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America's Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

James Strickland
James Strickland*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
*
James Manning Strickland, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 S. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045, USA. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America's statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This study both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multiclient lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.

Keywords

campaign financepolitical behaviorinterest groupsparties and interest groupslobbyinglegislative professionalismlegislative politicsterm limits
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 351 - 374
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2019

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