1. Vormärz, roughly the equivalent of “antebellum,” refers to the period from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the revolution in March of 1848.

2. The pioneering state-level studies were by Handlin, Oscar and Handlin, Mary Flug, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1969; orig. pub. 1947)Google Scholar; Hartz, Louis, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860, Foreword by Wright, Benjamin F. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprint ed., Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1968); Heath, Milton Sydney, Constructive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in Georgia to 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Primm, James Neal, Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State: Missouri, 1820–1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These studies were sponsored by the Social Science Research Council; for details on the project, see Handlin and Handlin, pp. viii-x and Appendix G. Related works include Goodrich, Carter B., Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800–1890 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960)Google Scholar; and Scheiber, Harry N., Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820—1861 (Athens, Ohio University Press, 1969)Google Scholar. For reviews of the literature over the years, see Lively, Robert A., “The American System: A Review Article,” Business History Review 29 (03 1955): 81–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Broude, Henry W., “The Role of the State in American Economic Development, 1820–1890,” in Hugh Aitken, G. J., ed., The State and Economic Growth (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), pp. 4–25Google Scholar; Goodrich, Carter, “Internal Improvements Re-considered,” Journal of Economic History 30 (1970): 289–311CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pisani, Donald J., “Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Economy,” Journal of American History 74 (12 1987): 740–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Harry N. Scheiber's numerous, insightful essays. For a recent study that brings new questions to this line of inquiry, see Gunn, L. Ray, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political Development in New York State, 1800–1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

3. Here scholars have followed the lead of Hurst, James Willard, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the 19th-century United Slates (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956)Google Scholar. For overviews of the literature, see Scheiber, Harry N., “Regulation, Property Rights, and Definition of ‘The Market’: Law and the American Economy,” Journal of Economic History 41 (1981): 103–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Public Economic Policy and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives,” Wisconsin Law Review (1980): 1159–89; Pisani, “Promotion and Regulation,” pp. 740–68. For an innovative structural perspective on the courts, see Hattam, Victoria, “Economic Visions and Political Strategies: American Labor and the State, 1865–1896,” Studies in American Political Development 4 (1990): 82–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Bourgin, Frank, The Great Challenge: The Myth of Laissez-Faire in the Early Republic, Foreword by , Arthur Schlesinger Jr, (New York: George Braziller, 1989)Google Scholar; Smith, Merritt Roe, “Army Ordnance and the ‘American System’ of Manufacturing, 1815–1861,” in idem, ed., Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1985), pp. 39–86Google Scholar; Charles F. O'Connell, Jr., ”The Corps of Engineers and the Rise of Modern Management, 1827–1856,” in ibid., pp. 87–116; Hoskin, Keith W. and Macve, Richard H., “The Genesis of Accountability: The West Point Connections,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1988): 37–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although published recently, Bourgin's book, like the SSRC studies, had its origins in the New Deal; for details see the foreword.

5. See Hardach, Karl W., “Some Remarks on German Economic Historiography and its Understanding of the Industrial Revolution in Germany” Journal of European Economic History 1 (Spring 1972): 73–77Google Scholar; Sperber, Jonathan, “State and Civil Society in Prussia: Thoughts on a New Edition of Reinhart Koselleck's Preuften zwischen Reform und Revolution, ”Journal of Modem History 57 (06 1985): 280–84Google Scholar. For an overview of the Prussian state's activities, see Ritter, Ulrich P., Die Rolk des Staates in den Friihstadien der Industrialisierung: Die preufiische Industrieforderung in der ersten Hdlfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1961)Google Scholar.

6. Trebilcock, Clive, The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780–1914 (New York: Longman, 1981), pp. 74–78 (quotation from p. 78)Google Scholar.

7. Ibid., p. 75.

8. For Germany see, for example, Henderson, W. O., The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar; idem, The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia, 1740–1870 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1958). For the United States, examples include Douglass North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790–1860 (Prentice Hall, 1961; New York: W. W. Norton, 1966), and more recently Cochran, Thomas C., Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar. North, Douglass, it should be emphasized, has come to give much greater weight to institutions. See his Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981)Google Scholar.

9. Kocka, Jurgen, White Collar Workers in America, 1890–1940: A Social-Political History in International Perspective, trans. Kealey, Maura, SAGE Studies in 20th Century History, vol. 10 (London: SAGE Publications, 1980), pp. 16–23Google Scholar. Cf. Bowman, Shearer Davis, “Planters and Junkers: A Comparative Study of Two Nineteenth-Century Elites and Their Regional Societies,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1986Google Scholar; Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

10. For Germany, see Hardach, ”Some Remarks on German Economic Historiography,” pp. 65–70; Henderson, Rise of German Industrial Power, p. 23; Hoffmann, Walther G., “The Take-Off in Germany,” in Rostow, W. W., ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 96Google Scholar; Mottek, Hans, Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands: Ein Grundnss, Vol. II: Von der Zeit der franzbsischen Revolution bis zur Zeit der Bismarckschen Reichsgriindung 3d. ed. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1987), p. 77Google Scholar; Tilly, Richard, “The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 1815–1866,” Journal of Economic History 26 (12 1966): 484–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the United States, see Bruchey, Stuart, The Roots of American Economic Growth, 1607–1861: An Essay in Social Causation (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 76–91Google Scholar; idem, The Wealth of the Nation: An Economic History of the United States (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 26, 58; Cochran, Frontiers of Change, pp. 78—100; Douglass North, “Industrialization in the United States (1815–1860),” in Rostow, ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth, p. 45; idem, Economic Growth of the United States, pp. 69–70.

11. Both countries had a fairly well developed public sector of the economy as the railroad era opened. In Prussia, the state, particularly through the Overseas Trading Corporation (Seehandlung) and the Mining Office (Oberbergsamt), owned a number of manufac-turing and mining enterprises. In the United States, state enterprise came primarily in the form of state government participation in banking and transportation. Yet, in neither country did the public sector carry so much weight that the economy could not be called capitalist. For Prussia, the classic work is Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution. Cf. idem, Rise of German Industrial Power. For the United States see Callender, Guy S., “The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 17 (11 1902): 111–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goodrich, Government Promotion; and Taylor, George Rogers, The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860 (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1968; orig. pub. 1951), pp. 352–383Google Scholar. The extent to which agriculture in the Prussian East and the American South took a capitalist form is a matter of considerable controversy; for a sensible introduction to the literature, see Bowman, “Planters and Junkers,” pp. 36–67. On Prussia, see also Bleiber, Helmut, “Staat und biirgerliche Umwalzung in Deutschland: Zum Charakter besonders des preu/Jischen Staates in der ersten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Seeber, Gustav and Noack, Karl-Heinz, eds.,Preufien in der deutschen Geschichte nach 1789 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1983), pp. 102–106Google Scholar; Hartmut Harnisch, “Zum Stand der Diskussion um die Probleme des ‘preu/Jischen Weges’ kapitalistischer Agrarentwicklung in der deutschen Geschichte,” in ibid., pp. 116–44.

12. Kocka, White Collar Workers, pp. 18–19; Horn, Norbert, “Aktienrechtliche Unternehmensorganisation in der Hochindustrialisierung (1860–1920): Deutschland, England, Frank-reich und die USA im Vergleich,” in Horn, Norbert and Kocka, Jurgen, eds., Law and the Formation of the Big Enterprises in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), pp. 124–25Google Scholar.

13. Cf. Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 5–30Google Scholar.

14. Friedrich, Carl J., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 5–6Google Scholar. Cf. Elazar, Daniel J., “Federalism,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 5 (1968), pp. 355–57Google Scholar. See, more recently, idem, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987).

15. Scheiber, Harry N., “Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789–1910,” Law & Society Review 10 (Fall 1975): 57–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The internal political structure of the state governments depended on the arrangements specified in their constitutions, subject only to the national constitution's stricture that they have “a Republican Form of Government.” United States Constitution, art. IV, sec. 4. The Constitution did not elaborate on the subject, and it has generally been accepted that the form of the state governments that existed when the Constitution was adopted implicitly defined “republican.” U.S. Congress, Senate, The Constitution of the United States of America (Annotated), Senate Doc. No. 232, 74th Congress, 2d sess., 1938, pp. 548–49.

16. This description draws on Ruf, Peter, “Ansatze zur Erneuerung: Die preu/3ischen Reformen 1807–1815,” in Schlenke, Manfred, ed., Preufien-Ploetz: Fine historische Bilanz in Daten und Deutungen (Wiirzburg: Verlag Ploetz Freiburg, 1983), pp. 173–77Google Scholar; Bleiber, “Staat und biirgerliche Umwalzung,” pp. 99–100; Koselleck, Reinhart, “Staat und Gesellschaft in Preu/3en 1815–1848,” in Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, ed., Modeme deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 5th ed. (Cologne: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1976), pp. 65–68Google Scholar; and idem, “Altstandische Rechte, au/3erstandische Gesellschaft und Beamtenherrschaft im Vormarz,” in Blasius, Dirk, ed., Preussen in der deutschen Geschichte (Königstein/Ts.: Verlagsgruppe Athenaum-Hain-ScriptorHanstein, 1980), pp. 219–236Google Scholar. Cf. Heffter, Heinrich, Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der Ideen und Institutionen (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1950)Google Scholar. King Friedrich Wilhelm III reigned from 1797 until his death in 1840; he was succeeded by Friedrich Wilhelm IV, who died in 1861. Although weaker than in the United States, a degree of decentralization actually characterized Prussia throughout the nineteenth century, reflecting the country's persistently heterogeneous economic and social structure and evident in enduring domestic conflict “between ministerial centralism and provincial regionalism.” Rüdiger Schiitz, “Preu/3en und seine Provinzen,” in Preu/Sen-Ploetz, pp. 28–31 (quotation from p. 29). Cf. 'Koselleck, “Staat und Gesellschaft,” pp. 58, 63.

17. Central state officials appointed the district magistrates (Landräte), but they did so from a list of candidates nominated by the district assemblies. Since the local nobility held the preponderance of power in the latter, they could ensure that the magistrates came from their own ranks. In 1812 the district magistrate had been replaced by a district director, appointed directly by the state rather than by the district assembly; due to opposition from the nobility, however, the district-magistrate system was soon reinstated. Not until 1872 was the district magistrate made a civil servant. Ruf, “Ansatze zur Erneuerung,” p. 176.

18. By 1830 only five state governments still retained property qualifications on suffrage while another eight required voters to be taxpayers. In addition, most had moved to popular election of governors and presidential electors. A glaring exception to the shift toward manhood suffrage remained in place, of course, as long as slaves and (in some states) free blacks had no voting rights. Morris, Richard B. and Morris, Jeffrey B., eds., Encyclopedia of American History, 6th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 198Google Scholar; Porter, Kirk H., A History of Suffrage (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1918), pp. 110, 148Google Scholar.

19. On the structure of the state governments, see Morris and Morris, pp. 132–33, 198. By the 1830s New York state under the Albany Regency had developed one of the strongest executives, its power particularly apparent in the areas of banking, education, and internal improvements. “For some time there has appeared in the administration of the State of New York,” Michel Chevalier noted with approbation in 1835, ”a character of grandeur, unity, and centralisation, that has procured it the title ofthe Empire-Slate.” Chevalier, Michael, Society, Manners and Politics in the United States (Boston, 1839Google Scholar; reprint ed., New York: Burt Franklin, 1969), pp. 370—77 (quotation from p. 371; original italics).

20. See note 16. The provincial assemblies (Provinziallandtage) were each headed by a marshall who was personally appointed by the king. In these bodies, noble (ritterliche) landowners held half of the votes, urban landowners a third, and peasant landowners a sixth, the nobility (Standesherren) voting as individuals and the others holding votes as a group.

21. Cf. Sewell, William H. Jr, “Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History,” History and Theory 6 (1967): 208–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skocpol, Theda and Somers, Margaret, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (04 1980): 174–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Cf. Kocka, Jiirgen, ”Eisenbahnverwaltung in der industriellen Revolution: DeutschAmerikanische Vergleiche,” in Kellenbenz, H. and Pohl, Hans, eds., Historia socialis et oeconomica. Festschrift fur Wolfgang Zorn zum 65. Geburtstag, Vierteljahrschrift fur Sozial- and Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 84 (Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 259–77Google Scholar. The following works provide the best overview of Prussian railroad development: Klee, Wolfgang, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1982)Google Scholar; and Fremdling, Rainer, Eisenbahnen und deutsches Wirtsrhaftswachstum, 1840–1879: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungstheorie und zur Theorie der Infrastruktur 2d ed., Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts-Sozial- und Technikgeschichte, vol. 2 (Dortmund: Gesellschaft fur Westfalische Wirtschaftsgeschichte e.V., 1985)Google Scholar. For the United States, see Fishlow, Albert, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Anle-Bellum Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Meyer, Balthasar H., History of Transportation in the United States before 1860 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1917)Google Scholar; and Taylor, Transportation Revolution, pp. 74–103s.

23. In 1850, when the United States boasted more than 14,000 kilometers of track, Britain had 9,800; The German States, 5,900; Prussia, 3,000; France, 2,900; and Belgium, 900 kilometers. In that year the American population stood at 23.3 million and the Prussian, at 16.5 million. Thus the U.S. had 6 km. of track for every 10,000 inhabitants while Prussia had 1.8 km. Taylor, George Rogers, “Railroad Investment Before the Civil War: Comment,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century: Studies in Income and Wealth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 526–27Google Scholar; Fremdling, Eisenbahnen, p. 48; Mitchell, B. R., European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970, abridged ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1978), pp. 315–16Google Scholar; Bureau, U.S. of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960)Google Scholar, Ser. A2; Rudiger Utikal, “Ereignisse und Entwicklungen 1815–1871, ” in Preu/SenPloetz, p. 211.

24. For the United States, see Fishlow, American Railroads; Fogel, Robert W., Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964)Google Scholar; O'Brien, Patrick, The New Economic History of Railways (London: Croom Helm, 1977)Google Scholar; Fogel, Robert William, “Notes on the Social Saving Controversy,” fournal of Economic History 39 (03 1979): 1–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Germany, see Fremdling, Eisenbahnen; idem, ”Railroads and German Economic Growth: A Leading Sector Analysis with a Comparison to the United States and Great Britain,” Journal of Economic History 37 (september 1977): 586–87; idem, “Germany,” in O'Brien, Patrick, ed., Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 1830–1914, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 121–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25. Bosselmann, Kurt, Die Enlwicklung des deutschen Aktienwesens im 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Finanzierung gemeinwirtschaftlicher Untemehmungen und zu den Reformen des Aktienrechts (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1939), pp. 48–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, ”Patterns of Railroad Finance, 1830–50,” Business History Review 28 (1954): 248–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Obermann, Karl, ”Zur Beschaffung des Eisenbahn-Kapitals in Deutschland in den Jahren 1835–1855,” Revue Internationale d'Histoirede la Banque 5 (1972): 315–52Google Scholar.

26. For historical and theoretical insight, see Deane, Phyllis, The Evolution of Economic Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, John A., Liberalism: Politics, Ideology and the Market (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987)Google Scholar. Cf. Grampp, William D., Economic Liberalism 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1965)Google Scholar. Hartz, Like Louis in The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955)Google Scholar, Grampp defines his subject so broadly (“in a liberal economy the state may do whatever the people want it to do and that it is able to do,” I:ix) that the term gives little purchase on the matters of greatest interest–the differences of opinion about the state's proper role that have so agitated political debate for two centuries.

27. Cf. Smith, David G., ”Liberalism,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 9 (1968): 278Google Scholar. Friedrich, Carl J. Treats the question whether a federal or a unitary structure is “more appropriate” in a given situation as a matter of “practical politics” (Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968], p. 6)Google Scholar, but, as Daniel J. Elazar notes, federalism “as a political device” is usually valued as “a means of safeguarding individual and local liberties” through the dispersion of power (“Federalism,” p. 354).

28. For an influential neoclassical formulation of economic liberalism, see Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 22–36Google Scholar. The term “intervention,” it should be noted, implies a notion of intrinsically separate political and economic spheres that runs counter to the broader argument here. In the interests of accessibility, however, I have retained it.

29. Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order,” p. 97.

30. Klee, Preujiische Eisenbahngexhichte, pp. 114–26; Kobschatzky, Hans, Streckenatlas der deulschen Eisenbahnen, 1835–1892 (Dusseldorf: Alba Buchverlag, 1971)Google Scholar. After the revolution the situation changed rapidly. By 1852 the first state line had opened in its entirety, and during the remainder of the decade state railroad construction accelerated and the state also took over the management of some private railroads. Thus by the 1870s roughly half of Prussian railroad mileage was state-owned. Bismarck was not able to convince the German Reichstag to nationalize the railroads, but he did succeed in persuading the Prussian Landtag to allow the state to buy up the major private railroads during the 1880s. See Klee, Preufiuche Eisenbahngeschichte, for an overview. The German state railroads as such did not come into existence until the end of World War I.

31. For details, see Burgess, George H. and Kennedy, Miles C., Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1846–1946 (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1949), p. 96Google Scholar; Goodrich, Carter B., “The Virginia System of Mixed Enterprise: A Study of State Planning of Internal Improvements,” Political Science Quarterly 64 (1949): 371–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “The Revulsion Against Internal Improvements,” Journal of Economic History 10 (November 1950): 145–50; Parks, Robert J., Democracy's Railroads: Public Enterprise in Jacksonian Michigan (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1972)Google Scholar; Phillips, Ulrich B., “An American State-Owned Railroad: The Western and Atlantic,” Yale Review 15 (11 1906): 259–82Google Scholar; and Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 90–91, 382–83.

32. Gerstner, Franz Anton Ritter von, Die innern Communicationen der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerica, Vol. 2 (Vienna: L. Forster, 1843), p. 222Google Scholar; Poor, Henry V., History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States of America (New York: John H. Schultz & Co., 1860), p. 580Google Scholar; Goodrich, “The Virginia System,” pp. 360–65; and Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 92–94.

33. As early as 1838, the state governments alone had incurred debts totalling $42.9 million for railroad development. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 92, 374; and Adler, Dorothy R., British Investment in American Railways, 1834–1898, ed. Hidy, Muriel E. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, 1970), p. 10Google Scholar. It would be helpful to have data on total railroad investment to this date, but such do not seem to be available. Two years later, however, a foreign observer reported what was probably an upper limit of $105.9 million. Gerstner, Die innern Commumcationen, vol. 2, pp. 334–37. This suggests a minimum contribution from the state governments of forty percent.

34. Goodrich, “The Revulsion Against Internal Improvements,” pp. 148–51 (quotation from p. 148).

35. The percentages reflect aid from the state and lower levels of government, excluding federal land grants. Goodrich, Carter B., ”State In, State Out—A Pattern of Development Policy,” Journal of Economic Issues 2 (1968): 366–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36. Joseph Mendelssohn to [August] Leo in Paris, June 29, 1844, in Statsbibliothek Preu/Jischer Kulturbesitz (West Berlin), Musikabteilung, Mendelssohn Archiv, Bankhaus Mendelssohn & Co., Vol. IX, Section VI. I am indebted to Dr. Hans-Giinter Klein for allowing me access to this collection before it had been catalogued.

37. For a detailed study of early policy, see Paul, Helmut, “Die preu/ische Eisenbahnpolitik von 1835–1838: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Restauration und Reaktion in Preu/3en,” Archiv fur Eismbahnwesen 50 (1938): 250–303Google Scholar. Through the Seehandlung or Over-seas Trading Corporation, the state purchased 1,000,000 Taler ($700,000) of stock in the Berlin-Anhalt Railroad and loaned the company an additional 500,000 Taler ($350,000). The Finance Ministry also invested 500,000 Taler in Berlin-Stettin railroad bonds, buying them at par when they were selling below par on the stock exchange and agreeing to forego one-half percent interest for six years. Schreiber, K., Die Preussuchen Eisenbahnen und ihr Verhdltniss zum Staat, 1834–1874 (Berlin: Ernst & Korn, 1874), pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Henderson, Rise of German Industrial Power, p. 48. Cf. Fremdling, Eisenbahnen unddeutsches Wirtschaftswachstum, p. 125n. On the Seehandlung, see Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 119–47. I have converted Taler to dollars at a rate of $0.70. See Bowman, Shearer Davis, ”Antebellum Planters and Vormdrz Junkers in Comparative Perspective,” American Historical Review 85 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: 795n; Gerstner, Die innern Commumcationen, vol. 1, p. viii; idem, Benchte aus den I'ereinigten Staaten von Xordamenca, u'ber Eisenbahnen, Dampfschiffahrteii, Banhen und andere djfenthche i'nternehmungen (Leipzig: C.P. Melzer, 1839), p. ii; Kgl. Legations-Kasse, Berlin, September 17, 1840, Zentrales Staatsarchiv Merseburg, Historische Abteilung II (hereafter, ZStA Merseburg), Rep. 2.4.1, Abt. II, No. 7694, Vol. I, p. 34r; and [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to Royal Prussian General Consul Konig in Alexandria [Egypt], February 25, 1861, in ibid., p. 108r.

38. For details, see “Die Verhandlungen der Vereinigten standischen Ausschiisse iiber die Eisenbahnfrage in Preussen im Jahre 1842,” Archw fur Eisenbahnwesen 4 (1881): 1–21; Reden, Friedrich Wilhelm von, Die Eisenbahnen Deutschlands (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1844), pp. 303–304Google Scholar; Schreiber, Die Preussischen Eisenbahnen, pp. 9–12; Enkling, Josef, Die Stellung des Staates zu den Pnvateisenbahnen m der Anfangszeit despreufiischen Eisenbahnwesens (1830–1848) (Kettwig: F. Flothmann, 1935), pp. 66–69Google Scholar; Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 163–66; Klee, Preu/iische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 105–108, 2156; Extract, Friedrich Wilhelm to Council of Ministers, November 22, 1842, in ZStA Merseburg, Rep. 93E, No. 546, Vol. I, pp. 2r-3v; Cabinet Order, Friedrich Wilhelm to Minister von Bodelschwingh, December 31, 1842, in ibid., pp. 23r-v; and Friedrich Wilhelm to Minister von Bodelschwingh, April 28, 1843, in ibid., p. 31r. For the views of the head of the Seehandlung on the subject, see Rother, , “Bemerkungen zur Forderung des Eisenbahnbaues unter den in Preuen gegebenen Verhaltnien,” 02 21, 1843Google Scholar, in ibid., pp. 43r–48r.

39. Bösselmann, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Aktienwesens im 19. Jahrhundert, p. 202; re-port of the General State Treasury (General-Staats-Kasse) on the status of the Railroad Fund in 1846 in ZStA Merseburg, Rep. 93E, No. 546, Vol. I, pp. 122r-123r; ”General-Dispositions-Plan fur die Verwendung des Eisenbahn-Fonds in den Jahren 1847 bis einschlie/Jlich 1856” in ibid., pp. 142r–143v.

40. Fremdling, Eismbahnen und deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum, p. 126. For details on the state's participation in individual railroad lines to 1869, see Rapmund, F., Die finanzielle Betheiligung des Preufiischen Stoats bet den Preufiischen Privateisenbahnen (Berlin: Verlag der Koniglichen geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1869)Google Scholar. Bösselmann, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Aktienwesens im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 201–202, provides useful summaries of railroad stocks and bonds issued up to 1850.

41. Maryland and New Jersey also imposed transit taxes on through passenger traffic, but they did so to generate state revenue in a politically inexpensive fashion. Until the 1870s, both states garnered a substantial portion of their revenue from such taxes, a strategy that in-creased in popularity during the Civil War. See Merk, Frederick, ”Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers,” Agricultural History 23 (1949): 2–3Google Scholar. A Maryland legislative committee that advocated state construction of the Washington branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 1830 argued that “it would … ensure a permanent and valuable revenue to the State. … [so that] every system of revenue burthensome to the citizens of the state, unfair in its operation or injurious to the morals of the community, might at once be dispensed with and abolished.” Maryland House of Delegates, Committee on Internal Improvement Report of the Committee on Internal Improvement, Delivered by Archibald Lee, Esq. Chairman, December session, 1830–31 (Annapolis, 1831), p. 5. The line was eventually built by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but the legislature gave it considerable financial aid (as did local governments) and at the same time imposed the transit tax mentioned above. Once it had established the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as a comfortable source of revenue, moreover, the legislature refused repeatedly to consider chartering competing lines to Washington. Merk, “Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers,” p. 4.

42. Meyer, History of Transportation, pp. 316–317, 354–355; Thurman W. Van Metre, Early Opposition to the Steam Railroad (n.p., n.d.), pp. 52–57; Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, p. 85.

43. New York State Assembly, Doc. No. 97, 78th Session, 1855, quoted in Van Metre, Early Opposition to the Steam Railroad, pp. 56–57.

44. New York (pseud.), Legislative Restrictions on the Carrying Trade of the Railways of the State New York: Viewed in Connection with Outside Competition (New York, 1860), pp. 3, 27–28; Merk, “Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers,” pp. 1, 7; Towles, John K., 'Early Railroad Monopoly and Discrimination in Rhode Island, 1835–55,” Yale Review 18 (11 1909): 308–19Google Scholar.

45. Ritner, Joseph, ”Annual Message to the Assembly, 1837,” Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser, vol. 6: Papers of the Governors, 1832–1845, ed. Reed, George Edward, (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1901), pp. 384–86Google Scholar.

46. Merk, ”Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers,” pp. 1–2; Van Metre, Early Opposition to the Steam Railroad, pp. 57–59; Meyer, History of Transportation, p. 395; Schotter, Howard Ward, The Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company: A Review of the Charter Annual Reports of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 1846 to 1926, Inclusive (Philadelphia: Press of Allen, Lane & Scott, 1927), pp. 7–8Google Scholar; Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought, pp. 267–68; Pollock, James, ”Annual Message to the Assembly, 1858,” Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser., vol. 7: Papers of the Governors, 1845–1858 ed. Reed, George Edward, (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1902), p. 937Google Scholar. The state finally sold the Main Line to the railroad in 1857. According to that agreement, the railroad would henceforth be exempt from state taxes, including the tonnage tax. But the state supreme court declared the provision unconstitutional, so the tax was reinstated until finally repealed in 1861.

47. Paul “Die preuische Eisenbahnpolitik,” pp. 260, 269–71; Enkling, Die Stellung des Staates, pp. 9–10, 28, 52; Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichie, p. 99.

48. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, p. 179; Enkling, Die Stellung des Staates, pp. 45–48, 78–79; Geschdfts-Bericht des Dtrectorium der Magdeburg-Cothen-Halle-Leipzig Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft fur die Zeit vom 15ten Mai 1842 bis turn 7ten April 1843, in ZStA Merseburg, Rep. 77, Tit. 258a, No. 2, Vol. 1, p. 170r (another copy may be found in Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preu/Jischer Kulturbesitz [West Berlin], Rep. 84a, No. 11233, 1843, Vol. 6, pp. 47–52). Details on other aspects of the dispute between the railroads and the post office may be found in the sources cited in note 47.

49. For details, see Dunlavy, Colleen A., ”Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia,” Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988Google Scholar.

50. Cf. Hall, Peter A., ”Patterns of Economic Policy: An Organizational Approach,” Born, S., Held, D., and Krieger, J., eds., The State in Capitalist Europe (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 21–53Google Scholar; March, James G. and Olsen, johan P., ”The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (09 1984): 734–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skocpol, Theda, ”Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Smith, Rogers M., ”Political Juris-prudence, The New Institutionalism, and the Future of Public-Law,” American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 89–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steinmo, Sven, ”Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain,” World Politics 41 (07 1989): 500–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51. Goodrich, “State In, State Out,” pp. 366–67.

52. Bourgin, The Great Challenge, pp. 127–75; Scheiber, Harry N., ”The Transportation Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism and Public Policy,” in Transportation and the Early Nation, Indiana American Revolution Bicentennial Symposium (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), pp. l–13Google Scholar; Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 18—21 (quotation from p. 19). Even though Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill in 1817 (which would have used monies derived from chartering the Bank of the United States to finance internal improvements), he did not object to the proposal itself but rather wanted a specific constitutional amendment so that it would not require a broad construction of the Constitution. See the works by Bourgin and Scheiber cited above. As Taylor points out, “Despite a great parade of constitutional scruple, successive chief executives and congresses actually approved grants to aid in building specific roads, canals, and railroads.” Even Andrew Jackson's administration, known for its hostility to federal action, spent nearly twice as much each year on internal improvements as did that of John Quincy Adams, “the great champion of internal improvements.” Annually the Adams' administration spent $702,000 while Jackson's spent $1,323,000. Ibid., pp. 20–21.

53. Ritter, Die Rolle des States, pp. 140–41, 144–46; Henning, Friedrich-Wilhelm, Die Industnalisierung in Deutschland 1800 bis 1914 (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1973), p. 80Google Scholar; Taylor, Transportation Revolution, p. 16; Koselleck, ”Staat und Gesellschaft,” p. 77; Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschkhte, pp. 100–1, 107; “Die Verhandlungen der Vereinigten standischen Ausschiisse,” pp. 4, 7.

54. Miller, George H., Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971), pp. 30–31Google Scholar. Cf. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 88–89, 379; and Meyer, History of Transportation, p. 558.

55. “Gesetz iiber die Eisenbahn-Unternehmungen, vom 3. November 1838,” GesetzSammlungfur die Kb'niglichen Preufiischen Staaten, No. 35, reprinted in Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschkhte, Appendix; Enkling, Die Stellungdes Staates, p. 75 (italics added); Gleim, ”Zum dritten November 1888,” Archiv fur Eisenbahnwesen 11 (1888): 804–806.

56. Eichholtz, Dietrich, Junker und Bourgeoisie vor 1848 in derpreu/Hschen Eisenbahngeschichte, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften des Instituts fur Geschichte, Series 1, Vol. 11 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), p. 42Google Scholar. For a fuller treatment, see Dunlavy, “Politics and Industrialization,” pp. 37–109.

57. The facts of the situation are well-known; for details, see Reden, Die Eisenbahnen Deutschlands, pp. 303–304; “Die Verhandlungen der Vereinigten standischen Ausschiisse,” p. 4; Paul, “Die preu/3ische Eisenbahnpolitik,” pp. 277–79; Kech, Edwin, Geschichte der deutschen Eisenbahnpolitik (Leipzig: G. J. Goschen, 1911), p. 50Google Scholar; Enkling, Die Stellung des Slaates, p. 66; Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 124, 163–65; idem, The Rise of German Industrial Power, pp. 48–49; Flenley, Ralph, Modern German History rev. ed. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 152, 168Google Scholar; and Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 10–11. The origins of the 1820 agreement clearly call for additional research; as one historian has written recently, it became “quite central” to Prussian politics in the Vormdrz period. Nipperdey, Thomas, Deutsche Geschichte, 1800–1866: Biirgerwelt und starker Staat (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1983), p. 278CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Klee, Preu/iische Eisenbahngeschichte, p. 107, suggests that the delegates from the Provincial Assemblies fully realized why Finance Minister von Bodelschwingh rejected the alternative of state construction in 1842: because obtaining the necessary funds would have required political liberalization.

58. I have borrowed the term “alarmed capital” from Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, who draws it from the mid-19th century American context. See below.

59. Cf. Enkling, Die Stellung des Staates, pp. 43, 51–52; Gleim, “Zum dritten November 1888,” p. 821; Paul, “Die preu/Sische Eisenbahnpolitik,” pp. 291–96.

60. Hansemann, David, Kritik des Preussischen Eisenbahn-Gesetzes vom 3. November 1838 (Aachen: J. A. Mayer, 1841), pp. 110–11Google Scholar.

61. Hansemann. Kritik, pp. 24–27 (quotation from pp.24–25). See also Hanseman, David, Die Eisenbuhnen and deren Aktionare in threm VerhaltniB zum Staut (Leipzig: Renger'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1837)Google Scholar; Klee, PrenBische Eisenhangeschichte, p. 101.

62. Klee, Preuflische Eisenbahngeschichte, p. 100. Cf. Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics, pp. 275–76.

63. Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order,” p. 89; and Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought, pp.44–45, “Charter log-rolling” involved banks as well as transportation projects and sometimes linked the two. The 1835 charter for Second Bank of the United States, for example, required it to subscribe to the stock of ten transportation companies (mainly railroads and canals) and to make “grants of financial assistance” to another eleven turnpikes and roads. Ibid., pp. 46–47. As part of the “revulsion” against state enterprise, some of the new state constitutions explicitly forbade chartering more than one railroad at a time. Goodrich, ”The Revulsion Against Internal Improvements,” p. 146.

64. Hungerford, Edward, The Story of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 1827–1927 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), pp. 241–42Google Scholar; Stover, John F., History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1987), pp. 66–67Google Scholar; Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought, pp. 42–44.

65. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, pp. 242–44; Stover, History of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, p. 68; Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought, pp. 43, 52–53, 267–68.

66. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 192.

67. Goodrich, “State In, State Out,” pp. 365–83.

68. Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 110–13; Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 124, 163, and 165–68; Tilly, Richard, “The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 1815–1866,” Journal of Economic History 26 (12 1966): 489CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hamerow, Theodore S., Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815–1871 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Flenley, Modern German History, p. 168; Carr, William, A History of Germany, 1815–1945 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 34–35Google Scholar; Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschtchte, p. 192.

69. Heffter, Heinrich, “Der nachmarzliche Liberalismus: die Reaktion der funfziger Jahre,” in Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, ed., Modernedeutsche Sozialgeschichte, 5th ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1976), pp. 177–96Google Scholar; Richard Dietrich, “Preu/3en zwischen Absolutismus und Verfassungsstaat,” Preufien-Ploetz, pp. 204–205.

70. Cf. Hahn, Erich, “Ministerial Responsibility and Impeachment in Prussia, 1848–63,” Central European History 10 (1977): 3–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71. See the diagram in Preufien-Ploetz, p. 215. The constitution resulted only indirectly from popular deliberation; after an assembly elected to deliberate on the subject ended in impasse, the king imposed (oktroyierte) the constitution from above.

72. Heffter, “Der nachmarzliche Liberalismus,” pp. 190–91.

73. For details on the campaign, see the documents in ZStA Merseburg. Rep. 77, Tit. 260, No. 6, Akten betr. das Verfahren gegen diejenigen Eisenbahn-Beamten, vvelche demokratische und regierungsfeindliche Gesinnungen an den Tag legen, Vol. I (August 12, 1849, to May 31, 1852), Vol. II (June 16, 1852 to July 22, 1858), and Vol. III (May 31, 1864 to September 11, 1901). Cf. Klee, Preuflische Eisenbahngeschichte, p. 119. In at least one instance, the campaign extended into the highest levels of railroad management. See the documents in ZStA Merseburg, Rep. 77, Tit. 260, No. 3, Vol. 1, pp. 132r–162v, regarding a “democrat” who had been elected a director of the Diisseldorf-Elberfeld Railroad but was forced to resign by Minister von der Heydt (working through the line's railroad commissioner). On Minister von der Heydt, a native of Elberfeld, see Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 169–89.

74. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 171–80; Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 119–25. As both sources indicate, von der Heydt's initiatives encountered considerable opposition, but he succeeded nonetheless.

75. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia, pp. 179–80, 185; Klee, Preuflische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 122, 124.

76. In 1846 the Finance Minister had instructed the railroads to submit the annual reports required by the 1838 law, a provision that had not been enforced until then. Since Section 34 of the law explicitly described these as necessary in order for the state to exercise its powers to regulate tolls and rates, his action implied a renewed effort to strengthen the state's powers.Festschrift u'ber die Thdtigkeit des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen in den ersten 50 Jahren seines Bestehens, 1846–1896 (Berlin, 1896), p. 393; “Gesetz iiber die EisenbahnUnternehmungen.” The impact of the American and Prussian political structures on the process of organizing railroad interests is treated in detail in my “Politics and Industrialization,” pp. 322–429; and briefly in my “Organizing Railroad Interests: The Creation of National Railroad Associations in the United States and Prussia,” Business and Economic History, 2d. ser., 19 (1990), forthcoming.

77. Enkling, , Die Stellung des Staates, pp. 55—56. The 1843 case involved the Upper Silesian Railroad. Zur Fein des Funfundzwanzigsten Jahrestages der Erbffnung des Betriebes auf der Oberschlesischen Eisenbahn, den 22. March 1867 (Breslau, 1867), pp. 60–67Google Scholar. For a later example, see Geschafts-Bericht der Direction der Magdeburg-Cothen-Halle-Leipzig EisenbahnGesellschaft fur das Jahr 1850, in Staatsarchiv Magdeburg, Rep. C20Ib, No. 2851, Vol. 3, p. 88.5r.

78. Although the railroads contested his action in the courts, von der Heydt had won the battle by the late 1850s. Henderson, The Stale and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 180–82; Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 215–16; Roloff, , ”Aus der Geschichte der Berlin-Stettiner Eisenbahngesellschaft,” Archwfiir Eisenbahnwesen 39 (1916): 885Google Scholar. The Berlin-Hamburg Railroad, supported by the Mecklenburg and Hamburg governments, put up strong resistance; that story can be followed in the numerous Berlin–Hamburg Railroad documents in the Staatsarchiv Hamburg.

79. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 182–83; and Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, pp. 126, 129.

80. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, pp. 75–93.

81. Klee, Preufiische Eisenbahngeschichte, p. 118.

82. The argument that the railroads constituted the first “big business” is developed at length in Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1977)Google Scholar. See also idem, comp. and ed., The Railroads: The Nation's First Big Business, Sources and Readings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965).

83. The following paragraphs rely on the excellent discussion in Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, pp. 1–41. Footnotes are used only for quotations from Miller or for additional sources. See also Levy, Leonard W., The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw: The Evolution of American Law, 1830–1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957; reprint ed., New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 135–39Google Scholar.

84. Cf. Evidence Showing the Manner in Which Locomotive Engines Are Used Upon Rail-Roads and the Danger and Inexpediency of Permitting Rival Companies Using Them on the Same Road (Boston, 1838).

85. Cf. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw, pp. 135–36.

86. Cf. Chandler, The Visible Hand, pp. 116–19.

87. See the excellent discussion in Lamoreaux, Naomi R., The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 46–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, p. 17.

89. For an early argument in favor of long haul-short haul differentials, see Report of the Directors of the Boston & Worcester Rail Road, to the Stockholders, at Their Ninth Annual Meeting, June 1, 1840 (Boston, 1840), pp. 7–8. For a general discussion of rate—making at the time, see Report of a Committee of Directors of the Boston and Worcester Rail-road Corporation. On the proposition of the Directors of the Western Rail-road, to reduce the rates of fare and freight on the two Rail-roads (Boston, 1840).

90. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, p. 23.

91. Ibid., p. 28.

92. Ibid., p. 32.

93. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, p. 32.

94. Manufacturers ‘and Farmers’ Journal, January 20, 1854, quoted in Towles, “Early Rail-road Monopoly and Discrimination in Rhode Island,” pp. 316–17. Cf. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, pp. 33–34.

95. Towles, “Early Railroad Monopoly and Discrimination in Rhode Island,” pp. 318–19.

96. Cf. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, pp. 34–40.

97. Ibid., p. 217n36.

98. Ibid., pp. 34–35. Cf. Merk, “Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers,” p. 1.

99. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, pp. 36–37; Pollock, James, “Annual Message to the Assembly, 1858,” Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser., vol. 7: Papers of the Governors, 1845‐1858, ed. Reed, George Edward (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1902), p. 937Google Scholar. The Pennsylvania Railroad did not escape rate regulation altogether in 1861; in a “compromise,” the tonnage tax and “other disabilities” were eliminated in exchange for a prohibition against long haul-short haul differentials. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, p. 36.

100. Ibid., p. 39; Scheiber, , ”Federalism and American Economic Growth,” p. 99. Cf. Memorial of the A tchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, to the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Kansas (Topeka: George W. Martin, 1879)Google Scholar. This tract discussed the threat to new construction (“if a stringent tariff law is enacted, it will be impossible to obtain one dollar of foreign capital for [new railroads],” [p. 42, original italics]) and emphasized the company's political support in areas that did not yet have railroads (p. 43), but, given its location in a comparatively thin part of the railroad network, it did not mention the potential diversion of traffic.

101. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, p. 40.

102. Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order,” pp. 115–16.

103. Kolko, Gabriel, Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965CrossRefGoogle Scholar; New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).

104. Journal ojthe Proceedings of the General Railroad Association, at Their Meeting Holden in New York, November 23d, 1854 (Newark, 1855), pp. 17–18.

105. Proceedings of the Convention of the Northern Lines of Railway, Held at Boston, in December, 1850, and January, 1851 (Boston, 1851), pp. 85–87.

106. Journal of the Proceedings of the General Railroad Association, p. 17.

107. Scheiber, “Federalism and American Economic Growth,” pp. 76–78, 116; Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, pp. 172–93 (quotation from p. 172).

108. Scheiber, “Federalism and American Economic Growth,” pp. 70, 99. See Elazar, Exploring Federalism, p. 37, for a similar usage of the term matrix. The effect of the railroads' capital intensity on rates also confounded Prussian officials, since they too had followed traditional practice and regulated tolls but not carrying charges in the 1838 railroad law. However, in the context of a unitary state, the issue did not unleash political battles in the way that it did in the American federal-legislative system. Ultimately, the Prussian solution to the problem was nationalization. See Gleim, “Zum dritten November 1888,” pp. 827–29.

109. Skowronek, Stephen, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 121–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.