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The Empirical Relevancy of Mental States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

David Lea*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology & Philosophy University of Papua New Guinea
*
Department of Psychology and Philosophy, University of Papua New Guinea, Box 320, University Post Office, NCD, Papua New Guinea

Abstract

In this article I defend the following argument: 1) Empirical investigation can only be conducted with reference to statements that are empirically relevant; 2) Statements that refer to mental states cannot be defined so as to render them empirically relevant; 3) Therefore, there can be no empirical investigation of mental states.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © University of Papua New Guinea & University College of Central Queensland 1991

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References

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