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The Reception of Ockham’s Thought in Fourteenth-Century England
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2016
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In the autumn of 1363 Wyclif returned to Oxford to take lodgings at Queen’s College and begin his formal training in theology. The Oxford of that day was supposedly dominated by the nominalistic philosophy and theology of Ockham and of his disciples, although not exclusively so. After a period of initial and vehement opposition to Ockham in the 1320s, it has been assumed that Ockham’s thought attracted a group of fervent disciples and influenced many others. The principal Ockhamists of the next generation, or what is sometimes called ‘the English school of nominalism,’ are identified in almost any textbook of medieval philosophy as being Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham. On occasion other names are added: William Crathorn, Thomas Buckingham, William Heytesbury, and John Dumbleton. The areas of discipleship vary, but those most frequently mentioned are: a nominalistic metaphysics, an epistemology of intuitive cognition, a terminist logic, a nominalistic physics, and a semi-Pelagian soteriology. Although an actual head-count is rarely provided, it is taken for granted that by 1335 many Oxford authors were sympathetic to Ockham and that Ockhamist teaching was not effectively displaced by the countervoices of Fitzralph and Bradwardine, a situation that lasted until Wyclif’s campaign against Ockham and the ‘doctors of signs’.
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References
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39 Ibid.
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47 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. I, d. 17, q. 5 (Vat. MS lat. 955, fol. 65ra). Tractatus de indivisibilibus (Florence Bibl. Naz. MS conv. sopp. A.3.508 fol. 140ra).
48 The Lectura secunda (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius MS 281) combines questions from the prologue to his London lectures, revised questions from his Oxford lectures, and new questions that do not appear to be derived from his Norwich, London, or Oxford lectures. The presence of the revised questions requires that the Lectura secunda be dated after the Oxford lectures, probably after 1334, which is the terminus post quem for the second redaction of the Oxford lectures.
49 In his Tractatus de indivisibilibus (Florence Bibl. Naz. conv. sopp. A.3.508 fol. 140ra), written after 1324 (since he cites Ockham’s Logica and Tractatus) Wodeham remarked that he had put forward the arguments contained in Ockham’s treatment of indivisibles before Ockham had written on the subject (meaning the treatise Wodeham knew as Tractatus de sacramento eucharistiae): ‘Quaere prosecutionem in ilio tractatu. Et haec argumenta fere omnia fuerant tua antequam Ockham aliquid scriberet de indivisibilibus.’
50 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. IV, q. 5 (Paris Univ. MS lat. 193 fol. 217rb-217va, as edited from other manuscripts): ‘Nolo tamen dicere quod quanti tas sit res alia a substantia et qualitate, et eriam a parribus earundem. Immo, quantitas continua est ipsae partes conrinuae in toto, et istae eaedem partes, si disconrinuentur, sint quantitas discreta; et hanc viam de parribus et non de toto teneo turn quia reputo eam rationabiliorem rum etiam propter calumniam vitandam multorum dampnantium quantitatem esse substanciam vel qualitatem.’ Ibid., a. 5 (fol. 220ra): ‘Sed istis non obstantibus, teneo idem quod prius, scilicet quod quantitas non est res disrincta a pardbus substannae et qualitatis, quia nihil potest esse quantum sine quantitate.’ Ibid., a. 1 (fol. 217va): ‘Ad primam rationem dico quod quantitas intrinseca motus non est res alia a motu et parribus eius.’ ‘Ad probationem dicendum quod per se loquendo terminus motus augmenti est res permanens et non successiva, et ideo non est per se loquendo nec simpliciter loquendo quanticas intrinseca motus, et haec loquendo de ultimo termino motus augmenti.’
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58 Modern commentators have sometimes confused scholastic discussions of the powers (or faculties) of the soul (i.e. intellectus and voluntas) with discussions of the acts of those powers (e.g. cognitio, volitio); thus Leff, Richard Fitzralph p. 97. Both Ockham and Wodeham (against Fitzralph) affirmed that intellect and will are one power or faculty, identical with the soul itself, although cognitive and volitional acts are for the most part distinct from one another and from the soul itself. Ockham, Ordinano, d. 1, q. 2 OTh 1 p. 396): ‘intellectus et voluntas sunt omnino idem… Et ita fruitio est in intellectu et est actus intellectus ex quo est actus voluntatis. Sed intendo dicere quod fruitio non est intelligere nec scire et sic de aliis actibus qui dicuntur actus quocumque modo cognitivi. Et isto modo, conformando me modo loquendi aliorum, intelligo quando dico fruitionem esse actum non intellectus sed voluntatis. …’ Ockham, Reportatio II, q. 20 (OTh p. 435): ‘potentiae animae …, scilicet intellectus et voluntas—non loquendo de potentiis sensitivis nunc … —sunt idem realiter inter se et cum essentia animae… licet eadem sit substantia numero quae potest intelligere et velie, tamen intelligere et velie sunt actus distincti realiter.’ In his London lectures, portions of which are preserved in the prologue to his Lectura secunda, Wodeham argued against any distinction between the soul and its powers; Cambr. Gonville & Caius 281 fol. 106ra ‘potentiae animae, etsi non sint distinctae res nee inter se nec ab anima, tamen sunt distinctae realitates eiusdem rei simplicis, sic quod licet sint idem realiter, distinguuntur tamen aliquo modo a parte rei.’ Here Wodeham uses Scorns, not Ockham, as his source. In his Oxford lectures Wodeham maintained that cognition and volition are separate things (res distinctae) from the soul itself. Consequendy love (both amor and dilectio) as well as enjoyment (fruitio) are res distinctae. See Wodeham, , Lectura Oxon. IGoogle Scholar, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2 (Paris Univ. MS 193 fol. 16vb) ‘Sed istis non obstantibus, teneo partem oppositam, quod fruitio est res distincta ab anima.’ Lectura Oxon. I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1 (Paris Univ. MS 193 fol. 16rb)’Non minus est amor res distincta ab animaquam ipsa cognitio. Sed cognitio est res distincta; ergo, etc’ The questions on the relation of the soul to its faculties and acts were revised and expanded by Wodeham in the second redaction of his Oxford lectures, and that revised form is preserved in the second redaction as well as in the Caius manuscript (Lectura secunda). Cf. Vat. lat. 955 fol. 21r, later addition in brackets ‘Nee in via nee in patria est anima fruido [sua, sed tarn amor viae quam patriae est qualitas recepta in anima vel angelo cum quia in via amor libere elicitur] ab anima. Item, quia non minus est amor res distincta ab anima quam ipsa cognitio. Sed cognitio est res distincta.’ In changing the subsequent passage in a. 2 to read ‘Sed non obstantibus istis teneo quod amor et cognitio sunt vere accidentia recepta in anima, licet hoc efficaciter probari sit difficile’, he marked through the earlier passage, noting in the margin Vacat, quamvis bene’. I am grateful to Stephen McGrade for calling to my attention the confusion on this issue and the passages in Ockham.
59 Lectura Oxon., I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat. MS lat. 955 fol. 27’) ‘Istis non obstantibus, teneo quod fruirio beatifica est realiter delectatio.’
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