¹ The term ‘Latin Averroism,’ whose main proponent is Mandonnet, P., Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle (Louvain 1911), has a long history. More recently, F. Van Steenberghen, objecting strongly to the designation of the Arts masters at Paris as ‘Averroists,’ proposed the alternative ‘heterodox Aristotelians,’ in Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites (Louvain 1931–1942) and Maître Siger de Brabant (Louvain–Paris 1977). See also Hissette, R., ‘Étienne Tempier et ses condemnations,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980) 231–70. Neither term does justice to the varied teachings of the masters so designated, but ‘Aristotelian’ is preferable to ‘Averroist.’ For Boethius' own place in the history of thirteenth-century philosophy see Bazan, B., ‘La réconciliation de la foi et de la raison: était-elle possible pour les aristotéliens radicaux?’ Dialogue 19 (1980) 235–54; for Boethius' understanding of the autonomy of philosophy, see Wilpert, P., ‘Boethius von Dacien — Die Autonomie des Philosophen,’ Miscellanea Mediaevalia 3 (1964) 135–52.Google Scholar

² Grabmann, M., ‘Die Opuscula De summo bono sive De vita philosophi und De sompniis des Boethius v. Dacien,’ Mittelalterliches Geistesleben II (Munich 1936) 220–24; idem, Neukaufgefundene Werke des Boethius v. Dacien und Siger v. Brabant (Sb. Akad…. München 1924). 247; Mandonnet, P., ‘Note complémentaire sur Boèce de Dacie,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 22 (1933) 250.Google Scholar

³ Van Steenberghen, F., La philosophie au XIII^e siècle (Louvain–Paris 1966) 404; Hissette, R., Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277 (Louvain–Paris 1977) 17.Google Scholar

⁴ The most recent editor of the De summo bono (DSB) gives 1270 as the approximate date of composition; he offers no explanation concerning the purpose or place of origin of the work: Green-Pedersen, N. G., Boetii Daci opera, opuscula: De aeternitate mundi, De summo bono, De somniis (Corpus philosophorum danicorum medii aevi 6.2; Copenhagen 1976) xlvi–xlviii.Google Scholar

⁵ Aquinas, Thomas, in the Sententia libri Ethicorum [Sent.] (ed. Gauthier, R.-A., Opera omnia iussu edita Leonis XIII P. M. 47.1–2 [Rome 1969] 51.74–76), attacks those who confuse Aristotle's concept of happiness with the Christian ideal of beatitude: ‘Ex quo patet quod felicitas de qua Philosophus loquitur non consistit in illa continuatione ad intelligentiam separatam per quam homo intelligat omnia, ut quidam posuerunt.’ Albert the Great, in his Lectura [Lect.], does likewise: ‘Dicendum, quod felicitas non est quaedam generalis beatitudo et ordinatio totius animae secundum omnes potentias, sicut quidam dicunt, sed operatio secundum determinatam virtutem, scilicet prudentiam, et determinatam potentiam, scilicet rationem’ (Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones Alberti Magni Opera omnia [Münster 1968] 14.1.1. 75.71–76.74).Google Scholar

⁶ Indeed, three manuscripts attribute the De summo bono to Thomas Aquinas: DSB xlvi.Google Scholar

⁷ G. Sajó compares the parallel passages of Boethius' De summo bono and his De generatione et corruptione, and concludes that the former work influenced the latter. Boethii Daci opera, Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione (Corpus philosophorum danicorum medii aevi 5.1; Copenhagen 1972) xi–xv. The style of both works is similar, and the passages in the Degeneratione provide little help in determing the place of origin of the DSB.Google Scholar

⁸ Sent. 29.26–34; the finis cuius and the finis quo are explained most fully in Summa Theologiae (S. Th.) I–II 1.8: ‘Finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo; idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur et usus sive adeptio illius rei….’ Albert's description of the subject matter of Aristotelian moral philosophy is similar to that of Boethius: ‘Dicendum, quod summum dicitur dupliciter: vel simpliciter, et sic est unum tantum, quod est deus; et sic non quaeritur hic. Vel summum alicui… et sic quaeritur summum bonum hominis…’ (Lect. 33.74–81). The origin of the twofold distinction within the end is Aristotle, , De anima 2.4 (415b20–21; cf. 415b2–3). The direct source for the thirteenth-century commentators is Averroës' commentary on the De anima: Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros (ed. Crawford, F. S., Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem 6.1 [Cambridge, Mass. 1953] 183–84). The first use of the distinction within the end, with respect to Christian beatitude, is in William of Auxerre's Summa aurea: see Guindon, R., Béatitude et théologie morale chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (Ottawa 1956) 54.Google Scholar

⁹ DSB 372.75–78.Google Scholar

¹⁰ ‘Primum autem principium, de quo sermo factus est, est deus gloriosus et sublimis, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.’ DSB 377.242–44.Google Scholar

¹¹ DSB 369.1–3. See Schneider, J., Das Gute und die Liebe nach der Lehre Albert des Grossen (Munich–Paderborn–Vienna 1967).Google Scholar

¹² DSB 369.4–7.Google Scholar

¹³ See above, n. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See below, pp. 213–214.Google Scholar

¹⁵ DSB 371.47–51.Google Scholar

¹⁶ DSB 369.7–14. Note that Boethius says: ‘Optima virtus hominis ratio et intellectus est; est enim summum regimen vitae humanae tam in speculando quam in operando’ (italics mine). The distinction between ratio and intellectus is derived from Ethica Nicomachea [E. N.] 2.1 (1138b34–1139a15), where Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues.Google Scholar

¹⁷ DSB 370.20–24, and 371.32–34; see Sent. 58.84–90, where Thomas argues that felicitas consists in both the active and contemplative life: ‘… sed felix habet perfectam virtutem … ergo iste semper vel maxime poterit operari in vita activa quae sunt secundum virtutem et speculari in vita contemplativa.’Google Scholar

¹⁸ DSB 371.62–65. The position of Boethius and Thomas is almost universally rejected in the thirteenth century in favor of that of Albert, who sees in the E. N. two distinct types of happiness, civil and contemplative: ‘Et sic secundum duos ordines duo sunt summa bona hominis, quorum tamen unum ordinatur ad alterum, scilicet civilis ad contemplativam’ (Lect. 33.7–10). The anonymous commentator on the E. N. of MS Vat. lat. 2172 (V), following Albert, gives the common interpretation of Aristotle's notion of happiness in the late thirteenth century: ‘Duplex est felicitas: contemplativa, et ista consistit in speculacione veritatis et maxime respectu primorum encium…. Alia est felicitas practica, et ista consistit in usu prudencie et operibus virtuosis’ (fol. 6^va). See also Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Trois commentaires “averroïstes” sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque,’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 16 (1947–48) 269–93.Google Scholar

¹⁹ DSB 374.149–375.64.Google Scholar

²⁰ E. N. 1.8 (1099a7–23).Google Scholar

²¹ DSB 375.165–70; E. N. 10.7 (1177a12–18).Google Scholar

²² DSB 375.163–64: ‘… ideo philosophus est facilius virtuosus quam alius.’Google Scholar

²³ DSB 370.20–24; E. N. 10.7 (1177b26–1178a8).Google Scholar

²⁴ DSB 375.170–73.Google Scholar

²⁵ DSB 375–77, passim. Such terms are common in commentaries on the E. N. in the late thirteenth century: e.g. : ‘Cum in bono separato, quod est prima causa, aliqualiter consistit humana felicitas …’ (V, fol. 7^rb). The commentary of James of Douai (?) names God as the extrinsic end for man (finis cuius): ‘… qui finis sit operacio hominis bene tamen est propter alium finem extrinsecum, scilicet finem ultimum simpliciter, qui est deus’ (MS Paris, B.N. lat. 14698 [J], fol. 133^va). See Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Les Questiones supra librum Ethicorum de Pierre d'Auvergne,’ Revue du moyen âge latin 20 (1964) 233–60.Google Scholar

²⁶ DSB 377.210–13.Google Scholar

²⁷ See above, n. 8.Google Scholar

²⁸ S. Th. I–II, qq. 2–5 are concerned mainly with the way in which God is necessary to human beatitude. See specifically S. Th. I–II 1.8: ‘Finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius et quo; idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur et usus sive adeptio rei…. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis…. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum….’ See also the perceptive comments of Kluxen, W., Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas v. Aquin (Mainz 1964) 120–21.Google Scholar

²⁹ E. N. 1.6 (1096b30–35); DSB 376, passim. Cf. the opinions of Albert and Thomas, who consider the concern of ethics to be human activities alone (Lect. 31.31–81; Sent. 14.14–21).Google Scholar

³⁰ Boethius' main contribution to the study of ethics in the thirteenth century is his realization that the divine plays an important role in Aristotle's Ethics; see Dudley, J., Gott und bei Aristoteles (Frankfurt a. M. 1981). Boethius' influence can be seen in Peter of Auvergne's questions on the E. N.: ‘Cum dicitur quod finis omnium est prima causa, non est de consideracione civilis scientie, dicendum quod hoc verum est secundum substanciam suam. Nichil tamen prohibet ipsam esse de consideracione civilis doctrine in quantum operaciones considerate a civili sciencie ordinantur ad ipsum’ (MS Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1386, [L] fol. 118^ra-b). See my article ‘Peter of Auvergne's Questiones supra librum Ethicorum: A Critical Text and Study,’ Mediaeval Studies (1986) 1–110; also Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Les Questiones …’ (above, n. 25).Google Scholar

³¹ The difference between felicitas and beatitudo is clearly stated by Robert Kilwardby in his De sortu scientiarum: ‘The spiritual good according to Catholics as well as ancient philosophers is beatitude, which philosophers call happiness; while the Catholics prefer beatitude. Beatitude according to the truth of the Catholic faith cannot be fully attained in the mortal life …’ (De ortu scientiarum, ed. Judy, A. C. [Toronto 1976] 124 [my trans.]). The word felicitas, when unmodified by terms such as in futura vita or divina, almost always refers to the philosophical concept of happiness. For a discussion of the problem of beatitude in this era, see the introduction to my article mentioned above (n. 30).Google Scholar

³² DSB 371.65–67.Google Scholar

³³ See above, n. 32. Robert Grosseteste always translates as felicitas. See his Ethica Nicomachea in Aristoteles Latinus 26.1–3.4 (Leiden 1974).Google Scholar

³⁴ DSB 372.72–73: ‘Hoc enim est maius bonum quod homo a deo recipere potest et quod deus homini dare potest in hac vita.’Google Scholar

³⁵ Foremost among them are Gauthier, R.-A. and Jolif, Y., L'Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain 1970) translation and commentary, note ad 1101a7. Also Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford 1892), whose note on 1101a6 summarizes the usual position of modern scholars: ‘The distinction between and is not carefully observed by Aristotle.’Google Scholar

³⁸ See my article ‘Aristotle on Beatitude,’ Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985) 205–14, which examines E. N. 1.9–10.Google Scholar

³⁷ Callus, D. A., ‘The Date of Grosseteste's Translation and Commentaries on the Pseudo-Dionysius and the Nicomachean Ethics,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 14 (1947) 200–209.Google Scholar

³⁸ Eustratii Metropolitani Nicaeae Enarratio in primum Aristotelis moralium ad Nicomachum (ed. Mercken, H. P. F.; The Greek Commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ of Aristotle [Leiden 1973] 147).Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid. 160: ‘E converso autem accidentia et opposite ei quod est bene substantiam quidem felicitatis non alterant, angustant autem quodammodo et impediunt beatitudinem, tristitias inferentia et multam operationem impediunt’ (italics added).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid. 163: ‘Interim autem igitur non erit beatus, si ipsi accidant infortunia qualia et Priamo. Beatus enim ille est in politicis qui secundum omnem speciem bonorum abundat.’ There can be no question here that Eustratius' concept of beatitude is purely philosophical.Google Scholar

⁴¹ (beatos, ut homines): E. N. 1.10 (1101a20).Google Scholar

⁴² Enarratio [above, n.38] 166.Google Scholar

⁴³ Lect. 60.78–86. See Pelzer, A., ‘Le cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque recueilli et rédigé par S. Thomas d'Aquin,’ Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 24 (1922) 333–61, 479–520.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ethicorum libri X (= Para.): Opera omnia (Paris 1891) 1.7.14.127b; cf. Lect. 22.37–45, where felicitas secundum essentiam is compared with felicitas in maxime posse, which denotes happiness together with an abundance of external goods.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Lect. 69.68–72.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Lect. 52.46–50: ‘Dicendum, quod felix simpliciter habet quae vult simpliciter, sed hoc non in vita, sed beatus felicitate civili habet omnia quae vult, secundum statum, non simpliciter, dummodo voluntas sit ordinata.’ Albert uses the words felix simpliciter here in order to distinguish heavenly beatitude from his notion of earthly beatitude (beatus felicitate civili).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Para. 1.7.15.127b.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Lect. 69.39–44.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Lect. 17.50–55, 57–58, 75–78.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Trois commentaires …’ (above, n. 18) 244–69.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See the introduction by Gauthier, R.-A. to L'Éthique à Nicomaque (above, n. 35), esp. 130–31.Google Scholar

⁵² Sent. 55.139–48.Google Scholar

⁵³ Sent. 59.198–60.215. The designation of the highest good as the status congregatione omnium bonorum is taken from Boethius, , De cons. phil. 3, pr. 2 (CCL 94.38), and is common in thirteenth-century commentaries on the E. N. Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Sent. 47.159–62: ‘Et quantum ad hoc subdit quod denudari quibusdam exteriorum bonorum coinquinat beatitudinem, in quantum scilicet reddit hominem aliqualiter contemptibilis in oculis aliorum.’Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Sent. 58.116–59.120: ‘Si bona, conferent ad hoc quod vita hominis sit beatior quia … felicitas indiget exterioribus bonis vel ad decorem vel in quantum sunt instrumenta operations secundum virtutem.’Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Sent. 60.215–22: ‘Et si ita est ut dictum est 〈beatos dicemus〉 illos de numero viventium in hac vita quibus existunt in praesenti et existent in futuro ea quae dicta sunt; quia ista videntur non usquequaque attingere ad conditiones supra de felicitate positas, subdit quod tales dicimus beatos sicut homines, qui in hac vita mutabilitati subiecta non possunt perfectam beatitudinem habere.’Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See my article ‘Aristotle on Beatitude’ (above, n. 36) where I argue that Thomas' interpretation of the text of Aristotle is essentially correct.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ H. P. F. Mercken speaks of a transformation of Aristotle's Ethics into Christian theology in the Sent.: see Mercken, H. P. F., ‘Transformation of the Ethics of Aristotle in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,’ Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, Atti del congresso internazionale (Rome–Naples 1974) 5.151–56. Mercken, , following Gauthier, , ‘Trois commentaires…’ (above n. 18), may be correct in ascribing a transformation of Aristotle's doctrine in the Summa Theologiae, but not in the Sent., where Thomas remains true to the intention of Aristotle. The following discussion of Aquinas' concept of beatitude is a summary of my ‘The Concept of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy (1987).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ S. Th. I–II 3.5; I–II 4.5.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ S. Th. I–II 3.2, ad 4.Google Scholar

⁶¹ S. Th. I–II 5.4: ‘Dicendum quod si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem … vel per aliquas occupationes…. Patet enim idem in felicitate activa; … Si autem remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem beatitudinem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas operationes virtutum; non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre…. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis, ideo Philosophus dicit in I Eth. aliquos esse in hac vita beatos non simpliciter, sed sicut homines, quorum natura mutatione subiecta est.’Google Scholar

⁶² S. Th. I–II 5.3, ad 1.2–3.Google Scholar

⁶³ DSB 371.65–372.75. Note that Boethius uses the terms eius hominis beatitudo, beatitudo humana, and beatitudo in hac vita to mean the same thing as Thomas' beatitudo imperfecta.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ DSB 372.75–78.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Although not expressly stated, Boethius' position differs little from that found in Peter of Auvergne's questiones on the Ethics: ‘Dicendum quod felicitatem dicimus duplicem: una [unam L] que est ultima perfectio hominis in vita, alia est post mortem; que utrum [est L] ipsius animae separate ponamus vel aggregati non est multum curandum; de felicitate autem que est in vita facit Philosophus mencionem, de alia autem non, et ideo similiter faciamus’ (L, fol. 122^va; edited by Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Les Questiones …’ [above, n. 25] 244, n. 24). There is no trace of the infamous ‘double truth’ doctrine on the fate of the soul in the DSB.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Sin is defined as the ‘declinatio hominis ab ordine naturali’: DSB 374.145–46.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See above, p. 206.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See my article in Mediaeval Studies (above n. 30); also Gauthier, R.-A., ‘Trois commentaires …’ (above, n. 18) 270–93.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ This article is a revised version of a paper read at the Centre for Medieval Studies and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, November 5, 1985.Google Scholar