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The Micropolitics of “the Army You Have”: Explaining the Development of U.S. Military Doctrine After Vietnam

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2012

Adam Joyce
Adam Joyce*
Affiliation:
New School for Social Research
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

The U.S. Army's recent embrace of counterinsurgency warfare and nation building complicates theories of military politics. For decades, critics declared the army too risk averse, too parochial, and too insulated to change, often thwarting civilian demands for greater flexibility. How should we understand these recent, unexpected changes? In this article I synthesize insights from historical institutionalism and American political development to derive a micropolitical perspective on institutional change. This approach advances two components as necessary before an institution transforms. First, mid-level agents shift the unofficial discourses through which they understand and describe the institution's core missions and capabilities. These slow and often subtle changes create a mismatch between the mid-level actors and the institution's paradigm. This erosion of institutional order provides an opportunity to reformers. The second component of transformation is the work of these reformers to forge coalitions with elites inside and outside government and press institutional leaders for change. In the rest of the article, I demonstrate the efficacy of the micropolitical approach by investigating how the army developed its AirLand Battle doctrine after the Vietnam War. My analysis of recently declassified correspondence, oral-history interviews, and the writings of officers and experts shows how mid-level officers and external reformers were able to shift the discourses of army leaders and develop an institutional paradigm that endured for decades. Indeed, AirLand Battle influenced the Weinberger criteria for deploying American troops, and it shaped U.S. conduct during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This suggests a research program that could demonstrate why and how the U.S. Army's way of war changed during the 2000s, as well as how durable this transformation will be.

Type
The Military in American Political Development
Information
Studies in American Political Development , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , October 2012 , pp. 180 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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64. I have conducted a deeper analysis of this process, based on oral-history interviews, internal papers, and articles in journals, which I can make available on request.

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66. Because of space constraints, I focus here on how army officers interacted with civilian critics. But there may be a range of other cross-boundary interactions, including with branches like the U.S. Air Force, that affected the army's doctrinal development.

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84. See, for example, Alexander M. Haig, letter to Starry, 1 August 1978, in Starry Papers, Box 13, Folder 9; Trevor N. DuPuy, letter to Starry, 15 December 1978, in Starry Papers, Box 15, Folder 3; Starry, “Living Systems: Message to Dr. Walter LaBerge,” 6 June 1979, in Press On!, Volume I, 543; Starry, letter to Alvin Toffler, 31 August 1982, in Press On!, Volume I, 393.

85. Starry, “Commander's Notes No. 3: Operational Concepts and Doctrine,” 20 February 1979, reprinted in Romjue, Active Defense, 87–89; Donald R. Morelli, “Oral Interview,” interview by John L. Romjue, 12 January 1983, TRADOC History Office Files, 18–19; William R. Richardson, memo to Starry, 12 August 1980, in Starry Papers, Box 51, Folder 5; Starry, memo to Meyer, 28 November 1980, in Meyer Papers, Box 3.

86. Donald R. Morelli, letter to Starry, 20 February 1980, in Starry Papers, Folder 20, Box 3.

87. Starry, “Life and Career,” 1147; Morelli, “Oral Interview,” 18.

88. Morelli, “Oral Interview,” 21.

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91. Starry, letter to Meyer, 26 June 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 17, Folder 7; Starry, memo to Meyer, 30 March 1981, in Starry Papers.

92. Starry, “Combat Vehicle,” 234; Starry, note to aide, circa 1 March 1980, in Starry Papers, Box 20, Folder 8.

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97. Ibid., 109.

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100. See Thomas A. Ware, letter to Starry, 6 April 1978, in Starry Papers, Box 12, Folder 1; DuPuy, letter to Starry; I. B. Holley, letter to Starry, 9 May 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 17, Folder 4.

101. Starry, “Tanks Forever,” Armor 84 (July–August 1975)Google Scholar, reprinted in Press On!, Volume I, 152; Starry, letter to John C. Faith, 19 May 1978, in Starry Papers, Box 12, Folder 8.

102. Starry, “Principles of War,” 2 May 1979, in Press On!, Volume I, 609–11.

103. Ibid., 612–14.

104. Starry, letter to I. B. Holley, 23 May 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 17, Folder 4; Starry, “Military History,” 5 November 1979, in Press On!, Volume I, 617; William R. Richardson, memo to Starry, 21 April 1980, in Starry Papers; Starry, memo to William R. Richardson, 25 April 1980, in Starry Papers; Richardson, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” interview by William H. Parry III, 2000, 29, in Papers of William R. Richardson, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

105. Starry, “FM 100-5 Defense Philosophy,” 11 November 1976, in Press On!, Volume I, 284.

106. Starry, “Training and Testing,” 23 January 1978, in Press On!, Volume II, 783; Starry, “The Central Battle Again,” 24 May 1978, in Press On!, Volume I.

107. Staudenmaier, William O., “Military Strategy in Transition,” Parameters 8 (December 1978)Google Scholar; Taylor, John W., “A Method for Developing Doctrine,” Military Review 59 (March 1979)Google Scholar; Gans, Daniel, “Fight Outnumbered and Win Against What Odds?” Military Review 60 (December 1980)Google Scholar.

108. Richard H. Sinnreich, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” interview by Steven G. Fox, April 24, 2001, 14–15, in Richard H. Sinnreich Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

109. Ibid., 16.

110. Office of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, “Comments on Operational Concept for Division 86,” circa 16 January 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 15, Folder 5 (emphasis added).

111. Cameron, John R., “Turf Philosophy Hard on Doctrine Cohesion,” Army 32 (August 1982)Google Scholar; Starry, “To Change an Army,” Military Review 63 (March 1983)Google Scholar.

112. Department of the Army, FM 100-1, The Army (1978), 5.

113. Ibid., 14.

114. Starry, “Defense Doctrine,” 17 October 1974, in Press On!, Volume I, 275–77.

115. Starry, “The Central Battle,” 24 April 1978, in Press On!, Volume I, 313.

116. Starry, “Defense Doctrine,” 275.

117. Starry, “Active Defense (Benedict),” 13 March 1978, in Press On!, Volume I, 300.

118. Starry, “The Corps Battle,” 1977, in Press On!, Volume I, 290.

119. Starry, “FM 100-5: Operations,” 30 March 1978, in Press On!, Volume I, 305–6.

120. Starry, “Corps Battle,” 291; Starry, “Battlefield Reserves,” 22 March 1978, in Press On!, Volume I, 303.

121. Starry, “Ground Forces Issues,” 31 December 1980, in Press On!, Volume I, 362.

122. Starry, “Continuous Land Combat,” 7 December 1977, in Press On!, Volume I, 170.

123. Starry, “Defense Philosophy,” 284. See also Starry, “Corps Battle,” 287.

124. Starry, “Central Battle,” 313.

125. Starry, letter to Meyer, 30 January 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 15, Folder 5.

126. Starry, “Central Battle,” 313.

127. Starry, “Instruction on Offensive Operations,” 29 March 1978, in Press On!, Volume I, 304; Starry, letter to Ware.

128. Starry, “Principles of War,” 611. See also “TRADOC's Reply,” Armed Forces Journal International 114 (October 1976)Google Scholar.

129. Army, FM 100-5 (1976), 4–1, 4–2, 4–5.

130. Ibid., 3–6.

131. Starry, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 28 December 1978, in Press On!, Volume II, 731–32.

132. Starry, letter to Donald R. Carter, 19 December 1977, in Starry Papers.

133. Starry, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 732.

134. Starry, memo to Meyer, 28 December 1978, in Starry Papers, Box 49, Folder 3.

135. William R. Richardson, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” interview by Michael Ackerman, 1987, 327, in Richardson Papers.

136. See Suzanne C. Nielsen, “U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–82: A Case Study in Successful Peacetime Military Reform,” (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 63–64; Richardson, “Oral History,” 2000, 17.

137. Starry aide, handwritten note to Starry, 19 January 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 15, Folder 5.

138. Starry, letter to Meyer, 26 June 1979.

139. Romjue, Active Defense, 33.

140. Ibid., 35–36.

141. Dinges, Edward A. and Sinnreich, Richard H., “Battlefield Interdiction: New Term, Old Problem,” Field Artillery Journal 48 (January–February 1980): 15Google Scholar.

142. Morelli, “Oral Interview,” 8.

143. Starry, memo to Meyer, 20 February 1979, in Starry Papers, Box 44, Folder 5.

144. Starry, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Employment,” 10 April 1979, in Press On!, Volume II, 736.

145. Ibid., 737.

146. Cate, “Large Unit,” 46.

147. Sinnreich, “Tactical Doctrine,” 17.

148. Jack N. Merritt, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” interview by Carlos Glover, March 7, 1997, 105, in Jack N. Merritt Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

149. Sinnreich, “Tactical Doctrine,” 16–17.

150. Morelli, “Oral Interview,” 9. Starry voices his dissatisfaction with ideas generated by Fort Leavenworth after the Fort Sill review in a memo to Richardson, 21 April 1980, in Starry Papers.

151. Starry, “Army of the Future,” 14 February 1980, in Press On!, Volume I, 668–670.

152. Ibid., 670.

153. Starry, “Force Structure,” 5 March 1980, in Press On!, Volume I, 461.

154. Starry, “The Integrated Battlefield,” 25 November 1980, in Press On!, Volume I, 199–200.

155. Starry, note to Morelli, 4 August 1980, in Starry Papers, Box 51, Folder 4; Starry, handwritten note on memo from Richardson, circa 27 January 1981, in Starry Papers, Box 53, Folder 3.

156. Department of the Army, “TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations—1986,” 25 March 1981, 2.

157. Ibid., 12, 2.

158. Ibid., 12, 2–3.

159. Ibid., 15.

160. I have conducted a deeper analysis of this part of the process, which I can make available on request.

161. For instance, Starry notes that the revision of FM 100-1, while done at Leavenworth, was a collaboration with the Army War College and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. At the time, the deputy chief of staff was Glenn K. Otis, who would soon succeed Starry as TRADOC commander. See Starry, letter to Meyer, 12 January 1981, in Starry Papers, Box 23, Folder 11. Morelli said the Army War College was a major influence on the separation of levels of war; see “Oral Interview,” 21–22.

162. Richardson, memo to Starry, 6 January 1981, in Starry Papers, Box 53, Folder 4.

163. Starry, “Tenth Principle of War,” 24 April 1981, in Press On!, Volume I, 625.

164. Department of the Army, FM 100-1, The Army (1981), 14.

165. Ibid., 17.

166. de Czege, Huba Wass and Holder, L. D., “The New FM 100-5,” Military Review 62 (July 1982): 54Google Scholar; Starry, “Active Defense,” 25 June 1981, in Press On!, Volume I, 371.

167. Starry, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned,” 18 September 1991, in Press On!, Volume II, 1254.

168. Morelli, “Oral Interview,” 10.

169. Wass de Czege, “Doctrinal Reform,” 107, 116–17.