Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T01:45:29.703Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Mental States as Social Discourse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Warwick Mules
Warwick Mules*
Affiliation:
Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Central Queensland
*
Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Central Queensland, Rockhampton 4702, Australia
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In a recent article published in this journal, Lea (1991) argues against psychological theory which proposes access to mental states through empirical investigation. His argument depends upon demonstrating certain logical flaws in the arguments of proponents of this kind of empiricism, thereby ruling their conclusions out of court. In response to Lea, I will show that empirical investigation of mental states is possible only when undertaken as a reflexive theoretical practice. Unlike Lea's argument which remains within the Cartesian/Kantian paradigm of a priori structures and categories, an argument based on reflexive theoretical practice takes account of the grounded conditions under which knowledge becomes validated in social settings, involving close attention to the status of language in context of use. I will show that certain elisions in Lea's argument, particularly in his invocation of Wittgenstein's work on language use, eliminates for him the possibility of dealing with language in this manner. Furthermore, I will also show in the course of undertaking the above tasks, that Lea's mode of augment is itself perfectly consistent with the form of apriori theorizing he wishes to reject.

Type
Articles
Information
South Pacific Journal of Psychology , Volume 5 , 1992 , pp. 45 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © University of Papua New Guinea & University of Central Queensland 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Attewell, P. (1974). Ethnomethodology since Garfinkel. Theory and Society, 1, 179–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, A. (1974). Theorizing. London: Heinemann.Google Scholar
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Nice, R. (Trans). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bruns, G. L. (1984). On the weakness of language in the human sciences. In Nelson, J. et al. (Eds.) The rhetoric of the human sciences. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Buttney, R. (1986). The ascription of meaning: A Wittgensteinian perspective. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 72, 261–273.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cicourel, A. V. (1964). Method and measurement in sociology. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Coulter, J. (1979). The social construction of mind: Studies in ethnomethodology and linguistic philosophy. Houndeville: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, H. (1984). Studies in ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Guignon, C. (1990). Philosophy after Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 50 (4), 649–672.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lea, D. (1991). The empirical relevancy of mental states. South Pacific Journal of Psychology, 4, 6–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Place, U. (1964). Consciousness is just a brain process. In Flew, A. (Ed.), Body, mind and death (276–287). New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Philosophical investigations. Anscombe, G. E. M. (Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar