¹ Riker, William H., Liberalism against Populism (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert, A Preface to Democratic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956).Google Scholar For another exception, see Horowitz, Donald, Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).Google Scholar

² Riker, , Liberalism against Populism, p. 252.Google Scholar

³ Dahl, , Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 134 and 143.Google Scholar

⁴ See especially Hardin, Russell, “Why a Constitution?” in The Federalist Papers and the New Institulionalism, ed. Grofman, Bernard and Wittman, Donald (New York: Agathon Press, 1989)Google Scholar, as well as Ordeshook, Peter C., “Constitutional Stability,” Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 4, no. 3 (1992).Google Scholar

⁵ Briefly, the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponds to a situation in which each of two persons must choose between two alternatives-to cooperate or not to cooperate. The payoffs (in terms of money, satisfaction, or any such measure) from their joint choices are as follows (where the first number in each cell corresponds to the payoff to the row chooser and the second number corresponds to the payoff to the column chooser):

Notice now that failing to cooperate is the dominant choice for both persons-a person prefers not to cooperate, regardless of what the other person chooses. But these actions yield the (1,1) outcome even though both persons would prefer to cooperate in order to achieve the outcome (10,10).

⁶ Taylor, Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976)Google Scholar, and Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).Google Scholar Briefly, a sequence of outcomes corresponds to a self-enforcing “agreement” if the pair of strategies that yield that sequence are in equilibrium-if neither player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his or her equilibrium strategy.

⁷ For example, although the strategy pairs (cooperate always, cooperate always) and (never cooperate, never cooperate) are in equilibrium-neither player has an incentive to shift to a different strategy if the other person does not shift-the pairs (cooperate always, never cooperate) and (never cooperate, cooperate always) are not equilibria.

⁸ Notice, moreover, that the precommitment strategies that Sunstein, for instance, sees as the essential character of constitutional agreements are equilibria and self-enforcing. See Sunstein, Cass M., “Constitutionalism, Prosperity, Democracy,” Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 3 (1990), pp. 371–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ See, for example, Fudenberg, Drew and Maskin, Eric, “Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, vol. 54 (1986), pp. 533–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Hardin, Russell, “Why a Constitution?” p. 119Google Scholar and passim; Ostrom, Vincent, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, 2d ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), p. 51Google Scholar; Sunstein, Cass M., “Constitutionalism and Secession,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (1991), pp. 633–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ See, for example, Foley, Michael, The Silence of Constitutions (New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1990).Google Scholar

¹² One way to attempt to resurrect the contractarian view is with the argument that contracts are self-enforcing owing to the desire on the part of the contracting parties to establish and maintain certain types of reputations. But this argument founders on the fact that constitutions, at least in their ideal conceptualization, are not documents written between specific individuals. Rather, they facilitate collective action within a society regardless of the identities of the members of that society. For additional discussion of the role of reputation building and maintenance in the enforcement of contracts, see Kreps, David M., “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in Perspectives on Positive Political Theory, ed. Alt, James and Shepsle, Kenneth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).Google Scholar For a discussion of constitutions from this perspective, see Gifford, Adam Jr., “A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm,” Public Choice, vol. 68 (1991), pp. 91–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 10 11, 1991.Google Scholar All subsequent references to the draft prepared by this commission pertain to this version, which, although subsequently revised, has not changed greatly.

¹⁴ Of course, this article could be interpreted as a jurisdiccional assignment that precludes autonomous republics and the like from passing laws that restrict mobility. Such an assignment would be wholly reasonable, but if that were the goal, then there are far more direct ways to make such assignments.

¹⁵ Contrast the American Constitution's 23-word prohibition that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble …” with the draft Russian Federation constitution's 191-word (English translation, Articles 26, 31, and 74) treatment of these prohibitions.

¹⁶ Article 8, draft Russian Federation constitution.

¹⁷ Niskanen, William A., “Conditions Affecting the Survival of Constitutional Rules,” Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 2 (1990), pp. 53–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Rapaczynski, Andrzej, “Constitutional Politics in Poland,” University of Oticago Law Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (1991), pp. 595–631.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ I should emphasize at this point that I eschew the social-choice theorist's definition of instability in favor of the pluralist's concern for governmental stability. That is, I am not equating the instability of individual outcomes with that of the state itself. For further discussion of this distinction, see Miller, Nicholas, “Pluralism and Social Choice,” American Political Science Review, vol. 77 (1983), pp. 734–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ Arrow, Kenneth, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).Google Scholar I note, however, that Arrow's theorem does not formally establish the possibility of cycles (e.g., situations in which society prefers, say, outcome A to B, B to C, and C to A), and, thus, it does not formally preclude “best” outcomes. A slight alteration in Arrow's original axioms, however, secures the requisite result. See Schwartz, Thomas, “On the Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation,” Theory and Decision, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 1–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Davis, Otto A. and Hinich, Melvin, “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society,” in Mathematical Applications in Political Science II, ed. Bernd, J. L. (Dallas: SMU Press, 1966)Google Scholar; and Plott, Charles R., “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule,” American Economic Review, vol. 57, no. 2 (1967), pp. 787–806.Google Scholar

²² McKelvey, Richard D., “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 12 (1976), pp. 472–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Black, Duncan, Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

²⁴ McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C., “Symmetric Spatial Games without Majority Rule Equilibria,” American Political Science Review, vol. 70 (1976), pp. 1172–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McKelvey, Richard D., “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 30 (1986), pp. 283–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ See, for example, Shepsle, Kenneth and Weingast, Barry, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” Public Choice, vol. 37 (1981), pp. 503–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hammond, Thomas and Miller, Gary, “The Core of the Constitution,” American Political Science Review, vol. 81 (1987), pp. 1155–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Denzau, Arthur and Mackay, Robert, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Perfect Foresight Expectations,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 25 (1981), pp. 762–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Miller, Nicholas R., “A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 24 (1980), pp. 68–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shepsle, and Weingast, , “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice”Google Scholar; and Ordeshook, Peter C. and Schwartz, Thomas, “Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes,” American Political Science Review, vol. 81, no. 1 (1987), pp. 179–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁷ “Sufficiently tight” refers to a technical condition on the form of the distribution of preferences. For details, see Caplan, Andrew and Nalebuff, Barry, “On 64%-Majority Rule,” Econometrica, vol. 56, no. 4 (1988), pp. 787–814.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ See Riker, William H., “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 2 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ordeshook, Peter C., “Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions’,” American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 2 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Coleman, Jules and Ferejohn, John, “Democracy and Social Choice,” Ethics, vol. 97, no. 1 (1986), pp. 6–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Akzin, Benjamin, “On the Stability and Reality of Constitutions,” in Scripta Hierosolymitana III, ed. Bachi, Roberto (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1956).Google Scholar

³⁰ Elster, Jon, “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe,” University of Chicago Law Review vol. 58, no. 2 (1991), p. 480–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ See, for example, Aranson, Peter H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., “Public Interest, Private Interest, and the Democratic Polity,” in The Democratic State, ed. Benjamin, Roger and Elkin, Stephen (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985).Google Scholar

³² Sunstein, Cass M., “Constitutionalism, Prosperity, Democracy,” Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 3 (1991), p. 380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ By “rational ignorance” I mean those situations in which a voter rationally chooses not to gather information about the candidates or their parties because the cost of doing so exceeds the incremental benefits associated with making more informed decisions.

³⁴ Sunstein, , “Constitutionalism and Secession” (see n. 10 above), p. 642 and passim.Google Scholar

³⁵ An important caveat to Rule 17 is that framers of constitutions ought to avoid attempting to specify rights that merely invite the state to expand its domain too easily and too greatly. Consider, for example, the following provisions of the draft Russian Federation constitution: Article 59: “The state protects the rights of the consumer and supports the activity of societies in defense of these rights and other forms of their protection”; and Article 60: “The state guarantees freedom of enterprise.”

³⁶ Epstein, Richard A., “AH Quiet on the Eastern Front,” University of Oiicago Law Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (1991), p. 568.Google Scholar

³⁷ For example, if each of n legislators is elected in a single-member district and if n − x > (n + 1)/2 votes are required to upset the status quo, then as few as (50 + ε)(n − x) < 50% of the voters can control the outcome. That is, if a simple majority in each of n − x constituencies prefers to change the status quo, then the status quo is defeated.

³⁸ Hammond, Thomas and Miller, Gary, “The Core of the Constitution,” American Political Science Review, vol. 81 (1987), pp. 1155–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ We can speculate, then, that the Seventeenth Amendment (providing that senators should be elected by the people, rather than appointed by state governments) circumvents an important provision designed to raise the vote quota. Although some of the original intent of bicameralism remains owing to the staggered election terms of senators, senatorial and congressional election districts coincide too closely to lead us to believe that bicameralism today imposes a significant constraint on legislative action.

⁴⁰ The Federalist Papers, ed. Wills, Garry (Toronto: Bantam, 1982), number 51, p. 262.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Niou, Emerson M. S. and Ordeshook, Peter C., “Stability in Anarchic International Systems,” American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 4 (1990), pp. 1207–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² Aranson, and Ordeshook, , “Public Interest, Private Interest, and the Democratic Polity” (see n. 31 above).Google Scholar

⁴³ The term-limitation movement in the United States provides a useful example. Although voters appear to favor such limits in the abstract, they fail to implement them for their national representatives knowing that doing so would put their representation at a disadvantage with respect to all other states. For additional discussion of this dilemma in more general contexts, see Fiorina, Morris P. and Noll, Roger G., “Voters, Bureaucrats, and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 9 (1978), pp. 239–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Niou, Emerson M. S. and Ordeshook, Peter C., “Universalism In Congress,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 29, no. 2 (1985), pp. 246–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁴ Riker, , Liberalism against Populism, p. 249 and passim.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For an example of collusion, consider this letter (November 16,1989) addressed {o the Speaker and Republican Party leader of the United States House of Representatives, signed by the leaders of both parties following passage of a legislative pay raise (Congressional Quarterly, 12 2, 1989, p. 3326).Google Scholar

Dear Mr. Speaker and Mr. Republican Leader:

The ethics reform package that was adopted in the U.S. House of Representatives today provides an opportunity for all federal elected officials to move away from a growing dependence on special interests.

As the leaders of our political committees we are well aware of the political dangers that Members of Congress might face if this issue were to be misused in the campaigns of 1990.

The four of us have agreed to issue instructions to our staffs that the vote on HR 3660 is not an appropriate point of criticism in the coming campaigns. Further we will publicly oppose the use of this issue in any campaign in the 1990 cycle.

This agreement demonstrates our commitment to helping provide a positive political and ethical environment in which qualified people can serve in government.

We applaud the House leadership for the work they have done in this difficult and important area and pledge our continuing support for their efforts.

Sincerely,

Ron Brown (Chair, Democratic National Committee)

Guy Vander Jagt (Chair, Nat. Republican Cong. Comm.)

Lee Atwater (Chair, Republican National Committee)

Beryl Anthony (Chair, Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm.)

⁴⁶ Aranson, Peter H., “Federalism,” Cato Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (1990), p. 20.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Rabushka, Alvin and Shepsle, Kenneth A., Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Pub., 1972).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ That approach involves a parliament apportioned equally between Czechs and Slovaks, in which most legislative measures require majority approval in each half. For additional details, see Cutler, Lloyd and Schwartz, Herman, “Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 58, no. 2 (1991), pp. 511–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ For a discussion of this case and how it fits our discussion, see Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Riker, William H. and Lemco, Jonathan, “The Relation Between Structure and Stability in Federal Governments,” in The Development of American Federalism, ed. Riker, W. H. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Federalism is not the only device that politicians have at their disposal. Issues can also be “depoliticized” by directing them to specific bureaucratic jurisdictions (e.g., allowing a quasi-independent Federal Reserve to set the discount rate and the money supply) or by allowing the courts to adjudicate them. But federalism has the specific advantage that if parties collude to avoid an issue, then it is difficult for challengers to increase this issue's salience in each constituency taken one at a time.

⁵² Riker, William H., Federalism (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).Google Scholar

⁵³ See, for example, Hibbing, John R. and Patterson, Samuel C., “A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 4 (1992), pp. 430–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁴ See especially Rae, Douglas, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967 and 1971)Google Scholar; Taagepera, Rein and Soberg, Matthew, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Lijphart, Arendt, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85,” American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 2 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ordeshook, Peter C. and Shvetsova, Olga, “Electoral Laws, Social Cleavage, and Political Party Formation,” working paper, California Institute of Technology, 1992.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Hermens, F. A., Democracy or Anarchy (Notre Dame, Indiana: The Review of Politics, 1941).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Indeed, for examples of situations in which increasing one's vote share actually decreases one's utility, see Schwartz, Thomas, “The Paradox of Representation,” working paper, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 1992.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Horowitz, Donald L., Democratic South Africa? (see n. 1 above), p. 171.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 175–77.

⁵⁹ Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, “Subgame Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation,” working paper, Harvard University, 1991. Briefly, “allocation” refers to the practice of giving parties in the governing coalition control of specific issues; “concession,” in contrast, requires negotiation on each issue. Allocation, then, can yield outcomes that are not Pareto efficient; concession cannot.