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Risk and Reform: Explaining Support for Constitutional Convention Referendums

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

William D. Blake Open the ORCID record for William D. Blake [Opens in a new window]  and
Ian G. Anson
William D. Blake*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD, USA
Ian G. Anson
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD, USA
*
William D. Blake, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250-0001, USA. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Scholars of comparative constitution-making and direct democracy agree that economic conditions affect public support for constitutional reform but disagree as to how. Prospect theory suggests both approaches may be correct, depending on the political and economic context in which voters operate. Fourteen states periodically ask their citizens whether to call a state constitutional convention, making this the oldest form of direct democracy in the United States. We test our theory in preelection polls in two of these states and a survey experiment. According to the results, negative perceptions of economic and government performance increase support for conventions when voters view them as opportunities to correct problems. On the other hand, if a convention represents a chance to improve on an acceptable status quo, voters with positive performance evaluations become more supportive. Our findings contribute to the heuristics literature and inform normative debates over direct democracy and popular constitutionalism.

Keywords

state constitutionsconstitutional conventionsdirect democracypolitical behaviorconstitutional venerationprospect theoryheuristics
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 330 - 355
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2019

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