Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T16:59:05.994Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

THE TROLLEY META-PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2022

Get access

Abstract

For many years, philosophers have argued about the Trolley Problem – but they've also argued about whether the problem ought to interest us. According to some, the artificiality of the situations means that they involve no complicating factors – and so we ought to take our intuitions about them especially seriously. According to others, though, the artificiality of the situations means that our intuitions about them are meaningless. I hereby name the puzzle of why our intuitions about this differ the ‘Trolley Meta-Problem’. The story that follows illustrates this problem – and the Trolley Problem itself – in a humorous way.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)