). Cf. Aquinas: “anima quodammodo omnia”, In III. de an. 1 13; S. Th. I, q. 84, a. 2, ad 2m.Google Scholar

²⁷ As W. Jaeger remarks, there was no word in Greek for “conscience”, a notion of which the Mediterranean world was ignorant in pre-Christian times. One ought, however, to take account of ideas, current especially in the middle and late Stoa, which come close to the notion of conscience in the Christian and modern sense.Google Scholar

²⁸ v. Gierke, O., The Development of Political Theory , tran. Freyd, B., (New York, 1939). The first German edition appeared in Breslau, 1880, under the title, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien. Google Scholar

²⁹ Calvin criticizes Melanchthon for having reserved something to man. “No theologian has humiliated humanity and reason more than he (Calvin). To humiliate man and to glorify God, this is the only goal of his theology”. Rognin, , Rev. Chrét. 1936, quot. Olgiati, F., L'anima dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento (Milan, 1924), p. 402. One must, however, not forget that there is the opposite interpretation of Calvin's anthropology, too. Dilthey, W., Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert (Ges. Werke, II, Leipzig, 1921, p. 231), claims that never before had the “loftiness of human destiny been felt and stated” as in Calvin's idea that grace cannot be lost.Google Scholar

³⁰ With the one notable exception of William of Conches who attempted a renewal of atomism, much in the sense of Democritus or, perhaps, better Epicurus or Lucretius. There is, of course, a noticeable appreciation of Stoic ethics; Seneca, for instance, is quoted frequently. But Stoic metaphysics, so far as they were known, did not meet with approval.Google Scholar

³¹ German Classicism does not furnish an argument in favor of the necessity of Platonism in Renaissance. The feature which attracted, e.g., Goethe, in first line was art. Renaissance art was influenced by the art of Old Greece, and there was a general interest in the sculptures stemming from these times. It was art which first transmitted to the German mind the ideal of Antiquity and, subsequently, of the Italian Renaissance. The latter being Platonic in its philosophy, it is easy to see how Platonism came to be identified with the spirit of Classicism.Google Scholar

³² “L'astrobiologie, la tendance de voir partout à la fois une action vitale (comme celle dont témoigne la croissance des plantes) et une régularité mathématique (comme celle que manifestent les lois du mouvement des astres) a été la manière de penser la plus repandue à la surface de notre planète entre l'époque néolithique et le triomphe récent de la science européenne moderne.” Berthelot, R., “L'Astrobiologie et la pensée d'Asie”, Rev. de Mét. et Mor. 44 (1937), 549. This is the last of nine essays on this topic, published in the same review, vols. 39–44 (1932-1937).—Concerning the tendency, common with many scholars, to seek for a foreign origin of all sorts of ideas, and to establish dependencies whenever similar ideas are found in the philosophies or mythologies of different peoples, the remarks of H. Fl. Dunbar seem to the point (Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy, New Haven, 1929, p. 249 f.): “As study of materials of symbolism makes clear that similarities of myth among divers races is no indication of influence or racial contact, so a study of thought as it developed through these materials shows definitely that influences need not be sought for the development of the philosophy and method of insight symbolism. Given the same problem and the same symbolic materials, it was Google Scholar

Footnote missing.Google Scholar

belief in the unpredictability of divine dispositions, and the wantonness of some of the gods' doings, the Homeric people are “awake to the idea of a general world order … the belief arises that the world is a κóσμoς, a perfect order, like the one men try to achieve in their states.” Rohde, E., Psyche (4th ed., Tübingen 1907), I, 43.—Sabine, G. H., A History of Political Theory (New York, 1937), p. 26 ff., remarks: “At the start the fundamental idea of harmony was applied indifferently as a physical and as an ethical principle…. The first development of this principle, however, took place in natural philosophy, and this development reacted in turn upon its later use in ethical and political thought.” Thus, in the eyes of this author the relation is the opposite of what W. Jaeger believes it to be.—If one may fully rely on certain reports, one has to admit that the social world became the prototype for the universe not only to the Greeks. Indications pointing in this direction may be found in Durkheim, E. and Mauss, M., “De quelques formes primitives de classification”, Année Sociolog. 6 (1901), 24 ff. and the works listed there.—J. Burnet interprets the words of Anaximandros in a somewhat different manner. As δíκη is regularly used of the observance of an equal balance between the opposites, hot and cold, dry and wet, the ἀδικíα here referred to must be the undue encroachment of one opposite on another. Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (4th ed., London, 1930), p. 52. The two views are not irreconcilable. The opposites may well be conceived as “fighting” one another. In fact, we still speak of spring “overcoming” winter and use many other such like phrases.Google Scholar

³⁷ The title of Hesiodus' great poem, “Eργα καὶ ἡμέραι is perhaps indicative. Cf. also Greene, W. Ch., Moira, Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge, Mass. 1944), p. 33. Unfortunately this excellent book appeared too late to be considered.Google Scholar

³⁸ If Hegel's famous word of Minerva's bird starting on its flight only in the dusk were generally true, one would have to place Anaximandros at the end of a period of the history of thought. Sometimes, however, this bird unfolds its wings also in the hours of dawn.Google Scholar

³⁹ Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy , p. 53.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Cf. Cicero, , De nat. Deor. I, 25: Anaximandros' opinion was that there were gods coming into being, rising and passing away, and these were the innumerable worlds. Also Aetius, I, 7, 12: the ἄΠϵρoι oὐρανoί are gods.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy , p. 135. Fragm. 94: ἥλιoς γáρ oὐχ Πρεσβήσεται μέτρα' εἰ δὲ μὴ, 'Eρινύες Δίκης ἐΠίκoυρoι ἐξευρήσoυσιν. Google Scholar

⁴² Burnet, J., ibid. p. 151.Google Scholar

⁴³ Frag. 4. Aetius, V, 30, 1. Diels, , Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (4th ed.), I, 138; it seems that Diels considers only the two words ὶσoνoμíα and μoναρχíα as originally of Alkmaion, the rest being a paraphrase by some other author. The text reads: Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Met. A, 5 (985 b 23 ss.).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Met. A, 6 (987 b 11): Cf. Aristoxenos in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I, 45: Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Aristotle, in fact, says that everything appeared to the Pythagoreans as fashioned on the pattern of numbers, or “modelled upon numbers,” as H. Trendennik in Met. A, 5 (986 a 1), so that the primacy of numbers seems well supported.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ W. Jaeger quotes a sentence of Simonides (frag. 4, 2) who describes ἀρητή as “built in hands and feet and mind rectangularly without fault,” Paideia (2d ed., Berlin-Leipzig, 1936), I, 356. The eminent scholar discovers in these words the first indication of an awareness of “mental formation” (seelische Geformtheit) which he believes to be related to the idea of the well ordered κóσμoς. But the “rectangularity” may have also reference to Pythagorean notions.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy , points at Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, V, 1 Lorenzo: “There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st / But in its motion like an angel sing”. One may add the famous words in Goethe's Prologue to Faust: “Die Sonne tönt nach alter Weise / In Brudersphären Wettgesang.” [For a detailed treatment see L. Spitzer's article, infra. ED.] Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Aristotle, , De caelo , B. 9 (290 b 12 ss.).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Plato, , Phaidon , 85 ss. Aristotle, , De an. A. 4 (407 b 30); Polit. O. 5 (1340, b 18). Macro-bius, De Somn. Scip. I, 14, 19.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Praechter, K., Die Philosophie des Altertums (Ueberweg-Heinze, I, 12th ed., Berlin, 1926), p. 71.Google Scholar

⁵² Aristotle, , Met. A. 5 (986 a 8): Google Scholar

⁵³ There is one fragment of Democritus, Diels, II, 72, fr. 34: ἐν τ ἀνϑρώΠῳ μικρ κóσμῳ ἔντι. We do not know more about this idea nor, apparently, did Democritus influence subsequent microcosmistic philosophies. One should remember “the fact, well known to ancient writers of history, but too much overlooked in modern times, that Democritus himself was strongly influenced by Pythagoreism”. Taylor, A. E., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus Oxford, 1928), p. 84.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Concerning the fifth element, , see Aristotle, , De gen. et corr. B. 8 (334 b 30–335 a 5). On the notion of and its relation to human nature, a complete survey may be found in Nuyens, F. J. C. J., Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de Zielkunde van Aristoteles (Nijmegen-Utrecht 1939). See, however, Cicero, , Tusc. Disp. I, 26, 65: “sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta, haec et deorum est et animorum”. Also Acad. post. I, 7, 28.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Mamertus, Claudianus, De statu animae , I, 21 (ed. Engelbrecht, A., Corp. SS. Eccles. Lat. Vol. 11, 1885), p. 71.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Magnus, Gregorius, Hom. in Evan. XXIX (P.L. 76, 1214 A). So also Isidore of Sevilla, Sent. I, 11 (P.L. 83, 559 A): “communia homini omnia naturalia esse cum omnibus quae constant et in homine contineri atque in eo omnium rerum naturam consistere (patet).” Similar statements are found in the writings of the Greek Fathers, e.g., Damascenus, Joannes, De fide orthodoxa, II, 12 (P.G. 94, 925): Nemesius, , De natura hom. c. 1 (P.G. 40, 512 C).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Scottus Eriugena, Joh., De div. nat. II, 4 (P.L. 122, 530 D) and III, 37 (ibid. 733 B).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ de Insulis, Alanus, Distinct. dict. theol. (P.L. 210, 755 a), sub voce creatura. Similarly also Sermo de Spir. Sancto (ibid. 222 D), furthermore Ars Fidei, II, 13 (ibid. 607). Silvestris, Bernardus, De mundi universitate, s. Microcosmus et Megacosmus, II, X (edd. Barach, S. Wrobel, J., Innsbruck, 1867, p. 55): “Mentem de coelo corpus trahit ex elementis / Ut terras habitet corpore, mente coelum.” Google Scholar

⁵⁹ de Insulis, Alanus, Lib. de planctu nat. (P.L. 210, 443 b). The parallel between the four elements and the four complexiones s. humores is common; e.g. William of St. Thierry, De nat. corp. et an. (P.L. 180, 698); also Augustodunensis, Honorius, Elucidarium, I. 11 (P.L. 172, 1117 A). Henricus Francigena (ca. 1120), Aurea Gemma, cf. Haskins, Ch. H., Studies in Medieval Culture (Oxford, 1929), p. 178 ff. “mundus iste ex quatuor elementis constat. Creator … providet ut mundus sibi similia contineret. Continet enim hominem qui microcosmus dicitur … qui ex quatuor elementis constat … sed etiam ex quatuor humoribus qui similes propterea sortiti sunt”.—This idea was transmitted to the Western scholars supposedly by Constantinus Africanus: “Corpus humanum ex quatuor humoribus constat sibi a mundi elementis appropriatis.” Müller, M., “Die Stellung des Daniel von Morley in der Wissenschaft des Mittelalters”, Phil. Jahrb. 41 (1928), 309. But see Damascenus, Joh., De fide orth. II, 12 (P.G. 94, 921): Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Beda, , De temp. rat. c. 35 (P.L. 90, 458 B).Google Scholar

⁶¹ P.L. 150, 1641 B, C.Google Scholar

⁶² Espenberger, F., Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1901, vol. 3, 5), p. 35, n. 4.Google Scholar

⁶³ There is a relation between the four elements and the qualities of the quatuor tempora. Augustodunes, Honorius, De imag. mundi , II, 59 (P.L. 172, 154). So also, earlier, a treatise, possibly by Gerbert, MS. Digby 83 Bodl., init.: “Quicumque mundane sphere rationem et astrorum legem,” Thorndyke, L., A History of Magic and Experimental Science, I, (New York, 1923), 382: a harmony of the elements, climates, seasons, and humors of the body.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Magnus, Albertus, Compend. theol. ver. II, 61 (ed. Borgnet, , vol. 34, p. 83). Elsewhere, however, he refers to minor mundus only rhetorice et per similitudinem loquendo. (In VIII. Phys. Tr. 1, c. 9, text. 17, ibid. vol. 3, p. 540).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Summa theol. I, q. 91, a. 1, c.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Doctor, M., Die Philosophie des Joseph ibn Zaddik (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1895, vol. 2, p. 20). Husik, I., A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York, 1916), p. 125 ff.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Letter by Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon, , Doctor, M., op. cit. p. 4. Cf. Sarton, G., Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore, 1917), III, 118.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Judaeus, Philo, De plant. (Opp. edd. Cohn, L. u. Wendland, P., II, 139, 15 ff).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Aristotle, , De an. B. 2–4 (413 a-415 b).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Reinhardt, K., Poseidonios (Munich, 1921), p. 343. —Two points may be noted in this passage. First, that the similarity with the lower organisms is not limited to mental capacities or faculties like perception or appetition, but also to a moral quality such as courage. Secondly, that the wording of Poseidonios recalls the way in which Scottus Eriugena states the same idea insofar as he distinguishes intelligere and ratiocinari. It is, however, doubtful whether this detail can be considered as indicative of a more direct relation to Poseidonios. For another interpretation of Poseidonios' philosophy, partly in agreement with, partly critically opposed to Reinhardt, see Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften (2 vols., Breslau, 1921-28).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Weissberg, L., Der Mikrokosmos, ein angeblich im 12. Jahrhundert von dem Cordubaner Josef ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches System nach seiner Echtheit untersucht (Inaug. Diss. Breslau, 1888), quotes, p. 55, the following passage: The passage is taken from Photius, , Bibl. cod. 249 (Vita Pythag.), p. 440 a. 33 ed. Bekker.Google Scholar

⁷² Judaeus, Philo, Leg. alleg. II, 22 (ed. cit. I, 107).Google Scholar

⁷³ “Das was wir heute eine kosmische Auffassung des Menschen nennen, ist der griechischen Metaphysik selbstverständliche Voraussetzung—so selbstverständlich, dass sie oft gar nicht ausgesprochen wird, sondern uns erst entgegenspringt, wenn wir den Zusammenhang der Gedanken verstehen.” Stenzel, J., Metaphysik des Altertums (Handb. d. Phil. I, Munich, 1931), p. 29.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Grosseteste, Robert, Quod homo sit minor mundus , in Baur, L., Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1912, Vol. 9), p. 59. The twofold parallelism is noteworthy. There is one of organs or functions and the elements, and one of parts of the body, on one hand, and parts of the universe, on the other. (Terra, in this context, obviously refers not to the element but to the planet.) The formula, too, that the “ratio “of an element is in an organ is not without interest. It indicates that the relation is not one of composition but of correspondence. Insofar, this passage might be quoted also as an instance of symbolistic interpretation. The structural viewpoint, however, predominates. Such ideas remained alive a long time. Cusanus uses the same argument, with the intention to illustrate the conception of the earth as a living being. He ascribes this view to Plato: De docta ignorantia, II, 13 (Opp. edd. Hoffmann, E. and Klibansky, R., I, Leipzig, 1931, p. 111).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Mauthner, Fr., Wörterbuch der Philosophie (2d ed., Leipzig, 1924), II, 324 ff.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ The ἄΠϵρoι κóσμoι of Anaximandros suggest that this philosopher had not yet developed the idea of there being but one universe. A Democritean fragment, too, speaks of ἄΠϵρoι oὐρανoί. However, one has to consider that the words oὐρανóς or κóσμoς are quite ambiguous. Aristotle distinguishes, De caelo, A (278 b 11 ff.), three meanings: (1) the oὐσία of the uppermost sphere, or Πϵριφoρά, of the universe, (2) the body next to this, comprising the planets, sun, and moon, that is oὐρανóς as opposed to Earth, (3) the whole universe as included by the uppermost circle. In any case, one must distinguish between the indetermined number of universes, or oὐρανoί, and the Pythagorean notion of a definite number of such oὐρανoί—an idea suggested to these philosophers by the number of regular bodies. They assumed that there are five κóσμoι , Plato, , Tim. 55, c. 7. Wherefrom Petron got his 183 worlds, of which we are told by Plutarchus (Taylor, A. E., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 79), seems not to be known. It is quite another question whether or not God could, or did, create several universes, a problem which plays a great rôle in late medieval speculation and also in the thoughts of Giordano Bruno.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Jaeger, W., Paideia (2d ed.), I, 356, goes perhaps a little too far in his emphasis on the primacy of “cosmic” speculation. But his statement implies, nevertheless, a useful correction of the tendency to overestimate the rôle of “animism”. First, according to this author, it is art which discovers in the harmony of the body the principle of the cosmos. “Vom Kosmos aus kommt der Grieche jetzt auch zur Entdeckung des Seelischen. Es brodelt nicht erlebnishaft als chaotische Innerlichkeit hervor, sondern wird umgekehrt als der letzte noch übrige Bereich des Seins, der noch nicht von der kosmischen Idee durchdrungen ist, gesetzlicher Ordnung unterworfen…. Es taucht jetzt der Gedanke einer seelischen Geformtheit auf.” On the Greek “vision of the individual” as set over against the one characteristic of Christianity and, especially, of the Christian Occident, see ibid. p. 163.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Thus, for instance, Adelhard of Bath. Willner, H., Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De codem et de diverso. (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1903, vol. 4, 1), p. 82 f.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Bernardus Silvestris, for instance, speaks occasionally of “sensilis hic mundus, mundi melioris imago”. De mundi universitate s. Microcosmus et Megacosmus II, X (edd. Barach, S. and Wrobel, J., p. 55): “In minori mundo, homine, Physis intelligit non errandum, si maioris mundi similitudinem sumpserit in exemplum”; ibid. II, XIV (p. 64).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ The Περὶ φύσϵως ἀνϑρώΠoυ was translated by Alfanus, Archbishop of Salerno (1058-1085) and again by Burgundio Pisano in the twelfth century. But the ideas of this “first anthropology”, as B. Domanski calls this work with some exaggeration, reached the occidental world through many channels: Domanski, B., Die Psychologie des Nemesius (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1900, vol. 3, 1), p. xix. One old manuscript, however, probably stemming from Mont St. Michel, correctly attributes the work to Nemesius: Bliemetzrieder, F., Adelhard von Bath (Munich, 1935), p. 390.Google Scholar

⁸¹ De nat. hom. c. 1 (P.G. 40, 529 and 532 f.): Eἰ τoίνυν, ὡς ἐν ϵἰκóνι τ ἀνϑρώΠῳ, καὶ τὰ ἔξωϑν ἐσoτρισϑϵίημϵν. And: Google Scholar

⁸² Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy , p. 128, note 4, affirms that “no Greek ever doubted that the world was in some sense a ζoν”. That every Greek felt this way is obviously an exaggeration. One may safely surmise that many inhabitants of Athens or Thebes never gave a thought to the problem. But even in regard to the philosophers, this statement seems to go too far.Google Scholar

^82a Taylor, A. E., Plato, The Man and the Work (New York, 1936), p. 416 ff. On Timaeus. see the same author's A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928).Google Scholar

⁸³ The four classes of the actual are: the unlimited (ἄΠϵιρoν), the limited (Πέρας), the mixture of both (μϵικτóν), the cause uniting them in the mixture Philebus, 23c.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Leg. X, 896: Schneider, A., “Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleiches in antiker und patristischer Zeit”, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. Suppl. II (Festgabe Cl. Baeumker), 1923, p. 68: “The World-Soul is credited with the capacity of knowledge. It comprises in its composition the elements of identity and diversity and thus the knowledge of the eternally identical and of the differences. Thus it is able to know the ideas and their terrestrial images…. The same is true of the immortal part of the human soul, which part is formed of the same, though less pure, elements”. The latter idea takes on, with certain “Platonists”, especially of the Middle Ages, the form that the human souls are formed out of the “remnants” of the World-Soul.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Tim. 30b: ζoν ἔμψυχoν ἔννoυν. 92c, on the oὐρανóς: ζoν ὁρατòν τὰ ὁρατὰ Περιέχoν. These statements are repeated, much without modification, by later authors, especially of the Stoa. Eg. Chrysippus (H.v. Arnim. Frag. Stoic. vet. II, 693), from Diogenes Laertius, VII, 142: ὄτι δὲ καὶ ζoν ὁ κóσμoς καὶ λoγικòν καὶ ἔμψυχoν καὶ νoϵpóν. Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Even if it is admitted that everything moving has to be alive, the fundamental idea is still very different from primitive animism. One can hardly accuse Varro of having indulged in so simplistic views. But he is reported by Isidore of Seville, Etymol. XIII, 1 (P.L. 82, 471 C) to have asserted that “nulla requies eius (sc. mundi) elementis concessa est … Unde et animalia Varroni videntur elementa quoniam per semetipsa, inquit, moventur”. It is not far from this statement, it would seem, to the conception of “freedom” in the infra-atomic world as suggested by some contemporary physicists. The rôle which movement played with Varro, is played now by “indetermination”. More important than this emphasis on movement is the conception, developed apparently in first line by the Stoa, that the κóσμoς comprehends dead and living, irrational and rational beings and, therefore, has to possess in its totality all these characteristics. Just as a member of the human body owes its life to the life of the world—membri sumus corporis magni , Seneca, , Ep. 95, 32—so life and rationality must come to the single beings from the universe. Also, since according to a generally assumed principle the whole has a greater dignity than the part, the former cannot lack any perfection the latter presents. “The world is better than its parts; therefore the world must be gifted with life”; Zenon, in Sextus Empiricus, as quoted by Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften , II (Breslau, 1928), 175. It should be noted, however, that the strictly Platonic interpretation of human nature creates certain difficulties when combined with the notion of the microcosm. If the body is a substance in itself, and the soul imprisoned therein—hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosum carcer, as Augustinus wrote, Contra Academ. I, 3, 9—then man can hardly be a microcosm, because the essential unity of κóσμoς is missing; there is a break in his nature. This difficulty apparently, has not been noticed, or if noticed not felt as serious, by those writers who unhesitatingly speak of man as minor mundus and, at the same time, as consisting of two independent substances, united one to the other in a more or less accidental manner. The difficulty is eliminated, perhaps only to some extent, in the Stoic conception by means of the συμΠάϑεια which supplies a unifying principle for the whole κóσμoς and for all its parts. One may recall, in this context, the cleavage between the res extensae and the res cogitantes in Cartesianism on one hand, and Leibniz' attempt to safeguard the unity of the κóσμoς by his notion of pre-established harmony. It is Cartesianism which ultimately made micrososmism in its “classical” forms impossible.—Concerning Timaeus, it must be noted that the statement he makes in the dialogue which bears his name are indeed unequivocal microcosmism—e.g. when man is spoken of as Tim. 88, c. 7; but also that his words do not render necessarily Plato's own views, as A. E. Taylor never tires to point out, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, passim.—Insofar as microcosmistic ideas are to be found with St. Augustine, they are limited to the all-pervasiveness of order. The same order which holds together the universe is also within every being, and the more clearly visible the higher the being. De Civ. Dei, XI, 22 (P. L. 41, 335).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Stenzel, J., Metaphysik des Altertums , p. 156, seems to go farther than the Platonic texts warrant: “Die Welt-Seele, die Gestirnseelen, und diejenigen Seelen, denen die Einkörperung in menschliche Leiber bestimmt ist, gingen für Plato in einer einheitlichen Seelenkraft [what this term exactly means, is not clear] zusammen, deren Wesen zunächst darin besteht, sich selbst und anderes zu bewegen, sich einfügend in alles Tun und Leiden”. It is hard to understand how the one World-Soul can “fit itself into all doing and suffering”, since it is the only origin of any event whatsoever.—If Plato himself did not indulge in astrological beliefs, there existed this tendency, it seems, already during his lifetime even among some of his followers. Moreau, J., L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stoïciens (Paris, 1939), p. 74. Moreau, incidentally, thinks that the World-Soul is to Plato only a “symbol” and that no physical reality was attributed to it prior to the later Academy. Likewise, the silent harmony of this soul becomes with the “so-called” Pythagoreans of a later age “une harmonie sonore”. See Tim. 37 b, and Moreau, p. 54 f. Taylor, A. E., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 182, thinks that astrology became important only in Hellenistic times. There is, indeed, no astrological implication even in Aratos' (ca. 275) poems. See Boll, Fr., Sternglaube und Sterndeutung (3d ed. Leipzig, 1926), p. 21.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Judaeus, Philo, De migr. Abrah. 220; see also De opific. 146, De aetern. 80, and other Passages. Usually Philo feels quite sure in regard to this doctrine; sometimes, however, it apparently impresses him as a rather daring hypothesis; cf. e.g. De somn. I, 15.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Jaeger, W., Humanistische Reden und Vorträge (Leipzig-Berlin, 1937), p. 170.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Cf. e.g. Augustine, St., De civ. Dei , IV, 31, reporting on Varro's view: “Hi soli videbantur animadvertiese quid esset Deus qui crediderunt eum esse animam motu, sc. ratione mundum gubernantem”. Ibid. VII, 6: “Dicit Varro … Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi”; also VII, 23. See furthermore Seneca, Natur. Quaest. I, praef. 13: “Quid est deus? mens universi”. Ep. 65, 24: “quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est.” Google Scholar

⁹¹ Hieronymus, St., Ep. 124, ad Avitum, on the of Origen (P.L. 22, 1062).Google Scholar

⁹² Damscenus, Joannes, De fide orthod. II, 6 (P.G. 96, 885 AB): Mηδείς δὲ ἐμψυχoμένoυς τoὺς oὐρανoὺς ἢ τoὺς φωστέρας ὐΠoλαμβανέτω' ἄψνχoι γαρ εἰσι καὶ ἀναισϑητoί. Scriptural passages, he adds, which have been quoted in favor of this idea refer either to rational creatures (men, angels), or are metaphorical.Google Scholar

⁹³ Basilius, St., Hom. III. in Hexaem. c. 9 (P.G. 29, 76 AB): .Google Scholar

⁹⁴ St. Augustinus, , De immortal. anim. 15, 24 (P.L. 32, 1033). Retract. I, 5, 3 (ibid. 591); also Retract. I, 11, referring to De mus. VI, 14, 43.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Augustinus, St., De gen. ad lit. II, 18, 38 (P.L. 34, 279).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Augustinus, St., Enchir. c. 58 (P.L. 40, 260): “ne illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eandem societatem (sc. angelorum) pertinerent sol et luna et cuncta sidera: quamvis nonnullis lucida corpora non cum sensu vel intelligentia videantur”.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Judaeus, Philo, De somn. I, 135; De opific. 73; De gig. 8. Cf. Schmidt, H., Die Anthropologie Philons von Alexandreia (Inaug. Diss. Leipzig, 1933), p. 27 f.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Philonic influence is maintained by Guyot, , Les reminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin (Paris 1905) and Heinemann, Fr., Plotin (Leipzig, 1921, esp. p. 189). W. R. Inge emphatically denies any such connection: The Philosophy of Plotinus (3d ed. London, 1929), 97. Cadion, R., La jeunesse d'Origène, Histoire de l'École d'Aléxandrie au début du IIIe siècle (Et. de Théol. Histor. Paris, 1936), is reported (Rev. Sc. Phil. Théol., 26 [1937], 371 f.) to have emphasized the rôle of Christian thought in the formation of Neo-Platonism, which influence, he claims, usually is overlooked. One also ought to take account of the dependence of Plotinus on some of his predecessors who were not ignorant of the Hebrew tradition. Poseidonios is one of them. There are many parallels in the Poseidonian fragments, preserved mainly in Cicero and Seneca, to passages in the Enneades. Poseidonios, however, was acquainted with the ideas of the Old Testament; Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, II (Breslau, 1928), 210 and passim.Google Scholar

^98a Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Studien der Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1927), p. 19: “Plotinus and Neo-Platonism try to combine the fundamentals of Platonic and Aristotelean thought; but the result is, considered from the viewpoint of systematics, only an eclectic mixture of the two constituents. The Neo-Platonic system is dominated by the Platonic concept of ‘transcendence’— the absolute opposition of the intelligible and the sensible…. But the dialectic tension, insolvable within Platonism, is dissolved by the reception and incorporation of the Aristotelean notion of evolution. The Platonic category of transcendence and the Aristotelean of evolution beget among them the hybrid notion of ‘emanation’…. The Christian Middle Ages got from this [Neo-Platonism, transmitted mainly by Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagites] the fundamental category of mediation, proceeding by steps, leaving intact on one hand divine transcendence, and overcoming it, theoretically and practically, on the other hand by the idea of a hierarchy of concepts and a hierarchy of spiritual powers.” Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See the letter of Gerolamo Benvieni to Salvacci, quoted by Olgiati, , L'Anima dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento (Milan, 1929), p. 605 f., referring to Pico: He justly is Count of Concordia, since he tries to reconcile the most divers currents of thought.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ It is also possible to combine Neo-Platonic with microcosmistic views by making not individual men, but man, or mankind, the microcosm. By this, a bridge is found to the Averroistic conception of the unitas intellectus. I do not venture to suggest that there is actually any relation between Averroism and microcosmism. However, there is a noteworthy remark in Nemesius, , De nat. hom. c. 2 (P. G. 40, 537 B, also 577 A), where the author refers to the Manichaean ideas. This passage might be indicative of some such connection as alluded to above. (On Manichaeism, see p. 366 f.) The remark in Nemesius may be dependent on Poseidonios. “Das Denkvermögen … ist dem Alldaimon, wie wesenähnlich, so stammverwandt”: Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysiche Schriften, II, 22; see also ibid. pp. 35 and 120, where the individual is characterized as an inseparable part of the cosmic δαíμων. Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Pseudo-Beda (ninth century), Mundi constitutio (P. L. 90, 902 A): “Plato … animas dixit humanas de reliquiis mundanae animae esse.” This author lists also the following opinions (ibid. D): “Dicunt … quidam unam tantum esse animam … ita ut una anima in pluribus rebus”; (ibid. 903 A): “Praeterea dicunt quidam eandem mundanam animam pariter cum humana anima esse in homine de qua vermes et fit in homine”. Whose are these ideas? That the human soul is a fragment of the ether is an opinion reported by Diogenes Laertius, in the Comment Pythag. VIII, 27. But the author of the Mundi constitutio cannot have known this work. The source of the idea is probably the Stoic notion of ἀΠóῤ&1FEi5;oια. The idea of two souls is also in Chalcidius and probably goes back to Numenius. One soul animates the body and is under the power of the stars. The other soul is rational, free and from God. Thus, there are a good and a bad soul. This notion, stems, as one may safely surmise, from Oriental sources and is maintained by Plutarchus. Cf. Espenberger, J., Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA, 1901, vol. 3, 5), p. 50; Baeumker, Cl., Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie (Munich, 1890), p. 385. It would be an interesting question whether this two-souls theory may be considered as an ancestor of modern ideas, from Goethe's “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust,” down to conceptions like the “id“ in Freud, or the animus-anima notions in Jung.—The idea of the human soul being made out of remnants of the World-Soul is critisized and rejected by Abaelard, , Theol. Christ. I, 4 (P. L. 178, 1151). It must have played a certain rôle even in the late twelfth century, since William of Auvergne, too, has a refutation of this notion: De universo, II, 2, c. 10 (in the text erroneously 11; Opp. Parisiis, 1674; I, 816b-819a). It may be traced back, presumably, to a misinterpretation of Tim. 41d, 4-7.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Plotinus, however, occasionally uses this expression, Enn. IV, 9, 4. It is noteworthy that the metaphor of umbra appears within Neo-Platonic speculations. But it is probably of Stoic origin. When Nemesius credits animals with ϵἰκóνα καὶ σκιὰν λoγικήν, he quotes Poseidonios.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Cf. Plotinus, , Enn. IV, 2, 1. For the medieval authors, the source of this much quoted statement is Augustine. Proclus, , In Tim. 32c (ed. Diehl, II, 53), sees an even closer analogy. As man loves himself, so does the universe. It is in “sympathy” with itself and thus preserves itself. There may be some Christian influence. The text reads: ὁ δὲ κóσμoς δι' ἀναλoγίας καὶ σνμΠαϑίας ἑαντ ϕίλoς ἐστίν' ἑαντòν ἄρα σώζϵι. Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., William of Conches, In Boethii de consolatione phil. comment. ed. Jourdain, Ch., “Deux commentaires inédits de Guillaume de Conches et Nicolas Triveth sur la consolation de la philosophie de Boèce,” Not. et Extr. des MSS. de la Bibl. Imper. 20, 2 (Paris, 1862), 76.: “Quidam ita intellexerunt animam mundi mediam non quod esset in omnibus, sed in medio mundi posita, i.e. in sole, et inde vires suas et potestates in corpora mitteret; quia aperte falsum est, postponatur.” Obviously, to speak of any location of the World-Soul is erroneous. The criticism may refer to teachings of the school of Chartres. Bernardus Silvestris, in fact, identifies the sun with the mens mundi, in De mundi universitate, sive Megacosmus et Microcosmus, II, 5 (ed. Barrach, C. S. and Wrobel, J., p. 44): “sol illustrior lumine, potentior viribus, augustior majestate, mens mundi”. This idea goes back to Timaeus and the commentaries on this dialogue…. Thus also in the late excerpt from Timaeus which under the name figures as a work of Timaeus Locrensis; Mullach, F. G. A., Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum (Paris, 1881), II, 39. Chalcidius has similar conceptions; “he follows in a noteworthy manner the Stoic Kleanthes;” Espenberger, J., Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus, p. 28. The proximate source may have been Cicero, see De nat. deor. II, 41. On the general spirit of Bernardus Silvestris, see Gilson, E., “La cosmogénie de Bernardus Silvestris”, Arch. d' Hist. Doctr. Lit. du M.-A. 3 (1928), 1. The ideas of Bernard remind of certain Hermetic texts. Whether there is any direct relation, I am unable to say. Cf. Kroll, J., Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 12, 2-4), p. 28.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Abaelard, , Theologia summi boni (ed. Ostlender, H., Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1939, 35, 2, p. 13): “Qui [sc. Plato] nec spiritus sancti personam praetermisisse videtur, cum animam mundi esse astruxerit tertiam a deo et noy personam [referring to Tim. 34 c, i.e. Chalcidius, ed. Wrobel, J., 31, 22-32, 1] … De hac autem anima … quae dicuntur ab hoc philosopho … nulli rei potuerunt aptari nisi spiritui sancto per pulcherrimam involucri figuram assignentur”. The same identification is implied in the passage, p. 16: “quod vero totum mundum unum animal dicit Plato, … maximam concordiam universorum Dei operum demonstrat … sic et Apostolus cum unitatem ecclesiae demonstrat unum corpus Christi appellat”. Concerning the term involucrum: “In argumentum … est genus demonstrationis sub fabulosa narratione veritatis involvens intellectum unde et involucrum dicitur”. Silvestris, Bernardus, Comment. super VI LL. Eneidos Virgilii , ed. Riedel, G. (Greifswald, 1924). See also John of Salisbury, Polycrat. VIII, 24 (ed. Webb, , II, 415). Thus it would seem as if Abaelard had made use only of an allegorical or symbolical expression, were it not that elsewhere he is quite explicit on the identity of the anima mundi and the spiritus sanctus, e.g. Theol. Christ. I, 4 (P. L. 178, 1156): “anima mundi quam, ni fallor, spiritum sanctum intellexerunt philosophi.” Ibid. 1159: “ipse praeterea Macrobius ea quae de anima mundi a philosophis dicta sunt mystice interpretanda esse … meminit”. The Council of Sens, 1140, repeats the condemnation of Soissons, listing among the errors condemned: “Quod spiritus sanctus sit anima mundi” (Denzinger, 370).Google Scholar

William of Conches, according to a fragment edited by Ottaviano, C., Un brano inedito della ‘Philosophia’ di Guglielmo di Conches (Naples, 1935), p. 17, quoted by Ostlender, , op. cit. p. 17, reports on authors who considered the “anima mundi nichil aliud quam divina benignitas vel spiritus sanctus”, whereas “alii dicunt eam esse quandam vigorem omnibus rebus inhaerentem … Haec anima … cum ipsa sit in homine et anima hominis similiter, videtur posse probari quod duae animae sunt in homine”. See also De philos. mundi, I, 15 (P. L. 172, 46). Cf. above note 101. We are, however, not told who these alii were. In this regard one might refer to a fragment listed by Diels (4th ed.), I, 105 (Hippocrates, , De victu), obviously concerning the World-Soul: Anaxagoras used the expression , frag. 12; but this text was hardly known, nor were others, to the authors of the twelfth century. Tim. 37d, 5, however, has too.Google Scholar

For the rest, it must be admitted that those who made the anima mundi coincide with the spiritus sanctus might have found certain auctoritates on which to rely. Of course, these passages had to be interpreted in the particular spirit of these readers, they had to be somewhat twisted, but as Alanus said: “auctoritas habet cereum nasum qui in quamlibet potest flecti directionem.” There are, especially, passages in St. Augustine which easily lend themselves to such an interpretation. Augustine was not in favor of the anima mundi-theory. But the students of Neo-Platonism, Dionysius, or Eriugena, found in the works of the Bishop of Hippo phrases like these: “Deus siquidem est rerum universitas ita quod nulla singularium” (Lib. de spir. et anima, II; P. L. 40, 788); “summe unum est et omnis formae principium”—did this not recall the Plotinian One? (De gen. ad lit. X, 32; P. L. 34, 234); or: “spiritus sapientiae multiplex (Sap. 7, 22) eo quod multa in se habet, sed quae habet haec et est et ea omnia unus est” (De civ. Dei, XL, 10, P. L. 41, 372). The latter statement seems to be influenced by Enn. VI, 2, 18: Similar passages can be found in post-Augustinian texts. These ideas are still effective in Nicolaus Cusanus when he writes, for instance: “Universum licet non sit nec sol nec luna, est tamen in sole sol et in luna luna; Deus autem non est in sole sol et in luna luna, sed id quod est sol et luna sine pluralitate et diversitate;” De docta ignor. II, 4 ( Opp. edd. Hoffmann, E. and Klibansky, R., I, Leipzig 1931, p. 74). Also: “nec animam illam (sc. mundi) nec naturam aliud esse conicio quam Deum omnia in omnibus operantem quem dicimus spiritum universorum.” Liber de mente, c. 13 (ed. Richter, in Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Leipzig 1927, p. 284).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Baumgartner, M., Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1896, vol. 2, 4), p. 80. Alanus seems to refer to the question when he remarks, Dist., sub voce ‘mundus’ (P. L. 210, 866 B, C): “Dicitur sapientia Dei juxta quam mundus factus est, quae a prophetis dicitur archetypus mundi.” Also: “Deus mediante natura res procreaturus,” Contra Haer. I, 40 (P. L. 210, 345 D). Cf. Cicero, , De nat. deor. II, 29: “natura est igitur quae contineat mundum … eumque tueatur.” Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Inge, W. R., The Philosophy of Plotinus (3d. ed. London, 1939), p. 210. Such identifications managed to pass as long as the trinitarian doctrine was not yet fully defined. Clement, , Strom. 4, 25; 5, 14; 7, 7; Theodoretus, 4, 750, do not hesitate to accept the immortal principles of the Platonists, the One, the and the World-Soul: “the One we call God the Father, , the Son or Logos, the soul The Holy Spirit”. But Bernardus Silvestris, too, seems to identify Noys with the Son, or perhaps to designate Him by this name. Gilson, E., “La cosmogénie de Bernardus Silvestris”, Arch. d'Hist. Doctr. Lit. du M.-A. 3 (1928), 12 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ de Insulis, Alanus, Anticlaudianus , (P. L. 210, 517 B): “Ut sic pygmaeus fraterculus esset gigantis / maiorisque minor mereatur imagine pingi.” Adelard of Bath seems to suggest that the World-Soul loses somewhat its lofty spirituality by contact with matter, as the human soul is dragged down by the same reason; see: Werner, K., “Wilhelm von Auvergne's Verhältnis zu den Piatonikern des XIIten Jahrhunderts”, Sitz. Ber. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. 74 (1870), 120.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Macrobius, , De somno Scip. I, 14, 7: “habet purissimam de qua est nata rationem”. Also Chalcidius, , 292.: the universe has “animam et quidem rationabilem”.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Nemesius, , De nat. hom. c.2, PG. 40, 580.: Nemesius refers also to Theodoros the Platonist in the latter's treatise ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ Πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἔστι. Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Plato, , Tim. 35a; Plotinus, , Enn. V, 3; VI, 7, 6. Especially the stoic philosophy emphasized this view.Google Scholar

¹¹² Augustinus, St., De civ. Dei , IX, 13 (P. L. 44, 267); see also De Trin. XII, 4, 4; 7, 12; 12, 17 (P. L. 42, 1000, 1005, 1007). Many later writers repeated the ideas of the doctor gratiae, for instance, William of St. Thierry (see Werner, K., Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie, Denkschr. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. 25, 82.), Hugh of St. Victor, , De sacr. I, 4, 26, (P. L. 176, 246), also Erud. theol. VII, 14: “homo quasi in medio collocatus, habet super se Deum, sub se mundum”; Lombardus, Petrus, II. Sent. 1,7. In the thoughts of Augustine himself microcosmistic speculation holds but an insignificant place. His outlook is mainly “anthropological”; individual man is his problem: man who longs to live and is forced to die (De civ. Dei, XIV, 25); who wants to do his will and encounters obstacles inside and outside of himself (Conf. VIII, 9); who fights himself, “bellum adversus me gero” (Ennar. in Psal. 140, 11); who strives for the good and succumbs to evil; man in his relation to God: “Duo solum scire quaero…. Deum et animam.” But man in his relation to the tangible world was not a question of much concern to St. Augustine.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Thus the Liber de causis, cf. Bardenhewer, O., Die pseudoaristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis (Freiburg i.B. 1882), p. 165. The expression “horizon” seems to go back, like so many others, ultimately to Stoic notions. Nemesius, whose dependence on Stoic philosophy is known and has been emphasized several times here, has the expression: Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Baumgartner, , Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis , p. 100, note 2. Alanus is the first Latin author whose writings show the influence of the Liber de Causis.—Ibid. pp. 10, 75, 93, references to Radulfus a Longo Campo, on whom see Grabmann, M., Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (Freiburg i.B., 1911) II, 48. Radulfus speaks of the World-Soul and the as of two invisible substances, distinct from God and the angels.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ On William of Auvergne (Parisiensis), see Baumgartner, , op. cit. p. 19. On Albertus: Schneider, K., Die Psychologie Albert des Grossen, (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d.MA., 1903, Vol. 4, 5-6), p. 219. Also De animalibus 11. XXVI, 1, 22, tr. 1, c. 5 (ed. Stadler, H., Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1920, vol. 16, p. 1355), where it is stated that the outstanding property of man is “quam dicit Hermes ad Esclepium scribens quod homo solus nexus est Dei et mundi.” Also, Aquinas, , C.G. II, 68. For the Hermetic texts see Scott, W., Hermetica (Oxford, 1924), I, 233. God willed that the κóσμoς be a living being so long as it exists, that it have αἴσϑησιν ἰδίαν καὶ νóησιν oύχ ὁμoίαν τ ἀνϑρωΠϵίᾳ, p. 183. Also Kroll, J., Die Lehren des Google Scholar

Hermes Trismegistos (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 12, 2–4).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Parisiensis, Gulielmus, De universo , I, 3, cc. 29–33 (Opera, Parisiis 1674; I, 801a ss.).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ e.g. de Mayronis, Franciscus, In II. sententiarum , d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 (Venetiis 1520, f. 151rb): “Dico quod celi non sunt animati”. On stars, ibid. d. 13, q. 1 (f. 154va-155rb). Suarez, , De superstitione, II, 5 (Opera, Paris, 1859; 13, 485).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Astrology and magic art—necromancy—were felt to be closely allied. The most famous astrologers did not escape suspicion. Dante places one of them in hell: “Michele Scoto che veramente delle magiche frode seppe il giuoco” (Inf. XX, 115). Magic appeared to Dante—however medieval his thoughts be—as a fraudulent activity. Cf. on Michael Scotus: Haskins, Ch. H., Studies in the History of Medieval Science (Cambridge, Mass. 1925) and Studies in Medieval Culture (Oxford, 1929). In a consistent Aristotelean system, astrological prediction is out of place. As J. Moreau remarks (L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stoïciens, Paris, 1939, p. 149, n. 1): “chez Aristote, à mésure qu'on s'éloigne du premier ciel, la complication croissante des phénomènes donne lieu à la contingence et au disordre, exclut la régularité absolue et ne laisse subsister que la constance approchée”. Met. E. 2 (1026 b 30): ὡς ἐΠὶ τò Πoλύ. Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Renaissance (Studien d. Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1927), p. 116.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Macrobius, , De somn, Scip. I, 12–14, explains that the soul receives in the Saturnic sphere “rationationem et intelligentiam quod λoγιστκóν et ϑεωρητικóν vocant; in Jovis vim agendi quod Πρακτκóν dicitur.” The idea is Stoic as well as Oriental. Sextus Empiricus reports that Poseidonios believed in a descent of the human soul from sun and moon to the earth. Adv. Math. IX, 71b-73. See Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, II, 108. The idea of such a descent and, correspondingly, of an ἄνoδoς of the soul after separation from the body is also found in the Hermetic texts. In descending, the soul acquires all kinds of impurities in the planetary spheres of which it is purified in its ascent: Kroll, J., Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos, p. 296.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Panofsky, E., Studies in Iconology. Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (New York, 1939), p. 209.Google Scholar

¹²² Groethuysen, B., Philosophische Anthropologie , (Hdb. d. Phil., Munich, 1931), p. 108: “In der weiteren Entwicklung der Renaissance-Anthropologie sucht der Mensch seinen Eigenwert von der Welt her zu erfassen: es verlangt ihn nach einer kosmischen Begründung seines Selbstbewusstseins.” Pico della Mirandola, in fact, declares that man does not occupy a place in the scale of being, but rather stands outside of this order, being alone a microcosm and image of the Creator. See below note 211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹²³ Gilson, E., Les idées et les lettres (Paris, 1932), p. 192. : “La Renaissance, telle qu'on nous la décrit, n'est pas le Moyen-Age plus l'homme, mais le Moyen-Age moins Dieu.” Olgiati, , Lo spirito dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento (Milan, 1926), p. 189.: “E la divinizzazione dell'uomo, della natura, della realtà; è la spiritualizzazione di tutto.” This later development of Humanism has been characterized by Eichendorff as the “pride of the subject”—der Hochmut des Subjects—in which this German poet and historian sees the basic evil of the Renaissance and which, he felt, also destroyed German Romanticism.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Stenzel, J., Metaphysik des Altertums (Hdb. d. Phil., Munich, 1931), p. 56: “Only seven hundred years after Parmenides did Greek philosophy refer to the self (ὁἐγώ, Plotinus) as a philosophical principle”. It should, however, not be overlooked that a certain consideration of the self appears already in the later Stoa. See Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysiche Schriften, I, 62 f. W. Jaeger has, in fact, suggested that Panaitios is the real founder of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Heinemann makes Poseidonios the ancestor of Plotinus. ibid. p. 59, n. 2.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Hoffmann, E., “Platonismus und Mystik im Altertum”, Sitz. Ber. Heidelberg. Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. 1939, Abh. 35, thinks that the development of Platonic philosophy towards mysticism is the effect of a twofold deformation of two authentical Platonic themes, the idea of diversity in reality, united by μέϑϵξις, and the idea of the soul. Ideas and τἀγαϑóν are both primary and irreducible; there is no processio. The falsification consists in placing the individual soul in the center, making of individual happiness the main issue, and therefore postulating the presence of God in all things: Neo-Platonic emanationism. The “presence of God” of which Hoffmann speaks, is probably of Christian or Judaeo-Christian origin. The notion of God, at the same time transcendent and immanent, governing the world and maintaining it by the concursus, is however not quite a new theme in the polyphony of Greek thought, since the late Stoa harbored similar notions.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Besides the known sources, there is now available an edition of an authentic Albigensian treatise: Un traité Néo-Manichéen du XIIIe siècle, Le Liber de duobus principiis , ed. Dondaine, A. (Rome, 1939).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ “Plutarchus comes nearer to the Manichean solution than any other Greek thinker. The imperfection of the world cannot come from God … we must therefore assume two principles…. The evil principle cannot be Matter, because we find evil to be a positive active thing, such as could not proceed from anything so characterless and indetermined as Matter. There must be a spiritual power of evil which may best be designated as an evil World-Soul”. Inge, W. R., The Philosophy of Plotinus , I, 90. The idea of the two souls is, however, adumbrated by Plato himself, Leg. X, 896c, 906a, and emphasized in the post-Platonian Epinomis. Thus, it becomes somewhat doubtful whether Plutarchus depends exclusively on Eastern sources.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Thorndike, L., A History of Magic and Experimental Science , (New York, 1923), I, 382.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ E.g. De virt. mor. 3; De anim. procreat. 28: He argues also that the chaos must have a soul, and since the chaos is the opposite of the κóσμoς, the chaotic soul must be evil.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Jamblichus, , in Stobaeus, , Ecl. I, 844.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Chalcidius, , In Tim. §295: “Platonem idem Numenius laudat quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, sc. silvam quae fons malorum est”. The correctness of this statement is questioned by Inge, , The Philosophy of Plotinus , I, 91. He rather thinks that the anima maligna rules over matter, as in Plutarchus, being a principle acting on matter from without.Google Scholar

¹³² Kristeller, P. O., Der Begriff der Seele bei Plotin (1929), p. 36, note 1, finds two souls also in the philosophy of Plotinus. One has to distinguish the World-Soul, and a superior psychic principle comprising both individual souls and World-Soul, μíα ψνχή. But there is no trace of an anima maligna. Whether Kristeller's interpretation is tenable or not is of no concern here.Google Scholar

¹³³ See the informative work of Bousset, W., Hauptprobleme der Gnosis (Göttingen, 1907), pp. 178, 181.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ A more detailed discussion would entail a study on the origin and the legitimacy of the notion of persona moralis and therefore a lengthy digression on various juridical and political conceptions. Interesting though the relations be between organismic microcosmism and the idea of persona moralis, they are beyond the scope of this article.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ de Insulis, Alanus, De planctu naturae (P. L. 210, 444 A-D). The passage goes back to Chalcidius. Cf. Augustinus, , De civ. Dei, VIII, 14 (P. L. 41, 238). But already Chrysippus had made similar statements. The notion of the world as a Πoλιτϵíα may even be older. Cf. Heinemann, I., Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, II, 283; Cicero, , De republ. VI, 61. A more detailed analysis would have to consider the manifold relations of this holistic conception with the Stoic principle of συμΠάϑϵια. Marcus Aurelius, for instance, refers to this principle as the foundation of both cosmic and civic order. See Reinhardt, K., Kosmos und Sympathie (München, 1926), p. 178 ff. St. Augustine uses the words compassio and conspiratio, by way of translations of συμΠάϑεια and σύμΠνoια. De Trin. XIII, c. 3, 6 (P. L. 42, 1017).Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Sarisberensis, Joannes, Policraticus , V, 2–4 (P. L. 199, 540), also VI, 1–35 (ibid. 589 ss.). On the universe as a res publica in writers of late Antiquity see, e.g. Heinemann, , Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, I, 130, where special reference is made to Judaeus, Philo, Spec. Leg. I, 13. Diogenes Laertius, however (Diels, I, 293), lists the idea as of Anaxagoras. See also Plato, Repub. IX, 592 a, b.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ On the citizens as members or organs, see e.g. Sarisberensis, Joannes, Policraticus , V, 1; Aquinas, , De regim. princ. I, 12.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Aquinas, (or Tholomaeus of Lucca?) De regim. princ. II, 7; IV, 11, 25. Engelbert of Admont, De ortu et fine imperii Romani, III, 16. Cusanus, Nicolaus, De concord. I, 10; 14-17; III, 1; 41. Marsilius Patavensis, Defens. pacis, I, 2. In c. 15 he calls the anima universalitatis the principium factivum of the state.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ See v. Gierke, O., The Development of Political Theory , tran. Freyd, B. (New York, 1939), p. 208 ff. and note 117.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Hobbes' theories of the state as organism are well known. The organismic conception becomes, however, in his hand a pure mechanism, in accordance with the general trend of his philosophy and the Cartesian conception of the body. Gassendi's ideas can be found, for instance, in Gassendi, Petri Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii … de vita … placitisque Epicuri (ed. IIIa, Lugduni, 1547), I, 375b–376a. Cf. also Brett, G. S., The Philosophy of Gassendi, (London, 1908), p. 23, on the World-Soul; p. 140, where the origin of the human souls from the World-Soul is denied.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ E.g. Romanus, Aegidius, De regim. III, 2, c. 3., quoted by v. Gierke, O. The Development of Political Theory, p. 196, note 56: “plures homines principantes quasi constituunt unum hominem multorum oculorum et multarum manuum”. The “body politic”, whether constituted by some few ruling persons in an oligarchy, or by the whole people in a democracy, thus becomes “quasi” a person.Google Scholar

¹⁴² The conception of the persona moralis varies from a mere legal fiction to the idea of an actually existing being of personal nature. The latter view is found, e.g., with v. Wolff, J. Chr., who claims that the state must be regarded as a single person (Institut. § 850) and thus has as much right to defend itself against any other person, for instance the individual citizen who commits an offense against the “person” of the state. (§ 1030).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ “Imago est expressa similitudo,” Augustinus, , LXXXIII Quaest. q. 74 (P. L. 40, 86); “vestigium est inexpressa similitudo”, Halensis, Alexander, Summa Theol. I-II, inq. 1, tr. 1, s. 2, q. 1, (Quarachi, 1927; II, 46, n. 36).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ This law has been emphasized and definitely overrated by Lévy-Bruhl and his many followers. There is no doubt that it exists and plays a great rôle in primitive thought. But it is active only under rather specific conditions, and by far not the universal principle of reasoning, even with the most primitive peoples.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ The distinction between ideal or symbolic numbers and numbers as the proper object of mathematical science is already clearly stated by Plato, Phil. 55c; Polit. 238d-285c. The understanding of medieval texts is sometimes rendered difficult because there is a third meaning of mathematics: mathematica often means astrological calculation and theory. Augustine distinguishes two meanings, a scientific and a superstitious one. De doctrina Christ. II, 28 (P. L. 34, 56), and others followed him, e.g. Abaelard, , Expos. in Hexaemer. (P. L. 178, 755), where he condemns astrological procedures; see also Dialect. (ed. Cousin, V., IV, 435). Some tried to prevent confusion by suggesting different spellings. Hugh of St. Victor wants matesis to be the name of the superstitious practice, and mathesis to be used for the sound doctrine, Didascal. II, c. 3 (ed. Buttimer, Ch. H., Diss. Washington, D. C., 1939, p. 24). John of Salisbury distinguishes the two meanings by pronunciation, máthesis (with the accent on the a) naming the science, mathésis (with a long e), the superstition: Policrat. II, 18 (ed. Webb, p. 102). The same distinction is in the Graecismus of Eberhard of Bethune (ed. Wrobel, p. 85): “scire facit máthesis, sed divinare mathésis”. Mathematical or numerical symbolism, however, received no particular name.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Cameron, A., The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection (Columb. Univ. Diss., Menasha, Wis. 1938), believes that to “have” number means, with the original Pythagoreans, “to be” such a number. This is not even certain of the older schools, and it definitely does not apply to later and medieval systems.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Inge, W. R., The Philosophy of Plotinus , I, 84.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ There is an extensive literature on number symbolism in old, medieval and modern times, pagan, Jewish, Christian, and Arabian. Some references are given in Dunbar, H. Fl., Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divina Commedia (New Haven, 1929), especially pp. 501, 505, and in the bibliography. Further information in Mahnke, D., Unendliche Sphäre. Beiträge zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik (Halle a.S., 1937). The question is mentioned, incidentally, by Dempf, A., Sacrum Imperium (Munich, 1929) and by many other authors.Google Scholar

A few passages will suffice to illustrate medieval ideas on numbers. Most of the relations established by the writers have their antecedents in Stoic texts and in others dependent on the former. The relation of the One to the male, of the two to the female sex, e.g., is mentioned in the Hermetic treatises. Kroll, J., Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos , p. 51 ff. It might be pointed out, incidentally, that this symbolism has deeper roots than the rather cheap fancy of the Freudian psychoanalysts is able to discover. Many passages in the philosophers of Chartres deal with such problems. Thierry declares: “Unitas … est omnipotens in creatione numerorum; sed creatio numerorum est rerum creatio; unitas igitur est omnipotens in rerum creatione”; Hauréau, B., Notices et Extraits, I (Paris 1890). The triad causa efficiens, formalis, finalis is repeated in unitas, aequalitas, unitatis aequalitatisque connexio: Vicaire, M. H., “Les Porrétains et l'Avicennisme avant 1250”, Rev. Scienc. Phil. Théol. 26 (1937), 467, note. Silvestris, Bernardus, De universitate, etc. II, II (ed. Barach-Wrobel, , p. 35): “Induxi rebus formas. elementa ligavi / Concordem numero conciliante fidem”. de Insulis, Alanus, Anticlaudianus (P. L. 210, 514 D): “Quae numeri virtus, quae lex, quis nexus et ordo / Nodus, amor, ratio, foedus, concordia, limes”, characterizes number; the relation of even and odd numbers is back of the following dichotomies: male-female, body-soul, earth-heaven, sense-reason, grief-joy, death-life (Ibid. 515 B). Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalion, II c. 7 (ed. Buttimer, Ch. H., p. 30): “virtus autem numeri est, quod ad eius similitudinem cuncta formata sunt”. It is easy to see how the One symbolizes God and how the Godhead comes to be represented by, or even identified with the Monad. The Monad, positing itself again, brings forth at the same time another Monad, equal to the first—monas gignit monadem, as one reads frequently—and also the alteritas or pluralitas. However, the dyad of which the ancient symbolists spoke is the ἀóριστoς δυας, the indeterminate not just the number two. A fragment of Xenocrates, Aet. I, 7, 30, already identifies the anima mundi with the dyas. Thus, there is a number-symbolism for the processio Dei ad intra as well as ad extra. One understands, accordingly, that Alanus can say (P. L. 210, 642): “Sola monas existit … cetera vere non sunt.” This remark may depend on a passage in Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita which is rendered by Eriugena, Scottus, De divin. nom. (P. L. 122, 1169 C): “non est multitudo non participans quid unius”; the original text reads: (P. G. 3, 980 A; see also 820 D, whereof the translation is in P. L. 122, 1149 A). These examples will do to characterize what E. Cassirer not unjustly calls the “process of divinization and canonization of number.” Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, II (Berlin, 1925), p. 179. The characterization which Aristotle gives of the Pythagoreans, that they always wanted to discover everywhere likenesses to numbers, (Met. A; 988 b 27), applies equally to the medieval writers.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Adelhard of Bath, in Willner, H., Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De eodem et diverso (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1903, vol. 4, 1), p. 23. Adelhard, however, is not willing to accept this definition: “cum nullus numerus se ipsum moveat, anima autem se ipsam moveat, eam numerum esse non intelligamus.” On this author, see Bliemetzrieder, Fr., Adelhard von Bath (Munich, 1935). The comparison, however, may stand considering the particular dignity of number. On the eminence of number, see, e.g., Augustinus, , De lib. arbitr. II, 16, 42 (P. L. 32, 1263-1264): “Intuere caelum et terram … formas hominum quia numeros hominum … adime illic haec, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt nisi a quo numerus…. Inspice iam pulchritudinem formati corporis, numeri tenentur in loco … nobilitatem in corpore, numeri versantur in tempore”.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Nemesius, , De nat. Homin. (P.G. 40 569 A): Cicero too reports that Xenocrates “animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse,” Tuscul. I, 10, 20. Plutarchus, Plac. philos. IV, 2: On Macrobius' anima numerus se ipsum movens, cf. Whittaker, Th., Macrobius (Cambridge, 1923), p. 60. Moreau, J., L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stöiciens (Paris, 1939), p. 51, n. 3., apparently interprets Xenocrates' words as if they were a mere metaphor. He writes: “l'âme … ne peut être representée que sous la forme de la totalité organique, comme système autonome de relations. Tel est le sens de la définition de Xénocrate.” But it does not seem that ancient writers did understand Xenocrates in this manner. For the Platonic root of this definition, see Tim. 35b 1-3; Taylor, A. E., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 111. In later times, this theory of number became associated with Neo-Platonic emanationism. Thus, it is understandable that Campanella calls the numbers “rays of God disseminated throughout the universe”, Olgiati, Fr., Lo spirito dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento, p. 742.Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Simplicius, , In Phys. III, 4 (ed. Diels, , Comm. Aristotel. Graec. 9, 453, 9: By assimilating, however, some of the spirit of old, one arrives, as it seems, to an understanding. The number invoked is, one may surmise, not number as such, but one number, namely the One. The One is more than a symbol of the Urgrund of being; it is this ultimate source of everything. Xenocrates had, as reported by Taylor, A. E. (A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 112), declared that the One and the multitude, are indefinables. The latter is everything not the One, diversity, multiplicity, and so on. It is, accordingly, also change, since change presupposes multitude or results in it. One need only to arrange the invocation differently to get an acceptable sense: Father of all, who art the indefinable, sublime One.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Macrobius, , De Somn. Scip. passim, especially II, 34. Macrobius depends on a Latin translation of some Neo-Platonic commentary on Timaeus, probably by Porphyry. Schedler, M., Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalters, (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1916, vol. 13,1), p. 3f, Plotinus himself refers to the movement of the stars as being like the harmony of a lyre; Enn. IV, 4, 8. Harmony being rooted in the World-Soul is often mentioned. See, e.g., Adelhard of Bath, in Willner, H., Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De eodem et de diverso, pp. 25, 27.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ See Schedler, M., Die Philosophie des Macrobius , p. 23, note. Switalski, B. W., Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Platos Timaeus (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1902, vol. 3, 6), p. 86.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ The suggestions for justification of music are sometimes rather quaint. See, for instance, the curious statements of Rupertus Tuciensis (of Deutz), De trinitate et operibus eius XII. De Spiritu sancto , VII, 16 (P.L. 167, 1779-1780), where the proportions of the numbers of the just (Gen. 18) mentioned by Abraham to God are found to be the same as those of musical intervals and thus to justify the study of music.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ E.g. Gundissalinus, , De divisione philosophiae , ed. Baur, L., (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1903, vol. 4, 13–14), p. 241. He defines modulatio as “quaecumlibet rerum diversarum Concors modificatio” (ibid. p. 96), thus indicating the general applicability of “music”.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Thus, when Claudianus Mamertus speaks of the four elements “quae moderate et musice concinunt,” De statu animae, I, 22 (C. SS E. XI, 73). Or Honorius Augustodunensis, Liber XII quaest. c. 2 (P. L. 172, 1197B): “Summus opifex universum quasi magnam citharam condidit in veluti varias chordas ad multiplices sonos reddendas posuit.” Quasi and veluti seem to indicate a mere metaphor. But the same author elsewhere is very definite on the reality of this musica mundana. The idea of harmony appears in combination with man the microcosm in a passage which Scotus Eriugena designates as verba praedicti magistri (i.e. of Maximus Confessor), De div. nat. II, 4 (P.L. 122, 530 D): “[homo] officina omnium iure appellatur; in ea siquidem omnia conferunt, quae a Deo condita sunt unamque harmoniam ex diversis naturis veluti quibusdam distantibus sonis composuit.” Cf. the excellent study by Handschen, J., “Die Musikanschauung des Johannes Scotus (Erigena)”, Deutsche Vierteljahrschr. d. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch. 5 (1927), 316.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Boethius, , Inst. arithm. I, 1: “constat musicae vim astrorum cursus praecedere”. So also Cassiodorus, De artibus (P.L. 70, 1208 F): “Pythagoras hunc mundum per musicam conditum et gubernari posse testatur”. Hispalensis, Isidorus, Etymol. III, 17: “Ipse mundus quadam harmonia sonorum fertur esse compositus”. Also the notion of the σύνδεσμoς linking all parts of the universe into an organic whole seems to be derived from musical harmony. See Jaeger, W., Nemesius von Emesa, Berlin 1914, Weidemann, p. 109.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ Augustinus, St., De lib. arb. II, n. 20; also Confess. X,19. Cf. Hessen, J., Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem heil. Augustinus (Beitr. a. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1916, Vol. 19, 2), p. 21 f.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ Macrobius has a very high idea of music: “iure … musica capitur omne quod vivit, quia caelestis anima, qua animarum universitas animatur, originem sumpsit ex musica”. De somn. Scip. II, 3, 11. The Epinomis, 987a, proves by reference to music that number is the basis of everything good, beautiful, divine, and of all the τέχναι.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Baur, L., Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1917, vol. 17, 4-6), p. 16 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ “Hi septem orbes (sc. planetarum) cum dulcissima harmonia volvuntur … A terra autem usque ad firmamentum caelestis musica mensuratur ad cuius exemplum nostra inventa affirmatur … a terra ad lunam est tonus, a luna usque ad Mercurium semitonus, etc.” (Obviously, the distances of the celestial bodies stand in the same proportion as the musical intervals), Augustodunensis, Honorius, De imag. mundi , I, 80–81, (P.L. 172, 140). The parallel goes farther, since Honorius adds (ibid. 82): “sicut enim hic mundus septem tonis et nostra musica septem vocibus disiungitur, sic compago nostri corporis septem mundis coniungitur, dum corpus quatuor elementis, anima tribus viribus copulatur … unde et homo microcosmus i.e. minor mundus dicitur cum sic consono numero caelesti musicae par cognoscitur”. See also Sarisberensis, Joannes, Polycrat. I, 6. Suchlike ideas are still active with Kepler, in his Mysterium cosmographicum of 1596 (Opp. ed. Frisch, , V, 315).Google Scholar

¹⁶² For the same idea see, for instance, de Insulis, Alanus, Anticlaudianus , III, 5 (P.L. 210, 517 B) where music is presented as the force by which hours and months and seasons are regulated and “… elementa ligat, cogitque planetas / Astra movet variatque vices quae musica nectit / Corporis humani partes, mundumque minorem / Ordinat et specie mundi melioris honorat”.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ See Paré, G., Brunet, A. and Tremblay, P., La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement (Publ. Inst. d'Études mediév. d'Ottawa, vol. III, Ottawa 1933), p. 174. Cf. also Schrade, L., “Die Stellung der Musik in der Philosophie des Boethius”, Arch. Gesch. d. Phil. 41 (1932), 360. Music is called “audible mathematics” already in Tim. 80b, 6-7.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ “Musica alia vertitur circa audibile, alia circa visibile.” Bacon, Roger, Op. mai. IV (ed. Bridges, , I, 237). And: “Praeter vero has partes musicae quae sunt circa sonum sunt aliae quae sunt circa visibile, quod est gestus, qui comprehendit exultationes et omnes flexiones corporis … Et istud dicitur in libro De ortu scientiarum [by Alfarabi], sc. quod gestus est radix musicae”. Op. tert. ed. Brewer, , p. 232.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Bingensis, Hildegardis, Lib. divin. oper. Vis. I, c. 4, 82 (P.L. 197, 813 D, 839 C, 862 D) et passim). Man especially is the image of every kind of creature: “Deus omnes creaturas secundum mensuram in ipso homine signavit”.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ H. Liebschuetz has presented a thorough and painstaking study, Das allegorische Weltbild der Hl. Hildegard von Bingen (Stud. d. Bibl. Warburg, XVI, Leipzig 1930); on Microcosmism: p. 59 ff. Cf. also Singer, Ch., “The Scientific Views and Visions of St. Hildegard”, Stud. in the Hist. and Meth. of Science, 1 (1917), 1.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ de Aguirre, Saenz, Theologia St. Anselmi (Rome, 1680) I, introd.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ He speaks, for instance, of the harmony of the universe and refers to terrestrial harmonies as analogical to the former. But there is no longer so simplistic a belief in the all-covering power of music. Nor does he feel that the harmony we know reveals the truth about the one hidden beneath it. In things of this earth, he says, no such perfect harmony is found that it could not be much greater. The perfect harmony of the universe will be revealed to us only thereafter. De docta ignorantia , II, 1 (Opera, edd. Hoffmann, R. and Klibansky, R., Leipzig, 1932; I, 62).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ One need only read the following passage to become aware of this difference: “Quia unitas absoluta est prima et unitas universi ab ista, erit unitas universi secunda unitas quae in quadam pluralitate existit. Et quoniam, ut in De coniecturis (L, 5 ff.) ostenditur, secunda unitas est denaria, decem uniens praedicamenta, erit universum explicans primam absolutam unitatem simplicem denaria contractione.” De docta ignorantia II, c. 6 (ed. cit. I, 79). Here, the universe is given the number ten, not because of the properties of this number or its particular symbolic significance, but because of the logico-ontological order of being, a viewpoint far from the number symbolism of a Thierry of Chartres, a Bernardus Silvestris, or an Alanus de Insulis.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ De ludo globi, L; De docta ignor. II, 2; III, 1. On the exceptional position of man, ibid. III, 3: “Humana vero natura est illa quae est supra omnia Dei opera elevata … intellectualem et sensibilem naturam complicans ac universa intra se constringens, ut microcosmus … a veteribus rationabiliter vocitetur”. Man, by perfecting the universal human nature, also perfects all other beings. The true perfection of human nature has been achieved by God becoming man. Through the Incarnation every thing attains its perfection. Cf. Cusanus-Texte , edd. Hoffmann, E. and Klibansky, R. (Sitz. Ber. Akad. Heidelberg, 1929), p. 33.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ De docta ignorantia , III, 3; De coniecturis, II, 14; De venatione sap. 32. “Not only the whole world, but also every single creature within this universe is … so to speak, a created god”: Faust, A., Der Möglichkeitsgedanke (Heidelberg, 1932) II, 287. On “creatura quasi infinitas finita aut deus creatus s. occasionatus”, see De docta ignorantia, II, 2. Cf. also Lorenz, S., “Das Unendliche bei Nicolaus von Kues”, Phil. Jahrb. 40 (1927), 44. The expression deus creatus may go back to Pseudo-Apuleius. See Apulei Platonici de philosophia libri, rec. Thomas, P. (Leipzig, 1908), p. 45. The ultimate source is, of course, Timaeus. Google Scholar

¹⁷² Referring to Cusanus, Conrad of Geissenfeld writes, Aug. 22. 1454, to John of Weilhaim: “quem pre ceteris in sancti Dionysii libris studiosissimum agnovimus”. Vansteenberghe, E., Autour de la docte ignorance (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1915, Vol. 14, 2-4), p. 219.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ E. Vansteenberghe quotes from the Impugnatorium which Vincent of Aggsbach directed against the admirers of Cusanus, particularly against Sprenger, Marquard: “Votre Cusa ne reçoit la théologie mystique pour divine, spirituelle et sécrète que si elle s'accorde avec le troisième chapitre du De anima de son misérable Aristote”. Autour de la docte ignorance , p. 66.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ The exact interpretation of this text is controversial. Some refer omnis creatura to created beings with the exclusion of man, others consider it as signifying humanity taken as a whole, See. e.g. on this matter Dulan, P., “Omnis creatura ingemiscit”, Div. Thom. (Plac.) 37 (1934), 386, and 39 (1935), 431; Tucco, F., ibid. p. 320, opposes Dulan. These articles contain also several references to other writers. Older opinions are reported, for instance, by Cornelius a Lapide, Commentarius in omnes D. Pauli epistolas (2d ed., Venetiis, 1717) p. 86 a,b.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ De docta ignorantia, III, 2. Cf. Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Stud. d. Bibl. Warburg, Vol. X, Leipzig, 1927) p. 42, where reference is made also to De vis. Dei, c. 20. Also Cusanus, , Excitat. IX; De coniect. II, 14: “humanus Deus, microcosmus aut humanus mundus”.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ “Mens est divinum semen sua vi complicans omnium rerum exemplaria notionaliter”, Idiota , III (de mente), c. 5 (ed. Richter, J., in Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ De coniecturis , II, 14; De ludo globi, I.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Compendium , VIII.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Rotta, P., Il Cardinale Niccolò Cusano (Milan, 1928, Pubbl. Univ. Catt. del S. Cuore, Sc. Fil. XII), p. 344, writes: “Ciascuna cosa è un' infinità finita, un Dio creato, anzi un Dio occasionato, perchè Dio, volendo creare sè, ne potendo, creò sè come poteva, e diede origine a ciò quod fieri potest Deo similius (De coniect. II, 2), il che vuol dire l'universo, il quale, appunto perchè può contrarsi in un limite, fa che l'infinitudine sua diventa per esso un finito; così le cose diventano ed appaiono un finito contratto dell' infinito universo, contraibile rispetto a quello, mentre alla sua volta è già un contratto dell'unità prima assoluta. Gli individui adunque sono il contratto attuale non direttamente della possibilità di Dio, che è possibilità della contrazione dell'universo, ma solo indirettamente della possibilità dell'universo, che è appunto la possibilità della contrazione particolare.—Da tutto ciò deriva questa importantissima conseguenza: non è, deduce il Cusano, che l'infinito perda la sua infinità e diventi questo o quest' altro finito, no, l'infinito solo si contrae nei singoli reali, sicchè in questi l'infinito e sempre latente, perquanto solo in potenza, mentre in atto non c'è che una parte di quella infinità, la quale così attuata solo in parte fa che quella cosa appaia finita”.—This able summary of the difficult theory of “contraction”—a pivotal point in Cusanian metaphysics—seems to suggest that man, and so any other creature, is a microcosm only potentia. But it is also conceivable that being a microcosm consists precisely in being a macrocosm in potentia. Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ De docta ignor. II, 9. What some have called the anima mundi is in truth “ratio et idea atque absoluta rerum necessitas”, the “contrahens quod per ipsum possibilitatem necessitat et constringit”; ibid. II, 7. Cusanus' admirer Dionysius Carthusianus (Rykkel) is very explicit in his rejection of the idea of a World-Soul and of the universe as an animated being. He speaks of these notions as “opinio insana nec rationi nec fidei consona”, De contemplatione, I, a. 69 (Opp. minora, IX, Tornacis, 1902); this work is, incidentally dedicated to Cusanus. There are many other passages in Dionysius to the same intent; e.g. In II. Esdrae, a. 9, on the words: “Tu vivificas omnia”, (Opp. I, Tornacis, 1899, p. 252); De divin. nom. c. 2, a. 15 (Opp. XVI, 60).Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Vansteenberghe, E., Le De ignota litteratura de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cuse (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1910, vol. 8, 6), p. 11. Cusanus, in his Apologia, not only justifies his own position, but also tries to defend Eriugena, condemned because of allegedly pantheistic doctrines by the Council of Vercelli in 1050; recommends Eckehardt; and even goes so far as to attempt a rehabilitation of David of Dinant. Cf.G. Théry, Autour du décret de 1210: I. David de Dinant (Bibl. Thomiste, VI, Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1925), p. 24 ff. However, Cusanus does not want these books placed into the hands of everybody. “Recte admonent omnes sancti quod illis debilibus mentis oculis lux intellectualis subtrahatur”. But this lux intellectualis is found also, e.g., in the writings of Dionysius Areopagita, so that this warning does not refer to condemned works only. St. Albert says that David of Dinant interpreted the anima quodammodo omnia in a pantheistic sense. S. Th. I, tr. 1, q. 5, a. 8. The influence of Scottus Eriugena may be detected by comparing certain passages in his works with concepts developed by, and characteristic of, Cusanus. One is reminded, for instance, of the Cusanian contractio when reading in De divis. nat. (P.L. 122, 631 A): “Est … participatio non cuiusdam partis assumptio sed divinarum dationum … a summo usque ad deorsum per superiores ordines inferioribus distributio”.Google Scholar

¹⁸² “L'universo … poteva sembrare bastasse a sè stesso, in quanto in sè pareva contenesse il principio di tutta la realtà; il Dio trascendente poteva ridursi ad essere il Dio immanente senza alcuno sacrificio dell'infinità sua e della sua libertà in quanto identica alla sua necessità; in altri termini, eccoci al Bruno ed allo Spinoza”. Rotta, P., op. cit. p. 351. To consider Cusanus' system as outright pantheism is definitely going too far, nor can Gerson or d'Ailly be made into representatives of panentheistic philosophies, as W. Dilthey does (Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus, Ges. Werke, vol. II, Leipzig, 1921, p. 324).Google Scholar

¹⁸³ This point ought to be considered in the controversies on the moot question whether or not there existed a pantheistic note or even an outspoken pantheism in the school of Chartres. The question is not yet definitely answered, notwithstanding the emphatical denials on the part of De Wulf and Gilson. Also Parent, J. M., La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres (Publ. de l'Inst. d'Etud. méd. d'Ottawa, VII, Ottawa-Paris, 1938) declares that there is no panthéisme Chartrain. Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ The similarity between disarms and Leibniz has been noted, for instance, by Zimmermann, R., “Der Cardinal von Kues als Vorläufer Leibnizens”, Abh. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. 1852, p. 321. There is also an (anonymous?) article in Der Mainzer Katholik of 1887, listed in the bibliography of Philos, Jahrbuch 1 (1888), 105. This article may refer to Schaeffer, J., Des Nicolaus von Kues Lehre vom Kosmos (Mainz, 1887, Inaug. Diss. Giessen). For views similar to Leibniz' Monadology, see e.g., De coniect. II, 14: Creatures are “imagines repraesentantes varie s. differenter”. Spiritual beings are “specula clariora et rectiora”.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ On the influence of Cusanian ideas on Kepler, see Panofsky, E., Die Perspective als symbolische Form (Vortr. d. Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1924/25), also Mahnke, D., Unendliche Sphaere (Halle a. S. 1930), p. 143.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ Perhaps it ought to be expressly stated that the name “psychological” is used here in its original sense, and that no reference is made to scientific or any other contemporary psychology. This name indicates simply that, if man is a microcosm, the reason for his being one has to be sought in the peculiarities of his soul and of the way it functions. These peculiarities and functions derive from the nature of the soul—as conceived by those who held this view—and from the relations it has to reality, because of its nature. Psychological microcosmism, therefore, has nothing to do with “psychologism”. It is not a theory of the origin of our ideas, but starts from a definite conception of the soul. One might have considered speaking of “epistemological” microcosmism, were it not that this name immediately suggests a realistic or idealistic philosophy.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Aristotle, , De anima , III, 8 (431 b 20). Aristotle does not favor the idea that human souls are parts of a World-Soul. In De gen. anim. (736 b 29) he declares that the alone is divine. However, “the soul has part in a body which is different from, and more divine than the elements”, namely the so-called fire contained in the a fire which does not destroy but gives life as a ζωτικὴ ἀρχή. He had held, it seems, views more in accordance with Timaeus and Laws in De philosophia and Protrepticus. See, J. Moreau, L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens (Paris, 1939), p. 106 ff. Joannes Philiponus ascribes a somewhat similar view to Plato: Comm. in Arist. de anima (ed. Hayduck, , Comm. in Arist. Graeca, 15, Berlin, 1897, pp. 77, 20).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ Magnus, Albertus, S. Th. II, tr. 11, q. 4, m. 2 (Opera ed. Borgnet, , 32, 608b); tr. 12, q. 74 (ibid. 33, 51). Man owes this position to the general plan of creation which aims at the perfection of the whole by being an image of divine perfection. Since man is specifically ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, he completes and crowns creation. Cf. v. Hertling, G., Albertus Magnus (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 14, 5-6), p. 173.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ St. Albert returns to this question quite often: De causa et proc. universi, m. I, tr. 4, c. 7; In II. sent. d. 14, a. 3; S. Th. II, tr. 11, q. 53m, m. 3; S. de creat. II, q. 55, a. 3. He also denies that the spheres are moved directly by God. In this, he is in accordance with Alexander Halensis, S. Th. II, q. 5, m. 2, a. 4, q. un.; q. 18, m. 4. The same opinion in Aquinas, , C. G. II, c. 69; III, c. 23; In II. sent. d. 14, q. un. a. 3; S. Th. I, q. 70, a. 3. Also Bonaventura, In II. sent. d. 14, p. 1, a. 3, q. 1; a. 3, 2.1.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ Aquinas, , In VIII. Phys. 1.4, ad 3m.: “Habet … homo similitudinem quandam cum mundo: unde dicitur … quod homo sit parvus mundus”.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ “Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet, quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum”. S. Th. I, q. 77, a. 2c. On the unity of the soul: “quod eodem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva”. Ibid. I, q. 76, a. 3c.Google Scholar

¹⁹² C. G. II, 20: “Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta, haec vero propter viventia in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia, animalia propter hominem, homo est enim finis totius generationis”.Google Scholar

¹⁹³ In II. sent. d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.: “In homine est quaedam similitudo ordinis universi, unde et minor mundus dicitur quia omnes naturae quasi in homine confluunt”. The Commentary on the Sentences is an earlier work than the Quodlibeta. It seems that St. Thomas became even more cautious concerning the microcosmic nature of man in later times.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ Quaest. quodlib. IV, a. 3: “quod homo assimilatur maiori mundo quantum ad aliquid … non tamen ad omnia assimilatur universo”. Also S. Th. I, q. 91, a. 1c.; q. 96, a. 2c.; I-II, q. 17, a. 8c. and ad 2m.; De pot. q. 5, a. 10.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ Magnus, Albertus, In VIII. Phys. tr. 1, c. 9, text. 17 (Opera , ed. Borgnet, , 3, 540): “Animal et praecipue homo dicitur mundus parvus quia in eo est motor primus, sicut intellectus, et sunt in ipso motores moti, sicut phantasia et appetitus et virtutes quae sunt in nervis motivis et musculis, et calor naturalis, et est in eo motum tantum, sicut corpus et membrum corporis aliquid, et motores inferiores habent motus proprios, sicut est in mundo magno: et ideo quod in parvo mundo fit et in magno videtur debere fieri”. See also In III. de somno et vig. tr. 1, c. 9 (Opera ed. Borgnet, , 9, 189).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ See particularly In III. de anima, c. 8, 1, 13 (no. 788 ed. Pirotti, ): “Scientia et sensus se habent ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in potentia; scientia vero et sensus quae sunt in actu ordinantur in sensibilia et scibilia quae sunt in actu, sed tamen diversimode … Sed potentia animae sensitivae et id quod scire potest, i.e. potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa”. In the light of this explanation one has to read the statement (ibid. no. 790): “anima est homini loco omnium formarum, ut sit homo quodammodo totum ens in quantum secundum animam est quodammodo omnia prout eius anima est receptiva omnium formarum.” See also S. Th. I, 9.84, a. 2, ad 2m: “anima quodammodo omnia, in quantum est in potentia ad omnia, per sensum quantum ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia”. Later writers, however, use a similar argument to prove a kind of microcosmism: “Alles was in der grossen Welt ist, ist auch in mir geistlich, darum bin ich und sie eins”, Weigel, Valentin, in Mahnke, D., Unendliche Sphaere, p. 122.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ The admiration of, and the often firm belief in, a kind of golden age of the human mind —a time when man was in close communication with the ruling powers, had a knowledge of the deepest secrets of the universe, and so on—is a curious phenomenon. The idea that mankind is on the decline is characteristic of certain historical epochs; whereas the opposite conception of vigorous progress, an optimistic and even over-optimistic outlook into the future, predominates in other centuries. The legend of the ages of the world—aurea prima sata est aetas—, the impression that history is a tremendous tragedy (expressed for instance by Otto of Freising in his dedication to Emperor Frederick) illustrate the first viewpoint. The notion of progress as it developed in the eighteenth century, or the way some felt at the beginning of modern times—Ulrich von Hutten's Es ist eine Lust zu leben—manifest the second attitude. It is, however, noteworthy that even in such optimistic times the feeling is not the same with all. Some who, on the whole, fully approve of the “modern” world may fall victims, occasionally, to strange moods. In the midst of the aliveness, of the enjoyment and affirmation of reality, of the trust in man's powers, so characteristic of the Great Renaissance, there are heard voices of despondency, even of despair, be it even thinly covered by Epicureanism. One need only recall the well known canzone by Lorenzo il Magnifico: “Qui vuol esser lieto sia / Da doman non c'è certezza”. This undercurrent makes understandable the success of Savonarola. When the emphasis on the past becomes stronger and attracts wider notion, this is perhaps a symptom of an epoch nearing its end. We have witnessed such tendencies in our own times, in the shape of the many sects who claimed to possess secret wisdom handed down since untold centuries. We probably live in a period of transition, between an age decaying and one not yet born. This return to the past should not be confused with the attitude of the laudatores temporis acti, or with the tenacious insistence on viewpoints rendered obsolete by recent developments, as it occurred in regard to Aristotelean physics at the time of Galileo. This attitude aims at preserving and keeping alive the immediate past and opposes its dissolution. The other attitude feels itself as a prophet of dissolution and as bringer of a remedy which, however old, is new to the present world. The general feeling of a Renaissance is not simply that of repristination of the past, but of finding in the past what is new for the present. Renaissance is always critical of the present, which is measured against a standard provided by the “great past”. Plotinus might have felt this way when he referred to the Enn. III, 7, 1. Nor ought one to overlook the differences between the two attitudes just mentioned on one hand, and that of Romanticism, on the other. Romanticism is interested only incidentally in the wisdom of the past. Its main interest is in the general Lebensgefühl, the forms and conditions of life. This may be seen in Rousseau's Retournons à la nature as well as in the love for things medieval in the Schlegels.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ It suffices to recall E. Gilson's studies on Descartes and, in the general history of philosophy, Heimsoeth's, H. Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik (2d. ed. Berlin, 1934).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ A. H. Wolfsohn has shown in a convincing manner that Spinoza was largely dependent on conceptions he learned from certain medieval Jewish authors. They, in turn, had taken over parts of the doctrine of the Brethren of Purity. On the latter's microcosmism see Dieterici, , Die Lehre von der Weltseele (Leipzig, 1868), especially p. 27, and Die Anthropologie der Araber (Leipzig, 1871) p. 41. The analogy of man, the microcosm, and the macrocosm is discussed by Gabirol, Ibn, Fons vitae, ed. Cl. Baeumker (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA., 1892), vol. I, 1-2; III, 2, p. 77 f; III, 58, p. 208. Also by ibn Zaddik, Joseph (see above note 67) and especially by Maimonides, Moses, Guide des égarés , ed. Munch, , I, 354. “The first thirteen propositions of the second part of the Ethics [Spinoza's] are built on this analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Propositions I-IX describe the macrocosm, whereas propositions X-XIII describe the microcosm, showing wherein the two are alike and wherein they differ”: Wolfsohn, A. H., The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, Mass. 1934), II, 7 f. Spinoza, of course, identifies the macrocosm with God. Already W. Dilthey had spoken of the mechanistic interpretation given to the micro- and macrocosms by Spinoza, , Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus (Ges. Werke, II, 287).Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ The Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century made an extensive use of Scholastic treatises, especially of Suarez. This suggests a connection between Scholasticism and later German philosophy. Hegel and Schelling, particularly, were both students at the Tübinger Stift and might well have become acquainted with some of these doctrines. On the influence of Aristotelianism and Scholasticism on the Protestant theologians, see Petersen, , Geschichte der aristotelischen und scholastischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921).Google Scholar

²⁰¹ Grabmann, M., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben , II (Munich, 1936), 418. On the study of Proclus by Cusanus, see Vansteenberghe, E., Arch. Hist. Doctr. Lit. 3 (1928), 275.Google Scholar

²⁰² “The most striking difference between the Platonism of the Neo-Platonists and that of the Renaissance, is the stronger accent laid on by the latter on naturalistic pantheism…. Plotinus … regards the heavenly bodies as divine and can, on occasion, speak like Bruno of the earth as one of the stars. The doctrine, however, is less prominent than his concept of intellectual and superessential divinity. With Bruno the reverse is the case. And Campanella too seizes on the materialistic side of the doctrine to confound the despisers of the visible world.” Whittaker, Th., The Neo-Platonists (2d. ed. Cambridge, 1918). But the development into naturalism belongs to a later phase of the Renaissance. Here we are concerned mainly with those years which Robb, N. A., Neo-Platonism of the Italian Renaissance (London, 1935), p. 270, calls, with a happy expression, “the incubation period of Italian Neo-Platonism”.Google Scholar

²⁰³ Olgiati, Fr., Lo spirito dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento , p. 526, speaking of the University of Padua, then a stronghold of Aristotelianism—although of a rather impure one—remarks: “L'astrologo era allora ritenuto il personaggio più necessario all'università”. And p. 789: “Magia ed astrologia in quest' epoca furono un risultato del panpsichismo”. The latter remark, although fundamentally true, needs some restriction. Panpsychism alone cannot be made responsible; the tendency towards naturalism has to be considered. This tendency outran, as it were, the state of knowledge, and the knowledge which was missing became replaced by imagination. Like science in later times, so astrology developed eventually into a naturalistic determinism, as it is the case with Pomponazzi. One must not forget, however, that the antagonism against astrology was, in these times, not the outcome of the “scientific” attitude nor the consequence of a new conception of nature. Astrology was rejected in defense of human freedom and of the dignity of man, which both are threatened if astrological determinism prevails.Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ This commentary, incidentally, figures in the catalogue of the library of Pico della Mirandola.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Burdach, K., Reformation, Renaissance, Humanismus (2d. ed., Berlin, 1926), p. 101, makes much of the influence of Bonaventura, whom he considers dependent on Franciscan and Joachitic spirituality. The first is obvious, the second questionable. The similarities which are listed, for instance, by Huck, J. Chr., Joachim von Floris und die joachitische Literatur (Freiburg i.B., 1938), p. 252, are in no way characteristic; they refer mostly to ideas and expressions which Bonaventura might have found in the Victorine texts or in Honorius, as well as in Joachim. Burdach quotes Bonaventura as having said that the “divine artist” created the human soul by means of nature. The latter expression is strongly reminiscent of the School of Chartres or of Alanus. It ought to be noted that to interpret words like “artist” in a modern sense, or even in the one more or less current in the Renaissance, is always somewhat risky. Ars signifies in medieval parlance not more than technique or ability to do something, τϵχνή; see “ars aedificatoris” in Aquinas, , where it means simply the plan of the builder, without any reference to a specifically “artistic” capacity. It is, however, true that the fact of art and beauty is more extensively considered by the philosophers of the Renaissance than it had been the case with the Schoolmen. This is, of course, partly the reflex of the impressive development of the fine arts, partly a result of the occupation with Antiquity, and partly the influence of Neo-Platonism. See, for instance, Ivanoff, N., “La beauté dans la philosophie de Marsile Ficine et de Léon Hébreu”, Humanisme et Renaissance, 3 (1936), 12. The aesthetic ideas of Ficino are contained, characteristically, chiefly in his commentaries on the Enneades. The rôle of Bonaventura, as a source of Renaissance ideas, seems not to be more important than that of other Schoolmen. The concept of “illumination” may well have exercized a strong appeal; but this is not originally Bonaventurian, rather Augustinian. Nor can one, as B. Geyer points out (Ueberweg-Heinze, II [11th ed., 1928], p. 394), consider “exemplarism” as particularly characteristic of Bonaventura's views, since the same idea is found with many other authors, also among the Aristoteleans. Kristeller, P. O., The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York, 1943), has noted the similarities of expression in Ficino and the Scholastics.—Cf. also Mahnke, , Unendliche Sphaere, pp. 48, 75; Jedin, H., Röm. Quart. Schr. 39 (1931) 284. Pico della Mirandola repeatedly refers to Aquinas, whom he calls splendor theologiae; his views are fundamentally Thomistic realism. Cf. Festugière, A.-J., “Studia Mirandulana”, Arch. d'Hist. Doctr. Lit. du M.-A., 7 (1932), 151.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Groethuysen, B., Philosophische Anthropologie (Hdb. d. Phil., Munich, 1931), p. 108, contends that man, for the medieval writers “stellt keinen an sich zu definierenden Wert dar”. One can hardly understand how anyone, acquainted with medieval texts, can arrive at such a conclusion.—Concerning the three worlds, Avicenna had taught that each region is divided in three parts, virtus intelligibilis pura, a animo motus, materia. See Sauter, C., Avicenna's Bearbeitung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Freiburg i. B. 1912), p. 89.Google Scholar

^206a Asclep. 40, 18. See Kroll, J., Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos , p. 318.Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance , p. 69. The passage occurs in Ficino's Theologia Platonica, III, 2. “Si cum utrisque [sc. inferioribus et superioribus] convenit, appetit utraque. Quapropter naturali quodam instinctu ascendit ad supera, descendit ad infera. Et cum ascendit inferiora non deserit, et cum descendit superiora non relinquit.” The position in the “middle” is mentioned also by Dante, De monarchia, I, 3. For a detailed account see Rolbiecki, J. J., The Political Philosophy of Dante Alighieri (Washington D. C., 1921), p. 212 ff.Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ One has to beware of understanding the naturalis instinctus according to the modern conceptions of “instinct”. Instinctus is, with Aquinas and the other writers, and so still with Ficino, precisely what the word says: something quod instinguit, a stimulus or incitement. It corresponds to the amor naturalis by virtue of which everything is ordained towards its natural end and shows a certain “inclination” for those operations which are conducive to the realization of this end. The faculties of the human soul, too, have such natural inclinations, and the rational powers of intellect and will thus tend “by nature” towards the superiora. Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ On the whole, microcosmism as found in the works of the Italian Renaissance depends on ideas current in Western thought since centuries. The notions of man as the “middle”, of the vinculum, of “sympathy” guaranteeing the unity of the universe and the parallelism of micro- and macrocosmic events, and others which have been mentioned as having been handed down from Antiquity and much considered in the Middle-Ages—they all continue to be effective as important elements in the structure of Renaissance philosophy. The illustrations could be multiplied ad libitum. There seems to be one aspect which had not been attended to by the medieval authors but is considered by Pico. This is man's capacity to create. It is somewhat astonishing that this fact has not been used in microcosmistic speculation. It would seem that the conception of man as microcosm would have been well in accordance with this fact. As the universe brings forth ever new forms and events, so does man. But much as the Schoolmen emphasized man's freedom and his power even on his own nature—potens naturae suae—and his duty to fashion his own life and personality, they did not relate this to microcosmism. Pico della Mirandola apparently sensed this relation, although he does not insist on it. He refers to man's position in the “center”, his being neither celestial nor terrestrial, neither moral nor immoral, his being placed so by God that he may shape and form himself. It depends on man whether he sinks to the level of the brutes or is regenerated into a being similar to God. “Poteris in superiora, quae sunt divina, ex tui animi sententia regenerari”. Pico may have been influenced, in his reference to creative power, by a passage in Enn. V, 4.1, where Plotinus speaks of a “mysterious power”, ἄρατoς δύναμις, impelling every creature to create, so that the latent qualities be unfurled (ἐξλίττϵσϑαι). Considering the influence Pico and some of his fellows or followers had on English thought, one is tempted to suspect a relation between the Mirandolian ideas and the aesthetic interpretation of the universe in Shaftesbury. See also below note 214.Google Scholar

²¹⁰ Olgiati, Fr., Lo spirito dell'Umanesimo e del Rinascimento , p. 592, quotes a letter in which Ficino compares the universe to a cithara and the individual things to the sounds called forth by God playing on harmonious strings. The comparison is nearly a locus communis. We have come across the same idea before, e.g. in Honorius (note 156). The speculation on numbers was furthered by the acquaintance with the Cabbalah. Pico della Mirandola was very proud to be the first to study this work which he had acquired non mediocri impenso. He influenced men like Reuchlin, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Francesco Giorgio Veneto and others. His enthusiam for number speculation notwithstanding, Pico was rather skeptical in regard to the use and the scientific nature of mathematics. But mathematics may mean with him, in first line astrological calculations. “Mathematicae non sunt verae scientiae” (quoted by Olgiati, , p. 610). But he has in mind, also, mathematics in our sense, since he states that this science cannot cope with the problems arising from the nature of the world and of history, which both must be conceived as continuously developing. Perhaps, Pico might have changed his mind could he have foreseen the further progress of mathematics since the times of Newton and Leibniz. Bruno, too, speaks repeatedly in a contemptuous manner of mathematics whose results he deemed mere plays of imagination. The reasons for his view are confused, and anyhow of no interest here.Google Scholar

²¹¹ della Mirandola, Pico, Heptaplus , IV, 1. See Thorndike, L., A History of Magic and Experimental Science, IV, 509. On the relation of circular movement and soul see also Plato, Leg, X, 897. Pico is not consistent in the way he presents his microcosmistic speculations. But one thought returns always, namely that man, as the microcosm, does not fill any definite place within an hierarchical order, since he comprises within his nature all the other orders. Pico, for instance, establishes the following series: God—intelligentiae, pure substances, or ideas—heavens, qualities, or virtues—elements, material composites; man does not figure in this enumeration because he participates in all of the members of the macrocosm. See Dulles, A., Princeps concordiae. Pico della Mirandola and the Scholastic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass. 1941), p. 82. The passage refers to the Heptaplus. In this work Pico also carefully distinguishes God's and man's relation to the universe: God contains all things in Himself as the principle of all, man as the medium of all (ibid. p. 112). The medium suggests, at the same time, the old idea of man the center and the Aristotelean-Thomistic notion of the anima quodammωdo omnia. In particular, there is a correspondence by which the human intellect is likened to the angels; his reason, and the head as the organ of reason, to the heavenly souls (of the stars); sense and motion, which are localized in the heart, correspond to the animals; nutrition and generation, to the plants (which is obviously but a modification of the notions of the vegetative and sensitive “souls” virtually contained in the one rational soul of man); the “spirit”—that is the intermediary something which links the soul to matter and enables the former to influence the latter (an idea still active, e.g., in Descartes)—is likened to light; the “spiritual body” or the vehiculum caeleste has its analogy in the heavenly bodies; and the corruptible body, in the elements (ibid. p. 115). In his famous Discourse on the Dignity of Man, Pico emphasizes man's position and, as it were, function by which he is made into a “creaturarum internuntium, … stabilis aevi et fluxi temporis interstitium et quod Persae dicunt copulam, imo hymenaeum”. The attribution to the “Persians” of the idea of copula is not without interest. One would like to know the sources to which Pico refers. Perhaps, his only source is Plutarchus.Google Scholar

²¹² Calvin, , Sermons sur le livre Job , Serm. 29, c. 10 (Opera , edd. Baum, G., Cumitz, E., and Renso, G., Brunsvigiae 1887, Vol. 30. c. 481): “Or est-il ainsi que l'homme est le principal ouvrage et la plus excellente entre toutes les créatures. Dieu a voulu déployer ce qu'il n'avait mis qu'en petites portions et au ciel, et sur la terre, et en tous animaux, tellement que l'homme est appellé comme un petit monde.” Google Scholar

²¹³ Dilthey, W., Auffassung und Analyse des Menschen im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert , Ges. Werke, II, 46. It is, however, hardly correct to characterize, as Dilthey does, the philosophy of these Italian Platonists as a “religious universalistic theism in a particular Neo-Platonic form”. Ficino, especially, intends to stay absolutely within the doctrine of the Church, though his enthusiasm for Plotinus and other writers carries him, perhaps, to a point where his views are not any more quite compatible with orthodoxy.Google Scholar

²¹⁴ Zwingli was in friendly relations with Pico's nephew Gianfrancesco della Mirandola. Mirandolean ideas are particularly noticeable in his De providentia. See Dilthey, , Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert, ibid. p. 155 ff., esp. p. 159. But Dilthey is mistaken in considering as an original idea of Pico the statement that man gives unity and meaning to creation. We have seen that this idea is much older. Concerning the Cambridge Platonists, see de Boer, T. T., The Theory of Knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists (Columb. Univ. Diss. 1931).Google Scholar

²¹⁵ See above p. 381. The idea that the universe is full of forces hostile to one another is not a new one. Nor is the other that these antagonistic forces are kept in balance and harmonious order by an immediate or mediate divine act. The passage quoted previously from Alanus de Insulis, p. 345, may serve as illustration. Many similar statements could be easily added.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ It is hardly necessary to mention expressly Fr. Brentano's interesting little work, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie (originally published in 1894, reedited by Kraus, O., Leipzig, 1926). See Gilson, E., “Franz Brentano's Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy”, Mediev. Studies, 1 (1939) 1 ff.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ “Jene neu-platonische Spekulation … schwankt nicht selten an der schmalen Grenzscheide zum Pantheismus unsicher hin und her und schillert stark in den Pantheismus oder doch Panentheismus hinüber”. Cl. Baeumker, , Das pseudo-hermetische Buch der 24 Meister (Beitr. z. Gesch d. Phil. d. MA. 1927, vol. 25, 1-2), p. 197. Bruno eventually identifies the World-Soul with infinite space and also with αἰϑήρ, which idea he apparently derived from Orphic texts. See Olschki, L., “Giordano Bruno”, Deutsche Vierteljschr. f. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch. 2 (1924), 44 f. Bruno's ideas can be gathered best, in a succint presentation, from his theses for the disputation at Paris in 1586: “natura … est ars vivens et quaedam intellectualis animae potestas … tria licet contemplari: legem in mente divina, … iudicium in mente animae mundi sed divinae legis normam decretum exsequente … mundus … animal est a mente dependens, perfectissimam, propriam sicut et nos animam habens.” Google Scholar

²¹⁸ It is impossible to report on many other continuations and transformations of microcosmism or on writers who essentially retain at least the terminology of medieval microcosmism. One of these is, e.g. Herbert of Cherbury. See Dilthey, W., Die Autonomie des Denkens im 17. Jahrhundert , Ges. WW. II, 259. On Carolus Bovillus, see Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos. Google Scholar

²¹⁹ Koyré, A., “Galileo and Plato”, Journ. f. the Hist. of Ideas , 4, (1943), 703. With the dissolution of the old conception of the cosmos, microcosmism becomes impossible. “Wo keine Gewissheit eines Makrokosmos mehr besteht, hat der Gedanke des Mikrokosmos keinen Boden und keine Wahrheit mehr”: Plessner, H., “Philosophische Anthropologie”, Philosophia, 2 (1937), 98.—Although this study is chiefly concerned with the past, it may be permissible to yield to the temptation to consider, incidentally, the possibility of microcosmism in contemporary thought. If it is true that the acceptance of a macrocosm is the conditio sine qua non for microcosmism becoming meaningful, then, of course, the view of “classic” physics was utterly hostile to any such idea. The universe of this physics is indetermined insofar as it does not make any difference whether there are more or less individual bodies contained therein. Notwithstanding the universal validity of the “laws of nature”, any part of the universe may be conceived as absent without the nature of the whole being altered. It seems that this is otherwise with modern physics. We are concerned here, naturally, not with the physical correctness of statements made by contemporary physicists, but with their cosmological implications. In this regard it would seem that notions like the “entropy of the universe tending towards a maximum” or the concept of a “world-tensor”, as well as other such concepts, point at a new “macrocosmistic” interpretation. The same can be said of Sir Arthur Eddington's idea that the presuppositions of physics allow to calculate the number of ultimate particles, see The Philosophy of Physical Science (New York, 1939), p. 170. If the universe in fact consists of a determined number of particles and if every cosmic event, however limited in its immediate appearance, is truly cosmic in nature, the conception of a macrocosm not unlike the one of old seems to suggest itself.Google Scholar

²²⁰ “Campanella, in armonia con la sua tesi dell'animazione universale, fa delle piante degli animali immobili”: Ottaviano, C., Introduction to his edition of Campanella, T., Epilogo magno (Fisiologia Italiana ), ed. Ottaviano, (Rome 1939, Acad, R. d'Italia, Studi e Documenti, vol. 10), p. 97.Google Scholar

²²¹ The following passages may serve as examples of Campanella's way of reasoning. “Ciascuno dovrebbe esser persuaso che tutte le cose sentono in particolare e in commune … ciascuna e tutte insieme abboriscono di maniera il vacuo tra loro, che con impeto naturale parziale corrono ad empirlo per serbar alla loro communità e repubblica integra … Bisogna dunque affermare che il mondo sia un animal tutto senziente e che godano tutte le parti della commune vita”. Campanella, T. Del senso delle cose e della magia , I, 9 (ed. Bruers, A., Bari, 1927, p. 26). “Stolta cosa è stimare che il mondo non sente perchè non ha gambe, occhi, mani. Questi stromenti convengono all' animale spirito chiuso in materia grossa … Al mondo … mani sono i raggi e virtuti attive diffuse ad operar.” (Ibid. I, 13, p. 34.) Others obviously felt that the stolta cosa had to be remedied. Thus, e.g., Giovanni da Fontana in his Liber de omnibus rebus naturalibus (1440), see Thorndike, L., A History of Magic and Experimental Science, IV, 150. Fontana establishes a correspondence between parts of the head and the parts of the universe: to the skull corresponds the primum mobile, to the right eye, the sun, to the left, the moon, to the brain, the sphere of fixed stars, and so forth. His words make the impression of fanciful enlargements of Philonian ideas. The old ideas were still very much alive in the sixteenth century, as one may gather from Franciscus Georgius Venetus (Zorzi, F. G.), De harmonia mundi totius cantica (Venet. 1525), whose ideas were considered important enough to deserve a special controversy by Mersenne. See the lengthy report in Jac. Bruckner, Historia critica philosophiae (Lipsiae, 1743), IV pt. I, pp. 347 ff., esp. 380, 382, 384.Google Scholar

²²² “Se a l'uomo non basta lo spirito corporeo a reggerlo, ma troviamo che abbia mente immortale, assai più convenirà che il mondo più nobile di ogni ente e figlio del sommo bene, tanto buono e bello, abbia oltre che nature partocolari senzienti, un anima eccellentissima maggiore d'ogni angelo che viene la cura di tutto … quest anima … la natura commune e arte universale da Dio creata, infusa nel mondo”. Campanella, T., Del senso delle cose e della magia , II, 32 (ed. cit., p. 161). Sometimes, however, Campanella uses expressions which come dangerously close to pantheism, thus when he says that God and the soul are in all things. But generally he does not forget the transcendence of God, just as he, all his vicissitudes notwithstanding, never ceases to feel himself a Dominican monk. Whenever he refers to himself, he is careful to put “Fra” before his name.Google Scholar

²²³ One might say that the principle, similia similibus cognoscuntur changes under the hands of Campanella into paria paribus cognoscuntur. Also, the notion that the knowing principle “becomes” the known, or that intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, appears distorted and exaggerated.Google Scholar

²²⁴ Patrizius, Fr, Panpsychia (vol. III of Nova de universo philosophia , Ferrara, 1591). See Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, p. 157. Similar ideas are found in Cardanus, who calls (De subtilitate, V), metals plantae sepultae. A. O. Lovejoy (The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, Mass. 1936, p. 60) quotes, with apparent approval, the comments of G. H. Palmer on certain verses by George Herbert, of the seventeenth century; the poet says that “Frogs marry fish and flesh … mines, th'earth and plants”, and Palmer refers to “the fancy that minerals grow”. But the relation seems closer to ideas like those of Cardano. On older notions of this kind, see Plumpe, J. C., “Vivum saxum, vivi lapides”, Traditio, 1 (1943), 1 ff. Gilbert, W., De magnete, also holds panpsychistic ideas, see McAllister, J. B., The Letter of St. Thomas Aquinas De occultis operibus naturae (Washington D. C., 1939), p. 138, n. 49.Google Scholar

²²⁵ Obviously, Paracelsus views it as impossible that the non-natural part of man, that is, his rational faculties, might become diseased. But they are impeded in their operations if the subservient “natural” powers function abnormally. Hence, under these conditions man becomes “totally nature”. Paracelsus' ideas on the rational faculties are, apparently, perfectly in line with traditional doctrines.Google Scholar

²²⁶ Astronomia magna; Opp. ed. Sudhoff, , XII, 40.Google Scholar

²²⁷ The word, virtue, or Tugend, has to be taken in the original sense of capacity or aptitude.Google Scholar

²²⁸ Astronomia magna; Opp. XII, pp. 73, 164, 166; Die Bücher von den unsichtbaren Krankheiten, ibid. IX, 308.Google Scholar

²²⁹ Paragranum; Opp. VIII, 168. On the determination of microcosmic changes by macrocosmic events there are numerous references. The macrocosm is per se and quoad nos prior. “Man is learned from the big world, and not from man”. Opus paramirum, ibid. p. 45. Concerning the importance of the hour, one has to remember that the use of the right time, καιρóς, had been emphasized since old times, e.g. in the corpus Hippocraticum, on diet; see also Tim. 98c, 5.Google Scholar

²³⁰ “Der edel nam microcosmus”: Die Bücher von den unsichtbaren Krankheiten; Opp. IX, 308.Google Scholar

²³¹ Agrippa of Nettesheim, for instance, applies the proposition, “Intelligendo se ipsum intelligit omnia alia Deus,” to man and unhesitatingly declares: “quicumque se ipsum cognoverit, cognoscit in se ipso omnia”. The correspondence between micro- and macrocosm is conceived as one-to-one correspondence; self-knowledge becomes identical with any kind of knowledge whatsoever man can possibly attain. Man is to Agrippa the microcosm, the second world: De occulta philosophia , II, 36.Google Scholar

²³² “Der Mikrokosmos-Gedanke—in der Fassung, die ihm die Renaissance-Philosophie gegeben hatte—gestattete eine solche μϵτάβασις ϵἰς ἄλλo γένoς, einen Übergang von der Physik zur Ethik nicht nur, sondern forderte geradezu zu ihm heraus: denn in ihr hat sich von Anfang die Kosmologie nicht nur mit der Physiologie und Psychologie, sondern auch mit der Ethik verbunden”. Cassirer, E., Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance , p. 118. It is, however, a mistake to credit only the microcosmism of the Italian Renaissance with such a unifying power. Much older forms of microcosmism, and also other views in medieval ontology and cosmology, proved capable of the same synthesizing force.Google Scholar

²³³ Lovejoy, A. O., The Great Chain of Being , p. 101 f.Google Scholar

²³⁴ Even Cusanus, who in his mathematical reflections sometimes comes rather close to modern conceptions, does not think of continuity as the moderns do. “Inter genera unum universum contrahentia talis est inferioris et superioris connexio ut in medio coincidunt, ac inter species diversas talis combinationis ordo existit ut suprema species generis unius coincidat cum infima immediate superioris, ut sit unum continuum perfectum universum”. De docta ignor. III, 1 ( Opp. edd. Hoffmann, E. and Klibansky, R., Leipzig, 1931, I, 120); also III, 3 (ibid. p. 126). The fundamental conception is not one of gradual transition, but of “opposites” held together by a μέσoν participating both in the lower and the higher levels. This idea is, of course, very old. It is stated e.g. by Nemesius, , De nat. hom. c. 5 (P.G. 40, 616): opposites cannot be brought together unless there be μέσóν τι δέσμoν. This view prevailed throughout the Middle Ages; see e.g. Aquinas, , C.G. II, 68.Google Scholar

I am afraid that I cannot agree with Professor Lovejoy who speaks in regard to medieval ideas of the “posulate that between natural things the transitions are insensible and quasi-continuous”, at least if, as the author seems to imply, transition and continuity are to be understood in the modern sense (The Great Chain of Being, p. 61). The link is not one member in a continuous series, one which just happens to be the uppermost, but which qua member is in no way distinct of other members; it is rather one holding an exceptional place, standing, as it were, astride the gap between the genera, and thus uniting or linking the otherwise separate levels of being. Perhaps, one ought to emphasize the difference between the fundamentally quantitative view-point of modern times and the qualitative principle underlying suchlike speculations in previous ages. An illustration may be gathered from color, taking it in its phenomenal appearance and not as “explained” by physics. There is, of course, a gradual transition from red to yellow; but yellow is not a higher degree of red; it is something altogether new, something which cannot be derived from red by any kind of gradual increase. In physics such a derivation is possible because, there, color does not exist; physics deals only with wave-lengths, and these, being mere quantities, increase by imperceptible gradual steps. The supremum infimi is at the same time the infimum superioris generis, because it unites within its being two heterogeneous principles; but this union of the two does not, to the medieval mind, constitute any true transition of the type commonly considered to-day.Google Scholar

²³⁵ Burckhardt, Jakob, in his famous work on “The Culture of the Renaissance”, probably did not yet realize the full complexity of the historical phenomenon he studied. Recent historians have become very conscious of this fact. Not even a partial aspect like “Humanism” can be adequately characterized by so simple a formula like the one coined by Burckhardt. “Emergence of the individual” does not say enough, and it entails a misconception of medieval ideas. On the insufficiency of this formula, see e.g., Strich, W., “Renaissance und Reformation”, Deutsche Vierteljschr. f. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch. 1 (1923) 591; v. Martin, A., “Zur kultur-sozialischen Problematik der Geistesgeschichte”, Histor. Zeitschr. 142 (1930), 242; Jacob, G. F., “Changing Views of the Renaissance”, History, 16 (1931), 214; Nelson, N., “Individualism as a Criterion of the Renaissance”, Journ. Engl. German. Philol. 32 (1933), 316. Many years before, E. Troeltsch had pointed out in an article (“Renaissance und Reformation”, Histor. Zeitschr, 110 [1913], 528), that “der Geist der Renaissance ist nicht allzu einheitlich zu formulieren und vor allem nicht mit den modernen Gedanken zu vereinheitlichen”. The eminent scholar, however, if avoiding on one hand the over-simplifications against which he warns, falls, on the other, prey to certain prejudices concerning the world of ideas characteristic of the centuries preceding the Renaissance. Much of what he believes to be new and specific of the Italian Renaissance is in fact much older and only restated, although indubitably in a different manner, by the writers of the Renaissance (see particularly Troeltsch's remarks, p. 531). In spite of the warning sounded by Troeltsch, and heeded by many, there are still many works which present the Renaissance as a thoroughly homogeneous epoch. The enormous variety of individuals and ideas is often overlooked. The image of an age of undisturbed sense of beauty, “progress”—an idea alien to these times—, enjoyment of life and reality, prevails in many studies. But in the Italian Rennaissance, there met an age which was slow to die and still powerful enough to create disturbance, and an age which was not yet—if such an expression is permissible—conscious of itself. This time is not only one of a new form of life emerging; it is this too, but it it also an age of crisis, with all the disequilibration which accompanies cultural periods of this kind.Google Scholar

If it is correct to label as “Renaissances” other epochs, besides the Italian Renaissance and the cultural changes resulting from it in other countries, it would appear as a methodological fault to limit, as is usually done, the studies on Renaissance exclusively to the cultural events in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It then becomes necessary to make a comparative analysis of the various Renaissances as they allegedly existed in Western Europe in the ninth and the twelfth centuries, eventually also of the so-called Ottonian Renaissance, and to combine these studies with others dealing with similar developments in Byzantium, perhaps even in Old Rome—the age of Plotinus—, maybe also within the Islamic world.Google Scholar

I have remarked above, p. 334, that the Revival of Aristotelianism “die Aristoteles-Reception”, to use Grabmann's expression, of the thirteenth century is not considered a Renaissance. In this regard, one author makes an exception. A. Dempf writes: “Wenn man nicht die den gesamten Universitätsbetrieb schon von 1260 an bestimmende Aristoteles-Renaissance als die eigentliche Philosophische Renaissance anerkennt … so gibt es keine kontinuierliche Geistesentwicklung vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit” (“Geisteswissenschaftliche Aufgaben der Erforschung der Renaissance-philosophie”, Deutsche Vierteljschr. f. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch. 7 [1929], 636).Google Scholar

I am quite aware of the incompleteness of these and other remarks in this article, pertaining to the topic of Renaissance. They are not offered in any sense as solutions. Also, the problem is envisioned here only incidentally, insofar as it arises inevitably when microcosmism is under discussion. These remarks are mere suggestions, of an obviously hypothetical nature.Google Scholar

²³⁶ Novalis, , in a letter to his betrothed, writes: “Du bist eine Elongatur des Universums, das Universum ist eine Abbreviatur von Dir.” Google Scholar

²³⁷ The Humanism of the Italian Renaissance, as it is usually described, is in fact a late form of the attitude characteristic of the earlier years of this movement. It results partly from a curious transformation of the latter. The emergence, out of the notion of the microcosm, of the idea of “superman”, of the “great” individual, who by his greatness is absolved from the laws binding the average person, has been briefly described by Leube, H., Reformation und Humanismus in England (Leipzig, 1930).Google Scholar

²³⁸ Scheler, Max, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Darmstadt, 1928).Google Scholar