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MOORE ON THE SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHER

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2021

Guy Longworth
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Extract

1. Since I don't know who you are, dear reader, and since I know that some people don't have hands, I don't know whether you have hands. Probably you do, but knowing that something is probable is rarely, if ever, a way of knowing that thing. By contrast, I know that I have hands. Let me check. Yes, here is one of my hands; and here is another. Since I know that here is one of my hands and that here is another, and since I know that it follows from those two claims that I have hands, I can deduce that I have hands. So, I know that I have hands.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 20 , Issue 57 , Spring 2021 , pp. 69 - 87
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021

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References

Lycan, W. G. (2007) ‘Moore's Anti-skeptical Strategies’, in Nuccetelli, S. and Seay, G. (eds.) Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 84–99.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1953) Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George, Allen and Unwin). (From lectures delivered in 1910–11.)Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1959) ‘Certainty’, in his Philosophical Papers (London: George, Allen & Unwin), 226–51. (From the Howison Lecture delivered in 1941.)Google Scholar