Korea’s developmental state and model of public administration

Korea’s economic miracle was achieved under almost three decades of rule by an authoritarian developmental state (Reference Jang and ShinJang and Shin, 2008: 60). President Park Chung-hee came to power following a coup in 1961 and quickly established a highly centralised and authoritarian regime that was to intervene in almost all areas of Korean public life. President Park (1961–1979) and his successor President Chun (1980–1987) used the Cold War context and geopolitics to sustain their authoritarian rule in Korea by claiming that it provided the Korean state with strong political and economic direction. According to Reference WongWong (2004),

Korea’s system of government concentrates executive power in the hands of the president. There are few constraints on presidential power from other political institutions, such as the National Assembly (Reference Ha, Joo and KangHa et al., 2009). Historically and culturally, the Korean population have tended to admire a strong-willed leader (Reference Brandsen and KimBrandsen and Kim, 2010). This high degree of centralisation of state power in the hands of the president represents a legacy from the era of Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945. This authoritarian and centralised approach to governing Korea was maintained during the period of Korean military governments from the 1960s to the 1980s (Reference Jang and ShinJang and Shin, 2008). During this period, an imbalance of power between the president and the National Assembly emerged that limited the ability of the assembly to impose checks and balances on increasingly authoritarian presidential control. Even in the democratic era, the National Assembly has experienced a limited role in the formulation of economic or social policy – little more than it possessed under the period of authoritarian rule (Reference Jang and ShinJang and Shin, 2008).

The organisational culture of Korean public bureaucracies reinforces this tendency towards centralisation. It is also strongly influenced by Confucian values with their emphasis on group over individual interests (Reference LeeLee, 2008). Confucianism represented Korea’s official state ideology from 1392 to 1910 under the Chosun Dynasty. It provides a basis for social order, and Confucian values emphasise the importance of harmony within the society, with individuals viewing themselves as part of an organic whole arranged in a hierarchy (Reference LeeLee, 2008). Confucianism provided a strict code defining the nature of the relationships among people in this highly stratified hierarchy: whether between the emperor and the nation, the government and the people, manager and subordinate, senior and junior or husband and wife. Confucian values encouraged never questioning superiors, the need to demonstrate respect for those in higher positions of authority and the pursuit of group harmony at the cost of individual happiness. These values became ingrained in the operation of Korea’s public bureaucracy and reinforced its authoritarian nature (Reference KimKim, 2000, Reference Kim2010; Reference LeeLee, 2008). The family-oriented and paternalistic nature of Confucian culture promoted high trust among relatives and members of an extended family, but low trust for those outside of this family group (Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim, 2002).

In addition to Confucian values, military governments from 1962 to 1987 relied upon an elite inner circle of bureaucratic advisors to implement their vision of economic development via rapid industrialisation. Blurred lines of control, however, between the state bureaucracy and authoritarian leaders provided this cadre of technocrats with some discretion to experiment with policy reforms (Reference WongWong, 2004). According to Reference Jang and ShinJang and Shin (2008),

These bureaucratic technocrats dominated appointments to the key institutions responsible for economic planning, the banks and government research facilities.

Five-year economic plans were a critical strategic tool utilised by Korea’s developmental state (Reference WongWong, 2004). The Park’s military government focused on economic planning from the early 1960s in an effort to shore up its legitimacy by demonstrating that they could mobilise Korea’s limited resources to drive economic development. Economic policies focused initially on developing light industries, with a focus on clothing textile and footwear industries. These female-intensive industries were later overtaken by investment in more male-dominated heavy industries such as car manufacturing and shipbuilding by the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Economic planning in the 1980s and 1990s focused on more capital-intensive and technologically advanced industrial sectors such as semiconductors. In the 2000s, Korea’s industries began a process of globalisation, with a number of them moving offshore to other Asian countries, and to Europe and North America, because of increased labour costs at home and to ensure access to international markets (Reference Kwon and O’DonnellKwon and O’Donnell, 2001).

As the Korean economy became more integrated into the global economy, the Korean state was less able to control national economic planning, or to allocate resources to chosen industrial sectors. In addition, Korea came under increased economic pressure from the US government and international financial institutions to liberalise exchange rates and to permit foreign direct investment flows into the country, particularly following the acceptance of International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) support in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (Reference WongWong, 2004).

Nevertheless, the Korean developmental state continues to experiment with interventionist industrial development policies. New industry sectors have emerged, such as biotechnology, though decision-making regarding which new industries to support has become less centralised. Therefore, Korea’s developmental state continues to adapt to changing social, political and economic realities (Reference WongWong, 2004). Korea’s economy in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis has altered substantially in the direction of more sophisticated and higher value-adding technology, while the country’s ability to compete on the basis of cheap labour had declined substantially. Moreover, following protests by students, industrial workers and civil society groups in 1987, the Korean state has had to respond to increased pressure for democratic reform and for increased citizen participation in government decision-making (Reference Kwon and O’DonnellKwon and O’Donnell, 2001).

As a result of such sustained protests, the Korean state has come under pressure to improve government-funded welfare. The size of the welfare state in Korea is modest when compared to the welfare states of Northern European countries and North America, and provides its citizens with limited social insurance, health care and public housing. During the authoritarian period (1961–1987), the government focused primarily on economic growth, with welfare regarded as a largely individual responsibility. For example, Korea’s public health expenditure remains low by international standards. The private sector dominates Korea’s health-care system, with approximately 80% of Korean hospital beds offered by private hospitals because of low government investment in the sector since the 1970s (Reference KimKim, 2005). The following section explores the origins of e-government in Korea, the major services provided by central and local governments and the possibilities for citizen participation.

The emergence of e-government in Korea

One of the aims of the of e-government initiatives promoted from the mid-1990s was to increase the level of transparency of government procurement practices and the level of citizen engagement and participation in government service delivery. These initiatives also sought to address perceptions of deep-seated corruption in relations between business leaders and public officials, by making the bidding process for government contracts more transparent, while also facilitating citizens’ access to information regarding government services. Among the 28 OECD nations, Korea had the fastest broadband Internet speed, almost twice the speed of Japan, the second fastest nation, and more than three times faster than other OECD member countries. In the second quarter of 2010, Korea recorded an average connection speed of 16.6 Mbps, a rise of 46.8% from the average speed of 11.3 Mbps in the second quarter of 2009 (OECD, 2011). Korea has also been ranked first for the last two years in the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) composite ICT Development Index (IDI) that measures and compares development in ICT across countries (see Table 1).

Table 1. ICT Development Index Top Five Country Rankings 2010 and 2011.

Source: ITU (2012).

Through a series of national technology plans in the 1980s, the Korean government established a high-speed communications network that resulted in the National Basic Information System (NBIS) by the mid-1980s. The first and second stages of the NBIS (1987–1996) involved the compilation of databases that stored information regarding finances and vehicle registration. When this government-wide computer network was completed, citizens could request government-issued resident registration, real estate and vehicle registration papers and other certified documents, from any district or local office in the country. Over time, citizens were required to submit fewer documents to government, while the time taken to process applications was reduced, often substantially.

In the mid-1990s, the rapid adoption of information technology (IT) around the world spurred the efforts of the Korean government to build a nationwide high-speed communications network. The government invested resources into upgrading the telecommunications infrastructure, resulting in Korea possessing the highest rate of broadband penetration among OECD members (see Table 1).

The Korean government’s e-government initiatives have benefited from leadership by various presidents from the 1980s onwards. The President’s Council on National Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Strategies developed the strategy for e-government and evaluated e-government initiatives. This council was chaired by the prime minister and consulted extensively with the private sector. This high-level committee was also supported by generous funding, and in 2011, e-government initiatives received approximately 1% of the national budget to support the construction of e-government infrastructure each year.

From 1996 to 2000, the Korean government laid the foundation for a national broadband network. In addition, the government developed the Master Plan for Informatization Promotion (1996) and Cyber Korea 21 (1999) that facilitated a significant increase in the use of IT in Korean government departments. Services that were provided online included real-estate registration and patent filing. During this period, both central and local government made used use of IT to streamline administrative processes. A chief information officer (CIO) was appointed by the Korean government (1998) and IT use was expanded across government departments.

A major emphasis on e-government occurred in 2001 when President Kim Dae-jung initiated a Special Committee for e-Government (2003) to coordinate inter-agency collaboration and information sharing. The Committee selected 11 major e-government initiatives. The Special Committee for e-Government established the following principles and direction for Korea’s e-government initiatives:

• • Initiatives pertaining to the national interest;

• • Integrate inter-agency initiatives into a single government-wide initiative;

• • Maximise the sharing of information across agencies and eliminate duplication.

The development of integrated systems across government ensured that government agencies were connected with one another to provide a more comprehensive range of services to the public. Under the Roh government (2003–2007), there was a major expansion of e-government, with some 31 major projects relating to e-government service delivery being initiated. From 2008 to 2012, the Lee government focused on integrating the various systems in place across government and expanding access to services via mobile phone technology, particularly smart phones. Citizens could increasingly access services online or via their mobile phones to conduct transactions online such as visa and passport applications, accessing birth records and payment of taxes and fees.

Citizen participation in e-government

E-government initiatives aim to improve government–citizen relations. They include facilitating access to information about government policies and enabling citizens to access services without having to engage with multiple agencies. The aim is to connect a series of government functions together in a seamless manner. Services may also be delivered to citizens through a variety of channels (online, government office front counter, call centre) requiring coordination between government agencies to ensure consistency in the messages communicated to citizens. Increasingly, citizens are accessing multiple channels to access government services and actively post their views on government web pages for other citizens to see. Citizens also expect a rapid response to their queries, and public officials are expected to reply within three working days (Reference O’DonnellInterview with second senior MOPAS official, 2012).

E-government at the local level

Decentralising authority to local government remains an ongoing challenge for Korean public administration reform. In 1988, the National Assembly passed the Self-governance Act that promoted local governance and decentralisation. Local legislative council elections began in 1991, and city mayor and provincial governor elections were held in 1995. Prior to 1995, the central government appointed top-level bureaucrats, such as mayors and provincial governors (Reference KimKim, 2010). The government of President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2002) emphasised the development of local government autonomy. In practice, however, local government in Korea has limited power and resources when compared to those of central government. Local governments have limited fiscal autonomy and are highly constrained in their ability to operate autonomously (Reference Jun and ParkJun and Park, 2001; Reference KimKim, 2010). Without financial independence, local government in Korea will continue to experience limited autonomy (Reference Jun and ParkJun and Park, 2001; Reference KimKim, 2010).

Nevertheless, reforms to enhance the transparency of local government decision-making have been introduced. In April 1999, the Seoul Metropolitan Government established the Online Procedure Enhancement for Civil Applications (OPEN) system to improve civil applications for 54 common procedures that could then be filed via the Internet. A year later, the OPEN system had received 28,000 applications from the public. Public servants with responsibility for permits and approvals were also required to ensure that their workloads were visible on Seoul Metropolitan Government Internet sites to enable citizens to track the speed with which their applications were processed (Reference QuahQuah, 2007). This focus on e-government initiatives involving enhanced transparency and potential for increased citizen participation represents significant innovations in Korea’s system of public administration. A further innovation has been the Local Government Information Network System Project, a comprehensive government administration information system that allows the sharing of government records relating to resident registration, vehicle registration and related information among 232 local governments that issue certified papers to citizens.

Seoul has been ranked first among city municipal governments over the last decade in a number of international surveys, such as the Digital Governance in Municipalities Worldwide Survey conducted by the E-Governance Institute at Rutgers University, New Jersey. Seoul was number one in the 2011 survey, just as it was number 1 in the 2009, 2007 and 2005 evaluations (Reference Holzer and ManoharanHolzer and Manoharan, 2012). Seoul was the world’s first city to introduce wireless high-speed mobile Internet services. Seoul’s information infrastructure provides citizens with greater transparency and accountability in the world’s second largest metropolitan area. Initiatives such as e-Seoul allow citizens of Seoul to use mobile devices to access public services ‘anytime, anywhere’. The website of Seoul provides a privacy policy that is accessible on every page and that accepts data and addresses the use of cookies or web beacons to track users. The city’s homepage is user friendly and provides citizens with opportunities to submit their ideas and suggestions on proposed policies via policy forums. The website is available in a number of foreign languages – including English, Japanese, Chinese, French and Spanish (Reference Holzer and ManoharanHolzer and Manoharan, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the focus of e-government on enhancing citizens level of participation in government service delivery, many citizens in Korea remain distrustful of government at the national and local levels and remain convinced that their politicians are corrupt. The following section explores the relationships between Korea’s large conglomerates, or chaebol, and experiences of corruption in Korean public life.

The Korean state, the chaebol and corruption

Korea’s authoritarian developmental state developed mutually beneficial relationships with the family-controlled private sector business groups, or chaebols, which were provided with access to cheap loans and monopolies over particular product markets. The increasingly close relationships between the Korean developmental state and the family-owned business groups ultimately led to many instances of corruption between chaebol owners, politicians and senior government officials (Reference Jang and ShinJang and Shin, 2008; Reference QuahQuah, 2007). Corrupt practices included large campaign donations being provided to political parties by the chaebols’ owners. There were also numerous bribery scandals involving senior government officials, politicians and even presidents. Corruption could take the form of generous loans being provided by state-controlled banks to chaebol subsidiaries (Reference Jun and ParkJun and Park, 2001: 9). A crucial factor in the emergence of the financial crisis in late 1997 was the provision of such large loans at low interest rates to the chaebols by the state-owned banking sector (Reference QuahQuah, 2007).

For a rich democratic country, Korea has fared poorly on Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, and corruption among public sector employees remains rampant. Bribery cases have been widely reported in the media within the Ministry of Construction, the Tax Collection Agency, the police, and within the customs service (Reference Jun and ParkJun and Park, 2001). There have also been numerous cases involving corrupt public prosecutors, with the Office of Public Prosecutors and the police receiving high rating for public distrust on a Government Information Agency survey – 69% distrust (Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim, 2002). The Korean public remains highly suspicious of the level of honesty of many levels of the public sector bureaucracy: ‘Currently, police officers, tax collectors, construction bureaucrats, many street-level bureaucrats, prosecutors and sanitary officers are seen as corrupt’ (Kim, 2002: 9). Overall, the Korean justice system is widely viewed by the public as being too lenient on Korea’s business and political elites who have substantial financial resources to pay bribes or to engage in other forms of corruption (Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim, 2002). During the Lee Myung Bak presidency (2008–2012), corruption scandals were commonplace and involved politicians and representatives of civil society organisations. The former president Roh Moo Hyun committed suicide in 2009 in the face of allegations of corruption during his period in power (Reference KimKim, 2012). A significant problem inherent in Korean democracy is the public’s lack of trust in political parties or the National Assembly. Individuals are more likely to engage in individual street protests rather than take their grievances to their elected representative or a political party. These parties are also fragile and tend to disintegrate and change their leadership with considerable frequency (Reference KimKim, 2012).

President Kim Dae-jung established an anti-corruption strategy soon after his election in 1998. This involved setting up an anti-corruption committee to coordinate anti-corruption activities and an anti-corruption law to protect whistleblowers and to facilitate investigations (Reference QuahQuah, 2003). In 2002, Korea’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) was established following the passing of the Anti-Corruption Act 2002 (Reference KimKim, 2010). KICAC’s budget and staff allocations, however, were criticised for being insufficient for the agency’s workload. The agency had a budget of USD18 million in 2004–2005 and a staff of 200. This was viewed by critics as insufficient given the scale and systemic nature of corruption within the economy. The large size of the country and bureaucracy and the relatively small size of this agency limited its ability to effectively address corruption complaints. Anti-corruption agencies have proved successful in Singapore and Hong Kong which have small populations, well functioning and efficient civil services, high standards of living and stable governments. Korea has a larger population, a lower standard of living compared with Hong Kong and Singapore, and a less efficient civil service.

Without adequate resources and stronger legislation, KICAC was unlikely to be able to resolve many of the complaints of corruption within the public or private sectors. In addition, KICAC did not gain powers to investigate corruption cases in the private sector and concentrated instead on addressing public sector corruption (Reference QuahQuah, 2003). For Reference QuahQuah (2003), ‘The fact that KICAC cannot investigate corruption reports is a reflection of a lack of political will in curbing corruption in Korea’ (p. 90). As a result, the Korean population remains distrustful of the operation of the bureaucracy and convinced that systemic corruption is still endemic within Korea’s public sector. In 2008, KICAC’s functions were moved to the newly established Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, along with those of the Ombudsman of Korea and the Administrative Appeals Commission. This restructure has arguably blurred the focus on identifying and eradicating corruption (Reference ChoiChoi, 2009). In summary, many commentators concur with Kim’s (2002) assessment that ‘South Korea suffers from rampant corruption, regional discrimination, and distrust between citizens and the government’ (p. 10).

Civil society, the state and e-government

E-government initiatives in Korea have not overcome the legacy of authoritarian rule where civil society groups were excluded from participation in government policymaking (Reference Ha, Joo and KangHa et al., 2009). The Korean government and public sector bureaucracy often decided critical public policy issues in secret during the authoritarian period (Reference Jun and ParkJun and Park, 2001), and civil society organisations were actively repressed from 1961 to 1987. This gave rise to a strongly antagonistic relationship between civil society and the state (Reference Brandsen and KimBrandsen and Kim, 2010). As a result, public trust towards the public sector remains low in Korea. For example, Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim (2002) found that 90% of people expressed distrust of the parties in the National Assembly in the early 2000s. A few years later, the AsiaBarometer Survey found that only 7.7% of the population trusted the political parties (Reference Carlson and TurnerCarlson and Turner, 2009). Central government and local government also recorded low levels of public trust in the AsiaBarometer Survey 2006 with trust levels of only 20.1% and 22.1% (Reference Carlson and TurnerCarlson and Turner, 2009). In addition, the proportion of the electorate participating in presidential, parliamentary and local elections has steadily declined (Reference KimKim, 2010).

Nevertheless, there is some survey evidence that Koreans perceive that the level of corrupt payments made to government officials, such as tax officials or the police, has declined in recent years. Democratic governments from President Kim Young-sam onwards placed a strong emphasis on eliminating corruption in the public sector. In relation to perceptions of corruption involving the courts, police and tax authorities, Koreans declared they experienced a declining trend over the last decade, with perceptions of being asked to pay a bribe to public officials declining from 6% in 2004 to 4% in 2005 and to 2% in 2006–2008. Korea was also ranked in the middle of TI’s global index and ranked 35th, 32nd and 39th out of 79 countries in TI’s Global Corruption Barometer 2004–2007 (Reference YouYou, 2009). This suggests that there is a contrast between Koreans’ strong perceptions of corruption among politicians, political parties and business elites and their declining experiences of bribery in their interactions with public sector officials (Reference YouYou, 2009).

The decline in trust and respect for authority is more openly expressed in the era of democratic governance, and civil society groups and individuals are prepared to more openly criticise politicians, institutions and the government. Public distrust is fuelled by perceptions that wealthy and powerful groups in Korean society escape with minimal penalties while the poor and less powerful are treated harshly. Presidents reinforce this perception by using their executive power to pardon many who are convicted of corruption. In 3.5 years, Kim Dae-jung pardoned 81,123 people, while Kim Young-sam pardoned 30,805 people (Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim, 2002). Perceptions that law enforcement is lenient towards those who are wealthy impedes the growth of civil society, with citizens regularly expressing low levels of respect for the law or trust on the operation of public institutions (Reference Jun and KimJun and Kim, 2002).

Civil society groups have also protested over the level of privacy of much of the information stored on e-government sites. For example, the Korean Teachers’ Union strongly opposed the level of personal data on students being gathered under the National Education Information System (NEIS). The NEIS aimed to link all schools in a network and to share information across the school system. In the face of protests over significant quantities of personal data being gathered and stored without students’ consent, the government agreed to establish servers for storing sensitive student data separate from the NEIS (Reference JhoJho, 2005). This highlights the potential for e-government in Korea to infringe on citizens’ privacy and to increase the level of knowledge and control that the state can exert over citizens (Reference JhoJho, 2005).