1. Williams, Daniel R., The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission (Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1913), 164Google Scholar.

2. Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, May 15, 1905; Letter reprinted in Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884–1918, v.2 (New York: Charles Scribner, 1925), 123Google Scholar.

3. Wilson, F. M. Huntington, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1945), 216Google Scholar.

4. McKinley, William, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley (New York: Doubleday & McClue Co., 1900), 105Google Scholar. Karnow, Stanley, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 129Google Scholar.

5. Roosevelt to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, February 23, 1904. Letter reprinted in Morison, Elting E., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), v. IV, 734/startpage>Google Scholar.

6. Rosenberg, Emily S., Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)Google Scholar. See also Rosenberg, Emily S. and Rosenberg, Norman L., “From Colonialism to Professionalism: The Public-Private Dynamic in United States Foreign Financial Policy, 1898–1930,” Journal of American History (June 1987): 57–82Google Scholar.

7. Clemens, Elisabeth, “Retrospective: Formative Action and Second Acts,” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, ed. Skowronek, Stephen and Glassman, Matthew (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 367Google Scholar.

8. Skowronek, Stephen, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In an especially insightful essay, Julian Go characterizes these links between colonial-state builders and the metropolitan state as “chains of empire.” Go, “The Chains of Empire,” in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, ed. Go, Julian and Foster, Anne L. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 182–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The appropriate role of the president and Congress in the conduct of American foreign affairs has occupied legal scholars for generations with no clear resolution. If nothing else, it is clear that the demarcations of authority in American foreign relations are highly ambiguous and have evolved significantly over time. For a recent review, see Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, “The Executive Power in Foreign Affairs,” Yale Law Journal, 111(2): 231–356.

9. Putting institutions first, of course, means that many compelling theories of political culture, race, and gender are largely pushed to the background. My purpose is not to make light of these theories, nor do I think these explanations have no merit—indeed, many provide brilliant insights into the background conditions of American imperialism—but they lie outside the scope of this article, which confines itself to a focus on the institutional arrangements and relationships between colonial officials and financiers that partially structured American imperial expansion. Many of these processes are well explored in recent works. On gender, see, for example, Gordon, Linda, “Internal Colonialism and Gender,” in Haunted By Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History, ed. Stoler, Ann Laura (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006)Google Scholar; Briggs, Laura, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Hoganson, Kristin L., Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippines-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Findlay, Eileen, Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870–1920 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999)Google Scholar. For race-based explanations, see, for example, Hunt, Michael H., Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Jacobson, Matthew Frye, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000)Google Scholar; Love, Eric T. L., Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865–1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

10. Gaddis, John Lewis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990), 407CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For other, less economically driven theories of imperial expansion, see Abernathy, David B., The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Motyl, Alexander, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Doyle, Michael, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Smith, Neil, America's Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

11. John Hobson made the connection between imperialism and capital most forcefully in his 1902 study, Imperialism. Hobson's work served as the basis for Lenin's famous 1916 pamphlet, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” which specifically discusses U.S. imperialism. For the application of Marxist arguments to the American case, see, for example, Nearing, Scott and Freeman, Joseph, Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism (New York, 1925)Google Scholar. Charles and Mary Beard, while not Marxists, also explained American imperialism through the lens of economic interests. See, for example, The Rise of American Civilization (1927); Beard, Charles A., The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest (New York, 1934)Google Scholar; Beard, Charles A., The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934)Google Scholar. The Beards, however, were never clear on the mechanisms of this connection; sometimes it was suggested that special business interests were at work, while other times they favored structural interpretations.

12. For the classics in this tradition see LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963)Google Scholar and Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton, 1959)Google Scholar. See also Emily S. Rosenberg's excellent review essay, “Economic Interest and Foreign Policy,” in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890–1993, ed. Martel, Gordon (Routledge: New York, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Another variant of the economic influence thesis holds that business, while initially opposed to the war, eventually became convinced that expansion would serve its interests. See, for example, Pratt, Julius, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (New York: Quadrangle, 1964)Google Scholar.

13. For an especially cogent analysis of Marxist theories of imperialism as applied to the U.S. experience, see Zevin, Robert, “An Interpretation of American Imperialism,” Journal of Economic History (March 1972): 316–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For another critique, see Frieden, Jeffry A., “International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation,” International Organization 48(4) (Autumn 1994): 559–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frieden, Jeffry A., “The Economics of Intervention: American Overseas Investments and Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890–1950,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (January 1989): 55–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. Lewis, Celona, America's Stake in International Investments (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1938), 610Google Scholar

15. Davis, Lance E. and Cull, Robert J., International Capital Markets and American Economic Growth, 1820–1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107Google Scholar.

16. Pletcher, David M., The Diplomacy of Involvement: American Economic Expansion across the Pacific, 1784–1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001)Google Scholar. In the late 1890s, to use a well-known example, two American capitalists in China, James Harrison Wilson and James J. McCook, attempted to secure the capital necessary to extend the Trans-Siberian railroad into China. After extensive meetings with Standard Oil, a number of railroads, and even representatives from J. P. Morgan, Wilson and McCook failed to achieve anything more than the most tepid interest in their project. Pletcher, Diplomacy of Involvement, 217.

17. Becker, William H., The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893–1921 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 181Google Scholar.

18. Calculated from Lewis, Cleona, America's Stake in International Investments (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1938), 606Google Scholar.

19. See Lipson, Charles, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Frieden, “The Economics of Intervention.”

20. For an elegant survey of these theories, see Brewer, Anthony, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. As Anthony Brewer argues, “[The state] may represent the interests of finance capital; that is not the same thing as acting as their direct agent.” Brewer, Marxist Theories, 107.

22. See, for example, Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

24. Zakaria, Fareed, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

25. Cain, P. J. and Hopkins, A. G., “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas, I: The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850,” Econ. Hist. Rev. XXXIX (1986)Google Scholar; and “II. New Imperialism, 1850–1945,” Econ. Hist. Rev. XL (1987)Google Scholar. For an updated treatment of the theory, see Hopkins, Cain and, British Imperialism, 1688–2000, 2^nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001)Google Scholar.

26. See, for example, Skowronek, Building a New American State; Skocpol, Theda, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Clemens, Elisabeth S., The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890–1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Carpenter, Daniel P., The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001)Google Scholar; Hacker, Jacob, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schickler, Eric, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001)Google Scholar. From the comparative literature, see Hall, Peter A., “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain,” Comparative Politics (April 1993), 275–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pierson, Paul, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thelen, Kathleen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in German, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)Google Scholar. For some of the limited American political development work in international affairs, see Katznelson, Ira and Shefter, Martin, eds., Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Zegart, Amy B., Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; and Stuart, Douglas T., Creating the National Security State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

27. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 360.

28. Wildavsky, Aaron, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action 4 (December 1966), 7–14Google Scholar; Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973)Google Scholar. See also Dahl, Robert, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950)Google Scholar.

29. Thus the federated nature of the American electoral system makes foreign affairs policies—imperialism in particular—a difficult “fit.” For an in-depth discussion of “fit” as it relates to American public policy, see Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.

30. Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Howell, William G., and Lewis, David E., “Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis,” The Journal of Politics 69(1) (January 2007), 6Google Scholar.

31. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Page, Talbot, in Congress: Structure and Policy, ed. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Sullivan, Terry (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 419Google Scholar.

32. Past theoretical research, for example, focuses on the ways in which a principal can shape the interests of his agents through institutional design, and empirical research supports many of these theoretical propositions through studies that demonstrate how the output of bureaucratic agents change as different political principals are appointed, or how signals of principal preferences are communicated to the agents through budget shifts. See, for example, Moe, Terry, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science (1984) 79: 1094–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McCubbins, Mathew D., Noll, Roger G., and Weingast, Barry R., “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 3(2) (1987): 243–77Google Scholar; and Wood, B. Dan and Waterman, Richard W., “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review 85(3) (1991): 801–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation,” American Journal of Political Science, 37(2) (1993): 497–528CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994)Google Scholar. See also Epstein, David and O'Halloran, Sharyn, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), xvCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. Moe, Terry, “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in Can the Government Govern? ed. Chubb, John E. and Peterson, Paul E. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1989), 282Google Scholar.

34. My thinking owes much to Mahoney, James and Thelen, Kathleen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. Mahoney, and Thelen, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35. Simon, Herbert, “Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 2(1) (1991): 125–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. March, James G. and Simon, Herbert, Organizations, 2^nd ed. (New York: Blackwell, 1993), 162Google Scholar.

36. Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior, 4^th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1997), 128Google Scholar.

37. Thelen, Kathleen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 213Google Scholar. While there can be no doubt that many institutions remain resistant to change, the focus on big exogenous shocks variously referred to as “critical junctures” or periods of “punctuated equilibrium”—the smoking guns in most accounts of institutional development—may be mistaken. For an important critique, see Pierson, Paul, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. See, for example, Beisel, Nicola, Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Fuller, Wayne E., Morality and the Mail in Nineteenth-Century America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity, 1880–1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press); Kerr, K. Austin, Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-Saloon League (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Robert C. Lieberman, Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 174–201.

39. I mean here something different than Peter Evans's concept of “embedded autonomy,” which refers to a particular set of ties between the state and industrial elites that can support a “shared project.” Evans is concerned with the type of bureaucracies that are likely to develop this relationship with society, whereas I am interested in how state actors are able to “borrow” capacity from society to further their own goals. See Evans, Peter, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

40. Clemens, Elisabeth S., “Lineages of the Rube Goldberg State: Building and Blurring Public Programs, 1900–1940,” in Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State, ed. Shapiro, Ian, Skowronek, Stephen, and Galvin, Daniel (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 193Google Scholar.

41. It is in this way that state building through partnership differs from Carpenter's (Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy) theory of state building through reputation building.

42. On capture theory, see Huntington, Samuel P., “The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest,” Yale Law Journal 61 (April 1952): 467–509CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McConnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966)Google Scholar.

43. Williamson, Oliver O., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

44. See especially Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy; Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism; Sheingate, Adam, “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development,” Studies in American Political Development 17:2 (Fall 2003): 185–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. Sheingate, Adam, “The Terrain of the Political Entrepreneur,” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, ed. Skowronek, Stephen and Glassman, Matthew (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 13Google Scholar; Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Bonchek, Mark S., Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 245Google Scholar. See Schickler (Disjointed Pluralism) for the role of entrepreneurs in Congress and Carpenter (Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy) for their role in executive agencies. Whether political entrepreneurs truly need to be self-consciously strategic is also a matter of debate. See Carpenter, Daniel P. and Moore, Colin D., “Robust Action and the Strategic Use of Ambiguity in a Bureaucratic Cohort: FDA Officers and the Evolution of New Drug Regulations, 1950–1970,” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, ed. Skowronek, Stephen and Glassman, Matthew (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 341Google Scholar.

46. For example, John Padgett and Christopher Ansell's study of power in fifteenth-century Florence shows that Cosimo de Medici's power came from his position at the intersection of kinship, patrimony, and financial exchange networks. Padgett, John F. and Ansell, Christopher K., “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1259–1319CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a very different context, Carpenter's 2001 study of the USDA (Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy) illustrates how chief forester Gifford Pinchot's connections to professional, scientific, and environmental organizations allowed him to push his own agenda of land regulation that many members of Congress bitterly opposed.

47. Pierson, Politics in Time, 149–50.

48. I thank Theda Skocpol for this phrasing.

49. White, Richard, “It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

50. Pomeroy, Earl S., The Territories and the United States, 1861–1890 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969 [1947])Google Scholar.

51. Leuchtenburg, William, “Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1916,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Dec. 1952): 483–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Henry Cabot Lodge, the patrician Massachusetts senator who had long hoped to see his country counted among the Great Powers, failure to adopt the treaty would be a “humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world, and would show we are unfit as a nation to enter into great questions of foreign policy.” Lodge to Roosevelt, December 7, 1898; Letter reprinted in Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884–1918, vol.1 (New York: Charles Scribner, 1925), 368Google Scholar.

52. Indeed, so opposed were many anti-imperialist Republicans to the course that now seemed increasingly likely that they were forced to reach out to William Jennings Bryan, a man they generally regarded as a dangerous demagogue.

53. Vanderlip, Frank A., The Century, 56(4) (August 1898): 555–63Google Scholar.

54. Taft to Lodge, Oct., 17, 1900, cited in May, Glenn Anthony, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 142Google Scholar.

55. The official title of the act announced that the islands were to eventually gain independence: “An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes.” The mining law had been prepared previously. See “Letter Transmitting Draft of a Mining Law for the Philippines,” in Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 151–59Google ScholarPubMed.

56. Report of the Philippine Commission, 149–50. See “Acts of the Philippine Commission” in Annual Reports of the War Department (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903)Google Scholar. The Spooner Act had provided a 25 percentage point reduction in the Dingley rates. A marked-up version of the bill in the BIA's own records shows that Sections 1 through 12 (the administrative and law portion) were drafted by Charles Magoon, the BIA's law officer, while the sections concerned with banking and development were written by other officials employed by the colonial state. The draft bill is available in Correspondence of Philippine Commission, NARA II, RG 350, Box 1.

57. Wright to Taft, Mar. 1, 1902, Library of Congress, Root Papers, Box 165. For an analysis of how this difference influenced the state-building trajectories of these two colonies, see Go, “The Chains of Empire,” in Go and Foster, American Colonial State. See also Go, Julian, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58. Taft to Root, Nov. 30, 1900, Library of Congress, Root Papers, Box 164.

59. Quoted in Stanley, Peter, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 227CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60. Another strategy to raise capital involved the reformation of internal taxes in the islands, including the Spanish cédula, a general tax imposed on the heads of household of between one-half and 37 pesos. See Luton, Harry, “American Internal Revenue Policy in the Philippines to 1916,” in Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule, ed. Owen, Norman G. (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1971)Google Scholar; Horde, John S., Internal Taxation in the Philippines (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1907)Google Scholar.

61. For a more in-depth discussion of the rise of managerial capitalism in this period, see Chandler, Alfred, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

62. These investment banks were part of a broader movement in the American economy – what Martin Sklar terms the “corporate reconstruction of American capitalism.” Sklar, Martin J., The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See especially 1–40.

63. Carosso, Vincent P., Investment Banking in America: A History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 80–82Google Scholar.

64. Carosso, Investment Banking in America, 81.

65. Carosso, Vincent P., The Morgans: Private International Bankers 1854–1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 420Google Scholar.

66. Healy, David, U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 194–209Google Scholar. See also Parrini, Carl, “Charles A. Conant, Economic Crises and Foreign Policy, 1896–1903,” in Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898–1968, ed. McCormick, Thomas J. and LaFeber, Walter (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 35–66Google Scholar.

67. Healy, U.S. Expansionism, 207. When it was adopted, the new currency became known locally as “conants,” after the economist, to distinguish it from the old “mex” currency.

68. Conant, C.A., “Coinage and Banking in the Philippine Islands,” Bankers' Magazine 64 (January 1902): 89–102Google Scholar; Conant, Charles A., “The Economic Future of the Philippines,” Atlantic Monthly 89 (March 1902): 366–71Google Scholar; Conant, Charles A., “Our Work in the Philippines,” International Monthly 5 (March 1902): 358–72Google Scholar.

69. Stanley, Nation in the Making, 96.

70. It seems that members of Congress themselves did not completely understand this provision when the bill was passed. The circulating coins were to be silver with a silver content worth less than their face value, and they were to be backed by a theoretical Philippine gold peso with 1/10 the gold of a U.S. five-dollar gold piece, thus fixing the pesos at exactly one-half of one dollar and allowing its value to fluctuate with other gold-standard currencies.

71. Giesecke, Leonard F., History of American Economic Policy in the Philippines during the American Colonial Period, 1900–1935 (New York: Garland, 1987), 97Google Scholar.

72. Edwards to Wright, January 1, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 14.

73. Root to Taft, April 1, 1903, Library of Congress, Root Papers, Box 165a.

74. Taft had visited the Vatican in 1902 to directly negotiate the price. This authorization was granted in the Organic Act. See Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, Sections 63–65.

75. Taft to Edwards, June 5, 1903; Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 1.

76. Forbes, W. Cameron, Philippine Islands, vol. 1 (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 269Google Scholar.

77. Forbes, Philippine Islands, v. 1, 270. The many letters in the archival records inquiring as to the legal status of the Philippine bonds show that this issue was left somewhat ambiguous by colonial authorities. See, for example, Edmund Seymour to Edwards, Jan. 5, 1903; American National Bank to Edwards, April 3, 1906, NARA II, RG 350 (Serial 9436), Box 548.

78. Taft quoted in Congressional Record, 58^th Cong., 2^nd sess., H.R. Rep. 2227, part 2.

79. This early decision became the operating assumption of the BIA through the 1920s. As Edwards's successor at the BIA, Frank McIntyre, explained in 1926, “Congress has not specifically pledged the good faith of the United States to the payment of the principal and interest of Philippine Government bonds, but as all bonds have been issued pursuant to its specific authorization, the Department of Justice and the War Department have invariably held that such bonds constitute a moral obligation of the United States.” Letter reprinted in Congressional Record, 58^th Cong., 2^nd sess., H.R. Rep. 2227, part 2.

80. See Opposition Report, Congressional Record, 58^th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. Rep. 2227, part 2.

81. Edwards to Wright, March 25, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 15. A further strategy employed by the insular state was to use its gold reserve fund deposits as an incentive for banks to provide capital; i.e., helpful banks received larger deposits. See Conant to Edwards, Jan. 25, 1906; Conant to McIntyre, May 1, 1906; Taft to McIntyre, Apr. 27, 1906, NARA II, RG 350 (Series 14077), Box 707.

82. Wright to Taft, April 1, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 16.

83. Congressional Record, 58^th Cong., 2^nd sess., (April 13, 1904), 4776.

84. Ibid., 4778.

85. Elliott, Charles Burke, The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917), 71Google Scholar.

86. Wright to Taft, Feb. 15, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 15. At the time, the Philippines had one narrow-gauge railroad—“absurd English engines, little forty pound rails, English and American coaches, and ponderous cement stations,” Forbes sneered. “Truly Spanish, ponderous stations and light rails.” See Cameron Forbes Journal v. 1, September 10, 1904, Harvard University, Houghton LibraryGoogle Scholar, Cameron Forbes Papers.

87. Stanley, Nation in the Making, 105. For these negotiations, see Taft to Speyer & Co., Jan. 29, 1906; Edwards to Speyer & Co., Feb. 2, 1906, NARA II, RG 350 (Serial 13931), Box 6951. Also see Forbes to Wright, Nov. 11, 1908, NARA II, RG 350 (Serial 15196), Box 732.

88. Edwards to Wright, Sept. 19, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 4, Folder 8.

89. See Stanley, Nation in the Making, 105. See also Solomon to Edwards, Nov. 20, 1908, NARA II, RG 350 (Serial 15196), Box 732.

90. The public-private distinction was further blurred in the railway issue, because as a guarantee to the bonds, a colonial state official was placed as a director of the Philippine Railway Company. See C. Lewis to Frank McIntyre, June 10, 1907, NARA II, RG 350 (Serial 12604), Box 666.

91. Edwards to Wright, March 25, 1904, Mass. Historical Society, Edwards Papers, Box 3, Folder 15.

92. Cabán, Pedro A., Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 144Google Scholar.

93. Clark, Victor S., Porto Rico and its Problems (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1930), 316Google Scholar.

94. Nearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy, 180–81.

95. Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message, 1904.

96. The continuity of foreign affairs leadership in this period is striking: Taft had left his position as governor of the Philippines in 1904 to replace Root as secretary of war. Root, after a brief return to his legal practice, became secretary of state in 1905.

97. Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography (New York: MacMillan, 1913), 548Google Scholar.

98. Perkins, Whitney T., Constraint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981), 40Google Scholar.

99. Munro, Dana G., Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100. Hay to Dawson, December 30, 1904, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905)Google ScholarPubMed; Dawson to Hay, January 2, 1905, in Foreign Relations of the United States.

101. Hay to Dawson, February 6, 1905, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 322.

102. “President vs. Senate,” New York Times, January 26, 1905, 6.

103. Teller quoted in Holt, W. Stull, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964), 215–16Google Scholar. Although Roosevelt denied these charges, there is every reason to believe that he did intend to begin the receivership without seeking Senate approval. The original January 20 agreement was scheduled to go into effect on February 1, and it was only when Senate hackles were raised that a new agreement was signed and drafted on February 7, which required Senate approval before it could begin.

104. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 552.

105. George Colton and William Pulliam, both of whom had previously served in the Philippines, became the first and second Receivers General.

106. Roosevelt to Charles Joseph Bonaparte, September 4, 1905, reprinted in Morison, Letters, v. 5, 10.

107. Root to Hollander, May 7, 1906, quoted in Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Root, vol.1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), 547Google Scholar.

108. Root to Cullom, November 23, 1905, quoted in Jessup, Elihu Root, vol. 1, 543.

109. Quoted in Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 105. Hollander's employment status was somewhat ambiguous. Although he received $1,000 a month from the United States, he was also paid $100,000 by the Dominicans. This strange arrangement led to a congressional investigation three years later. See Veeser, Cyrus, A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America's Rise to Global Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 154Google Scholar; Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 44.

110. Hollander quoted in Veeser, World Safe for Capitalism, 149, 152. Veeser provides an in-depth discussion of the colonial officials' efforts to distance themselves from the SDIC. The drafts of Hollander's report as well as a revealing “Confidential Memoranda” to Roosevelt can be found in Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Box 2.

111. Roosevelt to Hollander, July 3, 1905, quoted in Veeser, World Safe for Capitalism, 149.

112. See Jessup interview with Jacob Hollander, April 7, 1934, Library of Congress, Jessup Papers, Box A231. Archival evidence indicates that the firm did represent the interests of the Dominican Republic aggressively throughout the negotiations; a large number of letters between Jennings and Hollander can be found in Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Boxes 1–9. See also Personal Correspondence of George Colton, NARA II, RG 139, Box 2.

113. Root to Taft, Nov. 16, 1905, Dominican Receivership Records, NARA II, RG 350, Box 1.

114. Drew Carrel to Colton, May 23, 1906, Personal Correspondence of General Receiver George R. Colton, NARA II, RG 139, Box 1.

115. Hollander to Charles Allen, June 28, 1906, Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Box 3.

116. Charles Allen to Hollander, July 9, 1906, Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Box 3.

117. J. P. Morgan to Hollander, July 11, 1906, Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Box 3.

118. Transcript of 1934 interview of Jacob Hollander, Jessup Papers, Library of Congress, Box A231.

119. Jacob Schiff to Robert Bacon, August 13, 1906, Jacob Hollander Papers, NARA II, Box 3.

120. Collin, Richard H., Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 450Google Scholar.

121. When the Dominican Congress finally approved the convention, the panic of 1907 was underway and the loans had to be renegotiated with Kuhn, Loeb and Morton Trust—a complicated financial renegotiation that need not be rehashed here.

122. Report of the Dominican Customs Receivership (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917)Google Scholar.

123. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 47–52.

124. The Investors Monthly Manual (August 1901), 449–50.

125. See Kindleberger, Charles P., “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferguson, Niall and Schularick, Moritz, “The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880–1913,” The Journal of Economic History 66(2) (June 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an important critique of this body of literature, see Coyne, Christopher J. and Davies, Steven, “Empire: Public Goods and Bads,” Econ Journal Watch 4(1) (January 2007)Google Scholar.

126. Mitchener, Kris James and Weidenmier, Marc, “Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary,” The Journal of Economic History 65(3) (September 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although my data are drawn from a different source, my results confirm those of Mitchener and Weidenmier, who also found significant effects on sovereign bond prices after the establishment of the Dominican receivership. For making available digital copies of The Investors Monthly Manual, I gratefully acknowledge William N. Goetzmann and K. Geert Rouwenhorst's London Stock Exchange Project at the International Center for Finance, Yale School of Management, http://icf.som.yale.edu/imm/index.shtml. Par value for all bonds for which I gathered data was 100 pounds sterling.

127. Costa Rican bonds are 5 percent A-series; Guatemala 4 percent.

128. The Investors Monthly Manual (January 1905), 5.

129. Although the countries I include in my index are different, my results here again confirm those of Mitchener and Weidenmier, “Empire, Public Goods.” Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Venezuela data come from previously noted bonds with the addition of 6 percent Nicaragua bonds and 10 percent Honduras bonds. All have a par value of 100 pounds sterling. European bonds are as follows: Britain, Consol 2.75 percent; France, Retes 3 percent; Germany, Imperial 3 percent. Mexico, 5 percent Consolidated 1899 bonds. All data are from The Investors Monthly Manual, 1900–1912.

130. Although Knox did not lack administrative experience, he had a low opinion of Latin Americans and Latin American culture in general, a fact that he felt no need to hide. Root later noted that he was “absolutely antipathetic to all Spanish-American modes of though and feeling and action, and pretty much everything he did with them was like mixing a Seidlitz powder.” Jessup, Elihu Root, vol.1, 251.

131. Munro, Intervention, 163; Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 58.

132. Philander Knox, “The Spirit and Purpose of American Diplomacy,” University of Pennsylvania, June 15, 1910, Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Box 45; “Knox quoted in Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 60.

133. Philander Knox, “The Spirit and Purpose of American Diplomacy,” University of Pennsylvania, June 15, 1910, Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Box 45.

134. See, for example, Oscar S. Straus, “American Commercial Diplomacy,” Report of the Seventeenth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration (May 1911), 171. Straus refers to it as “a diplomacy of exploitation.”

135. “Interview with the Honorable Philander G. Knox,” 1912. The draft of the statement with penciled edits demonstrates Knox's attempt to put a positive spin on the phrase “Dollar Diplomacy.” One sentence, for example, is edited as follows: “The meaning of the somewhat unfortunate phrase ‘Dollar Diplomacy…” Tellingly, “somewhat unfortunate” is crossed out. The edited typescript of this statement is available in Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Box 29.

136. “Message of the President,” December 3, 1912, Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), xii.

137. Carosso, The Morgans, 591–92.

138. State Department Memorandum, September 1909, in Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 549Google ScholarPubMed.

139. Ibid., 550.

140. Ibid., 553.

141. Carosso, The Morgans, 590.

142. Ibid., 591.

143. Munro, Intervention, 225.

144. Charles Conant to Philander Knox, February 6, 1911, Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 565Google ScholarPubMed.

145. Taft, William Howard, “Message to the Senate,” Jan. 26, 1911, Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 559Google Scholar.

146. Philander Knox, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 1911, Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 589 [my emphasis].

147. Philander Knox, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 1911, Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 586Google ScholarPubMed.

148. Assistant Secretary of State to Alvey A. Adee, Jan. 13, 1911, quoted in Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 66.

149. Carosso, The Morgans, 591.

150. Healy, David, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 153Google Scholar.

151. Zelaya, who lived out his later years in New York City, later claimed that the State Department had encouraged the Bluefields revolution, although there is little hard evidence for this claim. See Zelaya, José Santos, La Revolución de Nicaragua y los Estados Unidos (Madrid: Impr. de B. Rodríguez, 1910)Google Scholar.

152. U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Convention between the United States and Nicaragua,” Hearings, 63^rd Cong., 2^nd Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), part VI, 170–71.

153. The loan would go to pay off Zelaya's opponents, who had granted themselves lavish awards for supposed damages under Zelaya's rule. Munro, Intervention, 195; Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 67; Healy, Drive to Hegemony, 157.

154. The text of the treaty can be found in Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 1074Google ScholarPubMed.

155. Philander Knox, “Speech before the New York State Bar Association,” New York City, January 19, 1912, Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Box 46.

156. Munro, Intervention, 203.

157. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 73.

158. The customs collector, Col. Clifford D. Ham, was at the time employed as a customs collector in the Philippines. Foreign Relations of the United States (1912), 1080Google ScholarPubMed.

159. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 75–77.

160. Healy, Drive to Hegemony, 161. The rising conflict between the receivership and the Dominican government can be traced in NARA II, RG 139 (SD-1-261-351), Box 4.

161. Foreign Relations of the United States (1911), 389Google ScholarPubMed, 1091; cited in Whitney, Constraint of Empire, 46.

162. Huntington Wilson to Taft, September 19, 1912, NARA II, RG 139, Box 5.

163. Quoted in Munro, Intervention, 263.

164. Quoted in Perkins, Constraint of Empire, 47.

165. Perkins, Constraint of Empire, 48.

166. Hart, Albert B., ed., Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1918), 18Google Scholar.

167. Quoted in Schoultz, Lars, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 220Google Scholar.

168. Quoted in Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 220.

169. Ibid., 209.

170. Bryan to Wilson, October 28, 1913; Bryan to Wilson, July 17, 1913; William Jennings Bryan Papers, LOC, Box 29. See also Bryan to Wilson, August 6, 1913; Bryan to Wilson, February 21, 1914, William Jennings Bryan Papers, LOC, Box 45.

171. Wilson to Bryan, March 20, 1914, William Jennings Bryan Papers, LOC, Box 45.

172. Bryan to Wilson, Jan. 7, 1915, William Jennings Bryan Papers, LOC, Box 45.

173. New York Times, June 19, 1914, Cited in Adler, Selig, “Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration,” Hispanic American Historical Review 20 (May 1940): 216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

174. 67th Cong., Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Domingo, Santo, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922)Google Scholar.

175. Stallings, Barbara, Banker to the Third World: U.S. Portfolio Investment in Latin America, 1900–1986 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987)Google Scholar.