Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T17:05:39.513Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Leader to Laggard: How Founding Institutions Have Shaped American Environmental Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2020

David Brian Robertson*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Missouri – St. Louis

Abstract

The U.S. led the world in environmental policy in the 1970s, but now lags behind comparable nations and resists joining others in tackling climate change. Two embedded, entwined, and exceptional American institutions—broad private property rights and competitive federalism—are necessary for explaining this shift. These two institutions shaped the exceptional stringency of 1970s American environmental laws and the powerful backlash against these laws that continues today. American colonies ensured broad private rights to use land and natural resources for profit. The colonies and the independent state governments that followed wielded expansive authority to govern this commodified environment. In the 1780s, Congress underwrote state governance of the privatized environment by directing the parceling and transfer of federal land to private parties and of environmental governance to future states. The 1787 Constitution cemented these relationships and exposed states to interstate economic competition. Environmental laws of the 1970s imposed unprecedented challenges to the environmental prerogatives long protected by these institutions, and the beneficiaries responded with a wide-ranging counterattack. Federalism enabled this opposition to build powerful regional alliances to stymie action on climate change. These overlooked institutional factors are necessary to explain why Canadian and American environmental policies have diverged.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Acknowledgments: Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers and the editors of Studies in American Political Development for very helpful comments on an earlier version. I thank many colleagues for comments that strengthened the article: Larry Gragg, Richard Bensel, Bat Sparrow, David Siemers, Steven Kautz, Ruth Iyob, David Kimball, Lorenzo Gonzales, Jeff Pasley, Jerritt Frank, Robert Konig, Peter Kastor, Robert Paulett, Susan Flader, Lorri Glover, Chris Deutsch, Shannon Fogg, Michael Bruening, Jeff Schramm, Kathleen Sheppard, Jack Rakove, and Petra Dewitt. I am deeply indebted to Missouri University of Science and Technology for awarding me a Maxwell C. Weiner Distinguished Professorship of Humanities for spring 2016; this honor allowed me necessary time to research and focus on this project.

References

1. Weaver, John C., The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–1900 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006)Google Scholar. See Schorr, David B., “Historical Analysis in Environmental Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of Legal History, ed. Dubber, Markus D. and Tomlins, Christopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018)Google Scholar.

2. Weaver, The Great Land Rush, 61–66.

3. Meadowcroft, James, “Greening the State?” in Comparative Environmental Politics: Theory, Practice, and Prospects, ed. Steinberg, Paul F. and VanDeveer, Stacy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 64Google Scholar.

4. Andrews, Richard N. L., “United States,” in National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building, ed. Jänicke, Martin and Weidner, Helmut (Berlin: Springer, 1997), 2543CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vogel, David, The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Vogel, David, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 164Google Scholar; Lundquist, Lennart, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Enloe, Cynthia H., The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective: Ecology and Power in Four Nations (New York: David McKay, 1975)Google Scholar.

5. Vogel, David, “The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe,” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (2003): 557–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stewart, Richard B., “Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,” Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 2046CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Burton, Ian, Wilson, John, and Munn, R. E., “Environmental Impact Assessment: National Approaches and International Needs,” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 3, no. 2 (1983): 133–50CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

7. Caldwell, Lynton K., “The World Environment: Reversing U.S. Policy Commitments,” in Environmental Policies in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda, ed. Vig, Norman J. and Kraft, Michael E. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1984), 322–23Google Scholar; Kelemen, R. Daniel and Vogel, David, “Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 4 (2010): 427–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. Vig, Norman and Faure, Michael, “Introduction,” in Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union, ed. Vig, Norman J. and Faure, Michael (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. OECD, How Stringent Are Environmental Policies? (Paris: OECD, 2016), 6, accessed July 7, 2019, http://www.oecd.org/eco/greeneco/How-stringent-are-environmental-policies.pdf.

10. Bertelsmann Stiftung [Foundation], “Policy Performance: Environmental Policies,” accessed December 25, 2018, http://www.sgi-network.org/2018/Policy_Performance/Environmental_Policies. The U.S. ranked last among forty-one industrial nations from 2014 to 2018, with a substantially declining score in 2018. In comparison, Canada ranked thirty-eighth in 2014, but twenty-fifth in 2018, with a substantially increasing score. See also Weidner, Helmut and Jänecke, Martin, “Summary: Environmental Capacity Building in a Converging World,” in Rankings of Capacity Building in National Environmental Policy: A Comparative Study of 17 Countries, ed. Weidner, Helmut and Jänecke, Martin (Heidelberg Springer, 2002), 423CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a study by a Canadian environmental think tank, Canada ranked marginally better than the United States in environmental performance; Gunton, Thomas and Calbick, K. S., The Maple Leaf in the OECD: Canada's Environmental Performance (Vancouver, BC: David Suzuki Foundation, 2010), 5Google Scholar.

11. McKitrick, Ross, Aliakbari, Elmira, and Stedman, Ashley, Environmental Ranking for Canada and the OECD (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2018), 5Google Scholar, accessed January 7, 2019, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/environmental-ranking-for-canada-and-the-OECD.pdf.

12. Kelemen and Vogel, “Trading Places.”

13. “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord,” June 1, 2017, accessed January 13, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.

14. Doern, G. Bruce, Auld, Graeme, and Stoney, Christopher, Green-Lite: Complexity in Fifty Years of Canadian Environmental Policy, Governance, and Democracy (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 6Google Scholar. See also Paehlke, Robert, “Environmentalism in One Country: Canadian Environmental Policy in an Era of Globalization,” Policy Studies Journal 28, no. 1 (2000): 160–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, accessed June 29, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework/climate-change-plan.html.

16. Ibid., accessed July 14, 2019; Rose Saba, “Every Canadian Province—Including Alberta—Now Has a Carbon Tax, but the ‘Pure Politics’ Battle Isn't Over,” Toronto Star, January 1, 2020, accessed January 9, 2020, https://www.thestar.com/calgary/2020/01/01/every-canadian-province-including-alberta-now-has-a-carbon-tax-but-the-pure-politics-battle-isnt-over.html.

17. Hirt, Sonia A., Zoned in the USA: The Origins and Implications of American Land-Use Regulation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 8689Google Scholar.

18. U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, The Growth Potential of Deregulation (Washington, DC: Council of Economic Advisers, October 2, 2017)Google Scholar, accessed June 12, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/The%20Growth%20Potential%20of%20Deregulation_1.pdf. On the correlation of wealth and stringency, see OECD, How Stringent Are Environmental Policies?, 8. American GDP growth is very comparable to that of Australia, Canada, and Sweden since 1960, and it has been somewhat higher than that of Germany and France. World Bank, “Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita” (in 2010 U.S. dollars), 1960–2015, accessed June 12, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2017&locations=DE-US-SE-CA-FR-AU&start=1960&view=chart.

19. Caldwell, Lynton K., “Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use—The Need for a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy,” William and Mary Law Review 15, no. 4 (Summer 1974): 759–75Google Scholar; Lipset, Seymour Martin, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. There is evidence that partisan opinions about environmental protection were diverging in the heyday of environmental legislation of the early 1970s, yet those laws were enacted; Dunlap, Riley E., Xiao, Chenyang, and McCright, Aaron M., “Politics and Environment in America: Partisan and Ideological Cleavages in Public Support for Environmentalism,” Environmental Politics 10, no. 4 (2001): 2348CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. Pew Research Center, “Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years,” June 4, 2012, accessed July 6, 2019, http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/partisan-polarization-surges-in-bush-obama-years/; see Jaime Fuller, “Environmental Policy Is Partisan. It Wasn't Always,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2014, accessed July 2, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/02/support-for-the-clean-air-act-has-changed-a-lot-since-1970/?utm_term=.75ffd0199e2a; Dunlap, Riley E., McCright, Aaron M., and Yarosh, Jerrod H., “The Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S.,” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 58, no. 5 (2016): 4-23Google Scholar.

22. Grossmann, Matt and Hopkins, David A., Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. See Daniel Schraad-Tischler and Christof Schiller, “Is Political Polarization Holding Back the US?” World Economic Forum, September 15, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/united-states-political-polarization-hinders-future-viability/.

24. Endre Tvinnereim, “A Polarized Climate? Party Sorting over Climate Change and the Environment among Candidates and Voters in Europe” (working paper, Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Sciences, Bergen, Norway, 2015), accessed June 12, 2019, http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/17176/WP%201-2015%20Tvinnereim.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. While Australia ranked lower than the U.S., its policy stringency increased much more after the mid-1990s.

25. Pierson, Paul, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1753CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the importance of sequence, see Pierson, Paul, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 7292CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the responses to Pierson in Studies in American Political Development 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 93112CrossRefGoogle Scholar, by Robert Jervis, “Timing and Interaction in Politics: A Comment on Pierson”; Kathleen Thelen, “Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Change”; and Amy Bridges, “Path Dependence, Sequence, History, Theory.” My study also employs the approach to historical explanation explained in Mahoney, James, Kimball, Erin, and Koivu, Kendra L., “The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 1 (2009): 114–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. Davis, Lance Edwin, North, Douglass C., and Smorodin, Calla, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. Libecap, Gary W., “Property Rights and Federal Land Policy, in Government and the American Economy: A New History, ed. Fishback, Price et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Gilligan, Thomas W., ed., “American Exceptionalism Due Principally to Secure Private Property Rights,” in American Exceptionalism in a New Era: Rebuilding the Foundation of Freedom & Prosperity (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2017)Google Scholar.

28. Caldwell, “Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use,” 759, 762. See also Opie, John, The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), xiGoogle Scholar: American “land laws and farm policies were based entirely upon the principle of unrestricted ownership of private property for personal profit.”

29. Weingast, Barry M., “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11, no. 1 (April 1995): 131Google Scholar.

30. Dunlavy, Colleen A., Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4Google Scholar; see also John, Richard R., Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. Wiley, Edwin and Rines, Irving R., Lectures on the Growth and Development of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 1916), 3Google Scholar; Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Engerman, Stanley L., “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 217–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32. Price, Edward T., Dividing the Land: Early American Beginnings of Our Private Property Mosaic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 332Google Scholar; Andrews, Richard N. L., Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 37Google Scholar.

33. Linklater, Andro, Owning the Earth: The Transforming History of Land Ownership (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 923, 35Google Scholar; Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001; first published in 1944), 3544Google Scholar; Kain, Roger J. P., Chapman, John, and Oliver, Richard R., The Enclosure Maps of England and Wales 1595–1918: A Cartographic Analysis and Electronic Catalogue (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 139Google Scholar.

34. Craven, Wesley Frank, The Virginia Company of London, 1606–1624 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1957)Google Scholar; Kupperman, Karen Ordahl, The Jamestown Project (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

35. Nelson, William E., The Common Law of Colonial America. Vol. I: The Chesapeake and New England, 1607–1660 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 40, 5152CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36. Curtis, Christopher Michael, Jefferson's Freeholders and the Politics of Ownership in the Old Dominion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37. Nelson, The Common Law of Colonial America, 50–52.

38. Stilgoe, John R., Common Landscape of America, 1580–1845 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 4748Google Scholar; see also Greer, Allan, “Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America,” American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (April 2012): 373–74)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39. Field, Barry C., “The Evolution of Individual Property Rights in Massachusetts Agriculture, 17th–19th Centuries,” Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 14, no. 2 (October 1985): 97109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. Konig, David Thomas, “Community Custom and the Common Law: Social Change and the Development of Land Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts,” American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 2 (April, 1974): 137–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. Stilgoe, Common Landscape of America, 35, 44–45; Cronon, William, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 74Google Scholar. Such surveys were never a characteristic of the southern colonies; Ford, Amelia Clewley, “Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as It Existed in 1800,” Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin 852 (1908): 1925Google Scholar.

42. Ely, James W. Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights, 3rd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3031, 35Google Scholar; Thomas, David A., “Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History: Part II: How Anglo-American Land Law Diverged After American Colonization and Independence,” Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 34 (Summer 1999): 295361Google Scholar; Bond, Beverley W., “The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies,” American Historical Review 17, no. 3 (April 1912): 496516. In 1732CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the British Parliament subtly helped further commodify American land by privileging merchants and creditors’ claims against real property in the colonies; Priest, Claire, “Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History,” Harvard Law Review 120, no. 2 (December 2006): 385459Google Scholar.

43. Treanor, William Michael, “The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” Yale Law Journal 94, no. 3 (1985): 694716CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Justice Holmes's majority opinion stated: “The general rule, at least, is that, while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking.…We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change” (pp. 415–16).

45. Wilson, James, “On the History of Property,” in The Collected Works of James Wilson, ed. Hall, Kermit L. and Hall, Mark David (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 1: 372–98Google Scholar, accessed December 4, 2017, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2072#Wilson_4140_1879.

46. Alterman, Rachelle, Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2010), 5, 25Google Scholar.

47. Libecap, Gary D., “Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: U.S. Exceptionalism,” in Handbook of Cliometrics, ed. Diebolt, Claude and Haupert, Michael (Berlin: Springer, 2018), accessed August 4, 2019Google Scholar, https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-40458-0_46-1.

48. Fitzgerald, Timothy, “Importance of Mineral Rights and Royalty Interests for Rural Residents and Landowners,” Choices 29, no. 4 (2014): 17Google Scholar.

49. Alberta Land Institute, “A Guide to Property Rights in Alberta: Subsurface Property Rights,” University of Alberta, 2014, accessed January 5, 2018, http://propertyrightsguide.ca/subsurface-property-rights/.

50. Dobra, John, Divergent Mineral Rights Regimes: A Natural Experiment in Canada and the United States Yields Lessons (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2014)Google Scholar, accessed January 5, 2018, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/divergent-mineral-rights-regimes-rev_0.pdf. For decades, American oil-producing states like Texas and Oklahoma have administered the rate of oil extracted from wells, an arrangement underwritten by federal law during the New Deal.

51. Nevins, Allan, The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775–1789 (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 117–70Google Scholar; Beer, Samuel H., To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1993), 200206Google Scholar; Kruman, Marc W., Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 15–33, 111–16Google Scholar.

52. For example, it was difficult for Massachusetts to establish state authority within its territory, even though it moved rapidly to do so. See Handlin, Oscar and Handlin, Mary Flug, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Hartog, Hendrick, “Losing the World of the Massachusetts Whig,” in Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in American Law: A Collection of Review Essays on American Legal History, ed. Hartog, Hendrick (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 143–66Google Scholar.

53. Ferguson, E. James, The Power of the Purse: A History of Public Finance, 1776–1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 6162Google Scholar; Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution, 652–56, 659–60.

54. Here, “fee” had a medieval meaning as one's domain; “fee simple” titles contrasted with “fee tail,” a feudal land holding that entailed obligations to the king.

55. Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, 30.

56. Einhorn, Robin L., American Taxation, American Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 25105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57. Newell, Margaret Ellen, “The Birth of New England in the Atlantic Economy: From Its Beginning to 1770,” in Engines of Enterprise: An Economic History of New England, ed. Temin, Peter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 41Google Scholar.

58. Ibid.; Becker, Robert A., Revolution, Reform, and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763–1783 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 1314Google Scholar.

59. Grenier, John, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2143CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60. Livermore, Shaw, Early American Land Companies: Their Influence on Corporate Development (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1939)Google Scholar.

61. Berkhofer, Robert F. Jr., “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial System,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 29, no. 2 (April 1972): 234CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Abernathy, Thomas Perkins, Western Lands and the American Revolution (New York: Russell & Russell, 1937), 221–25Google Scholar.

62. Onuf, Peter, “Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 34, no. 3 (July 1977): 371CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Many Virginians conceded that the state could not effectively govern the distant northwest even if they kept title to the territory; Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 243–44; Jensen, Merrill, “The Cession of the Old Northwest,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 23, no. 1 (1936): 2748CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63. Onuf, “Toward Federalism,” 353–74; Curtis, Jefferson's Freeholders, 53–76.

64. Journals of the Continental Congress [hereinafter JCC], July 12, 1776, vol. 5, 547; Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, 127–39, 254–61; Rakove, Jack N., The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 151–58Google Scholar.

65. The Articles of Confederation, 1781, accessed July 10, 2019, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp.

66. Gates, Paul Wallace, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), 60Google Scholar.

67. Nathan Dane, “Address to the Massachusetts House of Representatives,” November 9, 1786, in U.S. National Archives, Letters of the Delegates to Congress [hereinafter LDC], vol. 24, 19, accessed February 5, 2018, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg0245)).

68. JCC, September 22, 1783, vol. 25, 602; Elbridge Gerry to Stephen Higginson, March 4, 1784, LDC, vol. 21, 407, accessed February 5, 2018, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg021306)).

69. Grenier, The First Way of War, 152–69.

70. Rakove, Jack N., “Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance,” in The Northwest Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, ed. Williams, Frederick D. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1989), 11Google Scholar.

71. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 50.

72. JCC, May 21, 1779, vol. 14, 620–22.

73. Ibid.; JCC, June 22, 1778, vol. 11, 631–39; JCC, June 25, 1778, vol. 11, 648–51.

74. JCC, September 6, 1780, vol. 18, 808. Virginia approved a Resolution of Cession that followed these guidelines; “From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, January 17, 1781, Enclosing Resolution of [Virginia] Assembly Concerning the Cession of Lands,” U.S. National Archives, Founders Online, accessed February 7, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0481.

75. JCC, October 10, 1780, 915.

76. Ibid., 18, 915–16; James Madison to Joseph Jones, September 19, 1780, LDC vol. 16, 95–96, n.1, accessed February 7, 2018, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg01675)); Jensen, “The Cession of the Old Northwest,” 45, 48; Thomas Jefferson to [Governor of Virginia] Benjamin Harrison, March 3, 1784, U.S. National Archives, Founders Online, February 7, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0005; Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 235.

77. Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 250.

78. Onuf, “Toward Federalism,” 354.

79. Grubb, Farley, “U.S. Land Policy: Founding Choices and Outcomes, 1781–1802,” in Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, ed. Irwin, Douglas A. and Sylla, Richard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 259–60Google Scholar: Larson, John Lauritz, The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the Eclipse of the Common Good (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80. Onuf, Peter S., Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) 21Google Scholar.

81. Frymer, Paul, Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 5862Google Scholar.

82. David Howell to Jonathan Arnold, February 21, 1784, LDC, vol. 21, 383, accessed February 7, 2018, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg021289)); Atta, John R. Van, Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the Old Republic, 1785–1850 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 3334Google Scholar. New England employed a systematic model for distributing land. In New England, land was sold by township, organized for a small populated area, with a presurveyed area of land organized into rectangles and ready for occupation by an entire, compact community. Southern states had developed a more haphazard approach, usually allowing purchasers to choose a desirable parcel individually; Price, Dividing the Land, 341–42.

83. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 65.

84. JCC, May 28, 1784, vol. 27, 446–53; Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 61–62; Grubb, “U.S. Land Policy,” 284.

85. Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 251.

86. Onuf, Statehood and Union, 24; Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 65–66.

87. Weeks, Edward P., A Commentary on the Mining Legislation of Congress (San Francisco, CA: Sumner Whitney, 1877), 40Google Scholar.

88. Onuf, Statehood and Union, 21–43; quote, 40; see JCC, May 20, 1785, vol. 29, 375–81. On the cadastral map and land commodification, see Scott, James C., Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 4647Google Scholar.

89. Linklater, Owning the Earth, 217, 228.

90. Larson, The Market Revolution in America, 15. On the cadastral map as a tool of government control, see Scott, Seeing Like a State, 35–36. See also Opie, The Law of the Land.

91. Grubb, “U.S. Land Policy,” 286; Carol Hardy Vincent, Laura A. Hanson, and Carla N. Argueta, “Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data” (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report R42346, March 3, 2017); Quoctrung Bui and Margot Sanger-Katz, “Why the Government Owns So Much Land in the West,” The Upshot, January 5, 2016, accessed January 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/upshot/why-the-government-owns-so-much-land-in-the-west.html.

92. Northwest Ordinance; Frymer, Paul, “A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours”: Territorial Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 1 (March 2014): 119–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fyrmer, Building an American Empire; Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 256.

93. Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, July 15, 1787, LDC, vol. 24, 356, accessed February 7, 2018, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(dg024296)).

94. Berkhofer, “Jefferson, The Ordinance of 1784,” 241; Rakove, “Ambiguous Achievement,” 5–7; Rohrbough, Malcolm J., “A Freehold Estate Therein: The Ordinance of 1787 and the Public Domain,” Indiana Magazine of History 84 (March 1988): 4750Google Scholar.

95. Wilcox v. Jackson 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839).

96. Cayton, Andrew R. L., “The Northwest Ordinance from the Perspective of the Frontier,” in The Northwest Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, ed. Williams, Frederick D. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1989), 15Google Scholar.

97. Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 1st Sess., 1789, 45–452, accessed January 27, 2019, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=226; William Michael Treanor, “The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause.”

98. Cayton, “The Northwest Ordinance from the Perspective of the Frontier,” 15.

99. Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, accessed January 25, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp.

100. Finkelman, Paul, “Slavery and Bondage in the ‘Empire of Liberty,’The Northwest Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, ed. Williams, Frederick D. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1989), 6195Google Scholar. Finkelman points out that the ban on slavery was inconsistent with other provisions in the Ordinance.

101. Cayton, Andrew R. L., “Law and Authority in the Northwest Territory,” in The History of Ohio Law, ed. Benedict, Michael Les and Winkler, John F. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 1: 13–39Google Scholar.

102. The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory, Adopted or Enacted from 1788 to 1833 Inclusive, Vol. 2: Together With the Ordinance of 1787 (Cincinnati, OH: Corey and Fairbank, 1833), 111282Google Scholar.

103. British North America Act, 1867, 30–31 Victoria, c. 3, sec. 92 (5), (13).

104. Province of Alberta, “Mineral Rights,” accessed July 3, 2019, https://www.alberta.ca/mineral-ownership.aspx; Alberta Land Institute, “A Guide to Property Rights in Alberta,” University of Alberta, 2014, accessed July 18, 2019, http://propertyrightsguide.ca/subsurface-property-rights/.

105. Hessing, Melody, Howlett, Michael, and Summerville, Tracy, Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 94Google Scholar.

106. Greer, Allan, Property and Dispossession: Natives, Empires and Land in Early Modern North America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 408CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107. United States v. Bishop Processing Company, 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968).

108. Not until decades later did it become apparent that the federal government would find it difficult to sell much of the vast, dry, rugged western landscape. Today, the federal government retains ownership of 28 percent of American land; Vincent et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data.

109. Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Connecticut Governor Samuel Huntington, in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (hereinafter, “RFC”), September 26, 1787, III, 99–100, accessed July 15, 2019, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(fr003138)).

110. Hamilton in Federalist 17, in Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, The Federalist, ed. Cooke, Jacob E. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 105106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

111. On interstate trade competition, see Giesecke, Albert Anthony, American Commercial Legislation before 1789 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970; first published in 1910)Google Scholar.

112. Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Connecticut Governor Samuel Huntington.

113. Robertson, David Brian, Federalism and the Making of America, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), 2544CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

114. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in Founders’ Archives, U.S. Library of Congress, accessed July 27, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0218; Madison, in JCC, June 8, 1789, 457; Madison, Federalist 46, in The Federalist, 315–23.

115. RFC, June 30, I: 486.

116. RFC, July 13, I: 605.

117. Robertson, David Brian, The Original Compromise: What the Constitution's Framers Were Really Thinking (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118. Scheiber, Harry N., “Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789–1910,” Law and Society Review 10, no.1 (Fall 1975): 71, 84, 88, 95, 9899CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adams, Sean Patrick, “Promotion, Competition, Captivity: The Political Economy of Coal,” Journal of Policy History 18, no. 1 (2006): 7495CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

119. Neal D. Woods found that interstate economic competition tended to suppress environmental stringency among regional competitors; Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 1 (2006): 174–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar. David M. Konisky analyzed data aggregated data from all the states and similarly found that states behave in a way that responds to neighboring states, that is, the states most likely to be economic rivals (but found no pattern of a race to the bottom of environmental laxity across all the states); Konisky, David M., “Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (2007): 853–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Konisky also found that state regulators are keenly aware of the competitive regulatory actions of rival states; Konisky, David M., “Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, no. 2 (2007): 321–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

120. Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789–1910,” 57–118.

121. Davies, J. Clarence III, The Politics of Pollution (New York: Pegasus, 1970), 79Google Scholar.

122. Interview with William Ruckleshaus, former Director of the Environmental Protection Agency, January 1993, accessed July 1, 2019, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/william-d-ruckelshaus-oral-history-interview.html.

123. Engel, Kirsten H., “State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race and Is It to the Bottom,” Hastings Law Journal 48 (1996): 271398Google Scholar.

124. Brad Plumer, “Blue States Roll Out Aggressive Climate Strategies. Red States Keep to the Sidelines,” New York Times, June 21, 2019, accessed June 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/climate/states-climate-change.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fclimate&action=click&contentCollecti%E2%80%A6.

125. Konisky, “Regulatory Competition”; and Konisky, “Regulator Attitudes.”

126. Paddock, LeRoy C., “The Federal and State Roles in Environmental Enforcement: A Proposal for a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 14 (1990): 744Google Scholar; Becker, Randy and Henderson, Vernon, “Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries,” Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 2 (2000): 379421CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also List, John A., McHone, W. Warren, Millimet, Daniel L., “Effects of Air Quality Regulation on the Destination Choice of Relocating Plants,” Oxford Economic Papers 55, no. 4 (October 2003): 657–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

127. Lowry, William R., The Dimensions of Federalism: State Governments and Pollution Control Policies (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

128. Vogel, David, California Greenin’: How the Golden State Became an Environmental Leader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 1219CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129. Nancy Olewiler, “Environmental Policy in Canada: Harmonized at the Bottom?” 113–55; Harrison, Kathryn, “Are Canadian Provinces Engaged in a Race to the Bottom?” in Racing to the Bottom? Provincial Interdependence in the Canadian Federation, ed. Harrison, Kathryn (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 261Google Scholar.

130. Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos, “Tax competition between Sub-Central Governments” (OECD working paper on fiscal federalism no. 13, Paris, OECD, 2011), 24; Cairns, Robert D., “Natural Resources and Canadian Federalism: Decentralization, Recurring Conflict, and Resolution,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 22, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 5570Google Scholar.

131. The 1994 Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) banned provinces from providing any kind of subsidy to firms seeking to relocate from another province. Internal Trade Secretariat, Government of Canada, “Agreement on Internal Trade: Consolidated Version,” (Winnipeg: Internal Trade Secretariat, 2015), accessed April 25, 2020, https://www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Consolidated-with-14th-Protocol-final-draft.pdf. In 2017, the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CAFT) superseded the 1994 AIT. “The equalization transfer program and the Code of Conduct on Incentives have helped prevent sub-central tax competition in Canada from spiraling into a race to the bottom;” Wangari Gichiru, Jennifer Hassemer, Corina Maxim, Riamsalio Phetchareun, and Dong Ah Won, “Sub-Central Tax Competition in Canada, the United States, Japan, and South Korea,” Working Paper, OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government of the OECD (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009), ix, 7, accessed April 25, 2020 https://www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/48817035.pdf.

132. Cameron, David and Simeon, Richard, “Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 2 (2002): 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. “Environmental policy in Canada is one of collaborative federalism,” concluded territorial official MacKay, William R. in “Canadian Federalism and the Environment: The Literature,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 17, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 38Google Scholar.

133. Harrison, Kathryn, “Is Cooperation the Answer? Canadian Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 221–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

134. Marsh, George Perkins, Man and Nature, or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action (London: Sampson Low, Son and Marston, 1864)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hays, Samuel P., Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Cox, Thomas R., Maxwell, Robert S., Thomas, Phillip Drennon, Malone, Joseph J., This Well-Wooded Land: Americans and Their Forests from Colonial Times to the Present (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Smith, Kimberly K., The Conservation Constitution: The Conservation Movement and Constitutional Change, 1870–1930 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019), 7278Google Scholar.

135. Vogel, California Greenin’, 22–27, 50–62.

136. Evans, Gail E. H., “Storm over Niagara: A Catalyst in Reshaping Government in the United States and Canada during the Progressive Era,” Natural Resources Journal 32, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 2754Google Scholar; Jacoby, Karl, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1117Google Scholar; Terrie, Philip G., Contested Terrain: A New History of Nature and People in the Adirondacks (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008)Google Scholar.

137. Landrum, Ney C., The State Park Movement in America: A Critical Review (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2013), 3637Google Scholar.

138. Evans, Storm over Niagara.”

139. Turner, James Morton, The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hopkins, David A., Red Fighting Blue: How Geography and Electoral Rules Polarize American Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

140. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 201–54.

141. Congressional Record, June 10, 1970, 116, pt. 14: 19204–19205 and September 21, 1970, 116, pt. 35: 32901; President Richard Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Environmental Quality,” February 10, 1970, at The American Presidency Project, accessed July 15, 2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/240088.

142. Congressional Record, June 10, 1970, 116, pt. 14: 19204–19213 (House debate) and September 21, 1970, 116, pt. 35: 32900–32919 (Senate debate); Dwyer, John P., “The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act,” Maryland Law Review 54 (1995): 1195Google Scholar.

143. Representative L. Richardson Preyer (D-NC), Congressional Record, June 10, 1970, 116, pt. 14: 19213.

144. Representative Harley Staggers, Congressional Record, June 10, 1970, 116, pt. 14: 19204–19205.

145. Woods, Neal D., “Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy in the U.S. States,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 36, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 259–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rabe, Barry G., “Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization,” in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Vig, Norman J. and Kraft, Michael E. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 3536Google Scholar; Konisky, David M. and Woods, Neal D., “Environmental Policy, Federalism, and the Obama Presidency,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 46, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 366–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

146. Potoski, Matthew, “Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the Bottom?Public Administration Review 61, no. 3 (2001): 335–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

147. Vogel, California Greenin’; John S. Kiernan, “Greenest States,” Wallet Hub, April 15, 2019, accessed June 13, 2019, https://wallethub.com/edu/greenest-states/11987/; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, “Welcome,” accessed January 13, 2018, http://www.rggi.org/home; Rabe, Barry G., Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004)Google Scholar and Contested Federalism and American Climate Policy,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 494521CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

148. Jennifer Marlon, Peter Howe, Matto Mildenberger, Anthony Leiserowitz, and Xinran Wang, Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2019, accessed April 25, 2020, https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/.

149. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Policy Hub: State,” accessed January 11, 2020, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions#states; National Conference of State Legislators. “Energy,” accessed January 11, 2020, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy.aspx.

150. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, “Welcome.”

151. Roberts, Marc J. and Farrell, Susan O., “The Political Economy of Implementation: The Clean Air Act and Stationary Sources,” in Approaches Controlling Air Pollution, ed. Friedlaender, Ann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 158–60Google Scholar; U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of Federal and State Enforcement for Control of Air Pollution from Stationary Sources (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973)Google Scholar.

152. Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy, 196.

153. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Clean Air Amendments of 1970, House Report 91–1146 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1970); Jones, Charles O., Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), 175210Google Scholar; Crenson, Matthew, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 3582Google Scholar; Stewart, Richard B., “Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,” Yale Law Review 86, no. 6 (May 1977): 1196 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Melnick, R. Shep, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983)Google Scholar.

154. Drutman, Lee, The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stahl, Jason, Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American Political Culture Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 7273CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jacques, Peter J., Dunlap, Riley E., and Freeman, Mark, “The Organisation of Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Skepticism,” Environmental Politics 17, no. 3 (2008): 349–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Switzer, Jacqueline Vaughn, Green Backlash: The History and Politics of the Environmental Opposition in the U.S. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997)Google Scholar; Layzer, Judith A., Open for Business: Conservatives’ Opposition to Environmental Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 3181CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

155. National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Oil and Gas Severance Taxes,” accessed January 11, 2020, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/oil-and-gas-severance-taxes.aspx; Adele C. Morris, “The Challenge of State Reliance on Revenue from Fossil Fuel Production” (Climate and Energy Economics Discussion Paper, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, August 9, 2016); Rabe, Barry G., “Racing to the Top, the Bottom, or the Middle of the Pack? The Evolving State Role in Environmental Protection,” in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Vig, Norman J. and Kraft, Michael E., 9th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2015), 3357Google Scholar; Marie Cusick and Amy Sisk, “Millions Own Gas and Oil Under Their Land. Here's Why Only Some Strike It Rich,” National Public Radio, March 15, 2018, accessed January 11, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2018/03/15/592890524/millions-own-gas-and-oil-under-their-land-heres-why-only-some-strike-it-rich.

156. J. B. Wogan, “Scott Pruitt, America's Sue-Happy AG,” Governing, September 2015, accessed January 10, 2016, http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-oklahoma-scott-pruit-feature.html; Timothy Cama, “27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court,” The Hill, June 30, 2015, accessed March 16, 2019, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-states-challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court; Hertel-Fernandez, Alex, State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States—and the Nation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019)Google Scholar; Plumer, “Blue States Roll Out Aggressive Climate Strategies.”

157. “The split has become much more pronounced in recent years,” quoted in Plumer, “Blue States Roll Out Aggressive Climate Strategies.”

158. Faure, Michael G. and Vig, Norman J., “Conclusion: The Necessary Dialogue,” in Green Giants?Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union, ed. Vig, Norman J. and Faure, Michael (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 347–75Google Scholar. Compare to Hopkins, Red Fighting Blue.

159. National Federation of Independent Business, “NFIB's Clean Power Plan Rule Lawsuit Explained,” December 8, 2015, accessed March 7, 2019, https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-blog/legal/nfibs-clean-power-plan-rule-lawsuit-explained-72041/.

160. Mitch McConnell, “States Should Reject Obama Mandate for Clean-Power Regulations,” Lexington Herald-Leader, March 3, 2015, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.kentucky.com/opinion/op-ed/article44558769.html; Coral Davenport, “McConnell Urges States to Defy U.S. Plan to Cut Greenhouse Gases,” New York Times, March 4, 2015, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/politics/mcconnell-urges-states-to-defy-us-plan-to-cut-greenhouse-gas.html.

161. Jocelyn Durkay, “States’ Reactions to EPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,” National Conference of State Legislatures, February 22, 2016, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/states-reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards635333237.aspx; “Legal Challenges—Overview & Documents,” E&E News, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal; Michael Biesecker, “More Than 200 Members of Congress Are Backing a Court Challenge to President Barack Obama's Plan to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Associated Press, February 23, 2016, accessed March 2, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6e8688d4caea493085e8760610b9cb90/congress-backs-court-challenge-obamas-climate-plan; Elizabeth Daigneau, “Hoping for the Success They Had Against Tobacco, State AGs Unite to Fight Climate Change,” Governing, October 2016, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.governing.com/templates/gov_print_article?id=394976891.

162. The statements polled were “Earth is getting warmer mostly because of human activities” (Canada) and “Global warming is caused mostly by human activities” (U.S.). in Matto Mildenberger, Peter Howe, Erick Lachapelle, Jennifer Marlon, Anthony Leiserowitz, and Leah Stokes, Yale Climate Opinion Maps—Canada, February 15, 2016, accessed April 25, 2020, https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-canada/; and Yale Climate Opinion Maps—U.S. 2016, accessed August 6, 2019, https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/?est=human&type=value&geo=county.

163. Pew Research Center, “The U.S. Isn't the Only Nation with Big Partisan Divides on Climate Change,” accessed August 6, 2019, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/06/the-u-s-isnt-the-only-nation-with-big-partisan-divides-on-climate-change/.

164. Harrison, Kathryn, “The Struggle of Ideas and Self-Interest in Canadian Climate Policy,” in Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change, ed. Harrison, Kathryn and Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

165. Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.

166. Kathryn Harrison, “The Almost-Consensual Pan-Canadian Climate Plan Has Unravelled in Just Two Years: Why Is Meaningful Action on Carbon Pricing So Hard in Canada?” Policy Options, July 8, 2019, accessed July 25, 2019, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2019/the-fleeting-canadian-harmony-on-carbon-pricing/.

167. Harrison, Kathryn, “Environmental Policy: Climate Change,” in The United States and Canada: How Two Democracies Differ and How It Matters, ed. Quirk, Paul J. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), 196218CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

168. Canadian Conservative Party, A Real Plan to Protect Our Environment (June 2019), accessed July 23, 2019, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6162205/A-Real-Plan.pdf; John Paul Tasker, “Andrew Scheer Unveils Climate Plan Promising ‘Green Technology, Not Taxes,’” CBC, June 19, 2019, accessed July 23, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/andrew-scheer-climate-plan-1.5181826. After the national elections of 2019, the conservative government of Alberta submitted an acceptable plan for fees on emissions from large industrial concerns; “Ottawa Accepts Alberta's New $30-per-Tonne Carbon Plan for Large Emitters in 2020,” CBC, December 9, 2019, accessed January 12, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/ottawa-accepts-alberta-tier-plan-carbon-pricing-1.5386955.

169. Republican Platform 2016, 22, accessed July 24, 2019, https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf.

170. Milne, Janet E., “Carbon Tax Choices: The Tale of Four States,” in The Green Market Transition: Carbon Taxes, Energy Subsidies and Smart Energy Mixes, ed. Weishaar, Stefan E., Kreiser, Larry, Milne, Janet E., Ashiabor, Hope, and Mehling, Michael (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2017), 317CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “No On 1631 (Sponsored by Western States Petroleum Assn), 2018,” Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, accessed August 18, 2019, https://www.pdc.wa.gov/browse/campaign-explorer/committee?filer_id=NO1631%20507&election_year=2018.

171. Olewiler, “Environmental Policy in Canada”; Harrison, Kathryn, Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996)Google Scholar; Michelle Bellefontaine, “Contentious Carbon Tax Bill Passed by Alberta Legislature,” CBC, June 7, 2016, accessed February 3, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/contentious-carbon-tax-bill-passed-by-alberta-legislature-1.3620582.