The modern liberal state arose as part of a rebellion against the entrenched hierarchies of rank, power, and privilege that had characterized the feudal order of European society. Under that order, a person's prospects in life were determined almost entirely by his status at birth. The individual lacked the liberty to change his social and economic ranking and was rendered dependent on the will of those in higher-ranking positions. It was against this inclusive, closed, and ascriptive system of inequality and dependence that the proponents of the liberal state fought.

Freedom of speech long has been regarded as one of the “preferred freedoms” in the United States: one of the freedoms the U.S. Supreme Court deems “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” However, what freedom of speech does—and should—mean is a highly charged question in American constitutional law. I will explore this question by examining how several prominent constitutional theorists have proposed particular approaches to free speech law in order to further their political objectives. I will examine the free speech theories of the nation's leading feminist legal theorist (regarding pornography), critical race theorists (regarding hate speech), libertarian (regarding commercial speech), and legal republican (regarding deliberative democracy). I also will discuss the principal criticisms of each of these theories, whether the courts have been influenced by any of them, and, in conclusion, whether it is possible to advance a nonpolitical (i.e., a purely law-based or value-free) theory of free speech.

“ 'Free speech' is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance”—or so literary theorist and professor of law Stanley Fish has claimed. This cynical dictum is one of several skeptical challenges to freedom of speech that have been extremely influential in the American academy. I will follow the skeptics' lead by distinguishing between two broad styles of critique: the progressive and the postmodern. Fish's dictum, however, like many of the bluntest charges, belongs to neither class exclusively. As an initial characterization of the distinction between these critiques, progressive skepticism claims that freedom of speech is a bad thing, while postmodernist skepticism claims it to be conceptually impossible. Both forms of skepticism hold the classical liberal endorsement of free speech and condemnation of censorship to be both naive and reactionary. Skepticism about free speech flourishes at universities in the United States and is especially well represented among professors at the country's most prestigious law schools. As legal scholar Robert Post approvingly observes: “Liberated from traditional inhibitions against official suppression of speech, the left has mobilized to pursue a rich variety of political agendas.”

Free speech has historically been viewed as a special and preferred democratic value in the United States, by the public as well as by the legislatures and courts. In 1937, Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote in Palko v. Connecticut that protection of speech is a “fundamental” liberty due to America's history, political and legal, and he recognized its importance, saying, “[F]reedom of thought and speech” is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” It is likely notable that in the Bill of Rights free speech is protected in the First Amendment rather than later.

In this paper I discuss one facet of the multifaceted question of whether strong protection for intellectual property rights—in particular, rights in expressive works and in information in digital form—is, in principle, at odds with the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. The question has assumed particular urgency in recent years because the Internet and digital technology seem to have rendered formerly serviceable legal boundaries obsolete, and doctrines that sufficed in a print-on-paper world no longer seem adequate. Vigorous debate rages about what has come to be referred to as ‘propertization’. Commentators ask whether, and how, and based upon what empirical assumptions, old boundaries ought to be redrawn and doctrines modified. The academic literature tilts heavily away from endorsing strong property rights in digitized content, and toward expanded user rights and intensified First Amendment review in copyright cases. This paper tilts in a different direction. It swims against the academic tide not only in the direction of its analysis but, more importantly, in the kinds of questions it considers relevant and in its analytical focus. Readers should understand that the analysis is deliberately provisional and suggestive rather than completely developed, and the conclusions are tentative. The paper does not purport to be a definitive study that draws confident conclusions. It is offered as speculation and in the hope that readers will approach it in that spirit.

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical purposes, the product of ‘judicial review’, the power of judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented power, America's dubious contribution to the science of government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world, not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states, judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of judicial power.

Free speech has been treated as a preeminent constitutional right in the United States for more than half a century. The rights of property owners, on the other hand, have received little constitutional protection since the New Deal period of the 1930s. This modern dichotomy is particularly striking because it obscures an older constitutional tradition that equated economic liberty and freedom of expression. This tradition saw both property rights and speech rights as essential to the protection of personal freedom by restraining the power of government.

The right to join with other people to promote a particular outlook, known as the right of expressive association, is a necessary adjunct to the right of freedom of speech, which is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Freedom of speech would be of little practical consequence if the government could suppress ideas by bluntly prohibiting individuals from gathering with others who share their perspective. Freedom of expression must consist of more than the right to talk to oneself.

My thesis is simple. The right of informational privacy, the great modern achievement often attributed to the classic Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis article, “The Right to Privacy” (1890), asserts an individual's right not to have private personal information circulated. Warren and Brandeis claimed that individual dignity in a modern society requires that people be able to keep their private lives to themselves and proposed that the common law should be understood to protect this dignity by making dissemination of private information a tort. As broadly stated, this right not to have private information distributed directly conflicts with a broadly conceived freedom of speech and of the press. My claim is that, in cases of conflict, the law should reject the Warren and Brandeis innovation. Speech and press freedom should prevail; the privacy tort should be ignored. This conclusion requires a normative argument concerning the appropriate basis and status of speech freedom that this essay will not really provide but for which I have argued elsewhere. Here, instead, I will describe that theory of speech freedom, explore its implications for informational privacy, and finally suggest some reasons to think that rejection of the privacy tort should not be so troubling and is, in fact, pragmatically desirable.

The year 1999 witnessed the horrific shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, where two teenage boys killed twelve of their classmates, a teacher, and then themselves. What lessons are to be learned from this tragedy? Certainly, it tells us that in a nation with approximately one third of a billion people, even an infinitesimal percentage of mentally unstable persons can create mayhem. Are there other lessons?

It is widely believed that there is more freedom of speech in America today than there was at the time of the founding. Indeed, this view is shared by liberal commentators, as one would expect, as well as by leading conservatives, which is more surprising. “The body of law presently defining First Amendment liberties,” writes liberal law professor Archibald Cox, grew out of a “continual expansion of individual freedom of expression.” Conservative constitutional scholar Walter Berns agrees: “Legally we enjoy a greater liberty [of speech] than ever before in our history.” This shared assessment is correct—from the point of view of the political theory of today's liberalism—but it is incorrect from the point of view of the political theory of the American founding.

Freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition have long been celebrated as crucial to democratic government. (I will often refer to these rights collectively as ‘freedom of expression’ or as ‘freedom of speech’.) United States Supreme Court decisions have, quite rightly, justified strong protection of these freedoms because of their crucial role in the functioning of American democracy. (Of course, there are other justifications as well, but I will not discuss them in this paper.)