The view that depersonalization experiences can “be regarded as occupying a position somewhere between the delusional and the non-delusional” was first suggested by Ackner (1954) who gave as an example the depressive's experience of malaise. If this is accepted into the normal framework of experience it will be attributed to illness or fatigue. If it is accepted and organized into a delusional framework, the depressive delusion that the body is rotting away (for example) may be exhibited. If, however, the experience cannot be accepted into either a normal or a delusional framework it will remain peculiar, foreign, strange, and unreal and will appear as depersonalization. Ackner commented that if delusions should develop, experiences of change “will tend to be included” within them, and thus not appear as depersonalization. Discussing depressive depersonalization in particular, he considered that “with delusional development, the unreality feeling tends to recede”.