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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE PROCREATION ANALOGY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 December 2021

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Abstract

A prominent Christian apologist suggests it is inconsistent for an atheist to have a favourable attitude towards procreating while maintaining that a loving God would not place vulnerable beings in such a harmful world. I put this analogy to the test with a series of thought experiments, revealing crucial disanalogies between God and procreators that absolve the atheist from the charge of inconsistency and draw the reader's attention to the central issues on the problem of evil as debated by contemporary philosophers.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021

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References

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