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The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Secession
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
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Whether secession movements in Europe draw support from the disintegration of the Soviet Union into multiple units based on separate national identities or whether there are also independent centrifugal forces, the “right to secession” has emerged as a pressing question of democratic theory, one which is intertwined in complex ways with the current debate over the foundations of modern democratic society. This essay seeks to clarify the issue of right to secession through a critical examination of a single modern statesman: Abraham Lincoln.
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References
1. See Peterson, Merrill D., Lincoln in American Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 366–67, 396Google Scholar, for an inventory of Lincoln's international reputation.
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9. Lincoln's employment of Jefferson raises two important and related points, both of which lie just slightly outside the focus of this essay. One involves the question of the right to secession in the Jefferson model and the other the question of whether Lincoln “misread” or expanded upon Jefferson and the Declaration. While Jefferson's views on slavery and political equality for African-Americans bear similarities to Lincoln's – if one secludes the enormous autobiographical exception of slave ownership itself – so, too, do Jefferson's writings give great weight to states' rights, a perspective relevant to any theory of secession. Thus, it is certainly possible to imagine a scenario of secession in which a Jefferson recidivus responds in some ways similar to the way Lincoln did although the more likely narrative would place Jefferson in another role than the one Lincoln assumed. Whatever the relative weights Jefferson might have assigned the rights of equality and state sovereignty, nineteenth-century Americans, both northerners and southerners, held few doubts about where his doctrine led as Lincoln's model triumphed as an exemplar independent of his putative source. See Peterson's, Merrill D. conclusion that “the dark shadow of the War fell across the Jefferson image like a great and furious nemesis.” The Jefferson Image in the American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 209Google Scholar. For two differing views by admirers of Lincoln on whether Lincoln accurately read the Declaration, see: Jaffa, Harry, The Crisis of the House Divided (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959)Google Scholar; and Wills, , Lincoln at Gettysburg and his Inventing America (New York: Vintage, 1978), xii–xxivGoogle Scholar.
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17. Ibid., 161. The Southern response was to interpret Lincoln's populism as a form of praetorianism. See, for example, Daily Delta, February 26, 1861.
18. “Lyceum Address” (1838), in Selected Speeches, 14.
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40. Ibid., 143.
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