Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T05:16:49.775Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

SELF-OWNERSHIP AND AGENT-CENTERED OPTIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2020

Seth Lazar
Seth Lazar*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Australian National University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

I argue that agent-centered options to favor and sacrifice one’s own interests are grounded in a particular aspect of self-ownership. Because you own your interests, you are entitled to a say over how they are used. That is, whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice. This is not the only plausible argument for agent-centered options. But it has some virtues that other arguments lack.

Keywords

interestsagent-centered optionswell-beingreasons for action
Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , Winter 2019 , pp. 36 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2020 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 In this section, I cover the same ground as I do in Section 2 of “Moral Status and Agent-Centered Options,” Utilitas 31, no. 1 (2019), 83–105.

2 There are too many proponents of this view to cite them all, but the most influential sources are Williams, Bernard, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Scheffler, Samuel, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See especially Scheffler, Samuel, Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

4 The only other examples I have found along the same lines are Heyd, David, Supererogation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982);Google Scholar Hurley, Paul, “Getting Our Options Clear: A Closer Look at Agent-Centered Options,” Philosophical Studies 78, no. 2 (1995): 163–88;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Shiffrin, Seana, “Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centered Options,” Analysis 51, no. 4 (1991): 244–54;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Slote, Michael A., Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge, 1985).Google Scholar Note that Garrett Cullity’s argument is rather hard to place: he defends options on grounds of consistency, arguing that we must be permitted to pursue our own projects, since we are permitted to help others pursue theirs. Cullity, Garrett, The Moral Demands of Affluence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Kagan, Shelly, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).Google Scholar

6 Kagan, Limits of Morality.

7 Not everyone agrees on this point, e.g. Quong, Jonathan, “Killing in Self-Defense,” Ethics 119, no. 3 (2009): 507–537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Gert, Joshua, “Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength,” Erkenntnis 59, no. 1 (2003): 5–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Kagan, Limits of Morality, 378.

10 Slote, Common-Sense Morality.

11 For an independent statement of this concern, see Walker, Margaret Urban, “Autonomy or Integrity: A Reply to Slote,” Philosophical Papers 18, no. 3 (1989), 253–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a response on Slote’s behalf, see Shiffrin, “Moral Autonomy.”

12 Slote, Common-Sense Morality.

13 Walker, “Autonomy or Integrity.”

14 Perhaps not only human well-being; since nonhuman animals lack the rational capacities either to sacrifice their interests for the greater good, or to withdraw their interests from consideration in calculating the greater good, I will focus only on human well-being in this essay.

15 E.g., Thomson, Judith Jarvis, Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986);Google Scholar Quinn, Warren S., “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review 98, no. 3 (1989): 287–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 Chappell, Richard Yetter, “Value Receptacles,” Noûs 49, no. 2 (2015), 322–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Quinn, “Doing and Allowing”; Fiona Woollard, “If This Is My Body . . . : A Defense of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2013): 315–41.

18 Quinn, “Doing and Allowing.” See also Woollard, “If This Is My Body.”

19 Williams, Moral Luck.

20 Of course, sometimes these projects will be impersonally valuable, and will generate requirements.

21 Kagan, Limits of Morality.

22 For example, Hampton, Jean, “Selflessness and the Loss of Self,” Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1 (1993), 135–65;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hurka, Thomas and Shubert, Esther, “Permissions to Do Less Than the Best: A Moving Band,” in Timmons, Mark, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–27.Google Scholar

23 Quinn, “Doing and Allowing”; Woollard, “If This Is My Body.”

24 McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers, “Value and Agent-Relative Reasons,” Utilitas 7, no. 1 (1995): 31–47;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Pettit, Philip, “Universalizability without Utilitarianism,” Mind 96, no. 381 (1987): 74–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar