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The Reflexivity of Evil*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

John Kekes
John Kekes
Affiliation:
Philosophy, State University of New York at Albany
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Extract

The aim of this essay is to argue for the following claims: evil is prevalent; its prevalence is mainly the result of habitual and predictable patterns of action; these actions follow from the vices of their agents; in many cases, neither the evil actions nor the vices from which they follow are autonomous; it is nevertheless justified to hold the agents who perform these actions morally responsible for them; the widespread denial of this claim rests on the principle “ought implies can”; two versions of this principle must be distinguished; neither version can be used to exempt agents from moral responsibility for their nonautonomous actions and vices; this has fundamental implications for how morality and responsibility should be conceived.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , Winter 1998 , pp. 216 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1998

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References

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