¹ De civili dominio, I, ed. Poole, R. L., WS(1885), 11, p. 73Google Scholar, ‘Ulterius pro istis duabus clans veritatibus, quantum pronunc expedit, argumentatur contra istas tripliciter. Viderur primo contra sentenciam quod omnis prelatus, alteri ex vocacione Dei propositus, sit cuilibet sue iurisdiccioni subiecto vere dominus… quod tripliciter viderur esse falsum… tercio ex hoc quod homines essent sibi reciproce domini et servi; consequens impossibile, cum tunc eadem persona esset simul inferior et superior se ipsa.’

² Ibid., p. 75, ‘Minister vel servus, in quantum huiusmodi, respicit dominum relative; sed quilibet Chrisrianus debet reciproce alteri ministrare; ergo et esse reciproce servus et dominus.’ The debt to Aristotle on the relativity of dominus and servus to one another is explicit in Wyclif’s exposition of his own description of dominium, modelled on the strict political sense of the term, at the beginning of the De dominio divino, ed. Loserth, J., WS (1903-4), I, i, p. 4Google Scholar, ‘Stricrius tamen et magis pertinenter menti politici dicitur natura racionalis que preest sibi subdito, eius dominus. Unde ad hunc senium potest dominium sic describi: Dominium est habitudo nature racionalis secundum quam denominatur suo prefici servienti. Primo, quoad genus domimi, patet quod sit relacio, et per consequens habitudo: nam dominus et servus (ex Predicamentis et quinto Methaphisice) dicuntur ad aliquid, et per consequens illud quo for-maliter dicuntur huiusmodi est relacio.’

³ This statement at 1277b, 13-15, is part of Aristotle’s elaboration of the concept of citizenship as participation in government, an idea that applies most straightforwardly to citizens in one of his less preferred regimes, democracy (1275b, 5-6) but can be adjusted to fit other constitutions.

⁴ De civili dominio, I, 11, pp. 77-8, ‘Sed adhuc non deprehenditur fucus sophisticus supra tactus, quod homines, reciproce se maiores et minores, sint sibi invicem servi et domini. Solucio vero stat in hoc quod omnis homo cum sit duarum naturarum, utraque (scilicet corpus et anima) servit sibi ipsi et cuilibet iusto, si sit in gracia; et sic secundum naturam corpoream est inferior quam ipse vel alius frater suus est secundum spiri turn, et sic est servus ac dominus sui ipsius. Et sic diceret logicus quod non oportet, si servus, in quantumtalis, sit secundum aliquam naturam inferior quoeunque domino suo, quod simpliciter sit ipso inferior; sed satis est quod secundum racionem qua servit … Unde maioritas et minoritas evangelica propter suam spirituali tatem, sicut dominium et servi rus ewangelica, non repugnant.’ Compare De dominio divino. III, 3, pp. 221—2: ‘Nee est inconveniens sed consonum quod idem Christus sit servus et dominus sibi ipsi, cum sit duarum naturarum utraque, scilicet, humanitas et deitas, quarum inferior servit regularissime preminenti.’

⁵ Mark 10.42-5, Matt 20.25-8, Luke 9.46-8, Luke 22.24-7; and see Phil. 2.5-7.

⁶ See, for example, the contrast between arrogance and humility drawn by Bernard of Clairvaux, The Steps of Humility [De Gradihus Humilitatis], Latin text, with tr. and notes by Bosworth, George Burch (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 15, 210–11Google Scholar. Arrogance is the sixth step ‘down’ the ladder from humility to pride. The seventh step ‘up’ towards humility, drawn from the Rule of St Benedict, is ‘When a man not only confesses with his tongue that he is most lowly and inferior to all others, but in the depths of his heart believes so.’

⁷ Giles argues instead that royal power is ordained to the work and service (in opus el obsequium) of ecclesiastical power, that earthly power is deservedly the servant (merito famulatur) of spiritual power, and that no one is worthy of his paternal inheritance unless he is a servant (servus) of the Church; Aegidius Romanus, De ecclesiastica potestate, II.5,11.6,11.8, ed. Scholz, Richard (Weimar, 1929).Google Scholar Although he had argued earlier in the treatise that the subjection of earthly princes to the spiritual power is not setvitus but libertas, because Christ’s yoke is pleasant and his burden light (1.8), Giles was prepared to describe the relationship later in the language of servitude, claiming that offerings of the faithful to the Church should be made in recognition of this status (‘… ut homines fideles… sint tributarli et sicut tributarii et sicut servi empdcii ecclesie recognoscendo se esse servos ecclesie, ut pro se ipsis et pro omnibus que habent offerant aliquid ecclesie in recognicionem proprie servitutis.’ II.10). In book III of the De ecclesiastica potestate, Giles responded to objections against ecclesiastical ownership of material things, and he strove to show that his claims to universal lordship for the Church did not imply immediate jurisdiction over temporal matters in all cases, but he did not discuss Christ’s precepts to servanthood. In terms of lordship and service, there is nothing to restrain, let alone reverse or make reciprocal, the Church’s dominance.

James, writing only slightly later, briefly considered as an objection to his own position the fact that Christ had no temporal power and indeed fled from it, quoting Bernard’s assertion that in such matters the pope succeeds, not Christ, but Constantine. James did not, however, find this a serious obstacle to his view of the Church as a kingdom, for did not Bernard himself argue that the swords of both temporal and spiritual power were the pope’s, the former, indeed, to be exercised for the Church and not by it, in the soldier’s hand and at the emperor’s command—but at the priest’s behest (ad nutum sacerdotis)? Arquillière, H.-X., ed., Le plus ancien trailé de l’Église: Jacques de Viterbe, De Regimine Christiano (Paris, 1926), pp. 288–9Google Scholar: citing Bernard, , De consideration, IV.3, Opera, ed. Leclercq, J. and Rochais, H. M, 3 (Rome, 1963), pp. 453–4Google Scholar. Ockham was to devote an entire chapter of his Breviloquium (II.12) to citations from De consideratione supporting his own opposition to a lordly papacy.

⁸ Summa de potestate ecclesiastica (1483), sig. aзr. In discussing the pope’s presidentia (q. 19), Augusrinus asks whether the pope is the Church’s bridegroom or head but not whether he is her servant, and his next concerns are with the efficacy of the pope’s presidency (q. 20) and the obedience of Christians (q. 22). To be sure, obedience is not, for Augusrinus, the same as subjection or servitude (q. 82, art. i), hence he would have rejected Ockham’s contention that curialism makes Christians the pope’s slaves. It is difficult, however, to find any suggestion in this work that the pope himself is a slave of the Church. Christ’s perfection was not diminished by his carnality (q. 81), but neither is his participation in ordinary human life or his obedience (q. 82) offered as a pattern for the Christian exercise of authority.

⁹ Breviloquium, II.19, ed. Scholz, R. (Stuttgart, 1944; repr. 1952), pp. 96–8Google Scholar; De imperatorum el pontificum potestate, ch. 7, ed. Scholz, R., Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern (1327-1334), 2 vols (Rome, 1911-14), 2, pp. 461–2Google Scholar. Ockham’s rejection of ecclesiastical lordship in these passages accords with his principal argument against an extreme curialist conception of papal plenitudo potestatis: it is contrary to the Gospel as a lexlib-ertatis. It in effect makes all Christians the pope’s servi and imposes on them a servitus heavier than that under which the Mosaic law placed the Jews. On this argument, see my The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 140-6.

¹⁰ Defensor pacis, II.4.

¹¹ Around 1390 the friars were accused by a Wycliffite author of having hidden away Ockham’s anti-papal writings and other contentious works. Richard, H. and Rouse, Mary A., ‘The Franciscans and books: Lollard accusations and the Franciscan response’, in Hudson, Anne and Wilks, Michael, eds, From Ockham to Wyclif = SCH.S, 5 (1987), pp. 369–84 at p. 372Google Scholar, n. 9: cited by Professor Offler as evidence that, ‘the tradition of Ockham’s polemical works is thin and late. It was known or suspected that they existed, but they were hard to come by.’ Offler, Hilary S., ‘The “Influence” of Ockham’s Political Thinking: The First Century’, in Vossen-kuhl, W. and Schonberger, R., eds, Die Gegenwart Ockhams (Weinheim, 1990), pp. 338–65 at p. 348.Google Scholar

¹² De potestate pape, ed. Loserth, J., WS (1907), ch. 5, p. 100Google Scholar, Omnes apostoli preter Scarioth erant socii sibi obedientes, honore invicem prevenientes et superiores invicem arbitrantes.’ De civili dominio, 1,11, p. 78, ‘Unde apostolus, ad Philip, ii. 2.3. docet hanc regulam ecclesiasticam sub hiis verbis, Implete gaudtum meum, ut idem sapiatis, eandem caritatem habenles, unanimes, id ipsum sencientes, nichil per contencionem neaue per inanem gloriam sed in humilitate superiores sibimet arbitrantes. Et revera ista sola regula sufficeret ad fundare religionem congruam tori mundo.’

¹³ De officio regis, ed. Pollard, A. W. and Sayle, G, WS (1887), ch. 5, p. 102Google Scholar, ‘Dominus papa debet maiorem obedienciam suis subditis quam e contra, quia debet habere maiorem graciam et per consequens plus servire, quod si omittat peccaret graviter ex inobediencia.’

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 105, ‘Obediendum est cuicumque preposito, sive bonum precipiat sive malum; precipue autem pars obediencie est ut subditus exponat se ad operam et ministerium edificacionis ecclesie, et per consequens in casu ut corripiat suum preposi turn erran tern.’ Ibid., ch. 8, p. 200, ‘Stat duos dominos fideles, caritatem servando, esse sibi contrarios … Ymmo altero manifeste tirranisante conringit suum legium quo ad mundum servire et obedire sibi fideliter, procurando concordiam, anuncciando sibi veritatem et erro rem, necnon et rebellando, si oportet, contra tyrannidem obstinaram.’ Ibid., p. 201, ‘Patet quod non oportet legium Sirviendo tyrranno favere sibi in moribus. Favetautem homo nature hominis non solum resistendo sed edam occidendo.’ On resistance as obedience, Wyclif follows (but goes beyond) Grosseteste. See Luscombe, David, ‘Wyclif and Hierarchy’, in Hudson, Anne and Wilks, Michael, eds. From Ockham to Wyclif = SCHS, 5 (1987), pp. 233–44Google Scholar; pp. 238-9, nn.11-12; pp. 243-4: ‘Wyclif and Grosseteste have in common the view that the maintenance of true hierarchy may require opposition to any who subvert it, even if subversion comes from on high. Wyclif was ever ready to mention Grosseteste’s resistance to Pope Innocent IV. Yet as Dr Pantin noted, while Grosseteste is “probably the most fervent and thorough-going papalist among medieval English writers”, Wyclif seems to hold that the Church might, if necessary, carry on permanently without the pope and prelates if they remained reprobate and lacking in authority. This may well be true. But there is much in Wyclif‘s writings that confirms his agreement with Grosseteste on the need to conserve hierarchy. Wyclif did not abandon the notion of hierarchy; he explained in a different way how it should be properly understood.’

¹⁵ ‘Predestination, property, and power: Wyclif‘s theory of dominion and grace’, SCH, 2 (1965), pp. 220-36 at pp. 235-6. Also see Wilks, Michael, ‘Royal priesthood: the origins of Lollardy’, in The Church in a Changing Society: Conflict — Reconciliation or Adjustment? (Proceedings of the CIHEC Conference in Uppsala, August 17-21,1977), Publications of the Swedish Society of Church History, ns 50 (Uppsala, 1978), pp. 63–71Google Scholar, and ‘Reformatio regni: Wyclif and Hus as leaders of religious protest movements’, SCH, 9 (1972), pp. 109-30 at p. 130: ‘My purpose is simply to emphasize that, as Wyclif himself had always stressed, a reformatio could only succeed — and subsequently in Bohemia did succeed — when it was seen as a revolution from the top downwards. In a sense the real heir of Wyclif in Bohemia was not Hus, but Wenceslas. It was Wenceslas rather than Hus who in the end proved rhat Wyclif was right: that a reformation has to be an act by the head. But England had to wait for a century and a half after Wyclif s death for a king who was capable of understanding the point and of putting it into effect’