¹ As regards Godfrey's arrival in Paris, R. Arway notes that we are certain he arrived there no later than 1277. He adds, ‘There are solid grounds for holding, however, that Godfrey arrived in Paris at an earlier date and made his philosophical studies from 1270-1272, for we possess a notebook from those years which probably is to be attributed to his hand’; cf. ‘A Half Century of Research on Godfrey of Fontaines,’ The New Scholasticism 36 (1962) 193. This notebook has been studied by Glorieux, P., ‘Un recueil scolaire de Godefroid de Fontaines,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 3 (1931) 37-53. Neumann, B. (Der Mensch und die himmlische Seligkeit nach der Lehre Gottfrieds von Fontaines [Limburg/Lahn 1958] 1) also argues for 1270 on the grounds of this same notebook. For further defense of an early arrival cf. Duin, J.J., La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant: Textes et Étude (Louvain 1954) 272 n. 64.Google Scholar

² ‘Il est aujourd'hui admis que Godefroid de Fontaines a personnellement assisté aux cours de Siger de Brabant sur la Métaphysique’ (Duin, , La doctrine de la providence 167).Google Scholar

³ Cf. Glorieux, P., La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320 I (Le Saulchoir 1925) 149–168. As regards Quodlibet 15, cf. note 10 below.Google Scholar

⁴ Gilson, E., History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York 1955) 735–6.Google Scholar

⁵ Paulus, J., Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique (Paris 1938) xiii–xv. Cf. Gilson, , History 447-454.Google Scholar

⁶ The general reasoning of Q 2 q. 3 (‘Utrum mundus sive aliqua creatura potuit esse vel existere ab aeterno,’ Les philosophes belges 2 [cited below n. 8] 68) closely resembles that of St. Thomas in his De aeternitate mundi. But nowhere is the resemblance greater than in the argument beginning with the words, ‘Praeterea, in quocumque instanti ponitur res esse, potest poni principium actionis eius,’ and concluding, ‘ideo non de facili capiunt quod causa agens effectum suum duratione non praecedat’ (73). For the same argument expressed in practically the same words, cf. Thomas, , De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes (Opuscula philosophica [ed. Turin, 1954] 106). Godfrey did have access to Thomas' De aeternitate, for it is included in the notebook cited above (n. 1). Cf. Glorieux, , ‘Un recueil scolaire’ 39-40.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Gilson, P. Böhner-E., Christliche Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues (3rd ed. Paderborn 1954) 556.Google Scholar

⁸ For the dating of the individual Quodlibets, cf. Glorieux, , La littérature quodlibétique I 151–166. They have appeared in the series Les philosophes belges in the following order. T. 2: Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines (ed. De Wulf, M. and Pelzer, A., Louvain, 1904). T. 3: Les Quodlibet cinq, six, et sept (ed. De Wulf, M. and Hoffmans, J., Louvain 1914). T. 4: Le huitième Quodlibet (Louvain 1924), Le neuvième Quodlibet (Louvain 1928), Le dixième Quodlibet (Louvain 1931), all three edited by Hoffmans, J. T. 5: Les Quodlibets onze et douze (Louvain 1932), Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze (Louvain 1935), all edited by Hoffmans, T. 14; Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines (ed. Lottin, O., Louvain 1937). For further discussion of the dating, manuscript form, and style, cf. Arway, , ‘A Half Century’ 196-201. For a resumé of the arguments regarding the alleged Godfridian authorship of certain scholia to the Summa theologiae and the Summa contra Gentiles of St. Thomas, cf. Neuman, , Der Mensch 7-12. According to Neumann the scholia in question are neither to be accepted nor rejected en masse but demand individual evaluation. Not all are written by the same hand, and some may well have been written by Godfrey.Google Scholar

⁹ Cf. De Wulf, M., Un théologien-philosophe du xiii^e siècle: Étude sur la vie, les oeuvres et l'influence de Godefroid de Fontaines (Brussels 1904) 64. ‘C'est que le texte des quatre premiers quodlibets est une “reportatio,” c'est-à-dire une rédaction d'élève d'après des notes de cours.’ For De Wulf's views cf. also Les philosophes belges 2 xv. Cf. Arway, , ‘A Half Century’ 199-200.Google Scholar

¹⁰ As regards Q 15, cf. Lottin, O., ‘Une question quodlibétique inconnue de Godefroid de Fontaines,’ Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 30 (1934) 852–859. After careful comparison with the other Quodlibets, Dom Lottin not only concludes that Q 15 is authentically a work of Godfrey, but that it is a personal autograph rather than a mere reportatio. And from a comparison with the short versions of Q 3 and Q 4, he proposes that this same judgment also be applied to them. The short versions are also autographs, coming from the hand of Godfrey himself. Cf. 857, as well as Les philosophes belges 14.76. However, Stella, P. (Teologi e teologia nelle “Reprobationes“ di Bernardo d'Auvergne ai Quodlibeti di Goffredo di Fontaines [Turin 1957] 17-18) seems to be of another opinion, at least as regards the short versions of Q 3 and Q 4. Arguing from analogies between the manuscript of the brief redactions of Q 3 and Q 4 and abbreviationes of other Quodlibetal Questions of Godfrey whose redaction Stella attributes to Hervé of Nedellec, he concludes that the brief redactions of Q 3 and Q 4 were also drawn up in their present form by the hand of Hervé. According to Stella, then, they should not be regarded as Godfrey's personal autographs.Google Scholar

^10a Glorieux notes that Q 15 is harder to date than the others but succeeds in placing it in 1303 or 1304. He sees it as evidence that Godfrey had returned to Paris at this time. Cf. his ‘Notations brèves sur Godefroid de Fontaines,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médievale 11 (1939) 172–3.Google Scholar

¹¹ De Wulf, , Un théologien-philosophe cc. 1-3. Cf. Gilson, , History 739; Neumann, , Der Mensch 1-2; Arway, , ‘A Half Century’ 193-196.Google Scholar

¹² Les philosophes belges 2.235 (PB 2.235): ‘Nam quidam dicunt quod esse realiter est aliud ab essentia, realem compositionem faciens cum ipsa. Nunquam tamen est unum separabile ab alio, ita quod cum res non habet esse existentiae non habet esse essentiae. Sicut etiam materia differt a forma, si tamen materia careat omni forma, secundum aliquos etiam desinit esse omnino.’ Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid. Google Scholar

¹⁴ Ibid.: ‘Sed mihi videtur quod esse existentiae et essentia omnino sint idem secundum rem et differunt solum secundum rationem et modum intelligendi et significandi, nullam omnino compositionem facientia, sicut nec currere et cursus vel huiusmodi. Et ideo, in quantum manet res secundum esse essentiae manet etiam secundum esse existentiae et e converso, et in quantum intelligitur de uno intelligitur de alio et e converso’ Cf. also PB 2.323 for the short redaction of the same. Godfrey has outlined these positions on essence-existence as a preliminary to discussing ‘Utrum ponere res praedicamentales esse aeternas secundum esse quidditativum sit ponere mundum esse aeternum’; PB 2.233.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Godfrey considers Henry's theory in considerable detail in Q 2 q.2, Q 3 q.1, Q 4 q.2, Q 8 q.3, and Q 9 q.2.Google Scholar

¹⁶ PB 2.156: ‘Utrum creatura possit did ens ratione suae essentiae cum ipsa est non ens quantum ad esse existentiae.’ Google Scholar

¹⁷ PB 2.158.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. As may be seen from this passage and from many others (cf. n. 14 above), Godfrey easily moves from esse to esse existentiae, and from essentia to esse essentiae and vice versa in his discussion of their relationship. For all practical purposes he takes esse and esse existentiae as synonyms. The same will apply to essentia and esse essentiae. Thus one may speak of the distinction or identity of essence (essentia or esse essentiae) and existence (esse or esse existentiae). The same, however, will not be true for all his contemporaries. In addition to positing an intentional distinction between essence and esse existentiae, at certain points in his career Henry of Ghent also seems to have maintained such a distinction between essence and esse essentiae. Eventually, however, he seems to have reduced this second distinction to a purely logical one, and restricted the intentional distinction to that which obtains between essence (essentia or esse essentiae) and esse existentiae. Cf. Paulus, , Henri de Gand 311-314.Google Scholar

¹⁹ F. Van Steenberghen comments: ‘Ainsi il (Godefroid) rejette la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence, mais il s'oppose en cela aux outrances de Gilles de Rome, qui avait fait des deux composants des res et même des res separabiles, plutôt qu'à la pensée de saint Thomas’; Forest, A., Van Steenberghen, F., de Gandillac, M., Le mouvement doctrinal du xi^e au xiv^e siècle (Histoire de l'Église 13; 2nd ed. Paris 1956) 331. Since Q 3 dates from Christmas, 1286, Godfrey probably was familiar with Giles' treatment of essence and existence in qq. 9 and 11 of his Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia. For the dating of Q 3, cf. Glorieux, , La littérature quodlibétique I 153. Paulus comments: ‘Ce problème est examiné surtout au Quodl. III, 1-2, qui connaît probablement les questions disputées 1-11 de Gilles, comme aussi le Quodl. X, 7, de Henri, soutenu environ la même date’; Henri de Gand 321 n. 2. For the same judgment cf. Hocedez, E., ‘Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réelle (1276-1287),’ Gregorianum 8 (1927) 381. He considers it certain that Godfrey had Giles' doctrine in mind, and highly probable that he had direct access to his text. Cf. 381 n. 2 and his treatment of the same point in his Aegidii Romani theoremata de esse et essentia (Louvain 1930) (12).Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Q 2 q.2 (PB 2.60): ‘Ad cuius intellectum est considerandum quod essentia sic se habet ad esse existentiae eius quod est aut idipsum realiter cum ipso differens ratione vel intentione, aut esse dicit rem aliam ab ipsa essentia.’ For the short version of the passage from Q 3 q.1 cited in our text above, cf. PB 2.302. ‘Quantum ergo ad primum dicunt quidam quod esse et essentia sunt diversae res in creatura, ita quod essentia est potentia susceptiva ipsius esse et esse est actus eius’ (Italics mine).Google Scholar

²¹ Gilson, , History 424–425. Gilson also notes the difficulty one has in determining when a master such as Godfrey was rejecting the true Thomistic distinction, and when he was rejecting something which he incorrectly understood to be the Thomistic distinction.Google Scholar

²² PB 2.158: ‘Cum enim essentia creaturae posset esse et non esse, nec de intellectu eius est esse vel non esse (nam si de intellectu et ratione eius esset esse, non posset non esse et esset quoddam necesse esse quod convenit soli Deo; si autem includeret non esse nullo agente posset esse), ergo essentia creaturae intelligitur ut quoddam possibile esse, sive ut quaedam potentia ad esse tanquam ad aliquid re differens ab ipsa. Nam illud quo intellecto non intelligitur necessario alterum, sed etiam cum contrario illius potest intelligi, est realiter differens ab illo. Cum ergo omnis essentia creaturae possit intelligi non cointellecto esse eius vel sine esse, immo etiam cum contrario ipsius quia potest intelligi non esse, oportet quod esse sit aliud ab essentia et non sit de eius ratione; sed sit essentia sicut quoddam potentiale sive possibile esse et non esse de se.’ Google Scholar

²³ PB 2.302.Google Scholar

²⁴ The similarity between this passage and Thomas' exposition in the De ente et essentia is striking, at least at first sight. ‘Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate.’ Cf. Roland-Gosselin, M.-D., Le ‘de ente et essentia’ de s. Thomas d'Aquin (2nd ed. Paris 1948) 34. Yet Godfrey's passage seems to go further by noting that the essence can be known as non-existing. Cf. Giles of Rome (Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia q. 11 [Venice 1503] fol. 24^v) for six truths which, he maintains, cannot be safeguarded without the real distinction. The first of these is precisely this: ‘omnis essentia cuiuslibe creaturae potest intelligi cum opposito ipsius esse.’ Google Scholar

²⁵ PB 2.302.Google Scholar

²⁶ PB 2.158-59. Although the text is too long to quote in full, the concluding lines merit attention: ‘— cum inquam ita sit, ut iam dictum est, necesse est dicere quod esse addit rem aliquam super essentiam. Sicut ergo potentia materiae non reducitur ad actum nisi per aliquid additum scilicet per formam, ita et potentia essentiae non reducitur ad actum nisi per aliquid additum scilicet per esse. Ergo esse est aliud ab essentia sicut forma est aliud a materia.’ Google Scholar

²⁷ PB 2.159: ‘Si enim ens quod non est compositum ex materia et forma productum in esse per generationem, sed ens simplex in essentia in esse productum per creationem non esset tale quod in eo necessario aliquid esset receptum a creante illud, esset actus purus et esse purum, et esset suum esse, et sic esset infinitum et illimitatum et per se necesse esse. Sed hoc est falsuin.’ Google Scholar

²⁸ PB 2.159-60. Cf. 160: ‘In omni ergo re sive simplicis essentiae sive compositae creatae erit compositio realis essentiae et esse sicut volunt aliqui propter istas rationes.’ Google Scholar

²⁹ In addition to the argument based on our notion or concept of essence (cf. n. 24 above), one finds further parallels to Godfrey's argumentation in Giles of Rome. For an argument based on the distinction between that which participates and that in which it participates, as well as the notion that existence, unless limited by essence, will be unlimited, cf. Giles', Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia q. 11 fol. 24^v-25^r. However, the parallel is not perfect. In q. 9, Giles' principal argument for the real distinction is based on a strict analogy between the matter-form couplet and the essence-existence couplet, and a similar analogy between substantial change and creation (fol. 20^v-21^r). Above all, in the case of spirits, one would not be able to account for their created character without the act-potency composition whereby essence receives existence as its act. As will be seen below, such argumentation was also well known to Godfrey, even though he does not present it as a distinct argument in the opening pages of Q. 3 q.1. J. Paulus comments: ‘Gilles l'interprète de façon résolument réaliste, comparant l'essence et l'existence au couple de la matière et de la forme, et la création ou l'annihilation des substances à la génération ou à la corruption physiques. Dans une telle doctrine, l'esse prend nécessairement l'aspect d'une sorte de forme absolue et séparable de l'essence’; Henri de Gand 318. While commenting on the dispute concerning the real distinction between Henry and Giles, he writes: ‘la distinction réelle telle que la combat Henri, n'est point du tout la distinction thomiste, mais la sorte de “monstre” imaginé par Gilles’ (284). But is not one to say the same of Godfrey, that the real distinction which he knows and rejects is likewise not Thomistic, but rather the same ‘monster’ invented by Giles?.Google Scholar

³⁰ There can be little doubt that Godfrey would have known of the dispute between Giles and Henry. Giles seems to have replied to Henry's rejection of the real distinction (Quodlibet 1 q.9, 1276) after his return from exile in his Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia qq.9 and 11, which seem to have appeared in 1286. Henry's reply to this refutation appears in his Quodlibet 10 q.7, of Christmas, 1286. (Cf. Paulus, , Henri de Gand 281.) Godfrey's Q 3 also appeared at this time (Christmas, 1286). One might also seek for parallels between Godfrey and Giles' Theoremata de esse et essentia. However, while listing the sources which Godfrey seems to have had in mind in Q 3 qq.1-2, Paulus does not cite it. Cf. Henri de Gand 321 n. 2. Moreover, in his article treating of the same debate (‘Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome,’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 13 [1940-42] 328), he states that Henry did not have the Theoremeta available. One would suppose, then, that the same was true of Godfrey. However, the date of composition of this work is disputed. Paulus, in the same context, sees it as composed during Giles' period of exile (between 1278-1286) and Hocedez shares this view. Cf. Hocedez, , Aegidii Romani theoremata (12). And after noting that Godfrey probably had qq.9 and 11 of Giles' Quaestiones disputatae at hand at the time he composed Q 3, he observes that not all the ideas expounded there by Godfrey in his presentation of the theory of the real distinction are to be found in the Quaestiones disputatae. Some are found in the Theoremata. Further on he seems to assume that Godfrey did have access to the Theoremata as well; cf. ibid. (103). Finally, for a recent effort to date the Theoremata somewhat earlier, i. e., before Giles' exile, and to see them as directly involved in Henry's attack on the real distinction in 1276, cf. Siemiatkowska, S. K., ‘Avant l'exil de Gilles de Rome: Au sujet d'une dispute sur les ‘theoremata de esse et essentia’ de Gilles de Rome,’ Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 7 (1960) 4-6, 31, 48. At any rate, whether or not Godfrey did have access to the Theoremata, one does find similarities with his argumentation there as well. Thus, for the analogy between generation and creation, and between the matter-form composition and the essence-existence composition, cf. theorem V 19ff. (Theorem VI notes this parallel again, but points out certain differences between the matter-form composition and the essence-existence composition. Cf. 26-30.) For the distinction as necessary to account for the contingent character of the separate intelligences, cf. theorem XII 74-7. For the need of the real distinction to safeguard the limited and composed and participated character of finite being, cf. theorem V 25-6; theorem XX 141-2; for an argument based on the possibility of knowing created essences without knowing their existence, theorem XII 67-70, 73. (References are to Hocedez, , Aegidii Romani theoremata.) Google Scholar

³¹ PB 2.302.Google Scholar

³² Ibid.: ‘Quod patet primo, quia si universalia in suo esse universali et abstracto non habent esse in rerum natura, sed tantum in intellectu, oportet hoc maxime verificari de maxime universalibus. Sed ens et esse sunt de maxime universalibus. Ergo et cetera. Secundo, quia si aliquid in rerum natura esset esse absolute dictum, nullam determinatam rationem entis includens, cum omnia includant esse universaliter et absolute dictum, omnia essent illud unum esse; et sic in rerum natura omnia essent aliquod unum secundum rem sicut posuit Parmenides, quod falsum est. Ergo et cetera.’ Google Scholar

³³ Cf. PB 2.160-1 for the longer version.Google Scholar

³⁴ PB 2.161 and 163. Cf. also 303 for the short version: ‘Ex his patent duo. Primum est quod non sic est accipienda differentia causae primae ad res creatas, quod unum eorum dicat tantum esse absque determinata ratione entitatis. Immo quodlibet eorum dicit entitatem determinatae rationis. Nam prima causa non est universalis in praedicando sicut ipsum commune, sed in creando. Et ideo in prima causa debemus intelligere quod sit esse cum plena perfectione essendi ad creandum omnia, non autem quod ibi sit esse tantum absque determinata ratione essendi.’ Google Scholar

³⁵ PB 2.161 and 163. Cf. 303: ‘Secundum, quod in rerum natura non est aliquid in rebus creatis quod sit tantum esse nec ut participans, nec ut participatum quod sit effectus primi entis, et alia agentia causent essentias quantum ad formas, quia nihil est in rerum natura quod super esse absolute dictum non addat aliquam determinatam rationem essendi.’ — One finds a resolute refusal in Siger of Brabant to distinguish essence and esse in the creature in such a way that esse would be caused by the First Cause, while the essence would not. Cf. Siger's Quaestiones in Metaphysicam: Introductio, q. 7: ‘Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum’ (ed. Graiff, C. A., Siger de Brabant: Questions sur la Métaphysique [Lpuvain 1948] 14). Siger attributes such a view to Albert the Great in connection with his defense of a theory of real distinction and replies that all that is found in the thing is the effect of the first cause. There is nothing which pertains to the thing either essentially or accidentally which is not due to the first cause. ‘Ergo haec distinctio nulla est, scilicet, inter essentiam rei et esse per hoc quod unum sit effectus Primi Principii et aliud non.’ In addition to this manuscript (Munich Clm. 9559), Graiff cites the same according to a shorter version as found in Godfrey's ‘recueil scolaire’ (cf. n. 1 above): ‘Sed cum universaliter quicquid est in re sit effectus Primi Principii, non potest distingui inter essentiam rei et esse per hoc quod unum sit effectus Primi Principii et non aliud’ (15). There can be little doubt, then, that Godfrey was familiar with Siger's views on this point. (As regards the contents of Godfrey's notebook, cf. Glorieux, , ‘Un recueil scolaire’ 37-53 and Duin, , La doctrine de la providence 133ff.) Google Scholar

³⁶ PB 2.162 and 303 (short version).Google Scholar

³⁷ PB 2.162. In Q 2 q.8 Godfrey describes the object of the intellect as ens secundum quod ens and all else insofar as it shares in this object in some way. This object, then, cannot be purely univocal, but must be analogical. Being is primarily affirmed of substance, to be sure, but also of accidents insofar as they are ordered to substance. Cf. PB 2.135-6. However, this does not mean that being does not apply to accidents in the formal sense. Just as being is applied to God primarily, and to creatures insofar as they are caused by God, it is nonetheless formally realized in creatures as well. So too, the fact that accidents participate in and are described as being only insofar as they inhere in and are ordered to substance does not imply that being is not realized in a formal if diminished sense in accidents as well. Cf. also Q 15 q.3 (PB 14.20).Google Scholar

³⁸ PB 2.163.Google Scholar

³⁹ PB 2.303: ‘Ens minus habet addere quam unum, cum ratio entis includatur in omni ratione; non sic ratio unius quae se habet saltem ad rationem entis per additionem. Sed unum non addit aliquid reale super essentiam eius de quo dicitur. Ergo nec ens nec per consequens esse a quo ens dicitur.’ Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid.: ‘Secundum Philosophum, quarto Metaphysicae, ens et unum sunt unum inter se quia nihil addunt tertio cui adiunguntur. Unde secundum ipsum, homo, ens homo, et unus homo non dicunt aliud et aliud sed id ipsum. Sed hoc non esset si ens adderet aliquam rem super essentiam eius de quo dicitur ens. Ergo et cetera.’ For Aristotle, cf. Metaphysics 4.1003b 26-35.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Ibid.: ‘Unumquodque aut est ens per essentiam suam sive per se aut per aliquid additum. Si per aliquid additum, de illo quaeretur per quid est ens; et si est ens per se, eadem ratione standum erat in primo ponendo quod primum erat ens per se. Si autem ad hoc ponatur quod illud sit ens per aliud, ita etiam erit de illo alio, et ibit in infinitum. Relinquitur ergo quod unumquodque sit ens per se et non per aliquam rem additam et sic sequitur idem quod prius.’ As Godfrey indicates, this argument is taken from Averroes, , In Metaph. 4.2 (Venice 1562; 8 fol. 67^va). Arguments one and two as presented by Godfrey could be taken as one argument. In fact, all three are loosely joined to form one argument in the longer version. However, there the text seems to be misplaced. Instead of appearing in the section where Godfrey presents his arguments against the real distinction, it is to be found near the end of the previous section, which treats of analogy. Cf. PB 2.163-4.Google Scholar

⁴² In Metaph. 4 lect. 2 (Turin 1950 n. 558). For a similar criticism of Avicenna, cf. Averroes, , In Metaph. 4 fol. 67^ra: ‘Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei.’ For an interesting discussion of Averroes and Siger of Brabant in their opposition to Avicenna on this same point, cf. Maurer, A., ‘Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant,’ Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946) 78 ff. For Siger's difficulties with the Thomistic passage cited above, cf. his Quaestiones (Graiff, cited n. 35) 16. Siger presents the following arguments against the real distinction in the contra of his treatment, and his rejection of the distinction and citation of the final argument again in the body of the question (18) indicate his fundamental agreement. ‘Item, IV° Metaphysicae: idem est homo et ens homo, et non significat aliquid diversum apud dictionem repetitam: ‘homo’ et ‘homo est’ Item, substantia cuiuslibet non secundum accidens est aliquod ens; si hoc, cum esse imponitur ab actu essendi, ergo esse non praedicat aliquid quod non pertinet ad essentiam rei. Item, Averroes in eodem loco: si res est non per suam essentiam, sed per dispositionem additam essentiae, iterum illa dispositio est; et si dicas quod illa dispositio est per suam essentiam, standum fuit in primo; si non, procedendum est in infinitum.’ (13-14) The similarity between these arguments and those presented by Godfrey is interesting. However, it should be noted that these arguments do not appear in the short version of Siger's question, i. e., in Godfrey's notebook. Cf. n. 35 above.Google Scholar

⁴³ Thomas himself indicates as much in the sentence immediately following the passage cited above. ‘Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.’ In Metaph. 4.558. One finds a similar misconception of the Thomistic theory in Siger. For an interesting criticism of his confusion between the res-ens couplet (taken as transcendentals) and the essence-existence couplet, cf. Van Steenberghen, F., Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites II (Louvain 1942) 598–599. Cf. 595-600 for an excellent commentary on the Thomistic passage in question.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ PB 5.207. It is interesting to note that even at this late date in his career (1296, cf. Glorieux, , La littérature quodlibétique I 165), Godfrey's views on the real distinction remain unchanged. In the same context he comments: ‘Argumentum quod ad aliam partem inducitur non valet; quia falsum supponit, scilicet quod esse sit aliquid differens a substantia rei.’ Google Scholar

⁴⁵ PB 2.303-304. Godfrey finds support here in Boethius and in Aristotle: ‘sicut patet per Boethium, super illud verbum Perihermenias: verba secundum se dicta nomina sunt, ubi dicit Boethius quod legens nominaliter dictum, et legens participium, et legere verbum idem dicunt. Unde et Philosophus, quinto Metaphysicae, ubi distinguit nomina vult quod quotiens dicitur ens, et esse.’ For Boethius cf. In librum de Interpretation, PL 64. 309: ‘Quare per se dicta verba nomina sunt’ Cf. also 310, 429. For Aristotle, cf. De Interpretatione 3 16b 20-21 and Metaphysics 5 1017a 23-30, where one finds a derivation of the categories. For Godfrey, cf. also the long version (PB 2.164-5) as well as Q 13 q.3 (PB 5.207-8).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ PB 2.165. ‘Ergo cum esse prout accipitur pro esse existentiae sit verbum infinitivi modi erunt talia ei respondentia. Sed non contingit dicere nisi ens, essentia, entitas et huiusmodi. Quare oportet dicere quod omnia ista idem significant. Esse igitur dicit ipsam essentiam vel entitatem rei.’ Google Scholar

⁴⁷ PB 2.167-9. For the short version, cf. 304.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ PB 2.168-9. There is a certain similarity between some of the above arguments and three arguments directed against the real distinction by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 1 q.9 (Louvain 1961: reprint of 1518 ed. fol. 6^v-7^r). There Henry likens the case of esse to that of unity, truth, and goodness. If the latter are essential properties and are not really superadded to things, the same must be true of esse. Again, if the creature only possesses esse by reason of a superadded form, this form itself will be esse only by reason of something else superadded, ad infinitum. Finally, will this superadded esse be something substantial or something accidental? Henry finds difficulties with either alternative. In Quodlibet 10 q.7 Henry repeats these same arguments once again (fol. 416^v-417^r).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ PB 2.305.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ PB 2.171. Cf. also Q 13 q.3 (PB 5.208-9). Note in particular: ‘Non ergo potest dici quod essentia in actu sit indifferens ad esse et non esse. Immo includit esse, quia est id ipsum quod est illud sub alio modo intelligendi et significandi. Nec etiam essentia in potentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse. Immo excludit esse et includit non esse. Quantum ergo convenit alicui enti de essentia, tantum competit ei de esse; et e converso. Et cum essentia in potentia fit essentia in actu, esse in potentia fit etiam esse in actu.’ Google Scholar

⁵¹ PB 2.165-66.Google Scholar

⁵² PB 2.235-6: ‘Licet enim intelligendo naturam Socratis vel hominis secundum se intellectu incomplexo, non intelligam eum esse vel non esse prout hoc dicunt conceptus mentis tales terminos coniungentis, tamen intelligo eius existentiam quae non est alia res a sua essentia.’ In Q 7 q.11, while discussing the possibility of a natural knowledge of the divine quiddity, Godfrey notes that the diversity in our way of knowing what God is and that He is derives from our knowing processes rather than from any distinction in God himself. But he warns that one should not conclude that real identity of essence and existence applies only to God. Granted that in the case of creatures there is a distinction in knowing that something is (si est) and knowing what it is (quid est), this does not imply that one type of knowledge is directed towards its existence and the other towards its essence. In our knowledge of things which are not immediately evident to us, we begin with a vague knowledge of what the thing is or would be if it existed, i. e., a knowledge quid est nominis. This does not suffice to know whether or not the thing does exist in fact. One may then advance to the knowledge that the thing is (si est). This is to know it in terms of its supreme genus, i.e., that it is a substance or an accident. Then one may advance to a more determined knowledge of it in terms of its species (a knowledge quid est rei). But our knowledge that it is is not directed towards its existence and our knowledge what it is towards its essence. Both are directed towards its essence. Our knowledge that it is is knowledge according to its esse essentiae in generali (a vague and general knowledge whereby we know that it is a substance or accident, and consequently, an ens reale, whether potential or actual). Our knowledge what it is (quid est rei as opposed to knowledge quid est nominis) is directed towards its esse essentiae in speciali (a more determined and particularized knowledge according to its membership in its species). Cf. PB 3.378-80 and 386-7.Google Scholar

⁵³ PB 2.305.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ PB 2.169-71. For a similar refutation of the argument based on participation, cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 10 q.7 fol. 418^r. There Henry distinguishes two ways of understanding participation: ‘Uno modo intelligendo essentiam creaturae aliquid potentiale substratum, ut materiam, de qua vel in qua aliquid habet produci actione agentis, ipsum vero esse aliquid receptum in illo aut de illo productum actione agentis ut formam et actum’ Henry rejects this view of participation in being and proposes another: ‘Alio vero modo intelligitur ista participatio intelligendo essentiam creaturae aliquid potentiale obiectum, ut terminum actionis de nihilo productum. Ipsum vero esse intelligendo eandem essentiam ut est actuale obiectum et terminus actionis de nihilo ipsum producentis sicut similitudinem suam’ The similarity between these lines and some found in Godfrey's presentation in Q 3 q.1 is close enough to suggest that one author may have had the other's text at hand. (Cf. PB 2.170: ‘sed intelligi debet essentia antequam sit, ut potentiale obiectum sive terminus divinae actionis, de nihilo et non de aliquo ut de materiali principio producibile. Ipsum vero esse intelligitur intelligendo eandem essentiam ut est actuale obiectum et terminus actionis Dei ipsam de nihilo producentis ’) Godfrey's Q 3 and Henry's Quodlibet 10 both date from Christmas, 1286. Cf. notes 19 and 30 above. Cf. also Quodlibet 1 q.1 (fol. 6^v) for another exposition of Henry's theory. However, the similarity in terminology should not be pressed too far. If both Godfrey and Henry appeal to the same distinction to refute the argument based on participation, their positive views regarding essence and existence by no means coincide. For Henry there is an intentional distinction between essence and existence, for Godfrey only logical distinction.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ PB 2.306.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ PB 3.359-601 For Proclus, cf. The Elements of Theology, prop. 2 (ed. Dodds, E. R., Oxfor 1933, 2-3): Πᾶv τò µετέχov τoῦ ἑvòς ϰαì ἕv ἐστι ϰaì oὐχ ἕv. ‘All that participates unit is both one and not-one.’ One finds a somewhat similar theory in Siger of Brabaut. Accordin to the short version of his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam: ‘Licet autem omne ens causatur recedat a simplicitate Primi, non oportet tamen quod sit ibi compositio realis esse et esser tiae, quia recedunt omnia a Primo recedendo ab actualitate Primi et per accessum ad poter tiam. Unde per recessum a Primo diversificantur species entium et per participare plu vel minus unitatem primam, quae cum sit mensura entitatis in rebus, non potest esse quo aliqua duo aequaliter se habeant ad suam mensuram et quod sint diversa. Sicut specie numeri diversificantur per participationem plus vel minus unitatis, quae est numeri princ pium’ (cf. Graiff, , op. cit. 21). However, in the longer version of the same (Munich MS Siger presents this as only one of two possible ways of distinguishing the creature from the divine simplicity. If one still insists that a certain composition must be introduced int the creature, one need not conclude to essence-existence composition in simple created essences. One may rather appeal to the substance-accident composition. For such being are intelligent and hence, can only know by way of species which are really distinct from their essence (cf. 21-2). As has been noted, Godfrey would have little sympathy for this second alternative. For him, substance-accident composition does not account for compostion of the simple essence itself. And this is the crucial question: how distinguish a simplfinite essence from the Uncreated Being? For further discussion of Siger's theory, cf. Maurer, , ‘Esse and Essentia’ 84, 86 and Van Steenberghen, , Siger de Brabant II 600-03.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Gilson, , History 425. Hocedez, E. writes: ‘Gilles dans toutes ses œuvres depuis son Commentaire sur le premier livre des sentences, mais surtout dans ses Quaestiones disputatae, et jusqu'à la fin de sa carrière, assure tapageusement que sans la distinction réelle on ne peut sauvegarder ni la création, ni la liberté de Dieu dans son acte créateur, ni la possibilité de l'annihilation, ni l'analogie de l'être, ni la participation parla substance, de l'accident’; Aegidii Romani theoremata (32)-(33).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ PB 2.160: ‘Et ulterius et consequenter et quarto declarandum est quod ratione productions rei per quam ipsa res potest recipere esse, non oportet ponere compositionem ipsius esse ad rem sive essentiam rei sicut quibusdam videtur oportere dicere. Nam ad hanc rationem possunt fere omnes rationes reduci quibus probatur diversitas ipsius esse ad essentiam secundum rem aut per intentionem, et necessitate huius rationis amota videntur dissolvi omnes aliae rationes pro illa parte aut saltem difficiliores.’ Google Scholar

⁵⁹ PB 2.166ff, 171-3. Note that Godfrey inserts here (167ff.) in the longer version argument five of the shorter version against the real distinction. As indicated above, we have chosen to follow the plan of the shorter version for the sake of greater clarity. For criticism of any argument based on a strict parallel between essence and existence and matter and form, joined with further criticism of any argument grounded on the created or caused character of finite being, cf. 171-3. A new development appears here. Before its creation (or in an eternal world, by priority of nature), the matter of a stone, for instance, will be in potency to its esse essentiae before actually realizing it, as well as to its esse existentiae Or to apply this to an angel which is to be created, since it does not yet exist either as regards actual esse essentiae or actual esse existentiae, it will be in potency to both. Consequently, according to the underlying principle of this argument, the nature in question will not only be really distinct from its esse existentiae which it ‘later’ receives. It will also be in potency to its esse essentiae, since it does not yet possess this either. Hence it should also be distinct from its esse essentiae. But, argues Godfrey, it is clear that essentia and esse essentiae do not really differ. Consequently, the argument docs not apply to the alleged distinction between essentia and esse existentiae with any greater force. From the fact that an essence is in potency to exist, one cannot conclude to a real distinction between essence and existence.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ PB 2.174-5. Note 174 in particular: ‘Sed quia magis probabile est dicere quod non differt realiter esse et essentia, ideo dicendum quod re non ente secundum esse existentiae, ipsa nihil est actu in se ipsa nec in aliqua realitate secundum esse essentiae, sed solum est virtualiter in sua causa et est secundum hoc aliquid secundum esse essentiae et existentiae in potentia, ut semper quantum contingit alicui de esse essentiae vel de essentia, tantum de esse existentiae vel de existentia.’ Godfrey's usage here of ‘magis probabile’ should not deceive the reader, as it seems to be merely a dialectical device. In the light of his detailed refutation of the arguments for the real distinction, his presentation and unreserved acceptance of the arguments against it, and his rejection of Henry of Ghent's theory of intentional distinction (cf. PB 2.175-77 and references in n. 15 above), there can be no doubt as to his personal convictions. He returns again and again to the theme that whatever is true of essence is true of existence throughout the Quodlibetal Questions. This theme is, of course, anchored in the real identity of essence and existence. Again, real identity of essence and existence serves as a controlling principle in his solution of the problem of subsistence (cf. Q 7 q.5 passim) as well as in his attribution of accidental existence to accidental forms as distinguished from the existence of the substance (cf. Q 3 q.4, PB 2.188, 311). Finally, in addition to the passages quoted or referred to above (cf. for instance notes 14, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 48, 58, and 59), Godfrey concludes Q 3 q.1 with the following: ‘Hoc igitur modo loquendo de esse (intentional distinction) et quocumque alio modo quo ponitur differentia ipsius esse ad essentiam secundum rem aut per intentionem relicto, teneamus ut praedictum est quod esse et essentia id idem sunt, ita quod quantum intelligitur de essentia tantum intelligitur de esse’ (PB 2.177). Near the end of Q 3 q.2 he comments: ‘Et ideo secundum praedicta dicendum est quod cum omnino sint idem secundum rem esse et essentia’ (PB 2.179).Google Scholar

⁶¹ PB 2.177: ‘Utrum prius creetur essentia quam esse.’ Google Scholar

⁶² PB 2.178-9, 306.Google Scholar

⁶³ PB 2.179. Cf. 306-7: ‘Sed quia, ut probatum est supra, esse et essentia non differunt re, ideo unum non creatur prius alio nec unum praecedit aliud origine vel dignitate secundum rem.’ Google Scholar

⁶⁴ For a forceful presentation of the fundamental difference between Giles and Thomas as regards their understanding of the real distinction, cf. Nash, P. W., ‘Giles of Rome on Boethius’ “Diversum est esse et id quod est”,’ Mediaeval Studies 12 (1950) 57–91. Arguing mainly from Giles' understanding of the Boethian axiom as found in his Commentary on the First Sentences, Nash finds the divergence even greater than had Hocedez or Paulus. He criticizes the view that the difference between Giles and Thomas is due ‘mainly to a Platonically inspired “imagination” as though Giles understood esse and essence in the same way as St. Thomas, except for “picturing” these principles as things. What, perhaps, has not been sufficiently realized is that Giles gave these terms a very different meaning, and did so largely because his world was a Boethian world in which the creature is distinguished from the Creator by being a plurality of parts Giles’ interpretation is not Thomist, because it is both Avicennian and Boethian' (58). Cf. also: ‘The point is that, like the hylemorphists, Giles’ act and potency differ exactly as do matter and form, i. e., in the essential order. Esse is not an essence but only because it is not an intelligible, definitional addition. But it has all the other characteristics of a form. The essence in which it is received is treated exactly as any material subject. And both esse and essence are considered as on the same plane of reality; each is equally an aliquid, a res' (90-1). It seems hardly necessary to note once more how closely such a description of essence and existence squares with the theory as presented and refuted by Godfrey. For a more ‘Thomistic evaluation of Giles’ theory of the real distinction, cf. Pattin, A., ‘Gilles de Rome, O.E.S.A. (ca. 1243-1316) et la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence,’ Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 23 (1953) 80^*-116^*. However, even his interpretation seems to lend support to the view that Godfrey himself directly refuted the distinction as he found it in Giles. Cf. 92^* n. 41, 93^* n. 49, 107^*ff.Google Scholar