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Mental causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2009

Fred Dretske
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Abstract

When we explain someone's behaviour, we do so by appealing to their mental states – their beliefs, desires, and so on. But, as Fred Dretske explains below, materialists have a hard time explaining how our mental states could have any effect on our behaviour.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 3 , Issue 7 , Summer 2004 , pp. 7 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2004

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References

Dretske, F., Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1988).Google Scholar
Paige, K. N. and Whitham, T. G., ‘Report of research published in Science’, Scientific American, no. 4: 74, p. 252.Google Scholar