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Privacy, Control, and Talk of Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

R. G. Frey
R. G. Frey
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Bowling Green State University
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Extract

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , Summer 2000 , pp. 45 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2000

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References

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