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The Influence of Richard Campsall on Fourteenth-Century Oxford Thought
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2016
Extract
As is well known to Ockham scholars, much of Ockham’s career as a teacher of theology in the years from ca. 1317-24 involved an ongoing debate with his confrère Walter Chatton. The latter’s commentary on the Sentences is conceived as a defence of his own interpretation of Duns Scotus, from which standpoint Chatton undertakes what is virtually a point-by-point rebuttal of Ockham, with nearly equal attention to the views of Peter Aureol. What has not received much attention is the frequency with which a third scholar is Chatton’s target. This is the secular theologian, Richard Campsall, who often appears in the commentary as an unnamed quidam, and who was probably the most impressive philosopher at Oxford in the years just before Ockham began his lectures on the Sentences. Campsall’s name is nearly forgotten today; indeed, as far as it is possible to judge on the basis of our relatively meagre knowledge of late fourteenth-century thought, before the end of the century Campsall’s fame had faded, and most of his important insights were already being assigned to others—chiefly to Ockham.
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Footnotes
*
I am grateful to The National Endowment for the Humanities, The Leopold Schepp Foundation, and the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies at Villa I Tatti (Florence) for supporting the research of which this paper forms a part; and to Drs N. J. Green-Pedersen and H. Gelber, from whose insights I have benefited enormously. Much of what follows abbreviates material more fully documented in my forthcoming Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1350 [Vision and Certitude]. Latin quotations below contain as sigla: {} word(s) to be deleted for sense; <> word(s) added for sense; and, in texts edited by others, «» my emendations.
References
1 For the dating of Ockham’s and Chatton’s oeuvre, see Courtenay, W.J., Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden 1978) pp. 63–74, 160–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Courtenay discusses the evidence discovered and evaluated by the editors of the new critical edition of Ockham’s work and by H. Gelber.
2 For example, his stance on simple supposition (nn. 37-8 below); on relation (n. 47 below).
3 Most of what we know about Campsall’s biography has been established by Synan, E., ‘Richard of Campsall, an English Theologian of the Fourteenth Century’, Mediaeval Studies 14 (1952) 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, The Works of Richard of Campsall, 1 (Toronto 1068) 13-17; II (Toronto 1982), 3-6; with further precision in Gelber, H., ‘Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335’, PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1974, pp. 185–6, 203–4Google Scholar. While relying upon them, the present paper is intended to refine Campsall’s curriculum vitae further.
4 Synan, CampsallI 14, 19;J. A. Weisheipl, ‘Ockham and the Mertonians’, in J. I. Catto, R. Evans, eds. The History of the University of Oxford, I: The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford 1984) p. 614.
5 Synan, Campsall I p. 15.
6 Synan, Campsall I p. 15; also idem, ‘Richard of Campsall’ p. 3. For Campsall to have served as chancellor in 1325 he must still have been regent master. Synan indicates (Campsall I, p. 13) that Campsall’s tombstone at Merton and the inclusion of his books in a Merron library list argue for a date of death in the decade 1350-60; but see Courtenay, Wodeham p. 60 n. 64.
7 For an evaluation of the evidence advanced for dating of Ockham’s Oxford lectures, see Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ pp. 172, 201–5Google Scholar. It is important to remember that Sentences commentaries, although sometimes revised by masters, were created and delivered several years earlier, by bachelors of the Sentences (bachelarius sententiarius).
8 On these stages in a theologian’s training, see Courtenay, Wodeham pp. 45-53. Gál, Gelber, and Courtenay have separately argued for the presence of Chatton, Ockham, and Wodeham at the Franciscan stuáium London ca. 1320-4; consult Courtenay pp. 160-4. See also n. 50 below.
9 In a text discovered by Gelber (quoted n. 40 below), Wodeham states, hec erat ars Calmale quam volebat impedire Chatton. As the names are uninflected, it is difficult to interpret Wodeham’s remark. If, with Gelber (p. 198), one takes Campsall to be the subject and Chatton the object, then Campsall has to have known Chatton’s arguments, and developed the rule (ars) mentioned here in the course of refuting Chatton. If this were what Wodeham intended, it seems to me, then the accusative quam should have been an instrumental ablative (qua). I read this passage instead as ‘this was the rule of Campsall’s which Chatton wanted to block [with these arguments],’ which removes the difficulty of accounting for a time when Campsall could have learned of Chatton’s arguments.
10 See Vision and Certitude, chapter 3; more briefly, Tachau, , ‘The Response to Ockham’s and Aureol’s Epistemology, 1320-1340’ in Maierù, A. ed., English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries (Naples 1982) pp. 185–217Google Scholar [‘Response’].
11 Petrus Plaout de Palma, I Sent, [delivered Paris, 1391], Vatican MS Vat. lat. 4284 fols. 52ra–rb ‘Pro materie declaratione notandum est quod de differentia notitie abstractive et intuitive diverse sunt opiniones. Et primo circa hoc est quidam doctor anglicus qui vocatur Campsale, qui ponit quod eadem res est notitia intuitiva et abstractiva, successive tamen et non simul. Unde ipse ymaginamr quod notitia aliqua eadem adequate denominatur sive vocatur “intuitiva,” et hoc expresse, a rei nomine quia per earn intuetur presentiam obiecti per earn cognite, que quidem notitia eadem (n)umquam adequate remanente in substantia sua absolute obiecto absente, dicitur “notitia abstractiva.” Et fundatur iste doctor principaliter in uno principio quo consuevit frequenter uri Ockham et trahitur ab Aristotele, scilicet quod non est ponenda pluralitas sine necessitate, ita quod quandoque aliqua propositio affirmativa verificatur pro rebus, si ad verificationem eius sufficit positio unius rei cum alia uno numero <non> est ponenda tertia res, sic est quod ad verificandum istam “Sor intuitur B,” sufficit notitia de B cum presentia obiecti; et si subiectum substrahatur, ad verificandum istam “Sor cognoscit B abstractive,” sufficit notitia de B cum non-presentia obiecti; sive quandoque re de novo acquisita, ideo etc’…. (fol. 52va) ‘Alia est opinio Scoti in ista materia; alia Aureoli; alia Ockham; alia Gregorii.’
12 Chatton, I Lectura prol. q. 2 (ed. Callaghan p. 236) ‘Una opinio videtur esse quod notitia intuitiva et abstractiva non distinguuntur realiter, sed quod eadem notitia necessario est intuitiva rei quando est praesens et abstractiva quando est absens, quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate. Sed hic nulla est necessitas, quia isti utuntur pro arte respondendi quod ubi possum vitare omnia argumenta per positionem unius rei aliter denominando eam alia re posita et aliter ipsa circumscripta, ibi negant tertiam rem. Sed in proposito omnia argumenta probanda distinctionem inter intuitivam et abstractivam possunt «vitari» ponendo quod eadem cognitio secundum numeram denominatur cognirio intuitiva, cum res cognita est presens, eo quod conceptus cognitionis intuitivae connotat obiectum esse presens, et quod ipsa eadem cognitio dicitur et denominatur abstractiva quando res est absens, quia denominano ista per conceptum abstractum connotat rem esse absentem.’
13 For Ockham, see Tachau, ‘Response’ pp. 196-8; and idem, ‘The Problem of the species in medio at Oxford in the Generation after Ockham’, Mediaeval Studies 44 (1982) pp. 399-403. Campsall requires species to explain forgetting; see Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda d. 3, q. 5 (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius MS 281/674, fol. 176va) ‘Aliter responder Campsale, quod causa est quia aliquando alius actus intensus expellit speciem in memoria, et quod hec est causa obli(<vi>onis.’ For the evidence that Campsall identified these species with first intentions, see Vision and Certitude.
14 For example, Ord. prol. q. 1, in Opera Theologica I pp. 26-7, 31; and especially pp. 70-1:’Et hoc sufficit ad notitiam intuitivam, quod quantum «res» est ex se sit sufficiens ad faciendum rectum judicium de exsistentia rei vel non-exsistentia. Ad septimum dubium dico quod per notitiam intuitivam rei potest evidenter cognosci res non esse quando non est vel si non sit…’ Again, in Quodl. V, q. 5 [OT IX: 496]: ‘… per notitiam intuitivam non tantum iudico rem esse quando est, sed eriam non esse quando non est…’ This reading of Ockham is controver sial, and is defended in Tachau, Vision and Certitude; A. Ghisalberti, ‘L’Intuizione in Ockham’, Riuista di filosofia neo-scolastica 70 (1978) 207-26.
15 Preserved in Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl. MS C.A. 2. 180, 1-101, this commentary has not received detailed doctrinal study. Its present form postdates Thomas Aquinas’s 1323 canonization, and probably predates 1330, as there is no explicit (nor, as far as I can discern, implicit) reliance on authors later than Ockham. This would accord with the fact that the anonymous author still refers to William, and not yet to Ockham.
16 Erfurt Anon., I Sent. fol. 5va ‘Secunda definido: quod noritia intuitiva et abstractiva respectu eiusdem obiecti non sunt diversi actus, sed idem actus aliquando dicitur “noritia intuitiva,” videlicet quando res cognita est sufficienter presens cognoscenti; aliquando vocatur “abstractiva,” quando scilicet non est presens. Quod autem actus sit idem, etc., probatur quia non oportet ponere distinctionem realem in act<ual>ibus obiectivarum <?>, sed obiectivarum est idem; igitur <etc>‘
17 Ibid. fol. 5va ‘Sed dubium est quomodo scitur propositio negativa in qua negatur esse de aliquo, ut talis: “Sortes non est.” Non per experienriam, quia quando habetur experientia de aliqua re, ilia res necessario est. Non enim videtur aliquid nisi illud; sic igitur nec per demonstrationem, quia omnis talis est contingens; igitur <etc>… Terria definitio: quod per eundem actum sine re potest sciri rem non esse presentem probatur, quia ex hoc quod res est presens scit aliquis rem esse presentem; igitur ex hoc quod aliquis scit se non habere iudicium <rem esse presentem>, scire potest rem non esse presentem. Quarta definitio: quod per talem actum sine re non potest sciri rem non esse, quia non sequitur “scio rem non esse presentem, igitur scio rem non esse,” sed est falsa consequenria. Quinto dico contra WilMmutn <Ockham>, quia eodem actu sive eadem noritia intuitiva non scitur successive rem esse et non esse. Probatur primo ex precedentibus, secundo sic: ab eadem causa totali et naturali non proveniunt effectus contraili; sed intellectus cum actu et re causat iudicium quo scitur rem esse; igitur etc. Nec valet dicere quod intellectus cum actu sine re causat iudicium quo scitur rem non esse, quia hec est contra quartam conclusionem… etc’
18 For the calculation of this date, see my Vision and Certitude.
19 Parts of Rodington’s commentary have been edited in the helpful study by Tweedale, M., ‘John of Rodynton on Knowledge, Science and Theology’, PhD diss., UCLA 1965Google Scholar. Rodington, I Sent. prol. q. 2, concl. 1 (Tweedale p. 314; Vatican, MS Vat. lat. 5306, fol. 4V; Assisi Bibl.com. MS 133, fol. 3rb) ‘Et secundum istum modum dicendi potest dici quod intuitiva non distinguitur ab abstractiva, nisi sicut cognitio magis perfecta et minus perfecta, quia perfecta cognitio est per quam scio quod terminus est, etc., imperfecta quia non scio sic. Et sic dico quod non sunt alterius rationis, immo eadem cognitio primo potest esse abstractiva et post intuitiva, et econverso millies in die.’ Again (Tweedale, p. 318): ‘… visio et imaginario non differunt nisi sicut intuitiva et abstractiva in intellectu, quantum ad hoc scilicet, quod illud idem quod visio est in presentia rei, postea est imaginario in absentia.’ Rodington does not hereby rule out a formal distinction.
20 Ibid. (Tweedale, p. 329; Vat. lat. 5306 fol. 7ra) ‘Aliter potest dici ponendo quod hoc nomen “visio” connotat necessario aliquid existens visum. Et tunc diceretur, quando queritur qualiter se habet obiectum ad visionem, scilicet quod obiectum sit intrinsece inclusum in toto quod importatur per hoc nomen “visio,” et sicut Deus non potest tunc facere quod sit album sine albedine, ita non potest faceré visionem sine existente viso. Sic patet quod assumptum <Ockham> non concludit.’ Rodington ascribes the rebutted arguments to Ockham.
21 Ibid. ‘Aliter accipitur quantum ad totum quod significar et quod connotat, et sicut prius tractatum est, nee potest manere destructo visibili, nisi idem maneret sine se ipso, quia visio dicitur ista duo, scilicet: actum talem in sensu et obiectum existens extra, etc’
22 As was evident to the anonymous author of the Sentences commentary in Vatican, MS Vat. lat. 986, fols. 1ra-31vb. Considering whether there can be an intuitive cognition of a non existent, he quotes Rodington as having denied the logical possibility (that is, by God’s absolute power). See fol. 2vb ‘Dicit Rodington quod ly “intuitiva” est terminus connotativus, ita quod dicitur “intuitiva” quando obiectum est presens, quando est absens dicitur abstractiva; et sic centies in die potest esse eadem noticia intuitiva et abstractiva.’ Concerning Vat. lat. 986, see Tachau, , ‘French Theology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 51 (1984) 41–80.Google Scholar
23 This conclusion (argued more extensively in Vision and Certitude) differs from that of M. Tweedale who construed Rodington’s epistemology as Ockhamist.
24 Rodington, I Sent., prol. q. 2, (Tweedale, p. 321) ‘Ad primum argumentum pro secunda conclusione, dico quod abstractiva non presupponit necessario intuitivam …’ and, ibid: ‘intelligere possum quod non est nee esse potest, sicut negationes et talia que intueri non possunt.’
25 Rodington usually characterises his own views as a defense of Scotus against Ockham’s critique; hence the question is more precisely whether Rodington recognised his interpretations of the Subtle Doctor as indebted to Campsall’s.
26 Rodington, 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 2 (Vat. lat. 5306 fol. 68va-b) ‘Dicitur quod quedam est similitudo in natura, alia est ut signi ad significatum … Ad sextum dicit Campsalis quod probabilius est poni eiusdem speciei et eque similes similitudine nature, non signi ad sign<ific>atum—sed quare ex quo sunt similes in natura, quia representatur per unam et per aliam…’ Again, d. 30 (fols. 81vb-82ra).
27 Anon., I Sent., Vat. lat. 986 fol. 28va-vb ‘Aliqui bene concedunt quod Deus ab eterno cognovit nee potuit non cognoscere res in suo simplici esse et omnia in sua natura … quamvis aliter dicant de propositionibus complexis… Hoc posito, pono aliquas propositiones quas ponit Rodinton in primo suo <libro> et aliquas a Richardi Compsaley.’ All the ten conclusions can be found verbatim in Campsall’s ‘Notabilia de contingencia et prescientia dei’ in Synan, Campsall II pp. 38-43; at least five of these also appear in Rodington, 1 Sent. d. 38, (Vat. lat. 5306 fol. 84r).
28 On the characterization of Holcot as a ‘radical Ockhamist’, see Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ pp. 1–6Google Scholar; and Courtenay, W. J., ‘Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion’, (1974) repr. in idem, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought (London 1984) pp. 26–59.Google Scholar
29 Tachau, ‘Problem’ pp. 414-17; more extensively, Vision and Certitude.
30 Holcot, , ‘Utrum theologia sit scientia’ ed. Muckle, J. T., ‘Vtrum theologia sit scientia, A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holcot, O.P.’, Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), pp. 127–53, p. 130Google Scholar: ‘Contra hoc quod ponit Guillelmus quod per notitiam inruitivam rei non existenris possum evidenter scire rem illam non esse, ita quod noticia intuitiva est causa totalis illius iudicii… Unde videtur quod notitia intuitiva non possit esse «de» non-existentis, quia iste terminus est unus terminus connotarivus qui supponit pro quadam qualitate quae est noticia, et connotai obiectum cognitum esse existens et praesens in se, propter quam connotarionem illa noticia vocatur “intuitiva.” Et ideo eadem «notitia», si «conservaretur» miraculose, re destructa, iam non erit notifia intuitiva. Et sic eadem notitia potest esse modo intuitiva, modo abstractiva, quia tllud quod connotatur aliter et aliter se habet.’ Compare to nn. 12, 19-21 above.
31 Ibid., p. 130 ‘Contra. Impossibile videtur quod haec sit mihi evidens: Sortes non est, quia non sequitur “Sortes non est in «hoc» loco, ergo «Sortes» non est.” Similiter, «non sequitur» “non video eum nee tango, ergo «Sortes» non est.” ‘ Compare to n. 17 above.
32 For the following discussion of supposition theory and the logic of the Trinity, I rely with gratitude upon Gelber, ‘Logic and Trinity’ and idem, , Exploring the Boundaries of Reason. Three Questionson the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto 1983).Google Scholar
33 Chatton, I Reportatio d. 2, q. 5 (Gelber, ‘Logic and Trinity’ p. 610, n. 103) ‘Alia est opinio de villa que primo tenet quod aliquid est in una persona quod non in alia est concedendum esse, et cum essentia et proprietas nullam habent non-identitatem in re, hoc probant quia in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviât relationis oppositio. ‘ For the identification of this opinion as Campsall’s, see below n. 40.
34 Chatton, I Lectura d. 2, q. 6, a. 4 ( Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ p. 610–11, n. 107, 109)Google Scholar ‘Opinio cuiusdam doctoris videtur esse quod ars solvendi talia sumenda est ex ista regula: omnia sunt unum in divinis ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Si enim aliqua alia esset ars solvendi talia, maxime ponetur ilia quam alibi ponunt de non-identitate formali. Sed illa non est ponenda ad videndum tales sillogismos; ergo etc… Secundo sic: si talis non-identitas formalis poneretur, maxime hoc videretur ne contradictoria dicerentur de eodem. Sed hoc non cogit. Primo quia non sunt contradictoria, cum non est idem conceptus a parte subiecti. Secundo, quia affirmatio et negatio verificari possum de diversis conceptibus eiusdem rei, propter diversam suppositionem, ut quod hominis sit asinus, et quod homo non sit asinus, homo est species, nullus homo est species.’ See Gelber’s discussion, pp. 199-200.
35 Chatton, 1 Lect., d. 2, q. 6, a. 4 (in Gelber, ‘Logic and Trinity’ p. 611) ‘Assumprum probatur primo sic, quia cum dicitur quod essentia et paternitas non sunt formaliter idem, aut ly “formaliter” sumitur ibi prout distinguitur contra “materialiter,” aut significar ibi quod sit quaedam non-idenritas extra animam, propter quam non teneat syllogismos, aut est ibi syncategorema propositionis ita quod idem quod per se. Non est dare primum… nec est dare secundum … Nec sufficit dare tertium, quia talia argumenta non currunt de perseitate propositionum, sed currunt absolute de re quam de facto significant. Similiter, res non est causa quare propositio est per se, sed intellectus, nam in nostra potestate est quod intellectus praedicet inferius de suo superiori, et tunc non est propositio per se primo modo dicendi per se, et tamen significat rem quam significat sua conversa que est propositio per se primo modo.’
36 Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ pp. 209–10.Google Scholar
37 See, for example, Henry, D. P., ‘Suppositio and Significano in English Logic’, in Braakhuis, H. A. G., Kneepkins, C. H., and Rijk, L. M. de eds. English Logic and Semantics (Nijmegen 1981) 361–87Google Scholar; Maierù, , Terminologia logica della tarde scolastica (Rome 1972) pp. 219–24.Google Scholar
38 This is, of course, connected to Chatton’s discomfort with Ockham’s view that the mental proposition is the object of scientia, inasmuch as this stance rests on an understanding of predication shared with Campsall (above n. 35). See Knudsen, Ch., Walter Chattons Kritik an Wilhelm von Ockhams Wissenschaftslehre (Bonn 1976) pp. 43–50.Google Scholar
39 Wodeham I Oxon. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2 (Gelber, ‘Logic and Trinity’ p. 612, n. 114) ‘Sed tunc que posset esse causa quare deficit talis discursus? Sufficit ne dicere quod in talibus non est unitas medii quae sufficiat ad concludendum extremum de extremo; et ideo sit ibi fallacia accidenris sicut dixit Campsale et Ockham in suis Responsionibus ordinaria, videlicet quod sic: nam hec essentia est tres res realiter adinvicem distincte, scilicet tres persone, ergo eius unitas non sufficit ad concludendum extremum de extremo.’ See also idem, Exploring p. 27; Synan, Campsall II p. 5, n. 8.
40 Wodeham I Oxon. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2 ( Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ p. 610, n. 105-6)Google Scholar ‘Ad presens, hie primo videndum est an regula Anselmi de hoc sufficiat, communiter allegata: “omnia sunt unum ubi non obviât relationis oppositio” … Secundum patet, quia licet sciamus per illam artem in talibus paralogismis esse defectus <?> qualis vel qualiter explicanda sit iste defectus per hoc nescitur, sicut in seipso quilibet experi tur. Hec ergo ars supponenda est sicut vera et bona pro defectum sciendo vel non defectum, et hec erat ars Campsale quant volebat impedire Citation.’ For the acceptance of Campsall’s ars by Wodeham, Ockham, Holcot, see Gelber’s discussion, pp. 261, 266-7.
41 Gelber, , ‘Logic and Trinity’ pp. 1–5, 260–70.Google Scholar
42 Ibid. p. 267; idem Exploring pp. 26-8, especially n. 72.
43 Holcot, , ‘Utrum Deus possic scire plura quam scit’ ed. Courtenay, W., ‘A Revised Text of Robert Holcot’s Quodlibetal Dispute on Whether God is Able to Know More Than He Knows’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 53 (1971)Google Scholar p. s, lines 38-40; see also p. 19-20, lines 346-62; discussed in Tachau Vision and Certitude.
44 Tachau, , ‘Problem,’ p. 415–18Google Scholar; see above n. 26.
45 On the significance of the tendency to consider problems at a proposirional level (construed as Ockhamist) see Murdoch, J. E., ‘The Development of a Critical Temper: New Approaches and Modes of Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy, Science, and Theology’, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7 (1975) pp. 51–79.Google Scholar
46 See Tachau, , ‘Adam Wodeham on First and Second Intentions’, Cahiers de l’institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin 35 (1980) pp. 29–55Google Scholar, especially 33-6.
47 ‘We know Campsall’s position on the witness (early 1320s) of John Baconthorpe, O. Carm. I Sent. [Synan, Campsall I p. 16, n. 26] ‘Est alius qui reputai se hoc efficaciter demonstrare, Campsale, sic. Si relatio esset alia res a fundamento, ergo tot res generantur unico actu quo relaciones; sed quando moveo digitum adquiruntur infinitae relationes, qui«a» adquirunrur infinitae distantiae ad infinitas partes mundi secundum approximationem et recessum digiti mei ad infinitas partes mundi; et sic apparens inopinabile sequitur, quod ad motum digiti mei impleatur mundus infinitis rebus.’ For the evidence that this denial that a relation and its relata were really distinct was among a core of positions construed by fourteenth-century opponents as, in their term, ‘Ockhamist,’ see Erfurt Wiss. Bibl. MS C. E. 2. 109 (written 1344) fol. 25ra; also, Courtenay and Tachau, ‘Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339-1341,’ History of Universities 2 (1982) pp. 72-75.
48 Synan, Campsall II p. 3.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 4; and pp. 5, 36-7. The only indication that Campsall ever responded to Ockham is the reference to die latter in the sole copy of Campsall’s ‘Utrum materia possit esse sine forma.’ This reference, the question’s structure, and its inclusion in a manuscript (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. MS CLM 8943) comprising material from ca. 1320-ca. 1327, suggest that it stems from Campsall’s stint as opponens/respondens in debates, or from his magisterium in theology. Nevertheless, the same question bears a scribal reference to the opinion of the even younger scholar, Rodington (fol. 32’ in margin, mistranscribed in Synan, Campsall II p. 30, n. 42). Both references are probably due not to Campsall, but instead to the theological student who compiled the collection in preparation for his own lectures; thus the appearance of Ockham’s and Rodington’s names cannot serve either to date the text securely, or to provide evidence of who (other than die student) knew whose work.
51 See for example, J. Murdoch, ‘Critical Temper’; Weisheipl, , ‘Ockham and Some Mertonians’, Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968) 161–213CrossRefGoogle Scholar; F. Bottin. La scienza degli Occamisti in Studi di filosofia e di storia della filosofia 4 (Rimini 1982). For Mertonian rejection of Ockham’s noesis, see Tachau, ‘Problem,’ nn. 136, 152; idem Vision and Certitude.