¹ Dretske, Fred, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 80.Google Scholar

² That is, a capacity “for expressing indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an indefinite range of new situations” (Chomsky, Noam, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965], p. 6).Google Scholar

³ Thus, in the words of Harold Brown, “Robinson Crusoe alone on his island… would not be able to achieve rationality” (Brown, , Rationality [London: Routledge, 1988], p. 187).Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid., pp. 186–87.

⁵ Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), p. 18.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., pp. 18–19.

⁷ My concern here is to offer an interpretation of Hobbes's account of setting up the reason of a public arbitrator as right reason, which I then use as the basis for understanding public reason as a construction from the individual reasons of the members of society. One might of course object that, whatever Hobbes intended, the first interpretation offers a better account of the role of the arbitrator, so that right reason is a hyperbolic metaphor-and public reason an unnecessary construction. Although I hope that my account of public reason reveals its attractions as a remedy for problems of interaction, I offer no direct argument in this essay to show that rational individuals would find it a necessary, or even a desirable, construction.

⁸ Baier, Kurt, The Social Roots of Reason and Morality (Chicago: Open Court, forthcoming), ch. 1, section 7.Google Scholar

⁹ Hobbes, , Leviathan, p. 19.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Gibbard, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 56.Google Scholar

¹¹ Hobbes, , Leviathan, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

¹² Ibid., p. 24.

¹³ Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁵ Hobbes, Thomas, English Works, ed. SirMolesworth, Wm., vol. 5 (London: John Bohn, 1841), p. 194.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hobbes, , Leviathan, p. 79.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 111.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

²¹ Ibid., p. 77.

²² Ibid.

²³ Hobbes, , English Works, vol. 5, p. 193.Google Scholar

²⁴ Hobbes, , Leviathan, p. 111.Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid., p. 137.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁷ Hobbes, , English Works, vol. 5, p. 194.Google Scholar

²⁸ Hobbes, , Leviathan, p. 63.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid., p. 80.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 138.

³¹ Ibid., p. 80.

³² Ibid., p. 138.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 112.

³⁵ But even if the pitfalls in Hobbes's account may be avoided, one might still object (see note 7 above) that public reason is an unnecessary construction.

³⁶ If public reason is limited in scope, might there be other “collective reasons”-other authorized agents whose judgment and will would supplant the judgments and wills of their principals in some matters falling outside the scope of public reason? Or might there be a plurality of “public reasons,” each with its own scope? Perhaps we should think of a federal polity as embodying just such a plurality, or perhaps we should think of the medieval division between temporal and spiritual power as embodying such a plurality. These are important questions, but they fall outside the scope of this essay.

³⁷ Cf. Hobbes, , Leviathan, pp. 87, 111.Google Scholar

³⁸ Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 151.Google Scholar

³⁹ Hobbes, , English Works, vol. 5, p. 193.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ But what equity requires is not a matter I can consider here, so in the present context this is a mere assertion.

⁴¹ Hobbes, , Leviathan, p. 138.Google Scholar