Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T08:15:59.758Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ALL TOO HUMAN? SPECIESISM, RACISM, AND SEXISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2016

Andrew Oberg
Get access

Abstract

The issue of how we ought to treat the nonhuman animals in our lives is one that has been growing in importance over the past forty years. A common charge is that discriminatory behavior based only on differences of species membership is just as wrong morally as are acts of racism or sexism. Is such a charge sustainable? It is argued that such reasoning confuses real differences with false ones, may have negative ethical consequences, and could tempt us to abandon our responsibilities to the natural world. Finally, some benefits to human animal treatment that more humane nonhuman animal treatment may bring are considered.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 15 , Issue 43 , Summer 2016 , pp. 39 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 48 and p. 101.

2 Wolbring, Gregor, ‘The Politics of Ableism’, Development, 51 (2008) pp. 252–258CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Diamond, Cora, ‘Eating Meat and Eating People, Philosophy, 53:206 (1978), pp. 465–479CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1984) p. 98.

5 Noddings, Nel, ‘Comment on Donovan's “Animal Rights and Feminist Theory”’, Signs, 16:2 (1991) 418–422CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Steinbock, Bonnie, ‘Speciesism and the Idea of Equality’, Philosophy, 53:204 (1978), 247–256CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Tony Milligan, Beyond Animal Rights: Food, Pets and Ethics (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p.139.

8 Frey, R.G., ‘Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism’, Between Species, 4:3 (1988), 191–201Google ScholarPubMed (p. 196).

9 Cushing, Simon, ‘Against “Humanism”: Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34:4 (2003) pp. 556–571CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

10 Donovan, Josephine, ‘Reply to Noddings’, Signs, 16:2 (1991) pp. 423–425CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Without Offending Humans: A Critique of Animal Rights, trans. by Will Bishop (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

12 Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs, 3rd edn (London: Metro Books, 2000) pp. 22–24.

13 Frey, op. cit., Singer, op. cit., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 3rd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

14 Regan, Tom, ‘Cruelty, Kindness, and Unnecessary Suffering’, Philosophy, 55:214 (1980) pp. 532–541CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Stanley Cavell, ‘Companionable Thinking’, in Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian Hacking, & Cary Wolfe, Philosophy & Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) pp. 91–126 (p. 125); and John McDowell, ‘Comment on Stanley Cavell's “Companionable Thinking”’, in ibid., pp. 127–138 (p. 135).