Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2023
There has recently been intense debate about the relative merits of a centralised wage-setting system vis-a-vis a decentralised system. Most of the theoretical and empirical works on this issue focus on the static or current macroeconomic performance in terms of employment and inflation and microeconomic efficiency resulting from enhanced labour market flexibility. Following Lancaster’s work and subsequent extensions by Schott and Vartiainen, this paper regards wage bargaining as a dynamic game involving conflict over the distribution of current and future income. It is argued that the intertemporal decision makings of both workers and employers are influenced by so-called prisoners’ dilemma. In such situations, it is claimed that centralised or corporatist wage negotiations system leads to higher investment rates. This claim is corroborated with evidence from selected OECD countries.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Conference of Economists, Perth, 1993. The author is grateful to conference participants and Professor C. Kearney of the UWS-Macarthur for their helpful comments. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee. However, the usual caveats apply.