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Philanthropy and Selfishness*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

John O'Connor
Affiliation:
Philosophy, National Humanities Center

Extract

The question I want to discuss is “How can I say ‘No’ to a fund-raising appeal?” Since many people apparently find it easy to say “No,” it is not clear what the problem is. Put briefly, the problem is this: I do not want to think of myself as uncaring, unfeeling, and insensitive to the needs of others. And yet, within the last year I have not responded to appeals for funds from a wide variety of causes: medical research, famine relief, freedom of speech, environmental protection. I have turned down requests for support of scholarly magazines, research institutes, and other good causes. My only moderate-sized contribution during that time has been to the capital campaign of an organization of which I am a member. I have enough to have made (very) small contributions to all of the organizations from which I received appeals, but not enough so that my contributions to any single cause would be of major significance. How can I justify not giving?

The problem arises because these appeals (some of them, at least) apparently put moral claims upon me: they say that people are suffering and have needs, and you can help to meet them. Or they say that the intellectual and cultural life of our society will be enriched if you help.

One traditional philosophic view holds that moral claims have a special status. They override political, economic, social, and other claims. The only thing, according to this view, that can free one from a moral claim is another moral claim.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1987

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References

1 Payton, Robert, “Philanthropic Values,” paper delivered to a colloquium of the Woodrow Wilson Center, 1982.Google Scholar

2 Williams, Bernarddiscusses some of the issues related to this sort of claim in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

3 Silk, Leonard, “Economic Scene,” The New York Times, July 31, 1985.Google Scholar

4 Lewis, Flora, “The Choice of Causes,” The New York Times, May 29, 1986.Google Scholar