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MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMING ANIMALS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2009

John Hadley
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Extract

Third-party intervention has been the focus of recent debate in self-defense theory. When is it permissible for third-parties to intervene on behalf of an innocent victim facing an unjustified attack or threat? In line with recent self-defense theory, if an attacker is morally responsible for their actions and does not have an acceptable excuse then it is permissible for third-parties to use proportionate violence against them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 8 , Issue 22 , Summer 2009 , pp. 51 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2009

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References

Notes

1 This argument is influenced by the discussion of normative incompetence outlined in Formosa, Paul, ‘Moral Responsibility for Banal Evil’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 37(2006), pp. 501-520CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (London: Verso, 2002), p. 195.