No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Why do we believe what we believe? The answer may seem obvious: we believe what we've assessed to be true. However, there's a surprisingly basic logical flaw in this theory. And even more surprising is the real answer to the above question.
1 ‘believe, v., 4a', OED Online (Oxford University Press, March 2013), accessed March 25, 2013.
2 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677), Part 2, 49th proposition.
3 Gilbert, D., ‘How Mental Systems Believe’, American Psychologist, vol. 46 (1991), 107–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Harris, S. et al. , ‘Functional Neuroimaging of Belief, Disbelief, and Uncertainty’, Annals of Neurology, vol. 63 (2008), 141–147.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
5 Sutherland, Stuart, Irrationality (London: Pinter & Martin, 2007), 1.Google Scholar
6 Ibid., 11–12.
7 Winerman, L., ‘E-mails and egos’, Monitor on Psychology, vol. 37, no. 2 (2006), 16.Google Scholar
8 Wegner, D.M. et al. , ‘The Transparency of Denial: Briefing in the Debriefing Paradigm’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 49, no. 2 (1985), 338–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar