I would like to express my appreciation to Richard Bensel, Stephen Skowronek, Karen Orren, and Ira Katznelson for very helpful readings of earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my research assistant Kim Geiger and, for providing tapes of congressional roll call data, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

1. Brozen, Yale, Concentration, Mergers and Public Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 371–75Google Scholar; Clark, John D., The Federal Trust Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931), 3–5Google Scholar. The Proclamation of the Farmers Congress is quoted in Thorelli, Hans B., The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 144Google Scholar.

2. See, for example, Sydnor, Charles, The Origins of Southern Sectionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971)Google Scholar. The most complete statement of the significance of regional conflict in political development over the past century is found in Bensel, Richard F., Sectionalism and American Political Development (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

3. Among the best are Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy and Letwin, William, Law and Economic Policy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

4. Economists and political scientists have attempted to explain antitrust policy by connecting the behavior of the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division to contemporary phenomena like industrial structure and performance, the ideological tendencies of oversight committee members, and internal personnel characteristics, particularly the career paths of lawyers staffing the agencies. See, for example, Long, William F., Schramm, Richard, and Tollison, Robert, “The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity,” Journal of Law and Economics 16 (1973): 351–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weingast, Barry R. and Moran, Mark J., “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policy Making by the Federal Trade Commission,” Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 783–800CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Katzman, Robert A., Regulatory Bureaucracy: The FTC and Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980)Google Scholar. Because these approaches are, in the main, ahistorical and unconcerned with the more deeply rooted forces that lay behind “ideological” changes in the legislature or public opinion, they cannot account for cycles of antitrust activity, the peculiar content of the laws enacted during those periodic surges, or the comparative anomaly of U.S. antitrust policy in the industrial world.

5. On the tariff, sectionalism, and party coalitions, see Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 62–72, 368–85.

6. Ibid., 22–31 and 368–402.

7. Ibid., 415–50.

8. See, for example, McCarty, Harold Hall, The Geographic Basis of American Economic Life (New York: Kennikat Press, 1970Google Scholar; reissue of 1940 edition), frontispiece; and Ward, David, Cities and Immigrants (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 42–43Google Scholar.

9. Pred, Allan R., Urban Growth and City Systems in the United States, 1840–1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

10. The trade area boundaries in map 1 are Federal Reserve Branch Bank territories. At the time they were constructed, Spokane, Washington, was able, by lobbying, to secure a separate Branch Bank. This rather artificial truncation of Seattle's hinterland results in a higher industrial categorization for Seattle than for the other Pacific trade areas. When the eastern wheat region is merged into the Seattle trade area (as in the less politicized trade area boundaries shown in map 2), Seattle takes on a more “normal” industrial coloration as a “diverse” area. Trade area industrial levels are not shown for the late nineteenth century because the very few roll calls on antitrust-related issues in this period did not warrant the laborious process of fitting county-level industrial data into trade area and district boundaries. Since both trade areas and manufacturing belt boundaries are slow to change, however, map 1 may be read as an approximate picture of regional industrial patterns at the end of the nineteenth century.

11. The value-added data are taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures for the closest year (to the appropriate political era) for which data are given in county subdivisions. Since the 1909 census did not qualify, 1919 was used for the Progressive era. For the New Deal, the 1929 census was employed; and for the 1970s, the 1977 census. Corresponding population figures are taken from the 1920, 1930, and 1980 Census of Population.

12. Legislative rather than executive enforcement actions are emphasized, for several reasons. One is that Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission personnel, who are responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws, have more complicated political “constituencies”—presidential, congressional, and judicial—than do congressmen, and this complexity makes causal analysis more difficult. Furthermore, executive enforcement actions are based on prior written law, and expansion usually occurs as a result of new legislation, additional personnel, and budgetary encouragement, congressional support for which can readily be ascertained.

13. See Pred, Urban Growth and City Systems, andMeyer, David R., “Emergence of the American Manufacturing Belt: An Interpretation,” Journal of Historical Geography 9 (04 1983): 145–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. Unger, Irwin, The Greenback Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chaps. 9 and 10 and 202–03; Buck, Solon Justus, The Granger Movement (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 3–10Google Scholar, and chap. 3. See also Hicks, John D., The Populist Revolt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961)Google Scholar, and Koenig, Louis W., Bryan (New York: Capricorn Books, 1975)Google Scholar.

15. In the “trust,” stockholders of separate companies turned their stock over to a group of trustees who managed the combined companies and paid the stockholders dividends. In the later “holding company” scheme, a new corporation was formed to take the shares or assets of individual companies and issue new stock in the holding company to the original stockholders and to the public.

16. Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977)Google Scholar, chaps. 9 and 10. See also Allen, Frederick L., The Lords of Creation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1935), 5—21Google Scholar; Seager, Henry R. and Gulick, Charles A. Jr, Trust and Corporation Problems (New York: Harper and Bros., 1929), 49–61Google Scholar; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 256–58.

17. Woodward, C. Vann, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 314–18Google Scholar.

18. Ware, Norman J., The Labor Movement in the United States, 1860–1890 (New York: Vintage, 1964), 362–66Google Scholar; Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 103, 115.

19. Roseboom, Eugene H., A History of Presidential Elections (New York: MacMillan, 1957), 293Google Scholar. The 1888 platform of the Union Labor party (a coalition of farm and labor organizations, including Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, the Farmers Alliance, and several state antimonopoly parties) declared that “the paramount issues to be solved in the interests of humanity are the abolition of usury, monopoly and trusts”;Johnson, Donald B., ed., National Party Platforms, 2 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978)Google Scholar, 1:83.

20. Skowronek, Stephen, Building a New American State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 121–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; , Ari and Hoogenboom, Olive, A History of the ICC (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), 8–17Google Scholar.

21. Congressional Record, 49ih Congress, 1st session (henceforth 49–1), 7752. This is the first vote to substitute the Reagan bill for the much weaker Senate version (which did not ban pooling or long-short haul differentials, and relied on a commission to rule on the reasonableness of rates). Kolko's class/interest group approach is misleading here. He states, on the basis of published business group positions, that “large numbers of Midwestern and Southern business organizations” opposed the long-short haul and antipooling provisions of the House (Reagan) bill, and that regional distinctions were “not too important” on the choice between the House and Senate bills. Kolko, Gabriel, Railroads and Regulation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 33—34Google Scholar. Even if it were true that merchant groups nationwide preferred the Senate to the House bill, it is apparent from House voting patterns that these groups had much less political clout in the southern and plains states than in the manufacturing belt (see map 4).

22. On Sherman Act enforcement under its first three administrations, see Letwin, William, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 106–42Google Scholar; and (for a count of cases initiated) Posner, Richard A., “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 336CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. The most detailed account of the legislative history of the Sherman Act is in Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy. In contrast with the position of Senator Edmunds of Ver-mont (chairman of the Judiciary Committee) and the large majority of core Republicans, Senator Sherman of Ohio seems genuinely to have supported a federal antitrust law— although whether out of personal principle or the desire to accommodate restless periphery Republicans, it is impossible to say. Some commentators have viewed core Republican willingness to grant an antimonopoly law as an explicit intraparty trade to get periphery votes for the McKinley tariff. Since the Democrats increasingly condemned the tariff as the “mother of trusts,” it seems plausible that party leaders, for whom the tariff was the central issue, would have attempted to court public opinion and their own dissident party colleagues by cpncurrent passage of an antitrust law. Even in this interpretation, periphery representatives'would be due credit for the Sherman Act's passage. There are, unfortunately, very few roll calls on the Sherman Act, which passed both House and Senate with only one vote recorded in opposition. One of the few roll calls is the Bland (D, Missouri) amendment in the House to specifically ban anticompetitive acts by railroads and meat-packing firms. It passed 106–98 (Cong. Rec. 52–2, 5983) with almost entirely periphery backing. Only one-seventh of the supporters represented northeastern industrial states; these were Democrats supporting the periphery-defined party position. Opinions voiced during debate, amendments proposed, and the number and content of antitrust bills introduced by agrarian congressmen provide other evidence of regional support for anti-trust prior to passage of the Sherman Act. See “Bills and Debates in Congress Relating to Trusts,” Senate Document #147, 57th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903).

24. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 587–91; Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, 106–21. The Justice Department instituted only nine antitrust cases in the first four years, and only seven more by the end of the decade. See Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” 366.

25. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

26. The 1896 Democratic platform embraced free silver, a government-issued currency, expanded railroad regulation, a reconstituted income tax, and direct election for the Senate and presidency; it denounced antilabor injunctions and high tariffs. Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1:97–100.

27. Koenig, Bryan, 243; Roseboom, History of Presidential Elections, 293.

28. Moody, John, The Truth about the Trusts (New York: Moody Publishing Co., 1904), 133–204Google Scholar; Woodward, Origins of the New South, 315–16; Cong. Rec. 57–2, 1778; Nutter, G. Warren, The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 1899–1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)Google Scholar, table 37.

29. Thorelli, in The Federal Antitrust Policy, 500–18, lists almost ninety ostensibly strengthening bills introduced by forty-seven House members, of whom at least thirty represented districts in the south, plains, and mountain nonindustrial regions (nineteen were southern Democrats).

30. Fourteen states, mostly in the periphery, had constitutional provisions against monopoly, and six of these (Kentucky, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas) also had antitrust statutes that predated the Sherman Act (Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, 341–49). State antimonopoly penalties were often much more severe than those incorporated in the Sherman Act. North Carolina had the highest absolute fines and longest prison terms. In Iowa, however, the penalty for conviction under the state's antitrust law was twenty percent of capital investment. Texas probably had the strictest enforcement, and it was successful in its drive to keep Standard Oil from dominating the state's petroleum industry. See Pratt, Joseph A., “The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil,” Journal of Economic History 40 (12 1980): 815–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. , Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 396Google Scholar; Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 148, 345; Thorne, Florence C., Samuel Gompers: American Statesman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 127–29Google Scholar; Gompers, Samuel, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, vol. 1 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1925), 532Google Scholar.

32. New York Times, August 28, 1899, 3; September 14, 1–2; September 15, 3; September 16, 3; September 17, 3.

33. Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1:121–24.

34. Ibid., 517–24 and 538–49; John D. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy, 115–19. House votes on previous strengthening amendments that reveal the sectional differences on antitrust can be found in Cong. Rec. 56–2, 6494 and 6500. The 1903 bill (which incorporated new penalties, but only for trusts thereafter organized) passed with no dissenting votes after Democratic strengthening amendments were defeated on voice votes. The February 28, 1903, Senate vote against consideration of the Littlefield bill is found in Cong. Rec. 57–2, 2792. Twenty-six of the thirty-one senators voting to take up the bill represented non-industrial states of the south-plains-mountain periphery.

35. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” 366. Two other initiatives marked the institutionalization of antitrust policy in 1903: passage of an Expediting Act, which gave antitrust cases a fast track in the circuit courts, and a $500,000 appropriation devoted to Justice Department antitrust prosecutions—the first instance of an earmarked antitrust appropriation.

36. Roosevelt, quoted in Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, 245.

37. Ibid., 240–42; Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 553; Cong. Rec. 57–2, 928. The bureau's mode of operation was soon revealed in its investigation of the beef trust, initiated by a House resolution. When the bureau issued its report in March 1905, it excluded the information it had gathered about the beef packers' trade-restraining practices (Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, 242).

38. Divestitures ordered as a result of Sherman Act prosecutions included (through 1920) Standard Oil, American Tobacco, DuPont (explosives), International Harvester, Corn Products, and Eastman Kodak; Posner, Richard A., Antitrust Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 85–86Google Scholar. Most economists (Posner included) grant little significance to changes in industrial structure as a result of the antitrust laws. Alfred Chandler concedes only that the laws discouraged monopoly in markets where concentration was already well advanced, and encouraged the transformation of monopoly into oligopoly (The Visible Hand, 375). Arguing for the primacy of technological and organizational developments, he seems to believe that American firms simply accomplished by merger what, in the absence of strong antitrust laws, European firms achieved by cartel. This argument overlooks the demonstrably higher level of antitrust prosecutions and private suits authorized by American law, as well as the differences in competition that resulted between the United States (even before the merger loophole in the Clayton Act was closed) and Europe. In the latter, particularly in Germany, cartels might legally incorporate all major producers, and cartel sanctions were enforceable at law and could be imposed by the government itself. See Cornish, William R., “Legal Control over Cartels and Monopolization, 1880–1914: A Comparison,” in Law and the Formation of the Big Enterprises in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries, ed. Horn, Norbert and Kocka, Jurgen (Gottingen, West Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979), 287–303Google Scholar.

39. Johnson, Arthur M., “Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (12 1961): 420–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. An example of the intellectual/big business consensus can be seen in the proceedings of a 1908 symposium on trusts sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, which heard speakers denounce the Sherman Act as “absurd and mischevious” and endorsed the Hepburn bill. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy, 136.

41. Koenig, Bryan, 436–39; Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1:146.

42. See the votes on amendments offered by Rep. Thomas of Kentucky and Rep. Garrett of Tennessee, Cong. Rec. 61–2, 4226, and Cong. Rec. 61–3, 1070. On the Thomas amendment, for example, 76 percent of periphery representatives supported a higher threshold of removal, compared to only 22 percent of representatives from core industrial districts. Almost all “progressive” or “insurgent” Republicans (identified by their participation in the Cannon revolt of 1909–10) represented states and districts in the midwestern periphery and diverse regions, and the Republicans who joined the Democrats on these and subsequent antitrust votes came from that group. On the Thomas amendment vote, for example, 106 mostly periphery Democrats were joined by eleven Republicans from Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas.

43. In the 61st Congress, 73 percent of House Democrats represented districts in trade areas classified here as periphery, or nonindustrial, having value added (per capita) in manufacturing of less than $200. Only 26 percent of House Republicans represented periphery districts. With northern success in the 1910 elections, the periphery wing of the Democratic party dropped to 61 percent, but periphery dominance of the party's legislative agenda was unimpaired.

44. U.S. v. American Tobacco, 22 U.S. 179 (1911).

45. For a good discussion of the important post-Knight cases, see Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, 131–78.

46. Ibid., 267. Bill sponsors and identifications are taken from the Cong. Rec. Index 62–1 and Martis, Kenneth C., The Historical Atlas of Congressional Districts (New York: Free Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

47. Committee on Interstate Commerce, “Control of Corporations, Persons and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce,” Report to the U.S. Senate [1912], Pursuant to Senate Resolution 98, vol. 2, 2534, 2854, 2836–50.

48. The most detailed presentation of the periphery position was rendered by John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, formerly Democratic minority leader in the House, now a senator. Williams condemned “Hamiltonian” proposals for trust regulation by bureau. Although the Democratic platform had, only a few years earlier, advocated federal licensing of corporations in interstate commerce, the agrarians (particularly the southners) were now having second thoughts. Their licensing proposal had set specific standards and apparently automatic denial for corporations above a certain size, as well as those found guilty of stock watering or antitrust violations. Now the new enthusiasm of big business for federal incorporation threatened to produce a discretionary federal licensing mechanism that would forestall state antitrust efforts. Williams proposed, instead, that a set of minimum requirements be contained in all state charters granted to corporations that desired to do business across state borders. Corporations that violated charter provisions (which included prohibitions against interlocking directorates, watered stock, and price discrimination) would be denied access to interstate commerce. In addition to the specification of punishable abuses, Williams proposed heavier fines and expanded rights to sue for aggrieved parties. Committee on Interstate Commerce, “Control of Corporations,” 2503–24, 2916. The issue of federal licensing has repeatedly arisen in antitrust debates. A bill to establish federal licensing (with statutory standards) was introduced by periphery senators Borah and O'Mahoney in the late 1930s (see below), and in the 1970s a new generation of antitrust advocates again promoted federal licensing. See Mintz, Morton and Cohen, Jerry S., Power, Inc. (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 99–100, 155, 577Google Scholar; and Nader, Ralph, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976)Google Scholar. It is evident from the divergent uses anticipated by licensing advocates in the Progressive era that a federal charter mechanism could be made to serve a variety of interests. Thus, despite its broad appeal, disagreement over the component procedures and standards has kept corporate chartering in the hands of the fifty states.

49. Two other prominent examples of this pattern are the Interstate Commerce Commission, sponsored by Senator Shelby Cullom of Illinois, and the Tariff Commission, promoted by midwestern and Pacific progressive Republicans from “diverse” areas. The legislators who played the most important roles in designing and promoting the new trade commission were Senators Cummins of Iowa, Newlands of Nevada, Kern of Indiana (all states within “diverse” midwestern and Pacific trade areas) and Representative Stevens and Senator Hollis of New Hampshire (a “core” state in the Boston trade area).

50. Brandeis's defense of a “middle ground” approach can be found in “The Solution of the Trusts: A Program,” Harper's Weekly 58 (November 8, 1913): 18–19. The legislative product was HR 15926, 62nd Cong., 2d sess., and S 3276, 62nd Cong., 1st sess. (the LaFollette-Lenroot bill).

51. The diverse area position was most sharply presented in the Senate, where statewide constituencies incorporated both industrial and extensive farm economies. The role of diverse area congressmen in promoting compromise between polar core and periphery positions invites comparison between these regions and Wallerstein's “semi-periphery” in an international capitalist system. The promotion of political stability is, in Wallerstein's scheme, the major function of the “semi-periphery.” Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974): 405.

52. On the periphery Republicans' cultural and policy-based antagonism toward the south, see Sagaser, A. Bower, Joseph A. Bristoui, Kansas Progressive (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1968), 128–35Google Scholar; Lowitt, Richard, George W. Nonis: The Persistence of a Progressive (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968), 128–35Google Scholar; and Sarasohn, David, “The Democratic Surge” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1976), 158–62Google Scholar. In addition to the tariff, periphery Republicans objected to the agrarian Democrats' strong support for labor organizational rights (a commitment necessary to bind northern Democrats to the southern tariff and other policy positions, but obviously irrelevant to periphery Republicans). Among “progressive” or insurgent Republicans, only a few—like Robert LaFollette, whose “diverse” state constituency had both labor and farm sectors—gave strong and consistent support to labor guarantees. On this subject, see Sarasohn, “The Democratic Surge.”

53. Urofsky, Melvin I., A Mind of One Piece (New York: Scribner's, 1971), 73–81Google Scholar.

54. Link, Arthur S., Wilson, vol. 2, The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 34–35Google Scholar; and Wilson, vol. 1, The Road to the White House (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), chap. 10.

55. Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1:169. On Bryan's authorship, see Coletta, Paolo E., William Jennings Bryan, vol. 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 62Google Scholar; and Koenig, Bryan, 487, 496. The northeastern wing of the party had virtually no influence on the content of the platform, except, through Bryan, on the labor plank. In fact, Bryan made a crusade of excluding the northeastern “corporation element” from the convention, a crusade for which he got Wilson's endorsement (Coletta, 69–70; Koenig, 484–95).

56. Williams to Wilson, January 13, 1914, Wilson Papers, Library of Congress;Wilson to Williams, January 27, 1914, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 29, ed. Link, Arthur S. et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 184Google Scholar. Wilson's trust message was delivered to Congress on January 20, 1914.

57. First drafted in four separate bills, the original provisions were somewhat softened (in response to strong business opposition) when merged into the omnibus Clayton bill. The major omission was a definitions section opposed by the attorney general and President Wilson. On the drafting of the Clayton Act, see Young, Allyn A., “The Sherman Act and the New Antitrust Legislation II,” Journal of Political Economy 23 (04 1915): 308–19Google Scholar; Henderson, Gerard C., The Federal Trade Commission (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), 24–26Google Scholar; and Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 425–26. The text of the House-passed bill was printed as House Report #6, 63rd Congress, 2d session.

58. The Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of union boycotts as restraints of trade in the “Danbury Hatters” case, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) and in Gompersv. Bucks Stove andRange, 221 U.S. 418 (1911). At the genesis of the latter case, AFL leaders had been sentenced to prison terms for ignoring a restraint of trade injunction issued against them for merely listing the firm's name in a “we do not patronize” list. Labor cases under the Sherman Act are discussed in Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, 115, 123–28, and 157–61; and Berman, Edward, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930Google Scholar; reprint New York: Russell and Russell, 1969).

59. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 268. In the 63rd Congress, there were seventy-eight Democrats representing districts in core industrial trade areas. Sixteen northern Democrats were themselves trade union members.

60. On the labor provisions, see Jones, Dallas L., “The Enigma of the Clayton Act,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 10 (01 1957): 206–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Young, “The Sherman Act and the New Antitrust Legislation,” 321–22; Davidson, John Wells, “The Response of the South to Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1954), 228–33Google Scholar; and The New York Times, May 2, 1914, 8; and May 27, 1914, 1.

61. Rublee was later appointed by Wilson to serve on the FTC, but Senate opposition by both conservative Republicans and agrarian radicals prevented his confirmation. The Senate vote is found in Cong. Rec. 64–1 (1916), 7962.

62. Rublee, George, “The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade Commission,” Academy of Political Science Proceedings 11 (01 1926): 116Google Scholar.

63. May 2, 1914, 8. A sampling of the business outcry can be found in the Senate Judiciary Committee's Correspondence File 63A–E5, National Archives; The New York Times, June 17, 1914, 20; and Cong. Rec. 63–2, 9412–13 and 12736–43.

64. Cong. Rec. 63–2, 9081–82.

65. Rublee, “The Original Plan and Early History of the FTC,” 116–17; Davidson, “Response of the South to Wilson's New Freedom,” 204—12. Periphery senators objected strongly to the standardless grant of regulatory authority to the new administrative body. Senators Clapp of Minnesota, Borah of Idaho, Reed of Missouri, Shields of Tennessee, Thomas of Colorado, and Fletcher of Florida all expressed strong objections to the bureaucratization of antitrust policy during the FTC debate.

66. Young, “The Sherman Act and the New Antitrust Legislation II,” 315; see also, Davidson, “Response of the South to Wilson's New Freedom,” 213–15. An abridged version of the Senate debate on court review has been published in The Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, vol. 3, ed. Schwartz, Bernard (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), 1748–1807Google Scholar. As can be seen in table 4, the most zealous support for a strong and autonomous trade commission came from diverse area senators, but their number (seven votes in favor) was too small to secure passage. This last was accomplished with the votes of thirteen periphery Democrats who deserted their president and committee leaders to back the Cummins amendment, joined by seven periphery Republicans.

67. Senate Report #698, 63–2 (July 22, 1914). The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee was Charles Culberson of Texas, a loyal, moderately progressive Democrat. Culberson, who was in bad health, apparently played no significant role in the revisions, other than as a conduit for the new administration line. Senator Cummins, a member of both the Judiciary and Commerce committees and linked to the northern progressives now in Wilson's favor, probably played the pivotal role in revising the Clayton bill to accommodate the new commission emphasis. The committee's rationale for weakening the government's evidence section, striking criminal penalties, or omitting specific prohibitions altogether was more frequently defended on the floor by Cummins than by Chairman Culberson.

68. On the cotton crisis, see McCorckle, James L. Jr, “Cotton, War and Mississippi,” Journal of Mississippi History 45 (05 1983): 90–113Google Scholar; and Osborn, George C., John Sharp Williams (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), 248–49Google Scholar. For the south, the outbreak of war brought economic devastation. As the cotton crop piled up on the docks, much of it unsellable (the German market being effectively closed by the British blockade), rates for scarce shipping services rose 300–1000 percent. In this situation, with mail pouring in from the region's farmers, merchants, and bankers pleading for federal help, cotton belt senators predictably gave less attention to the antitrust debate than they had a few months earlier. Mississippi Senator John S. Williams had devised a plan whereby the government would purchase and operate foreign-built ships to relieve the shipping crisis. The controversial plan could not possibly succeed without the president's strongest efforts. Perhaps for this reason, Williams, whose own preferred antitrust program was so different from that being composed in the Senate, kept publicly silent and generally voted the administration position on Clayton bill amendments, as did most other southern senators.

69. The few northern labor-backed Democratic senators—notably Hollis of New Hampshire, Hughes of New Jersey, and Kern of Indiana—also voted loyally with the committee-administration position. I have separately analyzed over twenty Senate Clayton Act amendments, which fall easily into three categories: committee-administration weakening amendments; noncommittee weakening amendments; and strengthening amendments (the bulk of which were offered by Senators Reed and Poindexter). Amendments in the first category were passed by large majorities, with little regional variation; those in the second lost by large majorities, meeting greatest opposition among southern, plains, and western senators; the third group generated unusual patterns, winning support from a small group of Pacific, southern, and northeastern Democrats, a few core Republicans probably casting strategic votes, and dissident midwestern and western Republicans. The major amendments are found in Cong. Rec. 63–2, 13907–14602. There were a number of cases in which strengthening amendments were accepted by the committee and passed by voice vote, so that the picture gleaned only from recorded votes is overly bleak. For example, the holding company prohibition was strengthened when the Senate accepted motions by Senators Reed and Shields to change section 8 so that it prohibited intercorporate stock purchases “where the effect of such acquisition may be to … lessen competition” (the House version had said “is to … lessen competition”). In addition, a declaration that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce” was accepted by Culberson and added at the beginning of the labor exemption (section 6) by voice vote on the Senate floor (Ibid., 14464, 14591).

70. For Senate vote analyses, states are classified as core, diverse, or periphery according to the level of industrialization of the trade area in which a majority of the population resides. In the Progressive era, Washington was classified as “core” because the majority of the state's population resided in the Seattle trade area (see note 10).

71. Contemporaneous legal and economic critiques of the Clayton Act, and later scholars who rely on them, interpreted the conference bill as even weaker than the Senate bill. Such was not the case. These critics tended to prefer the New Nationalist antitrust program and thus saw the Clayton bill as wrongheaded populism. The FTC bill was viewed in a much more favorable light by both scholarly and middle-class magazine commentators. The Young and Henderson works cited in note 57 exemplify this bias.

72. Rublee, “Original Plan and Early History of the FTC,” 114–15; Jaenicke, Douglas W., “Herbert Croly, Progressive Ideology, and the FTC Act,” Political Science Quarterly 93 (Fall 1978): 477–80 and 485–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. See Cong. Rec. 63–2, 15987, 16280–85, 16329.

74. So argued Rep. Nelson of Wisconsin, Cong. Rec. 63–2, 16322.

75. Kolko, Gabriel, The Triumph of Conservatism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967)Google Scholar, chap. 10.

76. Davis, G. Cullom, “The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission, 1914–1929,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 (12 1962): 441Google Scholar; Benedict, Murray R., Farm Policies of the United States, 1790–1950 (New York: Twentieth Century, 1953), 149–50Google Scholar.

77. On the FTC and the basing point case, see Latham, Earl, The Group Basis of Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 54–58Google Scholar.

78. Davis, “The Transformation of the FTC,” 441–42.

79. Swift and Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deenng et ai, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). On the latter, see Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act, 103–10; and Kutler, Stanley I., “Labor, the Clayton Act and the Supreme Court,” Labor History 3 (Winter 1962): 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Subsequent legislation (the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 and the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932) repaired the damage caused to the Clayton Act by these two decisions.

80. As a result of population growth in the industrial cities, the periphery's percentage of House seats dropped from 47 in the Wilson years to 41 at the inauguration of the New Deal (1933). Within the Democratic party, the periphery (as shown in map 1) held 69 percent of the seats at the end of the Wilson years (1915–16), but only 50 percent in 1933 (map 2) and 45 percent after the 1936 elections.

81. Young, “The Sherman Act and the New Antitrust Legislation II,” 309; Link, Wilson, vol. 2, The New Freedom, 426.

82. See, for example, Tugwell, Rexford, The Brains Trust (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 227–78Google Scholar.

83. Labor leaders in the 1920s and early 1930s had repeatedly asked for repeal of the Sherman Act. Cf. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy, 245, and Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act, 268.

84. On the genesis of the NIRA, see Hawley, Ellis, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap. 1; and Bellush, Bernard, The Failure of the NIRA (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 1–30Google Scholar.

85. , Douglas's comments on the 1933 law can be found in Yale Law Review (01 1934): 521–33Google Scholar.

86. On the transformation of securities regulation, see James, Laylin K., “Comments: Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933,” Michigan Law Review 32, no. 8 (1934): 1130–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ritchie, Donald A., James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 51–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

87. “All I am trying to do,” said Senator Walcott, “is … to protect the business interests of the country by liberalizing the Securities Act, which does not protect business but injures business very seriously.” Cong. Rec. 73–2, 8706. Bipartisanship is more impressive in the Senate, since the elections of 1930–32 had decimated periphery Republican representation in the House.

88. The Senate amendment to eliminate the “death sentence,” in favor of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) discretion to eliminate holding companies where they were “detrimental to the interests of investors, consumers and the general public,” was offered by Senator Dieterich of Illinois, a Democrat. The conference committee bill compromised the issue by outlawing holding companies beyond the second degree and allowing the SEC to order further simplification into single, integrated systems. See Parrish, Michael, Securities Regulation in the New Deal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 175–76Google Scholar.

89. With southern legislators, the contrast was even more striking. States with significant textile industries—North and South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Tennessee—cast eight of their ten votes for the Dieterich amendment, while the remaining six southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas) opposed it nine to one. Cong. Rec. 74–1, 9053. It will be recalled that a state is here classified as “core,” “diverse,” or “periphery” according to the industrial levels (v.a.p.c.) of the trade area in which a majority of the state's population resided in 1929. Thus, North Carolina and Missouri were “periphery” states in spite of the existence of industrial centers in St. Louis and the Winston-Salem area. (The St. Louis trade area v.a.p.c. was under $200 and only 42 percent of North Carolina's population lived in the Winston-Salem trade area.)

90. The legislation of the “two New Deals” is discussed in more detail in my essay “Business, Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie,” in The Political Economy of Public Policy, ed. Stone, Alan and Harpham, Edward J. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), 115–40Google Scholar. My interpretation of the forces producing the “first” and “second” New Deals differs significantly from that of most historians, and of some participants as well.

91. The legislative histories of the transportation bills are discussed in my article cited in note 90 and my paper “The Roots of Regulation: Economics and Politics before and during the 1970s,” presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, September 2–5, 1982. The climate of committee reciprocity and executive dominance that marked the New Deal produced few roll calls on post-1935 bills. For example, the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, which strengthened the Clayton Act's price discrimination section, was passed without a record vote. Designed to protect small businesses against the chain store's advantage with suppliers, the act was strongly supported by smaller grocers and retail druggists, but periphery congressmen concerned about the survival of small business were its major legislative sponsors. New York Democrat Emmanuel Celler was its most vocal congressional opponent. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, which expanded FTC authority to act in cases involving potential injury to consumers (not just competitors) through deceptive advertising, also passed without record votes. It thwarted passage of stronger FDA legislation. See Jackson, Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal.

92. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” 366.

93. Gressley, Gene M., “Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal,” in The New Deal, ed. Sternsher, Bernard (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), 46Google Scholar.

94. Boedecker, Karl Adolph, “A Critical Appraisal of the Antitrust Policy of the United States Government from 1933 to 1945,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1947), 192–205, 321Google Scholar; Gressley, “Thurnian Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal,” 50–51. The power to suspend antitrust laws where prosecution might hamper the war effort was granted in Public Law 603, June 11, 1942.

95. This was the interpretation of disaffected brains truster Moley, Raymond. See his After Seven Years (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1939), esp. 374–75Google Scholar.

96. Friedel, Frank, The New Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers, 1959), 18–19Google Scholar.

97. Gressley, “Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal,” 37.

98. A discussion of this development is beyond the scope of this study, but some of the rudiments can be identified: the end of the unit rule for Democratic presidential nominations; the active involvement of federal employees in the primary and general elections of 1936–38 (a movement later halted by passage of the Hatch Act); and the work of the National Resources Committee, whose final report in 1943 sketched an ambitious and far-reaching plan for a postwar welfare state. (On the latter, see “Resources Board's Findings and Recommendations,” New York Times, March 11, 1943, 12.

99. , Arnold had made clear in his books, The Symbols of Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1935)Google Scholar and The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), that he shared neither the ethos nor the preferred (legalistic and combative) method of traditional antitrust activists—sentiments that caused him some difficulty with agrarian senators in his confirmation process. See U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, “Nomination of Thurman W. Arnold,” March 11, 1938 (75th Cong., 3d sess.). Arnold saw as competing symbols the individualistic “trial by combat” enshrined in the traditional antitrust movement (with its reliance on the formal legal system and criminal sanctions) and modern administrative government, “a symbol of efficiency and control.” His preference was clearly with the latter (The Symbols of Government, 133–94).

100. Edwards, Corwin D., “Thurman Arnold and the Antitrust Laws,” Political Science Quarterly 58 (1943): 340–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gressley, “Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal,” 44–45; Blum, John Morton, V Was for Victory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 130–40Google Scholar.

101. Passage of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act and a change in the personnel and philosophy of the Supreme Court made possible the landmark decision in U.S. v. Hutcheson et al., 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The case and its consequences are discussed in Edwards, “Arnold and the Antitrust Laws,” 347–48; and Neale, A. D. and Goyder, D. G., The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., 3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 6Google Scholar.

102. One indicator of regional sentiment is a Senate vote on a proposed cut of $750,800 in the ATD budget, on May 19, 1941 (Cong. Rec. 77–1, 4204). Senators from core industrial states split 10–10; senators from periphery and diverse states, 11–25. Both parties were divided (weakly) on regional lines. Southern textile states accounted for six of the periphery's ten votes to cut appropriations.

103. Similar amendments had been proposed by the TNEC and introduced in earlier congresses by Senator O'Mahoney (see Cong. Rec. 81–2, 16452).

104. Only ten Democrats opposed the Celler-Kefauver bill in the House, all but one of whom represented southern districts. An equal number of core Republicans backed the bill, although the large majority (28 out of 38) of Republicans voting for the bill represented midwestern and Pacific districts. It may be significant that in the Senate, although both core and periphery wings of the GOP opposed the bill, four Republican senators from New York and New England backed it, while four of five Republicans from Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska opposed it. The blurring of regional differences can also be seen in the cosponsorship of the bill by Rep. Celler of New York.

105. Relevant here are the decentralized character of U.S. labor law, state taxation differentials, national public works and defense expenditures, and the effects of national transportation and communications regulation, all of which have encouraged the geo-graphic decentralization of industry and population. For a discussion of the decline of the core economy in the 1970s and the political repercussions of that decline, see Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, chap. 7.

106. See, for example, Stone, Alan, Economic Regulation and the Public Interest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977)Google Scholar, chap. 10; and Pertschuk, Michael, Revolt against Regulation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

107. Pertschuk, Revolt against Regulation, 23.

108. The connection between policy preferences of House and Senate Commerce Committee liberals and FTC activism is documented by Weingast, Barry R. and Moran, Mark J. in “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policy Making by the Federal Trade Commission,” Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 783–800CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

109. Stone, Economic Regulation and the Public Interest, 232–34. On the “new class” see also Vogel, David, “The Public Interest Movement and the American Reform Tradition,” Political Science Quarterly 95 (Winter 1980–1981): 607–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and my own “Business, Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie” (on the 1930s) cited in note 90.

110. For a graph of the merger wave in all three aspects, see Shepherd, William G. and Wilcox, Clair, Public Policies toward Business, 6th ed. (Homewood, III.: Richard D. Irwin, 1979), 171Google Scholar.

111. The Neal Report was printed in Cong. Rec. 91–1 (May 27, 1969), 13890–13907.

112. American Bar Association, Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission (Chicago: ABA, 1969); and Cox, Edward C., Fellmeth, Robert C., and Schultz, John E., The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission (New York: Richard W. Baron Co., 1969)Google Scholar.

113. Katzmann, Robert A., Regulatory Bureaucracy: The FTC and Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980)Google Scholar, chap. 8; and FTC Docket #8934, September 1973. The Exxon case was dropped by the Reagan administration. An FTC critic has stated that the petroleum industry case consumed approximately 30 percent of the commission's antitrust enforcement budget in fiscal years 1977 and 1978; seeLiebler, Wesley J., “Bureau of Competition: Antitrust Enforcement Activities,” in The Federal Trade Commission since 1970, ed. Clarkson, Kenneth W. and Muris, Timothy J. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 86Google Scholar.

114. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, “Hearings on the Industrial Reorganization Act” (S 1167), 93–1 (March 12, 1973). The hearings, which continued through early 1975, focused on particular sectors of the economy (automobiles, oil, computers, communications). An analysis of the Hart bill is presented in Jones, William K., “The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust Proposal to Restructure the American Economy,” Columbia Law Review 73 (1973): 635—76Google Scholar. See Goldschmid, Harvey J., Mann, H. Michael, and Weston, J. Fred, eds., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Boston: Little Brown, 1974)Google Scholar for a study that exemplifies both the new respectability of antitrust among economists and law professors and the significance of the petroleum industry in the revival of antitrust debate. This work includes a discussion of the promise and practical difficulties in the Hart bill's approach. There is a (historically) remarkable exchange on pp. 400–07 in which the Michigan senator defends deconcentration in tones strongly reminiscent of the agrarian antitrust movement (“the government would intervene, but only on a one-shot basis. It would restructure industries … [and then] get out of the market”), while Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska defends large-scale enterprise on grounds of efficiency and international competitiveness.

115. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974, 327–28; Pertschuk, Revolt against Regulation, 53,54. In the only significant vote on the 1974 Magnuson-Moss bill, the House defeated an amendment by Rep. Eckhardt of Texas to add a consumer redress section similar to that in the Senate bill. Sixty-three percent of core representatives, but only 29 percent of periphery representatives, backed the amendment.

116. FTC, Annual Report 1978 (section heading).

117. White, Lawrence J., Reforming Regulation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1981)Google Scholar, chap. 15; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), 361–62.

118. Both vertical and horizontal (competing fuel) divestitures of petroleum companies were endorsed by the 1976 Democratic platform. See Johnson, National Party Platforms, 2:935. The significance of the petroleum industry to the antitrust revival of the 1970s is indicated by remarks of Sen. Birch Bayh (D, Indiana) during debate on the 1976 “Parens Patria” bill. While Bayh speculated that earlier enactment of the Parens Patria bill might have made more drastic action unnecessary, he contended that “the energy sector of our economy has become so concentrated and intertwined that greater enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is not enough.” Hence the necessity, he argued, for passage of the divestiture bill (of which Bayh was a cosponsor). Cong. Rec. 94–2, 15870.

119. On the consumer-coal coalition in the House, see Sanders, Elizabeth, The Regulation of Natural Gas: Policy and Politics, 1938–1978 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981)Google Scholar, chaps. 6 and 7.

120. Bensel, in fact, suggests that Houston and Miami have achieved a “senior” status among periphery cities and may, in the not too distant future, become core cities (Sectionalism and American Political Development, 413). It should be noted, however, that one of the working-class Houston districts—that of Rep. Bob Eckhardt, Texas 8—narrowly defeated the outspoken consumer advocate in the 1980 election.

121. The grant program distributed $25 million to the states between 1976 and 1982. According to the Justice Department, it facilitated the hiring of several hundred new state antitrust personnel, improvement in state antitrust laws, and a doubling of the volume of state antitrust cases. U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 101; Annual Report, 1982, 141.

122. The compromise version allowed states to hire outside attorneys but only if a court approved their fees. An amendment by Senator Burdick of North Dakota to limit aggregation of damages in all state antitrust suits lost on a narrow 39–41 vote (with core senators voting 4–14; periphery senators, 31–15); a substitute amendment by Alabama Senator James Allen to prohibit the bill's application to states whose legislatures did not specifically approve it survived on an early 38–36 vote that split both parties along regional lines. The strength and persistence of periphery opposition in the Senate subsequently forced the bill's sponsors to accept significant restrictions. The final Senate version had not only limited state triple damages suits to price fixing and patent violations and banned contingency fee hiring, but also authorized attorneys' fees for prevailing defendants in some cases and permitted states to pass laws negating their own parens patria authority. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1976, 431–37 for a synopsis of the debate and provisions of the parens patria bill.

123. Colorado and Hawaii representatives also endorsed most of the consumerist/ antitrust initiatives of the mid-1970s. As the energy crisis faded, a good bit of the “deviance” from periphery norms was “corrected” in subsequent elections in the politically volatile plains and mountain states. In the Senate alone, between 1976 and 1983 seven consumerist Democrats were defeated by antiregulation Republicans in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, and three other such switches occurred in open seats in Minnesota and South Dakota. In combination with five Democrat-to-Republican shifts in the south, these sweeping electoral changes signaled a Republican realignment rooted in sharp core-periphery differences on economic policy.

124. Support patterns on the premerger notification bill, which passed the House separately on August 2, 1976, were similar to those in table 21. The bill received the backing of 88.2 percent of voting core representatives, compared to 53.7 percent support in the periphery. The Republican party was split on regional lines. Core concern with mergers has heightened as large firms in declining industries channel their profits into acquisition of periphery firms rather than local capital investment. A case in point is the recent acquisition of Marathon Oil by U.S. Steel.

125. The bill to strengthen and expedite enforcement of FTC orders and regulations was defeated on a 175–214 vote on September 28, 1978. Core representatives backed this conference bill (102–72), while periphery members opposed it (44–111), objecting particularly to the deletion of a legislative veto provision previously passed by the House.

126. In Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming (and in no other states), both senators, regardless of party, backed the one-house veto.

127. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1977, 552–54; 1978, 28; 1979, 343–45; 1980, 15–18; and Pertschuk, Revolt against Regulation, 97–117.

128. Periphery opposition to the coop amendment offered by Representative Mark Andrews (R, North Dakota) was largely confined to scattered districts in some of the periphery's largest cities (Birmingham, Denver, Miami, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio).

129. Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U.S. 730 (1977); Neale and Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., 426–27; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 12, 1979, 917–18; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1979, 361–62.

130. New York Times, November 10, 1985, Fl, 26, and January 16, 1986, Dl; Newsweek, August 29, 1983, 50–52.