¹ Aristotle's translators prefer “virtuous.” We should bear in mind, however, that the excellences of character that Aristotle includes within “aretê” range significantly more widely than moral virtue as that idea is usually understood these days.

² The photograph accompanied “Stretching Boundaries to Honor a Diva,” by Anthony Tommasini, in the national edition of the New York Times for 09 28, 1996Google Scholar. It evidently did not appear in the full edition of the paper that was archived and microfilmed.

³ Aristotle, , Nicomachean EthicsGoogle Scholar. This and further references are to W. D. Ross's translation (revised by J. O. Urmson) and to lines of Immanuel Bekker's standard edition of Aristotle, 's Greek text. The Ross/Urmson translation has been published separately (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, and as part of The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, Jonathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), vol. 2.Google Scholar

⁴ Although it is not translated this way by Ross or by Terence Irwin, both of whom use “happiness.” For a defense of translating eudaimonia as “flourishing,” see Cooper, John, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 89–90, n. 1.Google Scholar

⁵ Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed.

⁶ Here I follow, e.g., Cooper, John M., “Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value,” in Frede, Michael and Striker, Gisela, eds., Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 81–114Google Scholar. See also Rogers, Kelly, “Aristotle's Conception of Τ⋯ Καλ⋯ν,” Ancient Philosophy, vol. 13 (1993), pp. 355–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the possibly conflicting view that “to kalon” refers to the common good, see Irwin, T. H., “Aristotle's Conception of Morality,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 1986, pp. 115–43.Google Scholar

⁷ A reflection of the conceptual difference between flourishing and nobility of action is that the former is an agent- or person-relative notion. A flourishing life is one that is good for the person leading it. Fineness of action, however, is not an agent-relative notion in this sense. I shall return to this point in Section VI.

⁸ Taylor, Charles, “What Is Human Agency?” in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 16–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Taylor contrasts “strong evaluation” with “weak evaluation,” saying of weak evaluation that for something to be (weakly) judged good, “it is sufficient that it be desired.” However, this probably misses the contrast he has in mind, since critically-informed-desire accounts of evaluation, such as Peter Railton's account of a person's nonmoral good (in Railton, , “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, vol. 95 [1986], pp. 5–31)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, will count as strong evaluation by that criterion. Strong evaluation seems rather to concern what Taylor calls the “worth” of desires, where worth is characterized in terms of such categories as “noble” and “base.” When I discuss these matters below, I will use “merit” where Taylor uses “worth,” reserving “worth” for values to which desires that have merit themselves respond. For an excellent critical discussion of Taylor's distinction, see Flanagan, Owen J., “Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation,” in Rorty, Amélie O. and Flanagan, Owen J., eds., Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).Google Scholar

⁹ Within the Kantian view of morality, the difference between merit and worth manifests itself as a distinction between two kinds of respect. (For a discussion of this distinction see my “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics, vol. 88 [1977], pp. 36–49.)Google Scholar Moral “appraisal respect” is an attitude of moral esteem or admiration for morally good character—the good will—and actions that express it. It is as of moral merit. (On my use of the construction “as of,” see note 32 below.) Moral “recognition respect,” on the other hand, is as of the dignity of persons—the intrinsic worth any person has simply by virtue of her capacity for moral agency. As a response to merit, moral appraisal respect expresses itself in admiration and emulation. As a response to worth, moral recognition respect shows itself in forms of conduct that express appropriate recognition for worth of that distinctive kind, for example, by regulating conduct toward others by principles that they would not reasonably reject.

¹⁰ Cf. Thomas Hurka's view that virtue consists in loving the good, in Hurka, , “Virtue as Loving the Good,” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 149–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ I am indebted to John Broome and Thomas Hurka for very helpful discussion of this point.

¹² See, e.g., Hurka, Thomas, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 3–23.Google Scholar

¹³ This seems to be Hurka's view.

¹⁴ For the record, however, I do believe that perfectionism fails to appreciate the role that appreciated values play in warranting the claims of self-perfection. What we are prepared to count as perfecting or cultivating ourselves itself depends on what we can see as developing our powers to appreciate values, which cannot in turn reduce to the value of developing those very powers.

¹⁵ Unless, of course, it can be fit within a defensible teleological metaphysics.

¹⁶ For the idea of a “final” or “more complete” end, of more or less final ends, and of the most final end, see Nicomachean Ethics, 1097a24–34. An end is final if it is aimed at for its own sake. One final end is “more final” than another if the second is also appropriately pursued for the sake of the first.

¹⁷ I take the term “prudential value” from Griffin, James, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁸ I argue for these claims in “Self-Interest and Self-Concern,” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1997)Google Scholar, and in “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 89 (1998), pp. 261–82Google Scholar. Thomas Scanlon's 1996 Lecture, Tanner, “The Status of Well-Being,”Google Scholar delivered at the University of Michigan, sounds some related themes.

¹⁹ Think here of informed-desire accounts of rationality, such as Richard Brandt's, combined with similar accounts of a person's (nonmoral) good, such as Peter Railton's. See Brandt, , A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Railton, , “Moral Realism.”Google Scholar

²⁰ I argue for this in “Self-Interest and Self-Concern” and in “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.”

²¹ Here I have been much influenced by Anderson, Elizabeth's Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 19–30.Google Scholar

²² For an elaboration and defense of the idea that distinctive values are normative for distinctive valuing attitudes, see Anderson, , Value in Ethics and Economics.Google Scholar

²³ For a general noncognitivist account of judgments about what “makes sense” or is rational, see Wise, Allan Gibbard Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)Google Scholar. Compare also McDowell, John, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie, ed. Honderich, Ted (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985)Google Scholar; and D'Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel, “Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions,” Ethics, vol. 104 (1986), pp. 739–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I also intend my normative claims in this essay about the relation between prudential value and the appreciation of merit and worth to be neutral with respect to contending metaethical theories of merit and worth.

²⁴ On the relevance of this distinction to that between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical theories, see Pettit, Philip, “Consequentialism,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Singer, Peter (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991).Google Scholar

²⁵ For an elaboration and defense of this idea, see Anderson, , Value in Ethics and Economics, pp. 19–30Google Scholar. See also Darwall, , “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.”Google Scholar

²⁶ For example, on Gibbard's norm-expressivism (in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings), the judgment that something is justified expresses the psychological state of acceptance of a norm warranting that thing. Suppose, as I have suggested, that the judgment that X has merit is understood as the judgment that esteem for X is justified. According to Gibbard's normexpressivism, then, this judgment will express acceptance of a norm that warrants having esteem for X. The judgment that X has merit will thus express, not an attitude toward X, but an attitude toward an attitude toward X. Cruder noncognitivisms, such as emotivism, do hold that the judgment that something X has value expresses an attitude toward X, but they are problematic as accounts of value judgment for this very reason, since one can sincerely say or think that something has value even if one does not currently have a favorable attitude toward it, say, if one knows oneself to be depressed, in a perverse mood, or the like.

²⁷ Compare here David Velleman's view that love involves an appreciation of the worth of a person (Velleman, , “Love as a Moral Emotion,” EthicsGoogle Scholar, forthcoming).

²⁸ Here again, I intend to be taking no metaethical stands. I assume, for example, that noncognitivists can proffer some account of judgments about the appreciation of values. On my use of “as of,” see note 32 below.

²⁹ Michael Smith makes a similar objection to externalism: that it must hold that what explains why the “good and strong-willed” person is motivated to act in accordance with his ethical judgments, even when these undergo radical change, is a de dicto desire to do what is right, whereas a morally good person would be moved, rather, by de re desires to do the very things he thinks morally good. See Smith, , The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 71–76, 82–83.Google Scholar

³⁰ Aristotelian continence contrasts with akrasia or incontinence, acting against one's better judgment. The continent person does what she believes she should; for example, she chooses acts she believes to be noble. What she lacks, and what the virtuous person has, is wholehearted engagement with and enjoyment of noble activity.

³¹ Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Terence (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), p. 37.Google Scholar

³² Here and elsewhere I use the “as of” construction to stress the way the appearance seems to the person having it. Just as color experience is as of an intrinsic color feature, say, the redness of a book, so the experience of esteem involves an “appearance” that is as of an intrinsic “merit feature” of the object of esteem.

³³ Just as “esteem” can refer to an attitude toward merit or one toward worth, so can “self-esteem.” Regarding self-esteem as an attitude and its relation toward feelings, I have been helped by discussions with Peter Vranas.

³⁴ Dillon, Robin points this out in her “Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political,” Ethics, vol. 107 (1997), pp. 226–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Dillon actually puts her points in terms of appraisal self-respect (or as she calls it, following Hudson, Stephen, “evaluative self-respect”)Google Scholar. However, appraisal self-respect is a species of self-esteem, namely, that concerned primarily with moral or moral-like features of the person.

³⁵ Again, for a defense of the metaethical theory that being good for a person just is being something it would make sense for someone who cares about that person to want for her for her sake, see my “Self-Interest and Self-Concern.”

³⁶ Parfit, Derek makes a similar claim. See his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 501–2.Google Scholar

³⁷ Brodsky, Joseph, On Grief and Reason: Essays (New York: The Noonday Press, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995), p. 21.Google Scholar

³⁸ Sacks, Oliver, “The Twins,” New York Review of Books, vol. 32 (1985), pp. 16–20.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴¹ G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, with the preface to the second edition and other papers, edited with an introduction by Baldwin, Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 237.Google Scholar

⁴² Indeed, Moore argued that there is no coherent concept of a person's good. There is only the concept of the absolute goodness of something a person may possess or of his possessing it. Moore famously argued on these grounds that egoism is incoherent (ibid., pp. 150–53).

⁴³ I argue to the contrary in “Self-Interest and Self-Concern,” and “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.”

⁴⁴ Thus, we might take worth to include good experiences—pleasures including experiences that are appreciated as having worth as experiences and not as themselves appreciating further worth, such as beauty.

⁴⁵ “What, then, is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be good for me? … When therefore, I talk of anything I get as ‘my own good,’ I must mean either that the thing I get is good, or that my possessing it is good” (Moore, , Principia Ethica, p. 150)Google Scholar. See also Hurka, Thomas, “‘Good’ and ‘Good For’,” Mind, vol. 96 (1987), pp. 71–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ For example, the prudential value of pleasures (as such) would consist in their involving an appreciation of the value of certain experiences considered as such.