1. In a study of the oppositional bloc, Manley finds that the Conservative Coalition was significantly less effective in the 89th Congress. Compared to the 1940s and 1950s, in the early LBJ years the obstructionists were far less successful when uniting to oppose an issue. See Manley, John, “The Conservative Coalition in Congress,” American Behavioral Scientist 17 (1973): 223–47.Google Scholar

2. In a special report to members of their Congressional Action Committee, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce insisted that, given the Democrats' recent electoral success, unions were in a relatively strong position to push their interests in the coming term. “Special Report: A Legislative Analysis in the Category of Labor Legislation,” December 10, 1964, Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 4.

3. The Labor–Management Relations Act (Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, enacted June 23, 1947), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, takes its colloquial name from the bill's chief sponsors, Senator Robert Taft and Representative Fred Hartley, Jr.

4. A union shop requires that employees join the union within thirty days after being hired. This is a slightly lower bar than a closed shop, which requires that all employees belong to the union upon being hired. The closed shop was banned outright under Taft-Hartley.

5. Which issues receive attention on the agenda, as Baumgartner and Jones argue, is the product of a gradual process of policy recession and emergence. Cox and McCubbins, by contrast, depict the agenda as more of a strategic list of policies that the majority party can agree upon. See Baumgartner, Frank R. and Jones, Bryan D., Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).Google Scholar

6. See Bawn, Kathleen, Cohen, Marty, Karol, David, Noel, Hans, and Zaller, John, “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics,” Perspective on Politics 10:3 (2012): 571–97.Google Scholar

7. See Cohen, Marty, Karol, David, Noel, Hans, and Zaller, John, The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008)Google Scholar; Karol, David, Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).Google Scholar

8. Frymer, Paul, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).Google Scholar

9. See Farhang, Sean and Katznelson, Ira, “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal,” Studies in American Political Development 19 (2005): 1–30.Google Scholar

10. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

11. Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda.

12. Parties are typically framed as organizations of individual candidates who share the common goal of attaining elected office. Building on Schlesinger's framework of “office seeking coalitions,” Aldrich continues this line of thought with a rational choice view of parties. According to Aldrich, party rules and structures are endogenous institutions that change according to the electoral needs of individual members. Bawn et al. break from this literature by bringing groups into the equation. See Schlesinger, John A., “The New American Political Party,” American Political Science Review 79 (1985) 1152–69Google Scholar; Aldrich, John A., Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Bawn et al. “A Theory of Political Parties.”

13. Cohen et al. The Party Decides.

14. Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics.

15. Frymer, Uneasy Alliances.

16. Ibid., 8–10.

17. Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics.

18. This differential in time spent on a given issue is particularly striking when considering how complicated Medicare and voting rights are policy-wise. The Section 14b repeal, by contrast, simply required one paragraph of text that outlawed right-to-work statutes.

19. Based on this figure, attention may not always be a good thing for certain groups. The large spike in union-related hearings during the 85th Congress is driven, for the most part, by an investigation of corruption in labor unions. For more on this difficult time for unions, see Lichtenstein, Nelson, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 162–66.Google Scholar

20. Frymer, Uneasy Alliances.

21. Indeed, after being spurned on Section 14b in 1965, labor groups talked publicly about withdrawing support from Democrats in 1966 congressional elections. “Labor Hints at Election Year Reprisals Over 14(b),” Iron Age, November 4, 1965, Folder 1379, Working Papers File, Everett M. Dirksen Papers, The Dirksen Congressional Center, Pekin, IL.

22. Assessing a group's true preferences, as Broockman notes, is no easy task. That said, identifying the motivations of a given group is essential to understanding whether the party's agenda truly reflects the group's interests. Only through careful historical scrutiny can we hope to pin down a group's genuine interests. See Broockman, David E., “The ‘Problem of Preferences’: Medicare and Business Support for the Welfare State,” Studies in American Political Development, 26 (2012): 83–106.Google Scholar

23. Unions cited not only their strong support of Democrats but also the issue's presence in Democratic platform itself as a reason why passage was due. Frank Rafferty, Telegram from Frank Rafferty, General President of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, to Lyndon Johnson, February 7, 1966, George Meany Memorial Archives (GMMA), Box 50, Folder 21

24. Johnson himself acknowledged this idea when mentioning that Section 14b had been in the Democratic platform for years. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

25. Feinstein, Brian D. and Schickler, Eric, “Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights Realignment Reconsidered,” Studies in American Political Development 22 (2008): 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. For more on Operation Dixie, see Griffith, Barbara S., The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Goldfield, Michael, “The Failure of Operation Dixie: A Critical Turning Point in American Political Development?” Race, Class, and Community in Southern Labor History (1994): 166–89.Google Scholar

27. Griffith, The Crisis of American Labor.

28. Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 162–66.

29. Lichtenstein, State of the Union; Katznelson, Ira, “Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity?” in The Rise and fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980, ed. Fraser, Steve and Gerstle, Gary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 185–211 Google Scholar; Farhang and Katznelson, “The Southern Imposition.”

30. Dark's history of labor and the Democratic Party covers the 1960s, and even H.R. 77 to some extent. His account, however, fails to appreciate the important role agenda setting played in the bill's defeat. See Dark, Taylor, The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001)Google Scholar.

31. John Chamberlain, “Will LBJ Take Lid Off Pandora's Box?” New York Journal-American, May 3, 1965, Folder 1373, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

32. Even AFL-CIO representatives admitted that the antirepeal forces waged a more focused ground game through letter writing and the like. See “Labor, Business Lobbyists Clashed on ‘Right to Work’,” CQ Weekly, October 15, 1965, 2088.

33. Notes for weekly TV radio program: “Final Report of 1st Session of 89th Congress,” July 6, 1965, Folder Remarks, Releases, and Interviews June–July, Remarks and Releases File, Dirksen Papers.

34. Hulsey, Byron C., Everett Dirksen and His Presidents: How a Senate Giant Shaped American Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000)Google Scholar, 216.

35. Patterson, James T., Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar, 525.

36. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress,” November 27, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 8–10.Google Scholar

37. Caro, Robert A., The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent. (New York: Knopf, 1990).Google Scholar

38. For more on how economic perceptions affect policymaking, at least in terms of the bias toward business interests, see Vogel, David, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic Books, 1989).Google Scholar

39. Wason, James R., “Labor-Management under the Johnson Administration,” Current History 48, no. 288 (1965): 66.Google Scholar

40. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, January 14, 1965, Citation 6730, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

41. In many ways, this mirrors Paul Frymer's discussion of the relationship between Democrats and African Americans in the years to come. Given that the GOP was deeply hostile to their core issues, unions lacked little recourse but to continue to support the Democrats. See Frymer, Uneasy Alliances.

42. At the start of the term, Johnson admitted that they had been working on their top priorities since September. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Pat Lucey, January 14, 1965, Citation 6731, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

43. President Johnson discussed these issues with many of his congressional allies. For instance, see Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Albert Gore, Sr., October 2, 1964, Citation 5804, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

44. See Broockman, “The ‘Problem of Preferences’.”

45. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and George Mahon, October 21, 1964, Citation 5937, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

46. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

47. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr., January 15, 1965, Citation 6736, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

48. Though significant to the lives of many low-income Americans, minimum wage was not the top priority of organized labor, particularly for union leaders. These short-term victories did not promise the lasting benefits derived from an environment where unions could organize more easily in the South and Midwest. Unlike the short-term gains offered by a wage increase, H.R. 77's institutional reform would systematically improve labor's capacity to organize new unions, thus producing increasing returns in the long run that would be much more difficult for opposition forces to undo. For more on the strategic logic to these positive feedback effects, see Pierson, Paul, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” The American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251–67.Google Scholar

49. Light, Paul C., The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter (with Notes on Ronald Reagan) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

50. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, January 14, 1965, Citation 6730, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

51. “Unions Get a White House Nod,” Business Week, January 9, 1965, 80.

52. “Move to Repeal ‘Right to Work’ Stirs Controversy,” CQ Weekly, May 14, 1965.

53. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

54. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr., January 15, 1965, Citation 6736, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

55. Ted Lewis, “Capitol Stuff,” New York Daily News, August 27, 1965, Folder 1376, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

56. Wason, “Labor-Management under the Johnson Administration”; CQ Weekly, “Labor, Business Lobbyists Clashed on ‘Right to Work’.”

57. Contrary to the claim that business was staying out of the fight, the Chamber of Commerce was already keeping a close watch on the issue. In a letter to its state chapters, the Chamber explained, “Hearings were primed to start in late February. When, without explanation, Mr. Johnson's anticipated message was not forthcoming, the House General Subcommittee on Labor postponed hearings indefinitely.” “Major Legislation in the 89th Congress,” Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2. Box 4.

58. While mostly in agreement, organized labor was not entirely united on H.R. 77's relative importance. Walter Reuther, one of organized labor's most uncompromising leaders, sided with Johnson's decision to delay action on H.R. 77. In justifying this position, Reuther reassured LBJ that he was “an American before he was a labor leader.” Reuther's support of the president's strategy was opposed by many other labor leaders and the rank and file, many of whom perceived the low priority as a betrayal. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

59. In a departure from other studies of organized labor during the post-WWII era, this case study suggests that unions did advocate for industrial relations reform at the national level. Looking back at this period, many scholars criticize organized labor's priorities as short-sighted, narrowly conceived goals. In contrast to its radical past, the post-WWII labor movement passively accepted fringe bargaining as its only recourse. Unfavorable labor laws and further integration into the Democratic Party fostered a general complacence among unions. Moreover, these political compromises would come to play a significant role in constraining the social democratic impact of the Great Society, what Katznelson has called a “lost opportunity.” By the 1960s, labor was more inclined to settle for a meager wage increase than jeopardize the gains unions had secured from aligning with the Democratic Party. See Lichtenstein, State of the Union; Katznelson, “Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity?”

60. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, January 14, 1965, Citation 6730, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

61. Johnson's various aides and secretaries kept a “Daily Diary,” in which they recorded all meetings and phone conversations, and, depending upon the verbosity of the assistant, a terse run-down of the day's events with running commentary. Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary Collection, LBJ Library.

62. To recognize labor for its role in lobbying for the education and health bills, George Meany was even brought along on Air Force One for the Medicare signing in March 1965. Daily Diary 19650730. Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary Collection, LBJ Library.

63. “Labor Message Promises Storms,” Business Week, May 22, 1965, 170.

64. In some regards, this tepid response by Johnson also revealed the minimal costs to obstruction, a highly influential factor behind the decision to filibuster a bill. See Wawro, Greg J. and Schickler, Eric, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the US Senate (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).Google Scholar

65. Lyle Wilson, “LBJ Speaks Softly About 14b,” May 27, 1965, Tucson Citizen, Folder 1374, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

66. CQ Weekly, “Move to Repeal ‘Right to Work’ Stirs Controversy,” 929.

67. See “Chronological Account of Legislative Battle to Repeal 14-b.” Memo from Biemiller to Meany, GMMA, Box 100, Folder 17.

68. Frymer, Paul, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).Google Scholar

69. NAM Press Release, April 8, 1965. Hagley Museum and Library. National Association of Manufacturers, Series 7, Box 139.

70. J. Howard Pew Personal Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Box 86.

71. “Special Report on [the] 14(b) Crisis,” Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 4.

72. Letter from Don A. Goodall, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, January 12, 1966, Folder 1553, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

73. Letter from William A. Barry, January 22, 1966, Folder 1535, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

74. The Chamber of Commerce spoke against the legislation in both the House and Senate in June 1965. Though offered by different speakers, the two testimonies were nearly identical. Each began by denouncing “compulsory unionism” as a violation of a core, Constitutional principle—freedom to choose. Coming later in the month, the Senate testimony offered an additional section on how repeal would lead to significant violence and labor strife. Included with the testimony was a recent news article documenting a bloody clash between union members and management in Garrett, Indiana. See “Testimony on Compulsory Unionism before the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, by Eugene Adams Keeney, 23 June 1965.” Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 10.

75. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Willard Wirtz, June 24, 1965, Citation 8193, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

76. For more on the persuasive powers of the office, see Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1991).Google Scholar

77. Beckmann, Matthew, Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in US Lawmaking, 1953–2004 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).Google Scholar

78. In a letter to George Meany, labor lobbyist Benjamin Chapman explained that “this would be one time the liberals couldn't get the two thirds vote needed for cloture.” He went on to ask Meany to appeal to Johnson to pressure the Southern Democrats not to filibuster. Benjamin Chapman, Letter to George Meany, August 27, 1965, GMMA, Box 50, Folder 21.

79. By the 1960s, right-to-work interests were mostly promoted by the NRTWC, an association that claimed to represent small businesses and disgruntled union members. After decades of working with labor, large businesses purportedly did not have a pressing interest in Section 14b. Indeed, according to a survey of labor organizations and antirepeal forces, big business was believed to have mostly stayed out of the legislative fight during the 89th Congress. See CQ Weekly “Labor, Business Lobbyists Clashed on ‘Right to Work’.”

80. “Right-to-Work Showdown Coming” June 24, 1965, Hagley Museum and Library. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 4.

81. “Association Newsletter, June 1965.” Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 5.

82. In 1965, the business groups produced numerous publications on the topic of 14b. While some pamphlets explicitly took a stand, like NAM's “Freedom to Choose: The Case for Retention of Section 14(b) of the Labor-Management Relations Act” (Hagley Museum and Library, NAM, Series 7, Box 139), others framed their content using an educational tone, such as the Chamber of Commerce's “The Issue: Choice or Compulsion” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 25). To reach even larger audiences, the NRTWC produced a 14-minute film entitled, “The People and 14(b).” Film Pamphlet. Folder 1545, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

83. The General Fireproofing Company, for instance, sent “GF'ers” packets of information documenting which senators to contact, where the member currently stood, and sample language to include in their letters. Letter (and enclosures) from General Fireproofing Company, January 26, 1966, Folder 1562, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

84. Resolution by General Federation of Women's Clubs, June 1965, Folder 1535, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers; Letter from Edgar R. Koons, September 8, 1965, Folder 1539, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

85. Dirksen's office retained many of the letters they received from sources of all sorts. For general constituent contacts, they often responded with a simple robo response, but a great number were marked up and filed away to be used as floor evidence. For instance, see Letter from William De Moulin, President of De Moulin Brothers and Company, June 22, 1965, Folder 1535, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers; “Good letter from union member,” September 17, 1965, Folder 1541, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

86. Schapsmeier, Edward and Schapsmeier, Frederick, Dirksen of Illinois: Senatorial Statesman (Champaign: University of Illinois Press Urbana, 1985)Google Scholar, 152.

87. Letter from Karl Grabeman to Bernard Waters, legislative counsel to Senator Dirksen, August 10, 1965, Folder 1537, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

88. In handwritten notes for a speech on the 89th Congress, Dirksen enumerates a laundry list of issues that the upcoming term will address. “14B” falls as the 17th topic among 29. Everett M. Dirksen, “The 89th,” circa 1965, Folder 21, Notebooks File, Dirksen Papers.

89. Andy Biemiller, Letter to George Meany, October 26, 1965, GMMA, Box 50, Folder 21.

90. This view was explicitly made by the Chamber of Commerce's Labor Relations Department in the run-up to the committee hearings. Conceding that the bill should sail through committee, the report states, “The main battle, therefore, will be fought on the floor of the House where present nose counts indicate a close vote.” “Repeal of State Right-to-Work Laws.” May 15, 1965, Hagley Museum and Library, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Series 2, Box 4.

91. Wawro and Schickler, Filibuster.

92. Indeed, the idea of a Republican-led filibuster seemed so remote in August that one newspaper editorial extolled the virtues of the filibuster as a brave choice requiring great resolve. “A Matter of Will,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1965, Folder 1379, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

93. Dirksen interview on Face the Nation, September 19, 1965, Remarks, Releases, and Interviews August–September, Dirksen Papers.

94. Lewis, “Capitol Stuff.”

95. Hulsey, Everett Dirksen and His Presidents, 216.

96. CQ Weekly, “Labor, Business Lobbyists Clashed on ‘Right to Work’,” 2102.

97. Dirksen interview on Face the Nation.

98. William S. White, “Tide Turns For 14(b)” St. Louis Globe Democrat, October 7, 1965, Folder 1377, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

99. Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, Press Release, September 9, 1965, Folder 1651, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

100. This numerical reality was evident as early as August. In a letter dated August 27, 1965, AFL-CIO official Benjamin Chapman informed President George Meany that a filibuster coalition was forming in opposition to the bill, and that “this would be one time the liberals couldn't get the two thirds vote needed for cloture.” GMMA, Box 50, Folder 21.

101. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Inside Report: Crisis over 14(b),” Washington Post, August 25, 1965, Folder 1376, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

102. In cases where reaching a supermajority is not feasible, filibusters can be overcome provided that the bill's supporters have the time and the resolve. If early enough in the year, the governing party can wait out the filibuster, thus shifting the costs associated with these “wars of attrition” to the obstructionists. Wawro and Schickler, Filibuster, 259.

103. In an “inside story” of how the filibuster coalition came to be, the Philadelphia Daily News identified a pivotal meeting in which Senator Strom Thurmond cajoled his colleagues to oppose the measure. Prospects of defeating H.R. 77 seemed so unlikely that Senator Dirksen did not even attend the meeting. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, “Filibuster Threat Dooms 14(b) Repeal,” Philadelphia Daily News, August 30, 1965, Folder 1376, Working Papers File, Dirksen Papers.

104. Poole, Keith T. and Rosenthal, Howard, Ideology and Congress (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Press, 2007).Google Scholar

105. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Reuther, November 24, 1964, Citation 6474, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

106. Johnson was now under public assault by union leaders still angry over his weak support for H.R. 77 in the previous term. As one union leader sternly demanded, “The Democratic Party is without question obligated to render assistance in this matter in order to redeem platform and campaign pledges. Your swift action in this matter is badly needed and deserved.” Frank Rafferty, Telegram to DNC Chair John Bailey, February 7, 1966, GMMA, Box 50, Folder 21.

107. To forestall a Senate recess, Mansfield used adjournments and other tactics to prevent any other legislation from becoming the pending business of the Senate. See “Right to Work,” CQ Weekly, February 4, 1966, 334.

108. Wason, “Labor-Management under the Johnson Administration,” 65.

109. In a conversation with Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz, Johnson was both confused and angry that labor viewed his support as insincere all along. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Willard Wirtz, February 22, 1966, Citation 9658, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.

110. Bawn et al., “A Theory of Political Parties.”

111. Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics.

112. Frymer, Uneasy Alliances.

113. Katznelson, “Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity?”