1. See Beer, Samuel H., Modern British Politics: Parties and Pressure Groups in the Collectivist Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982)Google Scholar; Stewart, J.D., British Pressure Groups (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

2. See McKenzie, R. T., British Political Parties (London: Heinemann, 1955)Google Scholar.

3. Rose, Richard, “Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain,” Political Studies xii, 1 (1964): 33–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. See Ceaser, james, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1979), esp. chap. IVGoogle Scholar.

5. Wilson's priorities might explain his focus on Gladstone's leadership (and neglect of the Liberal party). The leader occupied the central place in Wilson's vision. Parties proved significant only in relation to leadership; parties had to be made to realize that they were mere “servants” (Wilson's word). Wilson's failure to consider the context of Gladstone's leader-ship might also have been deliberate. As a political scientist, Wilson was prone to sacrifice accuracy for the sake of argument. Known for his gifts as a great orator, Gladstone provided the type of leader Wilson wanted in the United States, and so he “found” him in the United Kingdom.

6. For Wilson's early view that the U.S. system required reforms modeled after the British parliamentary system, see Congressional Government (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1885); and, “Cabinet Government in the United States,” International Review VII (August 1879): 146–163. For Wilson's later view that the U.S. presidency could provide the popular leadership necessary for coherent and efficient government, see “Mr. Cleveland as Presi-dent,” January 15, 1897. Reprinted in Arthur Link, ed., The Papers ofWoodrow Wilson, vol. 10 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1979), esp. p. 119; and Vail Motter, T.H., ed., Leaders of Men (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).Google Scholar

7. For a comprehensive discussion of Wilson's ideas, see Ceaser, chap. IV.

8. Croly, Herbert, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914), pp. 345–346Google Scholar.

9. For example, see Ranney, Austin, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1954), chap. 8, esp. p. 141Google Scholar. Ranney acknowledges that Wilson changed his mind about the potential for leadership in the presidency, but states that “that did not materially affect his general position [on parties].” To the contrary, once Wilson became convinced that the presidency could solve the problem of “leaderless” government, he redefined the notion of party to accommodate a presidency-centered system. Wilson continued to use the term party, but in his later writings, it clearly signifies a candidate-oriented organization.

10. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

11. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 14.

12. Toward a More Responsible Two-Parly System, 89–90.

13. For a thorough critique of the reasoning and evidence in the report, see Kirkpatrick, Evron M., “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?” The American Political Science Review 65 (12 1971): 965–990CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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15. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 4, 18.

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17. In the United States, critics of the report generally focused on the normative implications of the responsible-party theory and argued that pluralism provided greater democracy than a responsible two-party system could. Neither side in the debate seems to have fully considered what happens when pluralism flourishes within the two major~parties, as it does in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

18. Schattschneider, E. E., Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), 2Google Scholar.

19. Schattschneider, 53.

20. Burns, James MacGregor, The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), esp. 337–340Google Scholar.

21. Broder, David S., The Party's Over (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 170Google Scholar.

22. See “Strengthening the Parties,” in Pomper, Gerald, Voters, Elections, and Parties: The Practice of Democratic Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988), esp. 391Google Scholar.

23. Concrete connections—social, economic, and political—link developments in the United States and the United Kingdom. A detailed explanation of these factors extends beyond the scope of this article but provides the focus for my forthcoming book,“Conviction Politics”.' Leaders in Pursuit of Change (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas).

24. The United States had essentially achieved universal white male suffrage by the beginning of Jackson's first administration; the British electorate included the new industrial wealth following the Great Reform Bill of 1832.

25. Both Jackson and Peel campaigned against entrenched interests, but the nature of the interests differed. In the United States, commercial interests threatened to destroy the democratic vision of an egalitarian, agrarian community; in the United Kingdom, agricultural interests blocked the advancement of new industrial and commercial enterprises. Further-more, Jackson was a Democrat and Peel was a Conservative, but both challenged a common enemy—namely, the Whigs.

26. According to the newspaper, the president's use of the veto threatened to establish the “dominion of one man.” See the National Intelligencer, October 28, 1832.

27. See Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1946), esp. 206Google Scholar; and Syrett, Harold C., Andrew Jackson: His Contribution to the American Tradition (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1953). esp. 31–32Google Scholar.

28. Remini, Robert V., Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom: 1822–1832, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), esp. 356, 358Google Scholar.

29. First Annual Message, December 8, 1829. Reprinted in James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of Presidents, vol. II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 448.

30. First Annual Message, in Richardson, ed.

31. In addition to Jackson's first annual message, see Ceaser, esp. 160–161.

32. Gash, Norman, ed., Documents of Modem History: The Age of Peel (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), 79–80Google Scholar.

33. See The Times, 1841, esp. July 15, 24, 26.

34. Hansard, 27 August 1841.

35. Peel's Cabinet Memorandum. Reprinted in Gash, ed., 128.

36. Letter to Peel. Reprinted in Gash, ed., 129.

37. Speech on Repeal of the Corn Laws. Reprinted in Gash, ed., 132.

38. Peroration upon his resignation. Reprinted in Gash, ed., 133–134.

39. Even before repeal of the Corn Laws, Peel's position on another reconstitutive issue in Britain—church and state—divided his party. When Peel proposed to increase the grant to a Catholic seminary in Ireland, he carried the legislation with large majorities in both houses but needed Whig support on the third reading in the Commons. The Maynooth grant vote foreshadowed the cleavage on Corn Law repeal. Here, as in the case of the Corn Laws, Peel split his party but secured approval for his policy.

40. Kelley, Robert, The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal—Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone (New York: Knopf, 1969), esp. 185–186Google Scholar.

41. White, William Allen, “Cleveland,” McClure's Magazine, XVIII (1902): 32–325Google Scholar.

42. The New York Times, October 4, 1884.

43. The platform read:

Knowing full well … that legislation affecting the operations of the people should be cautious and conservative in method, not in advance of public opinion, but responsive to its demands, the Democratic party is pledged to revise the tariff in a spirit of fairness to all interests.

But in making reduction in taxes, it is not proposed to injure any domestic industries, but rather to promote their healthy growth.

44. Parker, George F., ed., The Writings and Speeches ofGrover Cleveland (New York: Cassell, 1970), 83, 85Google Scholar.

45. The Boston Journal, December 7, 1887.

46. Quoted in Nevins, Allan, Graver Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934), 510Google Scholar.

47. The New York Times, August 11, 1893.

48. The Times, December 5, 1868.

49. The Times, April 14, 1880.

50. The Times, January 6, 1886.

51. Gladstone, W.E., Midlothian Speeches (Leicester, U.K.: Leicester University Press, 1971), 212Google Scholar.

52. The Times, August 12, 1892.

53. The Sew York Times, November 2, 1912.

54. The Sew York Times, November 6, 1912.

55. Quoted in Braeman, John, ed., Wilson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), 51Google Scholar. See also Link, Arthur S., Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper & Row, 1963)Google Scholar.

56. The New York Times, November 7, 1916.

57. The Times, December 1, 1916.

58. The Times, December 6, 1916.

59. The Times, December 7, 1916.

60. George, David Lloyd, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. I, 2nd. ed. (London: Odhams Press, 1938), 620, 623, 625Google Scholar.

61. Lloyd George, vol. I, 626; See also Taylor, A.J.P., ed., Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London: Hutchinson, 1971), 134Google Scholar.

62. Quoted in Rowland, Peter, David Lloyd George: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 447–448Google Scholar.

63. The Times, November 18, 1918.

64. The Times, November 14, 1918.

65. Beaverbrook, Lord, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (London: Collins, 1963), 9Google Scholar.

66. Contrary to popular perceptions of British party government (especially in the United States), seven governments in the twentieth century have been coalition or national governments (more than a quarter of the total). Furthermore, in no general election in the twentieth century has the prime minister's party secured a majority of the popular vote.

67. See Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, “Ronald Reagan and the Reconstitution of American Politics: Creating a Supply Side Society.” Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1986; see also Ginsberg, and Shefter, , Politics by Other Means: The Declining Importance of Elections in America (New York: Basic Books, 1990)Google Scholar.

68. Kernell, Samuel, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1986)Google Scholar.

69. Tulis, Jeffrey K., The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987), esp. chap. 7Google Scholar.

70. “Opinion Roundup,” Public Opinion, 3 (December/January 1981): 30.

71. “Opinion Roundup,” Public Opinion, 7 (December/January 1985): 37.

72. “Character of Reagan Support Markedly Different Than In '80,” The Gallup Report No. 230 (November 1984): 10–11.

73. Ferguson, Thomas and Rogers, Joel, Right Turn (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), chap. 1, esp. 19Google Scholar.

74. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Schneider, William, “The Confidence Gap During the Reagan Years, 1981–1987,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 102, No. 1 (Spring 1987): 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75. See Mayhew, David, Divided We Govern (New Haven: Yale University, 1991)Google Scholar.

76. Heath, Anthony, Jowell, Roger, and Curtice, John, How Britain Votes (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

77. Cain, Bruce, Ferejohn, John A., and Fiorina, Morris, “The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament,” American Political Science Review 78 (03 1984): 110–125CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78. See Sykes, Patricia Lee, Losing From the Inside: The Cost of Conflict in the British Social Democratic Party, 2nd. ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990)Google Scholar.

79. In her first government, Thatcher lowered the standard rate from 33% to 30% and the top rate from 83% to 60%. In her third government, she cut the top rate to 40%. Only the poll tax stirred a great deal of controversy and sparked widespread resistance. The consequence for Thatcher's leadership is discussed below.

80. See Krieger, Joel, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline (New York: Oxford University, 1986)Google Scholar.

81. Personal interview, Lord Patrick Jenkin. June 18, 1991.1 should also note that gender appears to have played a significant role in elite perceptions of Prime Minister Thatcher and made her male ministers somewhat reluctant to challenge her in cabinet meetings. See Sykes, Patricia Lee, “Women as National Leaders: Patterns and Prospects,” in Genovese, Michael, ed., Women as National leaders (Newbury Park, Ca: Sage, 1993), pp. 219–229Google Scholar.

82. Young, Hugo, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Macmillan, 1989)Google Scholar.

83. Personal interview, Tony Kerpel, special assistant to Kenneth Baker, June 12, 1991.

84. Index to International Public Opinion (1982): 314–315; Index (1988): 390.

85. Index (1986): 430–431.

86. Index (1987): 376, 378; Index (1988): 391.

87. Index (1988): 390.

88. Index (1982): 313.

89. Crewe, Ivor, “What's Left for Labour: An Analysis of Thatcher's Victory,” Public Opinion, 10 (07/08 1987): 52–56Google Scholar.

90. Heath, et al., 133.

91. Personal interview, Norman Tebbit, June 27, 1990.

92. Members of the parliamentary party had many motives and reasons for opposing Thatcher, including opposition to her views on Europe, but they only acted when the prime minister lost her public support. See Sir Ian Gilmour's comment below.

93. Personal interview, Cecil Parkinson, June 11, 1991.

94. Personal interview, Jenkins, Peter, The Independent, 06 19, 1991Google Scholar.

95. Personal interview, Sir Ian Gilmour, June 26, 1991.

96. David Mayhew's recent book indicates that divided party control of government has little impact on the amount of significant legislation that gets passed. See Mayhew, Divided We Govern.