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A MODIFIED PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR A BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2013

Andrew Loke
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Abstract

Craig's second philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes the argument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can be modified thus: If time is beginning-less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting as long as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hence the antecedent is metaphysically impossible. I defend the premises and show that this argument does not presuppose the dynamic theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 13 , Issue 36 , Spring 2014 , pp. 71 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2014 

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References

Notes

1 Craig, William Lane and Sinclair, James, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, in Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J. P. (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Chichester, UK; Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 117.

2 Davies, P. C. W., God and the New Physics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983)Google Scholar, 11.

3 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 124.

4 See, for example, Craig, William Lane, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination Synthese Library 293 (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ibid, The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination Synthese Library 294 (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).

5 See, for example, Sobel, Jordan, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)Google Scholar,182.

6 I thank a previous reviewer of this article for suggesting this objection.

7 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 103–105.

8 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 119.

9 Dretske, Fred, ‘Counting to infinity’, Analysis 25 (1965), 99–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Oppy, Graham, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 61.

11 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 118n.16.

12 Leon, Felipe, ‘Moreland on the Impossibility of Traversing the Infinite: A Critique’, Philo 14 (2011), 32–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Leon, Felipe, ‘Moreland on the Impossibility of Traversing the Infinite: A Critique’, Philo 14 (2011), 32–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Cf. Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity, 59, 63; and Oppy'sArguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 141–2Google Scholar.

15 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 121–2.

16 Ibid, 104.

17 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, 121–2.