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MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMING ANIMALS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2009
Extract
Third-party intervention has been the focus of recent debate in self-defense theory. When is it permissible for third-parties to intervene on behalf of an innocent victim facing an unjustified attack or threat? In line with recent self-defense theory, if an attacker is morally responsible for their actions and does not have an acceptable excuse then it is permissible for third-parties to use proportionate violence against them.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2009
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Notes
1 This argument is influenced by the discussion of normative incompetence outlined in Formosa, Paul, ‘Moral Responsibility for Banal Evil’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 37(2006), pp. 501-520CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (London: Verso, 2002), p. 195.
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