This narrative demonstrates how public and private power interacted during the post–World War II era to create America's unique health care system, a system based on a high-cost, corporate model financed and managed by insurance companies. The article compares the divergent political, organizational, and economic strategies of the American Medical Association (AMA), which represented physicians, and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), which represented for-profit insurance firms. Even after the defeat of President Harry Truman's plan for a universal, government-managed system, policymakers in both parties attempted to reform the health care market, because most observers recognized that the embryonic insurance-company-funded model had inherent cost problems. In order to defeat numerous reform proposals, AMA and HIAA leaders allied to rapidly develop the market around insurance-company financing. Insurers and physicians constructed overlapping institutions to manage their increasingly close financial relationship, thus creating a pseudocorporate arrangement. In an attempt to control costs, insurance companies expanded their function beyond simply underwriting the risks associated with medical services consumption to also assuming a supervisory role, albeit distant, over health care delivery. When policymakers designed Medicare, they adopted the organizational framework that private health interests had already created, thereby legitimizing the previously contested high-cost model.

This article examines the efforts of political and legal actors to scale back access to the courts and judicial authority in the decades since the rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.  Despite the importance and consequences that such efforts have had for the judicial system and rights protections in the United States, public law and American Political Development (APD) scholars have only begun to study this phenomenon within existing theories of institutional change.  Through an examination of efforts to reform procedural rules that govern courtroom access, adjudication, and potential remedies, this article presents evidence that both builds on and pushes this scholarship in new directions.  In contrast to law and APD scholars who have promoted a ‘regime politics’ model of judicial authority that focuses on the interests of national elected officials and Supreme Court majorities, this article finds that actors pursuing retrenchment come from both within and outside the judiciary, evidencing a robust set of individuals and interests (far beyond judges and politicians) who might be considered “judicial” actors.  Building on and complicating current understandings of the politics of retrenchment, moreover, I find that the groups involved in judicial retrenchment change significantly over time, are motivated by more than partisan backlash, and that the availability of malleable institutional “rules” enhances the likelihood of their success.  Finally, I find that the processes of judicial retrenchment are distinctive but not static, unfolding in a series of methods for attempted change that are not only path dependent, but also path breaking.

This article offers a first-ever comprehensive empirical assessment of a key Progressive reform, the direct primary, and its impact on competition in American elections. We begin with a review of the problems Progressives diagnosed in the American electoral system and reasons to expect the direct primary to be a pro-competitive, democratizing reform. We then consider prior research into the direct primary and electoral contestation and describe the database of primary and general election outcomes that we have constructed to trace competition in primaries for federal and statewide offices. Finally, we examine the historical trajectory of competition in primary elections, starting with the first decades after the introduction of the reform and then the succeeding decades.

Consistent with the hopes of reformers, we find primary elections indeed provided a forum for contestation for federal and statewide elections. Although primaries were never broadly competitive, even at the outset, they accounted for about a third of the serious electoral tests faced by statewide officeholders and about a fifth faced by U.S. representatives. The role of primaries as a venue for robust contestation, however, was short-lived, as the competitiveness of federal and statewide primaries decreased sharply starting in the 1940s. The last section of this article explores whether two recent developments in American elections—the extension of two-party competition and the rise in the value of incumbency—conspired to temper the contribution of direct primaries to electoral competition.

Both political scientists and popular commentators have reacted to the culture wars of the 1990s as something new in American politics, a deviation from the durable grounding of politics in economic interests. However, as recent work, along with many of the classic treatments of the Populist and Progressive eras demonstrate, American politics has long been infused with both culture and economics. The interesting question is thus not “which one” but rather “how” these two dimensions of political value have intersected through time and what the dynamics of those intersections reveal. The paper uses congressional family policy debates to demonstrate two alternative policy frameworks during the Progressive Era, each with its own alignment of the two dimensions and one emerging as a harbinger to the New Deal welfare state. Through systematic discursive analysis of committee hearings transcripts of the Fifty-sixth to Sixty-sixth Congresses, it assembles two dominant conceptual frameworks of family as illustrative of the two approaches. The progressive understanding viewed family economics as foundational, circumscribing its cultural qualities and legitimating state intervention. In contrast, the traditionalist conception privileged self-regulating families' cultural qualities as more fundamental, only loosely related to economic condition, such that active state intervention into family economics was seen as inappropriate and ineffective. These alternative approaches to state and family relations viewed culture or economics alternatively as foundational or epiphenomenal, if related at all. As history unfolded, the progressive conception ultimately prevailed in New Deal and postwar social policies, which continued to emphasize the economic dimension as subsuming the cultural one. Investigating the dynamics of intersectionality between economics and culture is suggested as a potential pathway to bridge work emphasizing durable economic interests in politics with other work focused instead on the endurance of moral conflicts in political deliberations, implying that in the Progressive Era the parties were not only divided in terms of which set of issues were more important but also over how the two dimensions of political value related to each other, if at all.