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Macune's Monopoly: Economic Law and the Legacy of Populism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2014

Sidney A. Rothstein
Sidney A. Rothstein*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

This article argues that the Populist legacy is embodied by the constrained conception of democracy underlying the American state, which restricts popular sovereignty from the economic sphere. Charles Macune led the Farmers’ Alliance according to a robust conception of democracy that insisted on subordinating economic law to popular sovereignty. Macune's distinct economic thought marked a departure from previous antimonopoly movements, but his reliance on an inductive, empirical, institutionalist economic methodology was shared by the founders of the American Economic Association. Populism did not fail because it relied on outdated economic theory; it was defeated because it represented a coherent and credible threat to the established order. A successful campaign established the hegemony of the deductive method, which posited that manmade laws must serve the natural, universally valid laws of economics and that popular sovereignty must therefore be restrained from the economic realm. Without the means to conceive an alternative relationship between the state and economy, the path of twentieth-century American political development has been limited to those possibilities available under a constrained conception of democracy. This article articulates Macune's political strategy and highlights its underlying principles in order to present a more robust conception of democracy and illustrate the mechanisms by which it was defeated.

Type
Research Article
Information
Studies in American Political Development , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , April 2014 , pp. 80 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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198. Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865–1914, 183.

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204. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 109.

205. Skowronek, Building a New American State, 135–36.

206. Hadley, Railroad Transportation: Its History and Its Laws.

207. Adams, “Relation of the State to Industrial Action.”

208. Berk, Alternative Tracks, 153; Sanders, Roots of Reform, 195–97; Skowronek, Building a New American State, 160. For Adams's lasting influence on public economics, despite frustration with the ICC, see Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606–1865, vol. 2, 171–74.

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211. Ibid., 13; Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, 33–34; Skowronek, Building a New American State, 135–36.

212. Berk, Alternative Tracks, 157.

213. Ibid., 165; Skowronek, Building a New American State, 268.

214. Skowronek, Building a New American State, 268.

215. Berk, Alternative Tracks, 157.

216. Ibid., 176.

217. This abstracted use of statistics can be contrasted to the German Historical School's use of statistics, which insisted on context and contingency. See Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany 1864–1894, 155.

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235. Ibid., 26.

236. Prasad, The Land of Too Much, 191, 194–95; Skowronek, Building a New American State, 14.

237. Blyth, Mark, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 49–51, 90–95Google Scholar.