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A relative defence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2009

Michael Lacewing
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Abstract

Is morality relative? Might what is morally ‘right’ for one culture be morally ‘wrong’ for another? Issue two contained two pieces (one by myself) arguing against this kind of moral relativism. Here, Michael Lacewing suggests that there may be more truth in relativism than was suggested.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , Spring 2003 , pp. 71 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003

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References

Further reading

Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana Press, 1985), Ch. 8, 9Google Scholar
MacIntyre, A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988)Google Scholar