Did the United States circa 1850 provide more primary education to its youth than other European countries, especially Britain? And was its more decentralized and democratic polity an important reason why? Analyzing census data, parliamentary reports, and election results, I find the perceived American advantage in regard to enrollments is due to an underestimation of the population at risk, a confusion of enrollments with attendance, and a lack of attention to differences in the length of school terms. In neither northern or southern counties in the United States did the extension of the franchise correlate with more tax dollars for elementary schools; rather it materialized in counties with more Whig and moral reform partisans whom institutional and social historians have identified as being motivated by external benefits/ social control objectives. More similarities in educational status may exist between the two nations than is often acknowledged and a North Atlantic perspective might be fruitful. Agricultural employments and racial/ ethnic differences surfaced as deterrents to 3R competency in both places, though the spread of a high-fertility population into low-density areas presented the United States with a special challenge. These results suggest that the effects of late-nineteenth-century compulsory attendance and other education legislation merit a reevaluation.

Recently, a shared understanding has emerged concerning the migration patterns of US female teachers from 1860 to 1880, but the evidence is scattered in the literature and largely qualitative. This paper provides a unifying understanding of their migration patterns based on the US census. Our quantitative findings generally confirm the shared understanding. First, teachers more often migrated to urban than rural areas; higher wages and other forms of compensation in urban areas appear to be the reason. Second, teachers born in the Northeast migrated the most, and the majority went to the Midwest; the Southern movement was never widespread, even during Reconstruction. Third, teachers born in Massachusetts migrated most commonly among teachers born in the Northeast; the oversupply of teachers in the state seems to have been the influencing factor.

What is public, what is private, and what is the relationship between them? Can the public interest be clearly identified and protected? What role should government play in the lives of ordinary citizens? These are questions currently engaging policy makers and the general public as well as scholars in a range of disciplines. The provision and financing of urban public goods is one arena in which such questions have arisen. Historically, governments, private entities, and mixed forms such as public-private partnerships have undertaken these activities in the United States and other countries (Beito et al. 1989; Dyble 2010; Goodrich 1960; Hodge et al. 2010; Jacobson and Tarr 1995). In the late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century United States, tax revolts and concerns about “big government” led to increased scrutiny of the appropriate role of government. Contracting out of government activities and privatization both assumed increased importance (Dyble 2012; Light 1999).

In the United States, significant variation regarding the quality of public goods exists across local governments. In this article, I seek to explain these patterns. I argue that economically and racially homogenous communities are collectively willing to invest more resources in public goods relative to diverse communities. I provide evidence in support of this claim by analyzing the relationship between race and income diversity and the share of community security and education that is provided by private entities. I find that as racial diversity and income inequality increase, the share of private security guards and white children enrolled in private school is higher.

Nineteenth-century Pittsburgh and New Orleans were a mess: trash filled the streets impeding travel, hindering commerce, and spreading disease. City officials in Pittsburgh turned to private contractors to collect trash at public expense while in New Orleans they relied on city employees (through the mechanism of widows carts). Like Pittsburgh and New Orleans, nineteenth-century cities faced a mounting garbage problem and, like Pittsburgh, northern cities more often chose contract while southern cities more often chose city collection. In this paper, we look in depth at how Pittsburgh and New Orleans chose contract and city collection, what those solutions looked like in practice, and how these two cases might shed light on the North-South difference. We find that both cities rebuffed offers of assistance that may have led to better trash collection and instead based their collection practices on politics. Moreover, the solutions in practice defied the dichotomous labels of public and private and the assumptions that underlie each.

River works constituted the largest civil expenditure of the Qing state. In theory, the fiscal responsibility of the Qing state only stretched to major conservancy efforts of the Yellow River and Grand Canal, as well as the construction and maintenance of major river banks and irrigation initiatives. Smaller projects were funded and managed by local communities. Nonetheless, this division of funding between the state and local society was blurred in practice. Since the early eighteenth century, the Qing state routinely advanced the monies to pay for major repair and reconstruction of nonstate water-control projects; the communities who benefited from the finished project returned the investment to the state through extra duties on land taxes. This special method for financing hydraulic projects was frequently used in the first half of the nineteenth century when the Qing state experienced increasing fiscal difficulties. By examining the application of this financing method in different places and under varying circumstances between 1750 and 1850, this paper argues that the legitimation of state power through public good provision was the major justification of this policy.

From 1870 to the present, the city of New York has built and maintained municipal bathing places including river baths, indoor bathhouses, indoor pools, and outdoor pools, designed around competing motivations of hygiene, recreation, and play. In this paper, I consider what it means for different groups to play in public space using Caillois's (1961) division of ludus—competitive, rule-bound play, and paidia—exuberant, unstructured play. First, using historical examples, I show how these notions of play were expressed in two shifts in the construction of municipal swimming and bathing infrastructure in New York City. In 1870, the enclosure of formerly unstructured bathing spaces at the riverbanks, and the establishment of floating baths in the rivers was meant to structure both time and behavior in the water; in 1936, the construction of 11 enormous swimming pools under Parks Commissioner Robert Moses provided bathing spaces, with recreation at the center of their design program and social function. Second, I offer contemporary ethnographic data from two outdoor pools in Brooklyn to demonstrate how rules around acceptable play are differentially enforced inside of the same institution. Through these historical shifts and contemporary variations, I demonstrate how both the construction and everyday use of municipal bathing infrastructure has been the site of an ongoing tension between ludus and paidia, inflected with urban problematics of class and race.

This article compares the financing of urban infrastructure in nineteenth-century Chicago and twentieth-century Phoenix, highlighting distributional conflicts over the cost of public goods. Using the rich secondary literature on Chicago, particularly Robin Einhorn's book, Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833–1872, I explore whether adoption of development impact fees in Phoenix in 1987 represented a transition similar to that in Chicago between 1847 and 1851, when a system of special assessments paid by property owners benefiting from an improvement arose, in contrast to citywide financing of public works for citywide benefit. I examine the history of adoption and implementation of development impact fees, which were intended to “make growth pay for itself” by assessing new development to finance infrastructure it would require, and consider whether the fees resembled Chicago's special assessment system in constituting a privatization of government and in reflecting a view that government should not be used to redistribute. I conclude that models that address the provision of urban infrastructure, such as the Tiebout model, would benefit from greater attention to efforts to shift the cost of public goods over space, time, and social groups or classes in growing communities.