In the field of American state politics, the tension between majoritarian institutions and equality has largely been ignored. Do state institutions that empower majority preferences exacerbate disparities in social outcomes? Under what conditions do majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequalities in the American states? Our argument is that equality is most likely to be threatened under majoritarian institutions when (1) there are systemic participatory biases and/or (2) there are widespread prejudices about particular groups in society. We find that more majoritarian institutions are associated with larger disparities between White and Black life expectancy and poverty rates across the American states, but not differences in educational attainment. We also find that this effect is moderated by racial context, with majoritarian institutions being associated with greater disparities for states with diverse racial contexts and smaller disparities in more homogenous states. These findings suggest that majoritarian institutions operate to the benefit of the White majority, while coming at the cost of minority population outcomes when a racial threat is perceived, and presumably, public opinion is biased.

Separate from their feelings of national pride, Americans may also feel proud of the state where they live. I explore the political consequences of these feelings of state pride. I propose that when people feel proud of the state they reside in, they are more willing to empower their state governments to take action to address state challenges. Using survey responses from a module of the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, I find that people who express greater pride in their state are more likely to advocate for state spending on social programs. Feelings of state pride are also associated with support for policy devolution and the belief that state governments should have more influence over policymaking within the federal system. State governments have incentives to try to cultivate feelings of state pride, as those who feel proud of their state are more willing to empower their state government to effect change.

The 2020 Black Lives Matter protests dramatically increased the salience of police reform, yet the US Congress failed to pass any reforms. In contrast, state governments have passed hundreds of police-related bills since 2020. I summarize the plethora of state reforms passed over this period by grouping them into 18 key areas, including 14 I classify as pro-reform and four I classify as anti-reform. Next, I describe how party control and public opinion relate to state reforms. I find that state party control is a robust predictor of enacting pro-police reform policies, and that reforms are more likely in states with more Democratic and more pro-reform publics. While police reforms are responsive to public opinion, they are also typically incongruent.

The literature on representation has shown that those who reflect the characteristics, traits, and/or experiences of a group (descriptive representation) are more likely to represent that group’s interests (substantive representation). In this paper, we argue that questions about representation should be considered with regard to generational identity. Drawing upon research that shows the importance of the Millennial Generation identity for understanding Millennials’ attitudes and policy preferences, we look at whether this identity matters for the legislative representation of group interests by examining bill sponsorship activity in 31 state legislatures. Our results tentatively support the expectation that the Millennial generation identity conditions the sponsorship of Millennial interest bills. Millennial legislators are more likely than non-Millennial legislators to sponsor bills that disproportionately impact their group members. This result is observed among both Democrat and Republican legislators, but at different magnitudes and for different issue priorities. These findings suggest that the Millennial generation identity is a meaningful determinant of legislative behavior, even when examined alongside partisanship.

Court restructuring has become a salient national political issue, with proposals to increase the number of justices on the US Supreme Court gaining traction in response to various Court controversies. However, relatively little attention has been paid to state-level efforts, some successful, to increase the number of justices on state supreme courts. Although the number of justices on the US Supreme Court has not been changed since 1869, the size of most state supreme courts has been less stable. To place recent state supreme court expansions into context, this article analyzes the historical dynamics of state supreme court expansion. Analyzing an original dataset that includes every change made to the size of a state supreme court since 1789, it finds that court expansion has been more likely when the political competitiveness of a state is low and when state judicial selection and retention systems provide for lower levels of judicial independence.

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.

Paid sick leave, or the ability to remain home from work in the event of illness and receive compensation, has risen in prominence after the COVID-19 pandemic. Among the OECD countries, all but two, the United States and South Korea, have national paid sick leave (PSL) policies. Yet despite federal inaction in the United States, states have been adopting PSL, with 15 plus the District of Columbia having done so by the end of 2020. In the absence of federal policy, what drives states to adopt PSL mandates? In this article, we investigate two possible explanations – women in politics and jurisdictional competition. In the former, we suggest that increases in female representation in state-level governance make it more likely that a state will adopt a PSL policy. In the latter explanation, we suggest that jurisdictional competition in the form of cities or counties adopting municipal PSL policies creates pressure on the state-level government to enact statewide policies to harmonize policy, in a process of “bottom-up” federalism. To evaluate our hypotheses, we create a dataset of all state and municipal PSL policies in the United States. We find strong support for the gender representation argument, but not for the jurisdictional competition argument.

This article proposes that elections with substantial amounts of campaign activity change the substance of a state supreme court’s legitimacy from one derived from the court’s legalistic nature to one derived through representation. Using a national survey, it shows that because of this change the perceived legitimacy of courts with robust elections does not induce acceptance of their decisions. Only nonrepresentative courts with the legalistic form of legitimacy can convert their institutional legitimacy into decisional acceptance. This means that even highly legitimate courts with robust elections are ineffective at inducing acceptance. This hinders the ability of those courts to build public support for their decisions, which is essential for the effective functioning of the judiciary. Additional analyses show this effect is not caused by the politicization associated with campaigning but rather through the representation provided by elections.

Increasingly, governments report on public service quality, which has the potential to inform evaluations of performance that underlie voters’ opinions and behaviors. We argue these policies have important effects that go beyond informing voters. Specifically, we contend that the format in which policymakers choose to report information will steer the direction of opinion by exacerbating or mitigating biases in information processing. Using the case of school accountability systems in the United States and a variety of experimental and observational approaches, we find that letter grade systems for rating public school performance, as opposed to other reporting formats, exacerbate negativity bias. Public opinion proves more responsive to negative information than to positive information in letter grade systems than in alternate formats. Policymakers, then, do not simply inform public opinion; rather, their decisions about how to present information shape the interpretations that voters ultimately draw from the information provided.

Asian Americans are the fastest growing racial group in the US electorate, yet they are significantly under-represented in political office. How do predominantly immigrant groups like Asian Americans close this representation gap? We build on existing theories of minority representation and immigrant assimilation by highlighting the importance of a group’s political incorporation into American society. We argue that the representation of minority immigrant groups in political office requires social integration and the acquisition of civic resources, processes that can take considerable time. Using new data on Asian American state legislators spanning half a century, we find that immigration in prior decades is associated with greater political representation, while contemporaneous population size has either no independent impact or a negative one. Other indicators of immigrant social integration, including citizenship status, language ability, education, and income, also predict the likelihood of co-racial representation in political office. Our results suggest political representation gaps of immigrant groups narrow over time, though this may be a non-linear process. Our findings also imply that the least integrated members of immigrant groups are the most likely to be affected by representational deficits.

Interest groups are an important influence in the subnational policymaking process. Previously, environmental policy scholars measured the strength of environmental groups in the American policymaking subnational process by using proxies like state-level group membership in major nationwide environmental organizations (e.g., Sierra Club). Although these prior measures of group strength have face validity, recent scholarship suggests that the utilization of group financial resources is a better measure of the influence of interest groups in state-level models. We take this approach and provide a new way to measure state-level environmental interests by using aggregated financial information (income and assets) from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data obtained via the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). This measure provides several advantages over previous approaches because it varies over time, is derived from easily accessible public data, includes a greater diversity of environmental organizations, and it is considered reliable by prior scholars. We demonstrate its empirical value by deploying our measure in a model of state policy adoption. We encourage researchers to further utilize this new measure in their analysis of environmental advocacy at the subnational level.

In this research, we update the measure of case salience for state supreme courts originally developed by Vining and Wilhelm (2011). The original measure was compatible with the Brace-Hall State Supreme Court Data Project (SSCDP) and covered 1995 through 1998. Our updated measure is now compatible with the Hall–Windett Data on State Supreme Court Outcomes (2013), a more contemporary source for state supreme court information. Here we discuss the new dataset of salient cases from 1995 to 2019 and provide descriptive statistics.

For decades, in most states with a party registration option, the percentage of voters registering as unaffiliated with a major political party has steadily increased. But who are these registered voters in these polarized partisan times, and why might they register without a major party? We address these questions by drawing on parallel large-N original surveys of registered voters in two southeastern states experiencing a notable rise in registered independents but with different electoral rules for unaffiliated registrants. The closed primary rule in Florida reflects a much greater share of major party registrants versus North Carolina, which has a semi-closed primary rule. Nevertheless, even with these different primary laws, in both states we find that the decision not to register with a major party strongly covaries with identity as a political independent. Hence, registration rules may alter registration patterns, but individuals claiming to be less attached to a major party are markedly more likely to manifest this position by registering unaffiliated.

We evaluate three measures of state legislative professionalism: Squire’s (1992) index that measures professionalism relative to the US House, Bowen and Greene’s (2014b) two-dimensional scaling, and legislative operating expenditures per member, an older measure that remains in occasional use. Replications of 18 recent articles show that these three measures regularly produce significantly different estimates of the effect of professionalism, particularly in longitudinal analysis; when they do, the choice of measure often affects whether other central variables retain a significant relationship with the dependent variable. These divergent results appear to reflect differences among these measures in terms of missingness, vulnerability to outliers, measurement of session length, and whether to benchmark to the US House. Researchers seeking a general indicator of professionalism should consider these differences when choosing an appropriate measure.

Amid the growing trend of political polarization and nationalization of US politics, the link between federal and local governments has become increasingly significant in the American public policy process. Consequently, the president, as party leader, has increasingly supported co-partisan candidates, not only in federal elections but also in subnational ones. Incorporating 1,124 contested partisan local elections for 399 cities with populations exceeding 50,000 between 2005 and 2020, we investigate how the president strategically employs federal funds to assist co-partisan mayoral candidates. Using two-way fixed effects models, we find that the president distributes more block and project grants to swing cities with co-partisan mayors during mayoral election years. We do not find that the president disproportionately allocates grants to co-partisan mayors in swing cities during non-mayoral election years; instead, jurisdictions are rewarded irrespective of their electoral value.