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3. When parties change their ideologies, they not only change their particular bundle of issue positions, but they also change their particular bundle of ideas which inform, support, and hold together those issue positions.

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21. Ibid.

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29. Peffley and Hurwitz, “A Hierarchical Model.”

30. The specific form of government intervention in the economy is determined by other parts of a party's ideology, including a party's “theory of ends.”

31. This is especially true when politicians face what they deem “crisis management” situations: extraordinary events that require an extraordinary response by government officials.

32. The assumption that politicians usually want to expand and exercise the powers at their disposal fits with previous scholarship on the presidency. Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, 1960)Google Scholar; Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 12; Moe, Terry and Howell, William, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 4 (1999): 850–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. While Frances Lee points out that the logic of party competition gives partisans incentives to act in ways that cannot simply be explained by ideology or preferences, this article goes another step farther to argue that the logic of party competition gives partisans incentives to act in ways that actually change their party's ideology. Lee, Frances, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U. S. Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34. Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, 13.

35. If the Democrats had nominated John Nance Garner or Al Smith in 1932, it might have taken longer for President Garner or President Smith to come around to active intervention in the national economy than it took for the relatively progressive President Roosevelt.

36. The Southern wing of the party, represented by Democrats like John Nance Garner, benefitted from New Deal programs like the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration), REA (Rural Electrification Administration), and TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority). The urban, working-class wing of the party, represented by city machines like Tammany Hall, benefitted from New Deal programs like the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Act), NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933), and WPA (Works Progress Administration). The progressive wing of the party, represented by upper-class and/or intellectual Democrats like FDR, were happy to see the Democratic Party return to the policies of Woodrow Wilson.

37. Gerring, Party Ideologies in America.

38. Hinich and Munger (Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice, 75) point out that because party ideologies are reputational signaling mechanisms, and because they must be somewhat stable to serve this goal, ideologies help induce stability in electoral politics.

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41. In this way, party ideology development is the product of the interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions as they change over time.

42. Karol (Party Position Change in American Politics) has shown that members of Congress do frequently change positions on a variety of issues.

43. DiSalvo, Engines of Change.

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45. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” 206.

46. There are still many documents, however, that can reveal the ideologies of the two major parties in the early republic. For example, in addition to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Republican members of Congress adopted a kind of party platform in 1800 drawn from Thomas Jefferson's letter to Elbridge Gerry, written on January 26, 1799. Houghton, Walter Raleigh, Conspectus of the History of Political Parties and the Federal Government (Indianapolis, IN: Granger, Davis, 1880)Google Scholar.

47. It should be noted here that if we think of party control of government simply as party control of the White House, then it would seem that there are more instances of change in long-term control of government than I identify in the following sections. However, we have good reasons for believing that unified control of government is substantively different from control of the presidency when thinking about party theories of governance and party theories of economic intervention. When a party controls the presidency but not Congress, the party is severely limited in what economic interventions it can pursue. Thus, it has less of an incentive to change its theory of governance to call for a stronger national government (which includes congressional houses controlled by the opposition) and less of an incentive to change its theory of economic intervention (because it has fewer economic interventions to justify). When a party controls the presidency, but not Congress, for a long period of time, then we would expect changes in party theories of governance with respect to executive power and changes in party theories of intervention with respect to foreign policy. See Lewis, Verlan, “The President and the Parties’ Ideologies: Party Ideas about Foreign Policy since 1900,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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49. It is true that choosing eight years as the period of time is a subjective decision, and other analysts might have chosen a different period of time—maybe six years or ten years. However, eight years is a reasonable choice, and choosing a standard period of time allows us to examine American history for instances of change in long-term party control in a consistent fashion. The following analysis shows that the findings hold whether the standard chosen is six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years.

50. Democrats had long-term control of unified government during the seven sessions of Congress that began with FDR as President (1933–46), government was divided during the 80th Congress (1947–48), Democrats had short-term control of unified government during Truman's second term (1949–1952), Republicans had short-term control during the 83rd Congress (1953–54), government was divided during the rest of Eisenhower's administration (1955–60), and Democrats regained long-term party control during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961–68). Only the change in 1933, but not the changes in 1947, 1949, 1953, 1955, or 1961 represented a change in long-term party control of unified government.

51. It would not make sense to include 1825–60 as part of the era of “Republican” government because there was no longer a “Republican” Party.

52. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties, 72.

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54. The 1800 Republican Party platform criticized Federalists for “monarchizing” the Constitution and called for limited national government power by “preserving to the States the powers not yielded to them by the Union.” It also called for free trade, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.” Houghton, Conspectus of the History of Political Parties, 33.

55. Progressive historians, seeking to explain American party ideologies, focused on the economic class system in America, and how the parties drew their support from different classes (Turner, “Social Forces in American History”; Beard, The American Party Battle; Binkley, Wilfred, American Political Parties: Their Natural History [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943]Google Scholar). For political scientists and historians focused on class analysis, it was clear that American party history had been defined by the division between capitalists (Hamiltonian Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans) and agrarians (Jeffersonian Republicans and Democrats). The different economic interests of these classes drove the different ideologies of their political parties. This socioeconomic class analysis is useful for explaining nineteenth-century American party history but less useful for explaining the twentieth century. During the New Deal, the Democratic Party became a coalition of Southern rural agriculture and Northern urban labor. In the postwar era, the Democratic Party has become a coalition of city dwellers, while the Republican Party has become a coalition of those who live in suburban and rural areas. Nevertheless, economic class interests help explain the ideologies of the Federalist and Republican Parties in the 1790s.

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69. Risjord, The Old Republicans, 7.

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77. This analysis helps reconcile two contending camps of historians that argue over whether or not the election of 1800 was really a “revolution” as Jefferson claimed (Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make). In this framework, the election of 1800 really was a revolution because it represented a change in long-term party control of government, and the new party had distinct theories of governance, economic intervention, and ends. At the same time, it was not a revolution because the party's theories of governance and economic intervention evolved over time to justify the Federalist policies that the Republicans eventually adopted.

78. Jefferson, “Letter to Justice William Johnson.” It seems that Jefferson was the originator of the RINO (Republican in name only) epithet—criticizing the “new Republicans in Congress” as Republicans in “name only.”

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81. The Federalists last nominated a candidate for president in 1816 (Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 103).

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85. Kolodny, “The Several Elections of 1824.”

86. Van Buren, Martin, “Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Dudley,” in A Legacy of Historical Gleanings (Vol. 1), ed. Van, Catharina Rensselaer Bonney (Albany, NY: J. Munsell, [1822] 1875), 382Google Scholar.

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93. John, “Affairs of Office.”

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99. Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 162.

100. The 1832 National Republican Party platform called for protectionist trade policy, internal improvements, and opposition to the “spoils” system. Houghton, Conspectus of the History of Political Parties, 35.

101. Whig National Convention, “Whig Party Platform of 1844” (May 1), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed May 20, 2015, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25852.

102. Whig National Convention, “Whig Party Platform of 1852” (June 17), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed May 20, 2015, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25856.

103. Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 57.

104. Milkis and Nelson, The American Presidency, 134.

105. Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 867–68.

106. The Whigs did, however, maintain an important base in Kentucky and Tennessee.

107. Democratic National Convention, “Democratic Party Platform of 1844” (May 27, 1844), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed February 14, 2014, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29573.

108. Republican National Convention, “Republican Party Platform of 1856” (June 18, 1856), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed February 14, 2014, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619.

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117. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.

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125. As TR explained at the time of the election, “Wilson and Taft both fervidly announce themselves as Progressives, and as regards most of our principles they make believe to be for them, and simply to disagree with us as to the methods of putting them into effect” (Roosevelt, Theodore, “Letter to Gifford Pinchot” [November 13, 1912], in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 7, ed. Morison, Elting Elmore [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954]Google Scholar).

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130. Skowronek (The Politics Presidents Make) lists Coolidge as one of “three hard cases,” along with Cleveland and Eisenhower. Just as he did not act in accordance with his place in political time in Skowronek's model, he did not act in accordance with his place in control of unified government in this article's model.

131. For example, in the early 1920s, immediately after the nationalist and interventionist Democratic administration of Wilson, Republicans in Congress generally supported tax cuts more than Democrats in Congress. However, after a decade of Republican control of unified government, more Republicans than Democrats supported tax increases proposed by President Hoover.

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133. It is worth noting here that Republican Party language and ideology during the Hoover administration belies the myth that GOP ideology during this time was committed to laissez-faire economic policy. The anti-interventionist language and ideology articulated by Republicans, including Hoover, after the New Deal has caused some scholars to mistakenly assume that Hoover and the Republicans also advocated for less economic intervention before the New Deal. Some scholars point to the title of a book written by Hoover in 1922 (American Individualism)—which contained ideas that Hoover repeated in the 1928 and 1932 presidential campaigns—as evidence that Hoover articulated “neoliberalism,” “neoconservatism,” and “modern Republicanism” in the 1920s (Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 126). However, a close reading of this book, and his subsequent speeches, shows that Hoover was calling for what he called “progressive individualism” and the “social justice” policies of the Progressive Era. Hoover distinguishes this “progressive individualism” from “individualism run riot without tempering principles,” which, Hoover argued, “would provide a long category of inequalities of tyrannies, dominations, and injustices” (Herbert Hoover, American Individualism [New York: Doubleday, Page, 1922], 8). Hoover calls for an “American individualism” distinct from the “Old World individualism”: “In our individualism we have long since abandoned the laissez-faire of the 18th Century—the notion that it is every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.… We have confirmed its abandonment in terms of legislation, of social and economic justice.… We have learned that the impulse to production can only be maintained at a high pitch if there is a fair division of product. We have also learned that fair division can only be obtained by certain restrictions on the strong and the dominant” (Hoover, American Individualism, 10–11). By calling for “progressive individualism” in the 1920s as a middle ground between Old World laissez-faire “individualism” and autocratic “socialism,” Hoover was following “new liberals” in England like L. T. Hobhouse and prefiguring new “liberals” in America like Franklin Roosevelt. Hoover's language was typical of Progressives and Republicans in the 1880s–1920s.

134. Democratic National Convention, “Democratic Party Platform of 1928” (June 26, 1928), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed February 14, 2014, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29594.

135. Ibid.

136. Democratic National Convention, “Democratic Party Platform of 1932” (June 27, 1932), The American Presidency Project website, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed February 14, 2014, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29595.

137. Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 282.

138. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Radio Address from Albany, New York: “The ‘Forgotten Man’ Speech,” (April 7, 1932), The American Presidency Project website, accessed February 1, 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88408.

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