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Psychopathology According to Behaviorism: A Radical Restatement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 April 2014

Marino Pérez-Álvarez*
Affiliation:
University of Oviedo
*
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marino Pérez-Álvarez, Departamento de Psicología.Universidad de Oviedo. Plaza de Feijoo s/n. 33003- Oviedo (Spain). E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological conception of the so-called mental disorders. The “radical” sense of this restatement is that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, “radical” applied to behaviorism means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for “root” (and thus implies change beginning at a system's roots or getting to the root of things, in this case, of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.

Se hace un replanteamiento radical de la psicopatología dominante, caracterizada por los sistemas nosológicos y por su abocamiento a una concepción neurobiológica de los llamados trastornos mentales. El sentido ‘radical’ de este replanteamiento no es otro que el propio del conductismo radical. Como se recordará, ‘radical’ aplicado al conductismo quiere decir total (sin dejar de estudiar nada que interese a la psicología), pragmático (referido al sentido práctico del conocimiento) y de raíz (yendo a la raíz de las cosas, en este caso de los trastornos psicológicos). Sobre esta base, se introduce la distinción aristotélica de materia y forma que, además de ser conductista avant la lettre, sirve aquí de instrumento crítico para desenmascarar el tinglado de la psicopatología según está dado. Se señalan las implicaciones de este replanteamiento, algunas prestas ya para la práctica clínica.

Type
Complutense University Celebration of B.F. Skinner's Centennial (1904-2004)
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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